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ABSTRACT 
 
Autonomy as lived: An empirical-ethical analysis of patient autonomy in the 
clinical context of individuals engaged with self-testing technology 
Anna-Marie Greaney 
 
Aim/Background: This study examines the meaning of patient autonomy in healthcare 
in the clinical context of individuals engaged with self-testing technology. Patient 
autonomy has gained increased prominence in healthcare ethics, policy and practice in 
recent decades. This poses challenges when autonomy competes with other moral 
principles. The proliferation of self-testing technology provides a contextualised 
example of this ideological shift. The philosophical assumption underpinning these 
technologies is that they facilitate greater autonomy through self-management. This 
study explores that assumption and the wider reverence to autonomy in healthcare.   
Methodology: Heideggerian phenomenology provides an overarching philosophy for 
the research. The study adopts an empirical ethics research design, which integrates 
philosophical analysis and empirical enquiry in a cyclical fashion. Ethical analysis 
precedes and follows empirical investigation. Interpretive phenomenology is utilised 
to elicit the lived experience of autonomy among 12 individuals with diabetes engaged 
in the self-testing process. The perspectives of prominent stakeholders such as 
healthcare professionals and scientific community members are also sought. Data is 
analysed collectively in accordance with a hermeneutic approach. 
Findings/Recommendations: The study illuminates the ethical principle of autonomy 
in a practical context. Findings reveal an understanding of Autonomy as lived: The 
interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing whereby the patient experience 
of autonomy is underpinned by three inter-reliant relationships - Relationship with 
device, Relationship with illness and Relationship with healthcare provider. Findings 
suggest that autonomy is a contextualised, relational process, which exists as a 
continuum and occurs within constraints. The concept of ‘negotiated autonomy’ is 
suggested as a means to operationalise Autonomy as lived within the patient/healthcare 
professional relationship. Findings have implications for bioethicists, policy-makers, 
healthcare professionals and patients when conceptualising and operationalising 
autonomy. The study also highlights the benefit of dialogue among the scientific 
community regarding the social and ethical dimensions of emerging technologies.  
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GLOSSARY OF CORE CLINICAL/TECHNOLOGICAL TERMS 
 
Diabetes Mellitus: A chronic disease of the endocrine system characterised by deficient 
insulin production (type 1 diabetes) or ineffective use of available 
insulin (type 2 diabetes). This results in an inability to control blood 
glucose levels. Prolonged raised blood glucose levels can cause long-
term complications such as damage to blood vessels, the heart, 
kidneys and eyes.  
Glycaemic control:  The extent to which target blood glucose levels are achieved 
HbA1c:  Glycosylated Haemoglobin.  
Blood glucose levels can also be monitored by means of HbA1c or 
glycosylated haemoglobin. This measurement is taken at a clinic visit 
and gives a record of blood glucose levels over a period of time. 
Current NICE quality standards for diabetes in adults (2011) suggest 
that a target HbA1c value of between 48 mmol/mol and 58 
mmol/mol. This corresponds to between 6.5% and 7.5% in previous 
value terms. Participants in this study frequently refer to the 
percentage value.  
 
Hyperglycaemia: Raised blood glucose levels 
Hypoglycaemia: Reduced blood glucose levels 
Insulin: A hormone produced naturally in the body to regulate blood 
glucose levels. Can be given in synthetic form as a pharmacological 
agent to treat diabetes. 
Oral hypoglycaemics: Oral medication given to individuals with type 2 diabetes (still 
producing insulin) to reduce blood glucose levels  
Point of care testing:    A method of carrying out a complete diagnostic test near to the 
patient as opposed to within the traditional environment of a 
clinical laboratory.2  
Self-testing device:  Any device intended by the manufacturer to be able to be used by 
laypersons in a home environment (Irish Medicines Board 2004, 
p.6). 
  
                                                          
2 The term is used differently within the literature. Some texts refer to point of care devices in a 
clinically supervised context only, while others include self-tests for home use as point of care devices. 
For clarity purposes, this study distinguishes between point of care devices intended for use under 
clinical supervision, and those that are utilised as self-tests for personal use outside of the clinical 
environment.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABA  An Bord Altranais (The Irish Nursing Board) 
ADA  American Diabetes Association 
BDI Biomedical Diagnostics Institute 
DAFNE Dose adjusting for normal eating (A structured education programme for 
individuals with type 1 diabetes) 
DoH  Department of Health (Ireland) (Unless otherwise stated) 
DoHC  Department of Health and Children Ireland (Former title of DoH) 
EAGD  Expert Advisory Group for Diabetes (Ireland) 
HIQA  Health Information and Quality Authority  
HSE  Health Service Executive 
HTA  Health Technology Assessment 
IDF  International Diabetes Federation  
IMB  Irish Medicines Board  
IMDA  Irish Medical Devices Association 
NICE  National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (UK)  
NMBI  Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland (formerly ABA)  
RCT  Randomised Controlled Trial 
SMBG  Self-monitoring of Blood Glucose 
WHO  World Health Organisation  
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Thinking takes us beyond known ways, 
into the clearing,  
of un-formed understanding. 
 
It is of ourselves, in ourselves and beyond ourselves. 
Uniquely our own, common to us all. 
private, precious 
Only to be deemed worthy 
When the knowing is “said” 
 
The world of method/methodology 
can confine thinking to pre-made boxes 
with no escape 
 
In the open place 
trees show themselves 
light shines 
and in both seeing and not-seeing 
thinking comes 
up welling within.  
 
 
 
 
(Smythe 2005) 
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SECTION 1: PRE-UNDERSTANDINGS 
CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY 
 
Not only is Dasein woven together with the world – all parts of the world 
are fused into a colossal web of meaning in which everything refers to 
everything else. 
 
(Harman 2007, p.63) 
 
1.1 Introduction to the study: Why autonomy and self-testing? 
This study is about the lived experience of patient autonomy in healthcare. Autonomy 
has gained significant popularity as a core ethical principle in healthcare ethics over 
the last five decades. Current Irish healthcare policy encourages greater patient 
participation at all levels (Department of Health and Children (DoHC) 2008a, DoHC 
2008b, Department of Health (DoH) 2012a, Health Service Executive (HSE) 2013). 
Self-determination and autonomy are central features of codes of professional conduct 
for the nursing and medical professions (Irish Medical Council 2009, An Bord 
Altranais (ABA) 2000, Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland (NMBI) 2013).   
 
Recent technological developments have dovetailed with an increasing emphasis on 
patient autonomy in healthcare practice (Moreno 2007). One particular microcosm of 
this phenomenon is the medical devices industry, particularly with products that enable 
self-testing in a non-clinical environment. The premise which underpins the movement 
towards using self-testing devices, and is noted in associated marketing strategies, is 
that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and management 
of their health (Ryan et al. 2010). While patient autonomy is widely accepted in a 
westernised context as a paramount ethical principle (Kapp 2007, Gillon 2003), which 
would render self-testing a moral good, there is a growing counter argument in the 
literature. It is suggested that an over-zealous adherence to patient autonomy may 
allow individuals to be disadvantaged by their own choices, create unnecessary 
confusion and provide a means whereby healthcare professionals abdicate, either 
intentionally or otherwise, their own professional responsibilities (Gaylin and Jennings 
1996, Downie 1998, Seedhouse 1998, Scott et al. 2003a, Kukla 2005, Tauber 2005, 
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Whitney and McCullough 2007, Harnett and Greaney 2008, Mol 2008, Greaney et al. 
2012). I refer to the autonomy debate as the ‘autonomy conundrum’ to signify the 
‘problem’ that this creates both philosophically and practically. Essentially, the 
autonomy conundrum refers to the extent to which autonomy should triumph over 
other ethical principles. Despite the presence of the autonomy conundrum, healthcare 
policy and practice (albeit some divergence in the national consent policy (HSE 2013) 
continue to progress a care agenda, which principally assumes that an advanced model 
of patient autonomy is a ‘good’ thing. This study explores this assumption through an 
ethical and empirical analysis of autonomy in healthcare practice.  
 
While patient autonomy is a common theme in ethical discourse, there is a dearth of 
empirical work, which examines the lived experience of adopting more autonomous 
roles. This research seeks to address this gap. The study combines ethical analysis with 
empirical investigation to examine how patients experience autonomy in their daily 
lives, and the implications of this for healthcare professionals. The specific patient 
cohort encompasses individuals with diabetes who utilise technological devices to 
self-test their blood glucose levels. In order to illuminate the context in which the 
patient experience occurs, the views of healthcare professionals and those who develop 
potential self-testing technologies are also sought within the empirical component of 
the study. McMillan and Hope’s (2008) model of empirical ethics, which integrates 
ethical analysis and empirical enquiry in a cyclical fashion, is utilised to underpin the 
study design. Interpretive, or hermeneutic, phenomenology informs the research 
approach (Heidegger 1927/1962, Smythe et al. 2008). Heideggerian phenomenology, 
while a philosophical method, is also an empirical methodology (Adams 2010) and 
therefore provides a suitable theoretical basis for both philosophical and empirical 
work. A phenomenologically orientated hermeneutic approach is utilised to facilitate 
collaboration between the empirical investigation and ethical analysis (Rehmann-
Sutter et al. 2012).  
 
On a stylistic level, the research is presented within this thesis in a linear fashion to 
provide clarity for the reader and conform to academic convention. However, it is 
important to note that in reality, as is the nature of interpretive phenomenology, the 
process was a much more iterative one involving constant movement between reading, 
writing, reflection, data collection and moments of uncertainty (Smythe et al. 2008). 
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A reflective journal, maintained throughout the research process, but more diligently 
during the analysis stage, acts as testament to the iterative processes I engaged in and 
the challenges involved. A selection of journal entries is included as Appendix A: 
Analysis journal extracts.  
 
The terms ‘patient’ or ‘individual with diabetes’ are used throughout as opposed to the 
often more recently cited term, ‘service-user’. I believe that the term patient is 
appropriate as its traditional inference denotes an individual in need of care, and avoids 
a more pronounced link with the market place that ‘service-user’ suggests. I use the 
terms ‘philosophical analysis’ and ‘ethical analysis’ interchangeably. I acknowledge 
that philosophical deliberation extends beyond ethical analysis; nonetheless, ethical 
analysis always incorporates moral philosophy. The literature pertaining to empirical 
bioethics refers predominantly to ‘medical ethics’. I interpret, and utilise, this term in 
a looser context to incorporate all players in the healthcare environment who 
experience ethical problems in their daily activities.  
 
1.2 Study aim  
To examine and contextualise the meaning of patient autonomy in healthcare practice 
through an empirical and ethical analysis of autonomy among individuals engaged 
with self-testing technology  
 
1.3 The research context: The hermeneutic circle of understanding 
This study is concerned with the lived experience of autonomy among individuals 
engaged with self-testing technology. This engagement occurs within a wider context. 
The appreciation of the context, or situatedness, in which experience occurs is 
fundamental to an interpretive phenomenological approach, and the underlying 
Heideggerian philosophy (1927/1962). In accordance with Heideggerian 
phenomenology, all human experience is interpreted within a hermeneutic circle of 
understanding (Cohen et al. 2000). The hermeneutic circle is infused with the 
situational, cultural and historical context in which experiences occur and the 
presuppositions, or fore-structures, which the researcher brings to the interpretive 
process. This section sets out the context in which the participants in this study, 
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diagnosed with diabetes, relate their experiences of autonomy within the self-testing 
process. The hermeneutic circle, or “colossal web of meaning” (Harman 2007, p.63), 
in which the patient experience of autonomy is interpreted in this study is infused with 
a variety of factors. These factors incorporate the various settings in which the research 
takes place. The various factors within the hermeneutic circle are presented in Figure 
1 and summarised below.  
 
Figure 1: The hermeneutic circle in which the patient experience of autonomy 
occurs 
 
 
 
1.3.1 Economic challenges in healthcare  
Data collection occurs at a time of immense fiscal pressure in the Irish economy 
(September 2011-December 2012). The patient experience of autonomy in self-testing, 
and other stakeholder perspectives, are recounted at a time when Ireland had lost its 
economic sovereignty through commitment to a European Union/International 
Monetary Fund programme of deficit reduction. Ireland exited the programme in 
December 2013, but the most recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) report Health at a Glance (2013) outlines the impact on health 
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spending of austerity measures. Health spending in Ireland decreased by 6.6% per 
capita between 2009 and 2011. This decrease was in stark contrast to the growth rates 
of 7% from 2000 to 2009. Less healthcare spending potentially influences patients’ 
experiences of the healthcare system in terms of available personnel and services.   
 
1.3.2 Healthcare reform and chronic illness policy initiatives  
Prior to the emergence of the economic recession, Ireland had commenced a health 
reform programme designed to re-orientate health services towards a primary care 
model, which would involve reconfiguration of acute hospitals; integrated care 
strategies; the development of primary care teams and centres; and a structured 
response to chronic illness prevention and management (HSE 2008a). O’Connor 
(2013, p.40) notes, however, that the development of primary care has been “slow and 
tortuous” thus limiting the overall progress of healthcare reform. While over 500 
primary care teams have been formed, O’Connor refers to a lack of evidence to suggest 
that these teams are entrenched in the everyday lives of patients in a meaningful way. 
It is difficult to speculate as to how reforms might have progressed in the absence of 
fiscal difficulties; however, it is reasonable to suppose that the reduction in health 
spending has curtailed progress. The development of an integrated model of care 
remains a core focus of reform in the Irish health service, particularly in the context of 
chronic illness (DoH 2012a). Healthcare professionals interviewed in this study were 
primarily working within tertiary hospitals, but did have some primary care 
responsibilities within out-reach clinics.  
 
Chronic, or non-communicable, diseases represent a significant portion of the global 
health burden. Diabetes is often perceived to epitomise the challenge of chronic illness. 
Over 377 million people worldwide are diagnosed with diabetes. It has been estimated 
that diabetes related deaths will increase by two thirds during the period 2008 to 2030 
(World Health Organisation (WHO) 2012). The WHO call for an integrated approach 
in the prevention and management of chronic diseases (WHO 2009), is mirrored in the 
recommendations of the Expert Advisory Group for Diabetes in Ireland (EAGD) (HSE 
2008b).  
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1.3.3 A patient autonomy and self-management agenda 
The debate regarding the primacy of autonomy as an ethical principle in the bioethics 
literature often translates in a clinical practice context to concerns regarding the 
efficacy and morality of self-management programmes (Redman 2005, Newbould et. 
al 2006). A growing patient autonomy agenda is evident in an Irish context as outlined 
in the opening section of this chapter. This mirrors international trends whereby patient 
autonomy has gained increased prominence in healthcare ethics, policy and practice 
over the last number of decades. Redman (2005) examines the ethics of preparation 
for self-management programmes with a particular focus on the moral requirement to 
provide sufficient patient support. Redman (2005, p.262) highlights “a strong 
programme of self-management” as a component of patient autonomy. Self-
management training is recognised as a core dimension of integrated care in diabetes, 
of which self-monitoring of blood glucose levels forms an important component 
(EAGD 2008).  
 
1.3.4 Technology, innovation and healthcare 
The growing emphasis on technology in healthcare is also a significant factor that 
infuses the socio-cultural environment in which the patient experience of autonomy in 
self-testing occurs. Self-testing devices provide a specific example of an advancing 
technological approach to healthcare delivery. Technology in this study is defined as 
the practical application of scientific discoveries. This accords with contemporary 
dictionary definitions but also offers a coherent basis for more philosophical 
discussion (Oxford Dictionary 2010). Ihde (2006) maintains that we cannot properly 
understand our current situation in the world without an understanding of 
technological issues. The most recent strategic framework for the reform of the health 
service in Ireland (DoH 2012a) emphasises technology as a core component of the 
reform agenda. Members of the scientific community involved in technological 
innovation in diagnostics, were among the participants in this study.  
 
The Biomedical Diagnostics Institute (BDI) at Dublin City University, from where this 
cohort of participants was recruited, is Science Foundation Ireland funded CSET 
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(Centre for Science, Education and Technology).3 The Institute, founded in 2005, 
represents a clinical, academic and business partnership engaged in the development 
of point-of-care biomedical diagnostic devices. It’s “vision is to transform healthcare 
by pioneering advances in the science and technology of diagnostics and by translating 
these advances into clinical use” (BDI 2013). The Institute’s initial scientific expertise 
in core competencies has now been developed to include innovative clinical diagnostic 
platforms in oncology, infectious diseases and cardiovascular disease. The Institute 
has an active research community of post-graduate researchers. In addition to 
developing excellence in research, the Institute seeks to impart societal and economic 
benefits, stimulate interest in science among students at all levels and enhance the 
public’s understanding of science. This PhD project began as a collaborative enterprise 
between the Education and Outreach Unit at BDI and the School of Nursing and 
Human Sciences at Dublin City University. The resulting Diagnostics and Society 
group “aims to integrate ethical and social scientific research methodologies with BDI 
research programmes”. The current study seeks to address this dimension of BDI 
activity.  
 
Researchers within BDI are operating at the proof of concept and early validation 
phase of technological development in diagnostic devices. This information is 
significant to explain the context in which the scientific community expressed their 
views. The participants interviewed develop diagnostic devices that are currently 
intended for use in a near-patient, point-of-care setting, as opposed to unsupervised 
self-testing. In this sense, the clinician is the end-user around which the device is 
devised. The individual views of the BDI participants are however relevant in the 
context of self-testing devices. While the scientists interviewed do not have specific 
expertise in ‘self-testing’, their expertise in diagnostics has the potential to shape 
innovation in this area. The purpose of the focus group with BDI participants was to 
elicit participants’ views regarding self-testing and patient autonomy in light of the 
patient data. This enabled some insight into the vision for self-testing 
technology/patient autonomy espoused by individuals who are in a position to advance 
diagnostic technologies. The study was never at any point an exploratory study of BDI, 
                                                          
3 For a link to the Institutes website and additional detail regarding its objectives, collaborators, 
activities, outputs and governance structures see www.bdi.ie.  
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its personnel or its activities. In this light, it is important to note that any views 
expressed by the interviewees in this study are their personal views, and do not reflect 
those of the BDI Partner Institutions, Industry Collaborators or the finding body, 
Science Foundation Ireland.  
 
1.3.5 The patient’s world 
The patient’s unique experience of illness and her wider individual life course also 
represents a major influence on the experience of autonomy in self-testing, and is a 
core dimension of the hermeneutic circle. The relevance of the situated personal story 
is central to the phenomenological approach adopted within this study (Heidegger 
1927/1962, Johnson 2000, Smythe et al. 2008). It is acknowledged that an individual’s 
broader life context will influence her perception of illness and coping style 
(Karademas et al. 2009). The participants in this study are collectively presented as 
individuals with diabetes, yet individually they experience this diagnosis in a myriad 
of ways dependent on their own life stories.  
 
1.3.6 Researcher’s positionality 
The researcher’s perspective, or positionality, with regard to the research problem, is 
central to understanding in an interpretive study. Drawing on the phenomenological 
perspectives of Heidegger (1927/1962) and Gadamer (1960/2003), Ironside (2005) 
suggests that the phenomenological researcher is already engaged with the research 
problem. For Heidegger, there is a certain ‘giveness’ in the world as it presents itself 
to us whereby some things are more salient than others (Heidegger 1927/1962). Put 
more simply, some aspects of the world are already illuminated for us as individuals. 
While we may appear to select a phenomenon for empirical investigation, in reality it 
calls to us.  
 
I have been concerned with expressions of autonomy in a healthcare context from a 
multi-stakeholder perspective over the last decade (Greaney 2002, Harnett and 
Greaney 2008, Greaney et al. 2012). A number of experiences in my professional life, 
as a nurse, nurse educator and bioethics student have invoked and sustained my interest 
in this field. On a more personal level, experiences of ill health among family members 
have prompted reflection related to the reality, complexity and occasional burden of 
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patient choice. The challenges involved in balancing respect for autonomy with a 
responsibility to care ‘in the best way’ are also pertinent in our everyday interactions 
with those we love. The opportunity to engage in PhD studies related to the ethics of 
self-testing devices provided an ideal context in which to explore these issues at a more 
advanced level of scholarship. The autonomy conundrum represents an ongoing 
dimension of my thinking as an individual, family member, nurse, nurse educator, 
ethicist and bioethics researcher.  
 
The role of the researcher, particularly at the point of interpretation, is a central concept 
in Heideggerian hermeneutic research (Koch 1994, Laverty 2003, Smythe 2005). In 
contrast to Husserlian descriptive phenomenology, the researcher does not seek to 
‘bracket’ or set aside her own presuppositions (Laverty 2003). The researcher’s 
perspective is central to the interpretive process. Therefore, proponents of this 
methodology recommend that the researcher outline some detail of her personal 
perspective at the outset and maintain a degree of reflexivity as she progresses through 
the research process (Crist and Tanner 2003, Smythe 2005, Adams 2010).  
 
Koch and Harrington (1998) present reflexivity as a means to support the 
establishment of rigour in qualitative research. In a reflexive approach, the researcher 
is engaged in ongoing self-critique and self-appraisal to bring transparency to ‘what is 
going on’ within the research process. Ongoing reflexivity assists the researcher to 
move beyond her own frame of reference to understand more fully the perspective of 
the other. The reflective journal maintained during the course of this study assisted this 
reflexivity. In the early stages of the research, I wrote a detailed reflective account 
exploring personal pre-suppositions regarding patient autonomy and self-testing. This 
account was available for review throughout the course of the study to ensure that my 
own position did not engulf the participants’ voices.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure  
The study is presented in three sections. Each section consists of a series of chapters, 
which collectively describe the research process in a liner fashion. SECTION 1 
contains two chapters, the first of which outlines the pre-understandings that existed 
prior to data collection and the initial process of ethical analysis. The use of the term 
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pre-understandings is deliberate, as it reflects the researcher’s already engaged 
relationship with the research problem that is central to Heideggerian phenomenology. 
Chapter 1 introduces the study, explains the rationale for the research, outlines the 
aim of the study and sets the research context. The research context includes the 
personal perspective and pre-suppositions, which the researcher brings to the research 
study. Chapter 2 presents the literature review. The literature review traces the 
autonomy conundrum from the wider bioethics debate to the self-testing context, and 
concludes with the more specific phenomenon of self-testing among the diabetic 
population. In addition to the ‘traditional’ empirical literature review, the chapter also 
incorporates the initial ethical analysis within the study, which explores the nature of 
patient autonomy and choice in healthcare, in the specific context of self-testing 
devices. This analysis was subsequently developed and published. The published 
paper is presented as Appendix B. Section 1 concludes with a justification for the 
research study and a brief overview of the methodological processes chosen.  
 
SECTION 2 presents the research strategy in a series of two chapters. Chapter 3 
outlines the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the study. These include; 
the field of empirical bioethics, the philosophy of technology discourse, Health 
Technology Assessment, hermeneutics and Heideggerian phenomenology. This 
section also justifies the suitability of Heideggerian phenomenology to address the 
research problem. Chapter 4 outlines how these more abstract concepts have been 
incorporated within the research methodology. The chapter describes the participant 
profile, the specific research settings, data collection tools, the process of analysis and 
the ethical procedures and systems of rigour employed.   
 
SECTION 3 outlines the new empirical and philosophical understandings, which the 
research study brings to the meaning of autonomy in a specific healthcare context. This 
section is comprised of 3 chapters. Chapter 5 presents the empirical study findings – 
an understanding of Autonomy as lived. The chapter outlines The interdependent 
phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing, as the meaning of autonomy in the specific 
healthcare context of engagement with self-testing devices. Autonomy is presented as 
contextual, related to one’s existential existence and reliant on a number of 
interdependent relationships. The chapter presents three central thematic 
understandings: Relationship with device; Relationship with illness; and Relationship 
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with healthcare provider. Each theme is discussed individually in accordance with a 
number of sub-themes, which collectively present the overall phenomenon of 
Autonomy as lived. Chapter 6 discusses the contribution of the research study in both 
normative and pragmatic terms, in light of the existing literature. The initial ethical 
analysis of autonomy outlined in chapter 2 is revisited. A means of operationalising 
Autonomy as lived in practice is explored. Pragmatic considerations regarding, the use 
of technology in healthcare, the merits of self-management programmes and self-
monitoring in diabetes are explored. Chapter 7 concludes the study, discusses some 
limitations and outlines a number of recommendations for bioethics, healthcare policy 
and clinical practice based on the discussion within the previous chapter. The chapter 
closes with a summary and presents a possible future research agenda, which will 
enable further illumination of the understandings presented in this study. This 
summary, in one sense the end of the study, yet also a possible new beginning, is 
congruent with the ‘open’ nature of interpretive phenomenology and the cyclical 
model of empirical bioethics employed in the study.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: PATIENT 
AUTONOMY AND SELF-TESTING DEVICES 
 
There is no one place for the literature to be cited within a research 
report. It rather comes-along as a dialogical partner, supporting, 
building, challenging, showing. 
 
(Smythe and Spence 2012, p.21). 
 
2.1 Introduction: The literature review in interpretive phenomenology 
This chapter presents the literature review, which informs the study design and 
concludes with a more detailed justification for the proposed research. It also 
delineates how the literature review in hermeneutic research differs from quantitative 
and other qualitative approaches. In interpretive phenomenology, the relationship with 
the literature is ongoing and reflective as the quotation above suggests.  
 
Trafford and Lesham (2008) define the literature as a corpus of knowledge, which the 
researcher utilises to progress all stages of the research process. This is particularly 
true in hermeneutic phenomenology where the literature plays a very significant role 
in the interpretive and discussion phases of the research study (Smythe and Spence 
2012). Smythe and Spence outline the uniqueness of the literature in hermeneutic 
research and challenge the prevailing view in academia that there is only one approach 
to literature searching. The authors contend that the hermeneutic researcher is on a 
constant journey with the literature, involving a “reading, searching, intuiting, 
thinking, talking, writing, letting-come process by which they discern what matters” 
(p.14). The literature is essential to the development of thinking at the interpretive and 
discussion phases. As ideas evolve, new sources of literature are sought. In this way 
the boundaries of the corpus are constantly extended.   
 
This review presents an initial synthesis of the literature pertaining to the relationship 
between patient autonomy and self-testing devices. The review begins with the 
literature regarding patient autonomy, and presents the historical basis and dimensions 
of the debate concerning the primacy of patient autonomy in healthcare practice. As 
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the review proceeds it becomes more focused, whereby the autonomy issue is linked 
specifically to the self-testing milieu and finally to self-monitoring among the diabetic 
population. Other literature sourced is integrated within the chapters which follow, 
thus explicating how the literature acts as a “dialogical partner” in the research process, 
as Smythe and Spence (2012, p.21) suggest.4  
 
2.2 Patient autonomy in contemporary healthcare practice: The 
‘autonomy conundrum’ 
The word autonomy is derived from the Greek, whereby ‘autos’ refers to the self and 
‘nomos’ to laws. In this original sense autonomy referred to a political system shared 
by a group of citizens. A city in ancient Greece had ‘autonomia’ when its people were 
in a position to make their own laws (Dworkin 1988). O’Neill (2002) explains that the 
concept of ‘individual’ autonomy is generally attributed to Kantian autonomy whereby 
individuals, as opposed to societies, become the locus of autonomy. While autonomy 
is often interpreted inconsistently in healthcare (Keenan 1999, Aveyard 2000, 
Slowther 2007), there is an understanding in the more general lexicon that ‘autonomy’ 
is concerned with ‘self-governance’, ‘self-rule’ and ‘independence’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2010). In short, the general interpretation is that as an autonomous 
individual, ‘I decide what happens to me’.  
 
Ashley (2012) draws on the philosophical literature to present a succinct overview of 
personal autonomy and delineates four distinct models: proceduralist, substantivist, 
internalist and externalist. The four models are presented on an axis whereby 
internalist and externalist accounts cross-cut the other two. An image of this axis is 
attached as Appendix D: Personal autonomy - a conceptual axis. Essentially, 
proceduralist accounts of autonomy relate to the ‘process’ of decision making. This is 
the understanding of autonomy generally used in determining capacity in law 
(Government of Ireland 2001). Proceduralist autonomy is normatively neutral and not 
dependent on the ‘content’ of decisions. This understanding of autonomy coincides 
with a liberal philosophy of non-interference with the choices of others. Substantivist 
accounts of autonomy take issue with the neutrality of proceduralist accounts, and 
                                                          
4 A more detailed account of the literature review process is presented as Appendix C.  
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propose that the ‘type’ of choices made are significant in determining autonomy. In 
this sense, adherence to a certain set of criteria in the decision-making process is not 
necessarily described as an autonomous decision. Internalist and externalist accounts 
relate to the extent to which autonomy is understood as dependent on an individual’s 
internal reflective and evaluative capacities alone or also reliant on external enabling 
conditions. Ashley (2012, p.22) also refers to relational autonomy which exists as 
“add-on, as opposed to alternative, to the procedural and substantive models”. 
Relational autonomy is described as “an ‘umbrella term’, insofar as it comprises a 
range of accounts that adopt different views concerning the conception of the ‘self’ in 
question and the role social relations play in the development and exercise of 
autonomy” (Ashley 2012, p.19).5  
 
Autonomy, as an ethical principle, has gained particular prominence in healthcare 
since the introduction of the four-principle approach to medical ethics by Beauchamp 
and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1979). The publication is now in its 
seventh edition (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). The principle-based approach 
represents a mid-range theory of ethical decision-making. The four principles are 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. While there is a continuing 
debate about the merit of this approach (Holm 1995, Düwell 2006, Huxtable 2013), 
the principles have endured as a core foundation of bioethics, particularly in an 
American context. Acknowledging the ambiguity associated with autonomy 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p.101) offer the following, widely quoted definition: 
 
At a minimum, personal autonomy encompasses self-rule that is free from 
both controlling interference by others and limitations that prevent 
meaningful choice, such as adequate understanding.  
 
Patient participation in healthcare has increased significantly over the last forty years. 
Complex social developments have replaced a tradition of medical dominance with a 
                                                          
5 Ashley is a researcher affiliated with the Essex Autonomy Project, a research unit and knowledge-
exchange forum based in the Department of Philosophy and Art History at Essex University. The 
initiative is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the UK. Its central activities 
include clarifying the philosophical nature of autonomy, and assisting healthcare professionals to 
navigate the legislative framework of autonomy in a practical context. The various activities/outputs 
of the project have provided a significant source of information and reflection throughout the PhD 
process. Further detail on the project will be presented as the review proceeds.  
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culture of patient autonomy (Rothman 2001).6 Willis (2006) presents an historical 
treatise of the decline of medical dominance and lists neo-liberalism, economic 
rationalism, a growth in consumerism and associated litigation, and the 
industrialisation of medicine as reasons for this change. Modern American bioethics7 
has also contributed significantly to this change where the principle of autonomy has 
gained increased prominence as the leading ethical principle underpinning healthcare 
delivery (Moreno 2007). Moreno refers to “an autonomy-driven bioethics” (p.417) in 
the US fuelled by several social events including the blatant disregard for the rights of 
participants in the Tuskegee Syphilis experiment, the emergence of the Belmont 
Report detailing ethical principles for research, and the influential Roe v Wade 
decision in 1972 with respect to women’s reproductive rights and the legalisation of 
abortion. Paternalistic models of care have now been replaced by greater patient 
participation across the caring spectrum (Eldh et al. 2006).   
 
Contemporary professional codes of conduct, healthcare ethics texts and policy 
documents provide some empirical evidence of this shift towards greater patient 
autonomy. Gillon’s (2003) proposal that autonomy should be upheld as the first 
principle has gained momentum in healthcare ethics. The code of conduct for the 
nursing and midwifery profession in Ireland is currently under review. The most recent 
draft edition of the code (Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland (NMBI) 2013) 
places significant emphasis on patient autonomy, self-determination and freedom to 
choose, albeit in the context of appropriate capacity. The Irish Medical Council’s 
(2009) most recent direction to its members, while acknowledging some exceptions, 
asserts the patient’s right to control what happens to her in accordance with her 
autonomy. One particular medical ethics textbook outlines autonomy as the “primary 
consideration in patient centred treatment” (Schwartz et al. 2002 p.8).  
 
                                                          
6 There is some scepticism regarding the extent to which this new ‘ethos’ is reflected in each patient 
interaction. However, the overall policy context and the general healthcare rhetoric have embraced 
this change.  
7 The term bioethics is described by O’Neill (2002, p.1) as a “meeting ground”, as opposed to a 
discipline, for those who debate “the ethical, legal, and social questions raised by advances in 
medicine, science and biotechnology”. A historical account of the emergence of bioethics is found in 
Reich, W.T. 1994. The word bioethics; its birth and legacies of those who shaped it. Journal of 
Medical Ethics 4, pp. 319-335. 
26 
 
Current healthcare policy in Ireland, similar to other states, reflects this paradigm shift 
and denotes a move towards the more autonomous patient. A recent national policy 
for consent in the health services in Ireland outlines the importance of patient 
autonomy in treatment decisions (HSE 2013). Self-management is acknowledged as a 
significant factor contributing to increased patient autonomy (Redman 2005).8 A 
number of recent policy documents refer to greater patient participation in care and 
care decisions e.g. National Strategy for Service User Involvement in the Irish Health 
Service (DoHC 2008a), Tackling chronic disease: A policy framework for the 
management of chronic diseases (DoHC 2008b), The Health Service Transformation 
Programme (HSE 2008a) and Future Health (DoH 2012a). These policy initiatives 
reflect international trends in many respects, led by the World Health Organisation, 
which recommends a greater emphasis on self-management as part of a multi-sectoral 
approach towards the prevention and management of non-communicable diseases 
(WHO 2008). 
 
2.2.1 The autonomy conundrum: philosophical perspectives  
The suitability of the primacy of autonomy as an ethical principle has been afforded 
great attention in the bioethics literature. On the one hand, there is support for the 
supremacy of autonomy (Gillon 2003), while an opposing school of thought suggests 
that other principles such as beneficence and justice are unsuitably underdeveloped 
(Holm 1995). An over-zealous adherence to patient autonomy may allow individuals 
to be disadvantaged by their own choices, misrepresent the reality of healthcare ethics, 
create unnecessary confusion and provide a means whereby healthcare professionals 
abdicate, either intentionally or otherwise, their own professional and caring 
responsibilities (Holm 1997, O’Neill 1997, Downie 1998, Seedhouse 1998, O’Neill 
2002, Scott et al. 2003a, Kapp 2007, Whitney and McCullough 2007, Harnett and 
Greaney 2008, Mol 2008, Agledahl et al. 2011, Greaney et el. 2012). I refer to this 
disquiet regarding the value of greater patient autonomy in healthcare as the ‘autonomy 
conundrum’. Both the philosophical and empirical literature supports the degree of 
contemporary interest in this conundrum.  
 
                                                          
8 The relationship between self-management an autonomy is further explored as the literature 
review, and subsequent research project, evolves.  
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O’Neill (1997) recommends caution in moving towards a culture of greater patient 
autonomy, asserting that it fails to acknowledge the special caring relationship that 
exists in healthcare. The tensions that exist between patient autonomy and professional 
responsibility are also recognised by others (Gaylin and Jennings 1996, Downie 1998, 
Kukla 2005, Tauber 2005, Mol 2008). Kapp (2007, p.99) discusses patient autonomy 
in the particular context of informed consent and presents what he refers to as “realists’ 
critiques” of the concept (p.99). Such critiques include barriers to shared decision-
making in the practical sense due to the patient’s inability to comprehend complex 
clinical information. It is also noted that patients may not want to be involved in their 
own care despite a growing trend in social policy, healthcare ethics and clinical 
guidelines, which suggest that they should.  
 
Gillon’s (2003) specific adherence to autonomy as a paramount principle in healthcare 
practice, which can encompass the other bioethical principles, has been rejected by 
Callahan (2003) in favour of communitarianism and by Dawson and Garrard (2006) 
on the basis that it rejects the prima facia nature of the principles. In accordance with 
this ‘prima facie’ approach, Ross (1930) explains that one principle might triumph 
over others in specific situations. Using the healthcare context as an example, the 
principle of beneficence may triumph over autonomy when patient welfare is at stake.  
 
Seedhouse (1998) makes a distinction between creating and respecting autonomy. He 
contends that one may promote autonomy without actual adherence to it. In this sense, 
denial of autonomy at certain points in a patient’s illness trajectory may actually 
maximise their potential to develop greater autonomy at a later point. Seedhouse refers 
to the mental health setting particularly and notes that recovery may be promoted by 
not granting patients all their choices. Scott et al. (2003a) raise similar themes and cite 
the work of Carson (1995) to lend weight to the ‘vacuous’ notion of autonomy which 
focuses on the negative right to non-interference, and may subsequently lead to 
abandonment of ill patients. The distinction between autonomy and freedom is a 
recurring theme in the philosophical literature and is central to this debate. The 
underlying premise in advancing the autonomy principle seems to be that autonomy is 
synonymous with freedom, or, that autonomy is dependent on freedom to choose 
(Kukla 2005). Philosophical analysis suggests that this is not necessarily the case.  
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Dworkin, in his seminal treatise on autonomy (1988) refers to freedom as liberty and 
suggests that the terms liberty and autonomy should always be distinguished. He 
proposes that “autonomy is a richer notion than liberty” and relates to “the idea of 
being a subject, of being more than a passive spectator of one’s desires and feelings” 
(Dworkin 1988 p.107). Dworkin contends that the perception “of autonomy that insists 
upon substantial independence is not one that has claim to our respect” (p.21). For 
Dworkin, the notion of freedom, or liberty is not an absolute pre-requisite for 
autonomy. To focus on the freedom issue is to subscribe to a negative autonomy, 
whereby autonomy is synonymous with self-governance and the absence of 
constraints. Conversely, positive theories of autonomy encompass a more relational 
model characterised by caring and interaction with healthcare professionals (Moser et 
al. 2007). The distinction between positive and negative perceptions of autonomy is 
generally attributed to the work of Berlin (1969).  In Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin 
(1969) distinguishes between positive liberty, which is concerned with self-mastery, 
and negative liberty associated with non-interference by others. The autonomy 
conundrum, for the most part, is associated with situations where autonomy is 
correlated with negative liberty, and a subsequent reliance on non-interference. 
 
Mol (2008) equates extended autonomy in healthcare with a model of enhanced patient 
choice and contends that more choice does not necessarily lead to better care, but may 
merely fuel the free-market and support commercial interests. Mol outlines the logic 
of care and the logic of choice as opposing structures, with conflicting value systems, 
and puts forward a number of interesting arguments in support of this claim. At the 
outset, she explains that care is a process of interaction and intervention, whereas 
within the ‘logic of choice’ care becomes a product. Mol (p.30) takes issue with this 
consumerism, which has “emancipated” patients into “citizens” and claims that this is 
not a model conducive to good healthcare. Mol believes that viewing patients as 
citizens simply does not work. In accordance with her analysis, patients can only be 
citizens with the “healthy” parts of their bodies. Citizenship signifies control, freedom 
and civilisation, meaning that our bodily functions and passions are kept under control. 
These are abilities not always associated with the ill patient. 
 
The logic of choice emancipates patients from a previous model of medical dominance 
but, in accordance with Mol’s thesis, something is lost in this process. Choice, 
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consumerism and citizenship may not result in better healthcare. Mol’s position 
reflects an increasing criticism of a consumer-based and autonomy-driven culture in 
healthcare (Moreno 2007, Callahan 2009, Agledahl et al. 2011). Agledahl et al. (2011) 
note that respect for autonomy has been interpreted in a healthcare context as meaning 
respect for one’s autonomous choices. The authors argue that adhering to patient 
choice misrepresents the reality of healthcare practice, and denotes an inappropriate 
application of the doctrine of informed consent from research ethics to the wider 
patient care context. The analysis goes on to explain that choices in healthcare occur 
over time and may be presented to patients in an arbitrary fashion, which takes account 
of professional expertise and the realistic constraints of the healthcare environment.  
 
There is evidence of a wider recognition of the significance of the autonomy 
conundrum in current healthcare practice and the need to address the issue. The Essex 
Autonomy Project within the Department of Philosophy and Art History at Essex 
University is a research unit and knowledge exchange forum, which engages with 
these issues. The aim of the project is to “clarify the ideal of self-determination in 
history, theory and practice, both for its own sake, and in order to provide guidance to 
those who must apply this notion” (Essex Autonomy Project 2013)9. The specific 
relevance of the autonomy conundrum for healthcare professionals is evident in this 
extract: 
 
Traces of our contemporary confusion over these matters can be found in 
recent legal cases. One influential decision invokes the “absolute right to 
refuse to consent to medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, 
or for no reason at all.” A second insists that “the patient’s right of choice 
exists whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, irrational, 
unknown or even non-existent.” The very grandeur of these 
pronouncements is due testimony to our deep commitment to the ideal of 
autonomous judgment, but it should be clear that they also produce a host 
of difficulties for the practitioner who sets out to implement them. (Essex 
Autonomy Project 2013) 
 
                                                          
9 A more detailed account of the activities of this research centre and a link to its comprehensive 
resources is available at  http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/  
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2.2.2 The autonomy conundrum: empirical perspectives   
While much of the literature is philosophical and discursive, a growing body of 
empirical work explores patient autonomy in patient/healthcare provider interaction. 
Empirical work has demonstrated that patients value autonomy in interaction with 
healthcare professionals. Oliveira et al. (2012) undertook a systematic review and 
meta-analysis of previous studies, which investigated the relationship between 
interaction styles of clinicians and patient satisfaction. The analysis concluded that 
styles which valued patient autonomy (including involving, supporting and facilitating 
patients) yielded greater patient satisfaction.  
 
Hill et al.’s (2013) study supports this conclusion. The study found a positive 
correlation between patients’ perceived autonomy support, and visit satisfaction, 
among 55 patients at a women’s clinic in Texas. The study also examined patients’ 
preferences for autonomy utilising the Autonomy Preference Index (API). The API is 
a validated six-item self-report tool used to investigate patient preferences in decision-
making during the consultation process (Ende et al. 1989). It is significant that 
patients’ preferences for autonomy within Hill et al.’s study were significantly lower, 
depending on whether they were asked about autonomy preferences in general, or, in 
relation to specific scenarios. The researchers surmise that this is not necessarily 
contradictory, but that patients may exercise their autonomy by deferring decision-
making to their doctors. Having the autonomy not to be more involved in decision-
making in some instances, may be positively evaluated as autonomy support and result 
in satisfaction with the consultation process. 
 
Additional empirical studies lend further support to the proposal that patients may not 
necessarily want to assume absolute autonomy in their interactions with healthcare 
professionals, but value a shared decision-making approach (Scott et al. 2003b, 
Levinson et al. 2005, Doherty and Doherty 2005, Hamann et al. 2007, Madsen et al. 
2007, Schildmann et al. 2013). A large-scale quantitative study using a survey design 
in Toronto investigated patients’ preferences for participation in decision-making at 
three levels: seeking information, discussing options and making the final decision 
(Levinson et al. 2005). The sample was stratified to ensure representation from the 
wider population. Results showed that while 96% of patients surveyed preferred to be 
31 
 
offered choices and asked their opinions, 52% displayed a preference for leaving the 
final decision to their doctors. The researchers also used regression analysis to explore 
the relationship between various demographic variables. Results indicated that 
healthier people, women and those with a higher level of education sought a more 
active role in decision-making. In contrast, older adults and ethnic minorities preferred 
to leave the ultimate decision-making to their physicians.  
 
These findings reflect those highlighted by Hamann et al. (2007) with a German, albeit 
smaller, sample. The researchers used the API scale to assess the desire to take an 
active role in the decision-making process among patients in six different clinical 
groups. In findings similar to the Toronto study, the respondents expressed a desire to 
be involved but not to assume complete control. Females, younger patients and the 
better educated accounted for a small, but statistically significant, preference for a 
more active role in decision-making. Qualitative studies also indicate similar results. 
In separate studies, Madsen et al. (2007) and Schildmann et al. (2013) explored the 
decision-making preferences of patients diagnosed with cancer. While Madsen et al. 
explored the patient experience of consenting to participate in a clinical trial, 
Schildmann et al.’s study explored decision-making in a more generic sense. Both 
studies concluded that autonomy and personal decision-making were not priorities for 
patients at all times in the care environment, and that physician trust was highly valued. 
Participants in Madsen et al.’s study noted the stresses and loneliness associated with 
the decision-making process.  
 
The importance of shared decision-making is similarly supported by Randers and 
Mattiasson (2004) in the context of the older adult. The authors investigated the 
relationship between autonomy and integrity in interactions between older adults and 
healthcare workers, using a participant observer methodology. In their analysis, which 
draws on Collopy’s thesis on autonomy, the authors refer to the loss of “decisional 
autonomy”, a loss that has to be supplied for the patient by others (Randers and 
Mattiason, p.66). A shared approach to decision-making is instigated in response to 
the patient’s vulnerability. The authors conclude that substitution of the patient’s 
autonomy may ultimately protect her integrity and recommend that nurses seek the 
model of autonomy, which will best meet the context in which the patient encounter 
occurs. This study is distinctive as it utilises more qualitative methodologies to explore 
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the autonomy conundrum in healthcare. In addition, the research includes healthcare 
professionals as participants when investigating the autonomy issue.  
 
As reflected in Randers and Mattiasson’s findings (2004), empirical work shows that 
healthcare professionals do not necessarily prioritise autonomy in all interactions with 
patients. The tensions that patient autonomy creates for healthcare professionals are 
also evident in empirical studies that may not seek to explore autonomy at the outset, 
but nonetheless, autonomy-related concerns emerge as interactions between patients 
and healthcare professionals are explored. Holm (1997) undertook a grounded theory 
study of the moral problems experienced by doctors and nurses in practice. He coined 
the term “protective responsibility” to encompass the sense of professional obligation 
expressed by participants as they recounted the manner in which they approached 
moral problems (1997, p.127). ‘Protective responsibility’ relates to the healthcare 
professional’s awareness of the vulnerability of the patient by virtue of their ill-health, 
and the significance of non-maleficence in the ethical decision-making process. The 
decision-making process did not involve an over-zealous adherence to patient 
autonomy, but rather an appreciation that professionals play an important role in 
decision-making in the context of client care.  
 
Chiovitti (2008) also utilised grounded theory to explore the meaning of caring among 
17 nurses engaged with patents in a psychiatric setting. The findings revealed similar 
concerns among healthcare professionals. Chiovitti concluded that caring was 
expressed through the psychological process of ‘protective empowering’ as a core 
category. Protective empowering involved six individual categories of care 
interventions. While nurses sought to empower patients to become more actively 
involved in their health, considerations of patient safety were also significant. 
 
2.2.3 The autonomy conundrum and freedom to choose in healthcare: Emerging ethical 
analysis 
The exposure to the philosophical and empirical literature to this point suggests the 
need for more considered ethical analysis of the nature of autonomy in healthcare. This 
stage of enquiry is integral to the model of empirical bioethics applied within the study 
design, whereby ethical analysis precedes empirical work (McMillan and Hope 2008). 
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It appears, based on the review thus far, that autonomy is misunderstood in healthcare, 
or at least interpreted in a very narrow context. The literature suggests that dominant 
interpretations of autonomy in healthcare are problematic, as they are based on an 
inappropriate reverence to an isolated, negative autonomy, and fail to realise the 
relational nature of human existence.10  
 
A number of understandings have been established through the exploration of the 
autonomy conundrum to this point. (1) Healthcare ethics and recent social policy 
documents uphold patient autonomy as a paramount ethical principle. (2) This model 
of autonomy goes beyond merely encouraging participation as autonomy is 
increasingly portrayed as an individualised freedom to choose. (3) This policy ‘shift’ 
and its practical consequences are problematic for healthcare professionals who 
endeavour to reconcile respect for patient autonomy with their professional 
responsibilities and a competing caring logic. (4) It is also reasonable to suggest at this 
point, based on empirical evidence, that patients do not always necessarily embrace 
this policy shift, and on occasion prefer healthcare professionals to take a greater role 
in the decision-making process. I propose therefore, that this model of patient 
autonomy does not provide a suitable benchmark for healthcare policy, or 
professionals, because (a) it represents a one-dimensional, sometimes misguided, 
perception of autonomy associated with the absence of constraints and (b) it denies 
important considerations of relationality, care and responsibility, which may better 
serve patients. I shall address both these points separately.  
 
(a) It appears that the model of autonomy, which pervades current healthcare policy, 
is based on a misguided understanding of Kantian philosophy whereby autonomy is 
equated with non-interference. There is a wider acknowledgement of the manner in 
which Kant’s metaphysic of morality is misinterpreted in healthcare (Baron 1995, 
O’Neill 2002, Paley 2002, Heubel and Biller-Andorno 2005). In Groundwork of the 
                                                          
10 This emerging analysis, explored within the supervision process, prompted a more in-depth 
philosophical review of autonomy in the earlier stages of the PhD process. The work, which ensued, 
resulted in a published paper on the nature of autonomy and choice in healthcare, within the specific 
context of self-testing devices. This paper is available for review as Appendix C: Published autonomy 
paper. A brief summary is offered here to lend greater comprehensiveness to the literature review 
process. This analysis was revisited as the empirical work proceeded. Ethical analysis and empirical 
work converge in the discussion chapter where the initial argument presented here is revisited and 
developed in light of empirical work.  
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Metaphysic of Morality Kant outlines an a priori metaphysic of morality (1998). Kant’s 
Autonomy of the Will is often inappropriately interpreted as an approach to morality 
where an individual acts solely on principles that are self-embodied and not influenced 
by external entities. However, in reality Kant does not subscribe to an isolated 
autonomy but rather an ‘autonomy of principles’ associated with duty towards others 
(O’Neill 2002). Critiques of an individualistic interpretation of Kantian autonomy also 
note that Kant’s Formula of Humanity and Law of Universality are more indicative of 
the need to engage with the ‘other’ than an isolated freedom of choice (Paley 2002, 
Heubel and Biller-Andorno 2005).  
 
(b) A relational understanding of autonomy proposes that our interactions with others 
are significant in expressions of autonomy (Meyers 1989, Christman 2004). This is 
particularly relevant in the context of the relationship between patient and healthcare 
provider, yet also the patient relationship with significant others. The concepts of care 
and responsibility, implicit within the healthcare professional’s role, suggest an 
incompatibility with negative accounts of autonomy and the need for greater 
interaction in the decision-making process (Downie 1998, Holm 1997, Olsen 2003, 
Hofmann and Lysdahl 2008, Mol 2008, Chiovitti 2008). At this point in the review, it 
appears that an alternative construction of autonomy may best serve healthcare 
practice and patients.  
 
If autonomy can exist in the presence of some constraining factors, then 
an anti-paternalistic healthcare philosophy, which seeks to advance 
autonomy by promoting individual freedom to choose, is fundamentally 
flawed. (Greaney et al. 2012, p.386).  
 
2.2.4 The autonomy conundrum in healthcare: concluding comments  
In conclusion, the dominance of patient autonomy in healthcare is questioned on the 
grounds that an advanced individualistic paradigm is not necessarily congruent with a 
number of core issues in healthcare: the relational nature of human existence; positive 
patient outcomes; patient preferences or meeting professional responsibilities. 
Philosophical and empirical literature has collectively informed this debate and 
suggests the need for an alternative construction of autonomy. 
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The empirical studies described above primarily adopt quantitative designs. Such 
methodologies, particularly where survey designs are employed, allow for larger 
sample sizes, more reliable statistical analysis and therefore more generalisable 
findings. However, there are some difficulties with this approach. The studies, for the 
most part, do not explore the actual reasons for patients’ preferences in the context of 
care delivery. In addition, while Scott et al. (2003b) investigated nurses’ perceptions 
of the extent to which patients were offered choices, in general, aside from Randers 
and Mattiasson’s (2004) research, the studies reviewed explored patient preferences 
for decision-making and participation in care in isolation from the social context in 
which those preferences occurred. Hill et al.’s study (2013) suggests that patient 
preferences for autonomy may vary, depending on the specific context in which 
decisions are made. Studies generally do not seek to investigate the impact of a more 
active role in decision-making on overall patient welfare, or seek to elicit the patient’s 
actual experience of adopting a more autonomous role. While the studies do not refer 
specifically to the practice of self-testing, they do help to illuminate the debate 
regarding the merits of increased patient participation in healthcare. Further research 
is required to explore patients’ perceptions of adopting a more autonomous role in 
decision-making and other aspects of their care.  
 
2.3 Self-testing technology as a microcosm of the autonomy conundrum in 
contemporary healthcare practice 
The self-testing context represents a specific microcosm of the wider autonomy 
conundrum in healthcare. The availability of self-testing technology potentially 
maximises the patient’s opportunity to assume a more autonomous role and become a 
more active participant in her care. Self-testing devices are marketed as a means to 
encourage patient participation in healthcare, and improve overall health outcomes 
through the early diagnosis of disease (Simplicity Health 2009). The association 
between self-testing and patient autonomy has international significance. A Dutch 
study by Ronda et al. (2009) note that self-testing devices ‘fit’ with the current 
emphasis on consumer autonomy and self-management within healthcare. Ryan et al. 
(2010) draw a comparable association in the UK, while Moreno (2007) identifies self-
testing as a specific example of the relationship between patient autonomy and 
consumerism in the United States.  
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Recent developments in healthcare technology have heralded a profusion of self-
testing devices. The Irish Medicines Board (IMB) defines self-testing devices as “any 
device intended by the manufacturer to be able to be used by lay persons in a home 
environment” (IMB 2004, p.6). The literature review reveals minimal empirical 
evidence to date with regard to prevalence of self-testing and the overall range of tests 
available. A Dutch study (Ronda et al. 2009) explores the use of self-testing 
technologies among internet users. 16% of 12,529 participants from an internet sample 
indicated previous use of a self-test with an approximate average of 2.1 tests per 
participant. The ten most frequently used tests were for: diabetes, cholesterol, allergies, 
urinary infection, HIV infection, anaemia, ovulation, chlamydia, glandular fever and 
hepatitis. Ryan et al. (2006) identified 104 unique tests associated with 24 different 
conditions in a systematic internet search in the UK. In a follow-up study 13% of 
respondents indicated use of self-testing devices after pregnancy tests, deemed to be 
routine, were excluded (Ryan et al. 2010).  
 
Caven (1987) presents an account of the various social, legal and ethical issues 
associated with self-testing devices at a time when pregnancy testing kits and blood 
glucose monitors were the only available devices. The author raises concerns related 
to the impact of self-testing, and an associated self-care model, on patient well-being, 
healthcare costs and the nature of the patient/healthcare professional relationship. As 
the availability of self-testing devices increases, so too does debate regarding their 
clinical value (Ianchulev 2005, Heneghan et al. 2006, Towfigh et al. 2008, Farmer et 
al. 2009a, Paxton 2009, Malanda et al. 2012), cost-effectiveness (Simon et al. 2008, 
Clar et al. 2010), psychosocial impact (Kachroo 2006, Kalb 2008, French et al. 2008), 
legal status (Gevers 1999) and moral significance in the context of patient autonomy 
(Levitt 2001, Modra 2006, O’Lynn 2007, Kearns et al. 2010, Greaney et al. 2012). 
While self-tests can offer convenience, privacy and a sense of empowerment to those 
who use them (Ryan et al. 2010, Gubala et al. 2011) there is also the possibility of 
harm due to false positives and false negatives, unnecessary costs, the absence of a 
healthcare professional to offer a broader analysis of test findings (Burger and Kass 
2009) and an increasing population of the ‘worried well’ (Ryan et al 2010).  
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2.3.1 Self-testing technology and patient autonomy 
A dominant debate regarding the moral value of self-testing diagnostic devices centres 
on their role in advancing an individualistic and empowerment paradigm in healthcare 
delivery, which replaces a previously more stringently controlled and professional-led 
healthcare system. Much of this debate exists within the bioethics literature. The ability 
to self-diagnose without, or with reduced, professional support is seen as an example 
of extended patient autonomy and questioned on this basis (Modra 2006, O’Lynn 
2007, Kearns et al. 2010, Greaney et al. 2012). There are particular ethical concerns 
identified in the context of direct-to-consumer genetic testing (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2010), screening tests (Raffle 2001, Burger and Kass 2009) and HIV testing 
systems (Kachroo 2006). The commercial incentive to progress home testing systems, 
despite possible ethical issues, is also acknowledged in the literature. Whellams (2008) 
claims that the eagerness to attain Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval for 
home-based HIV testing in the United States was disproportionate to consumer 
demand, and motivated more by the desire to maximise commercial benefit.  
 
Kearns et al. (2010) acknowledge the potential benefits of diagnostic self-testing 
devices, yet raise some ethical concerns, which have relevance for the autonomy 
conundrum. The authors debate the autonomous and relational dimensions of the 
individual and propose that while diagnostic self-testing tools can advance individual 
autonomy through independent testing and decision-making, the results obtained have 
implications for one’s “relational responsibilities” (p.3). The paper explains this 
position in the context of a man who uses a home testing kit to discover that he is 
infertile. Does he have a moral obligation to share these results with his partner and 
thus fulfil his relational responsibilities? The authors raise further contextual issues 
with regard to home testing and utilise the work of Charles Taylor to highlight that 
diagnostic self-testing is not something that occurs in a vacuum but rather holds great 
significance for those who experience the diagnosis. The paper offers an important 
dimension to the debate as it suggests that diagnostic self-testing cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the associated contextual issues. 
 
While empirical studies do not specifically explore patient autonomy in the self-testing 
context, there is some reference to the concept in the findings of studies to date. 
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Grispen et al. (2011) undertook a cross-sectional internet survey in the Netherlands 
exploring psychosocial determinants of self-testing with three specific devices. The 
study found that self-efficacy was significantly associated with self-testing among 
those engaged in cholesterol, glucose and HIV testing. Similarly Ryan et al.’s study 
(2010) exploring motivations for self-testing concluded that, in addition to other 
factors, members of the public self-tested in accordance with their general attitudes to 
their own health. Some participants believed self-testing was an empowering process 
and engaged in self-testing to enable them to make more autonomous decisions about 
their health. However, the researchers note that some participants suggested a degree 
of caution with regard to self-testing. It is acknowledged that self-testing can be an 
overzealous activity engaged in by the ‘worried well’. This sentiment is expressed 
quite well by one of the participants in Ryan’s study (2010, p.580): 
 
So long as you don’t start reading into everything and turn yourself into a 
hypochondriac because that’s what can happen, isn’t it really … I think 
I’ve agreed that I would do some self-testing, so long as you’re, you’ve got 
to be careful, haven’t you? 
 
The profusion of self-testing technology also has the potential to alter the relationship 
between healthcare provider and patient (Caven 1987, Mol 2000, Willems 2000). This 
reflects a wider acknowledgement of the impact of technology on healthcare practice 
(Reiser 2009). Mol (2000) notes the glucose monitor as a particular technological 
device which can potentially facilitate greater patient independence but also has a 
wider effect on the relationship between patient and healthcare professional. In 
accordance with Mol’s analysis; “diagnostic devices actively intervene in the 
situations in which they are put to use” (Mol 2000, p 9). The extent to which those 
who develop self-testing devices appreciate the potential ethical and psychosocial 
outcomes of technology is not well explored. In Ethics on the Laboratory Floor, van 
der Burg and Swierstra (2013) recommend that ethicists and social scientists engage 
with scientists in the laboratory setting. The purpose of this engagement is to 
encourage reflection on technological innovation and potentially co-shape emerging 
technologies. This particular approach is relatively new; however, philosophical 
reflection on technology is not a new phenomenon. 
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Philosophical deliberations on technology and its impacts have occurred throughout 
history. These discussions have been collectively presented within a particular 
discourse known as the philosophy of technology (Mitcham 1990/2003). The 
philosophy of technology recognises the importance of technology as a non-neutral 
entity which shapes the way we live in the world (Scharff and Dusek 2003). Similarly, 
a more multi-disciplinary discourse, referred to as Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) notes the role of technology in enabling human action and its important impact 
on social structures (Sismondo 2010). Health Technology Assessment (HTA) is an 
emerging research discipline within healthcare, which seeks to explore the cost-
effectiveness of new technologies in accordance with their clinical efficacy. The 
significance of these discourses will be developed in the chapter that follows as the 
theoretical underpinnings of the study are explored.  
 
2.4 Self-testing technology and patient autonomy in diabetes management 
2.4.1 Self-testing technology and diabetes management 
Self-testing had inception in the diabetic population (Free and Free 1984). Due to the 
considerably evolved tradition of self-testing in this client group, a review of the 
literature in this context offers a significant evidence base to inform the self-testing 
and patient autonomy debate. Diabetes, or diabetes mellitus, is a chronic endocrine 
disorder characterised by an inability of the pancreas to produce sufficient insulin (type 
1 diabetes), or effectively utilise available insulin (type 2 diabetes) (WHO 2013). 
Insulin is the hormone, which regulates blood glucose levels in the body. In the 
absence of sufficient insulin, hyperglycaemia (raised blood glucose levels) results 
causing damage to blood vessels with potential long-term complications. Self-testing 
of blood glucose levels, associated interpretation, and subsequent self-management is 
recognised as a means of maintaining ‘in-range’ blood glucose levels (Wallymahmed 
2013). Self-testing is most frequently referred to as self-monitoring, or self-monitoring 
of blood glucose (SMBG), in the diabetes literature. Blood glucose levels can also be 
monitored by means of HbA1c or glycosylated haemoglobin. This measurement is 
processed in the hospital laboratory and gives a record of blood glucose levels over a 
three-month period.11 
                                                          
11 Current NICE quality standards for diabetes in adults (2011) suggest a target HbA1c value of 
between 48 mmol/mol and 58 mmol/mol.11 This reflects the current guidance from the American 
Diabetes Association (2013), albeit acknowledging some nuances in specific patient contexts. 
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The early links between self-testing, diabetes care and autonomy are apparent. Patient 
autonomy in a healthcare context is often promoted within a model of patient 
empowerment. While patient empowerment is generally understood as a relatively 
recent phenomenon in healthcare associated with patient-centeredness and autonomy 
(Holström and Röing 2010), Joslin’s approach to diabetes care in the early 20th century 
pioneered what the Joslin Diabetes Center (2012) still refer to as their model for patient 
empowerment. Joslin recommended the use of Benedict’s urine test in his 1918 
textbook, Diabetic Manual for the Doctor and Patient (Joslin Diabetes Center 2012).  
 
Benedict’s test uses a chemical reagent that changes colour relative to the amount of 
reducing sugars, or monosaccharides, in a solution. Since its introduction the range 
and availability of self-testing devices for diabetic patients has continued to grow (Free 
and Free 1984). The first disposable test for blood glucose measurement was 
introduced in 1964, but did not become available in wider circulation as a self-testing 
device until 1979 (Free and Free 1984). The technological capabilities and user-
friendliness of blood glucose monitors have continued to evolve (Vashist et al. 2011). 
Current innovation is concerned with minimally invasive, or non-invasive, monitoring 
of blood glucose levels and continuous glucose monitoring systems, which can be used 
in association with internal insulin pumps to regulate blood glucose levels (Gubala et 
al. 2011, Moser at al. 2012). Regardless of the specific technologies applied, SMBG 
is now a widespread practice and forms a core component of overall diabetes care 
(American Diabetes Association (ADA) 2013). 
 
2.4.2 Self-testing technology and diabetes management: Patient autonomy and 
empowerment 
Historically, the purpose of self-testing in the diabetic population has its roots in 
greater clinical efficacy, but also in enhancing patient autonomy within an 
empowerment model (Joslin Diabetes Center 2012). When diabetics began to self-test 
their urinary glucose levels, treatment involved participating in an essentially 
starvation diet low in carbohydrate (Free and Free 1984). Joslin was eager that 
diabetics should take an active role in the management of their illness even in the 
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absence of a requirement to titrate medication doses (insulin or oral medication) with 
blood glucose levels. His general thesis was that participating in self-testing would 
increase patient empowerment and improve overall diabetes outcomes (Joslin Diabetes 
Center 2012). Self-testing may enable patients to determine their own blood glucose 
levels at a given point and time and modify diet, exercise and medication accordingly. 
This can potentially empower patients and enhance their autonomy. However, analysis 
of empirical studies shows that evidence, albeit limited, is inconclusive with regard to 
the impact of self-testing on patient empowerment.  
 
A study exploring community nurses’ reasons for advocating self-testing listed patient 
empowerment as a motivating factor (Abbott et al. 2007). One participant (DN6 p. 9) 
noted: 
 
My aim is about self-empowerment and promoting self-care … the ethos 
of the team is to deliver care that allows patients to do as much as they can 
for themselves with support and guidance.   
 
However, the researchers note that there was no evidence to suggest that the patients 
had an opportunity to express their own preferences for self-care. Some participants 
reported that limitations existed among patients that would impede self-testing such as 
poor eyesight, limited dexterity, needle phobia and dementia. In addition, one 
community nurse suggested that making decisions based on self-monitoring was not 
common among patients: 
 
Most of the patients I see are happy to do the testing themselves, but then 
wait for the nurse to make an assessment and decide what to do. (DN7 
p.10) 
 
This study was a small-scale qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews 
involving seven nurses’ perceptions of the purpose and functions of self-testing in 
diabetes. Therefore, generalisations cannot be made from the data. However, the study 
raises an interesting point regarding the use of self-testing to advance patient 
empowerment in the apparent absence of determining the extent to which patients 
desire empowerment, autonomy and self-care. This points to an oxymoron of sorts, 
which could be referred to as ‘enforced autonomy’. Davies and Elwin (2008) refer to 
this oxymoron, although not using the term per se, and raise a number of problems 
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regarding a move towards ‘mandatory autonomy’ in healthcare policy and practice. 
The authors indicate a preference for ‘optional autonomy’, which will encompass an 
understanding of restraints on individual choice and the cultural context of people’s 
lives.  
 
A well-publicised randomised control trial (RCT) in the UK, The Diabetes Glycaemic 
Education and Monitoring (DiGEM) study, explored the impact of SMBG on 
glycaemic control among individuals with type 2 diabetes not treated with insulin 
(Farmer et al. 2009b). The study design incorporated 40 qualitative interviews using a 
purposive sampling technique with a sample of the wider trial participants. 
Empowerment emerged as one of the three prominent themes within the study along 
with awareness and influence on health behaviour. The researchers take empowerment 
to mean increased control over healthcare. Patients commented on the convenience of 
the technology, which removed the need for clinic appointments, allowed them to 
initiate clinician follow up and inform healthcare decisions. Similarly, a study utilising 
survey methodology noted that 80% of participants reported a high satisfaction with 
SMBG and associated self-monitoring with feeling more in control of their illness 
(Barnard et al. 2010).  
 
However, despite the positive accounts of self-testing within Barnard et al.’s study 
(2010), there were also accounts of depression, anxiety and guilt among others 
participants, with women reporting self-chastisement to a greater degree than men. 
Likewise, other patients in the DiGEM study reported a sense of failure, frustration, 
and discouragement when findings were high or seemed incompatible with recent 
lifestyle behaviours (Farmer at al. 2009b). Peel et al. (2004) also reported experiences 
of failure among participants when readings were counterintuitive. Similarly, a study 
in the UK explored the impact of replacing routine SMBG with a more intensive 
patient education programme and found that patients were reassured not to have to 
self-test regularly as testing reinforced the sick role (Harris and Cracknell 2005). 
Participants in the study also noted feelings of failure and poor health-related 
behaviour when unfavourable results were obtained. The replacement of SMBG with 
a more rigorous education programme resulted in improved glycaemic control in 
addition to the positive psychosocial outcomes. 
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It appears therefore as French et al. (2008)12 suggest, that diabetics who are eager to 
pursue health-related behaviours can be demotivated by self-testing when the results 
do not accord with what they perceive to be their recent glucose-reducing behaviours. 
The researchers in the DiGEM study note that while the impact of small health 
behaviours may be more favourable in the long-term as evidenced by HbA1c results, 
these results are not apparent to patients who self-test on a regular basis. While the 
study found a statistically significant difference regarding beliefs about the severity of 
the consequences of diabetes among participants in the intensive monitoring group 
versus the less intensive or usual care groups, there was no statistically significant 
difference in beliefs about personal control over diabetes and the perceived 
effectiveness of treatment. It is therefore important to consider why healthcare 
professionals routinely recommend SMBG, if all it serves to do among some patients 
is to heighten their awareness of the severity of their illness, yet provide them with no 
sense of control over their situation. Despite some favourable accounts of SMBG as 
an empowerment tool, only 2 of the 40 patients who were interviewed in the DiGEM 
study expressed an absolute preference for SMBG as opposed to scheduled clinic visits 
and HbA1c testing. Other studies indicate more disturbing experiences among those 
undertaking self-monitoring of blood glucose.  
 
Peel et al. (2007) found that female participants in their study associated SMBG with 
feelings of guilt and self-chastisement. A later study undertaken by Barnard et al. 
(2010) reported similar results among some female respondents despite more positive 
feedback from the wider population. The Efficacy of Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose 
in Newly Diagnosed Type 2 Diabetes Trial, or ESMON study (O’Kane et al. 2008) 
found that patients assigned to the self-monitoring group scored 6% higher on the 
depression subscale of the well-being questionnaire. These findings raise obvious 
questions about the impact of self-testing on patient empowerment and autonomy, and 
also general well-being. O’Kane et al. (2008) acknowledge this as a recurring theme 
in the literature and recommend further investigation into the actual effects of SMBG 
on patients. The researchers surmise that these negative feelings may not necessarily 
be related to a sense of powerlessness, but rather associated with the strict discipline 
required in self-monitoring in the absence of any tangible gain.   
                                                          
12 This paper reported the qualitative findings of the DiGEM study.  
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It seems also that patients lacked the capacity for more autonomous roles due to a lack 
of education and a shared vision for self-testing. Patients reported their confusion with 
regard to the limited interest healthcare professionals placed in SMBG and referred to 
a lack of education with regard to self-testing and its purpose (Peel et al. 2007, Farmer 
et al. 2009b, Clar et al. 2010). Appropriate education is acknowledged to be of core 
importance in determining the success of point of care testing systems (Price 2003, 
Gubala et al. 2012), self-management programmes (Redman 2005, Murphy et al. 
2011) and overall diabetes care (International Diabetes Federation (IDF) 2009, 
American Diabetes Association (ADA) 2013). 
 
2.4.3 Self-testing technology and diabetes management: Clinical efficacy 
The early interest in self-testing devices for blood glucose monitoring was motivated 
by a need to reduce perinatal mortality rates of up to 50% in infants of mothers whose 
diabetes was poorly controlled (Free and Free 1984). More recent emphasis centres on 
the role of self-monitoring in optimising blood glucose (glycaemic) control, a 
significant factor in reducing the long-term complications of diabetes (IDF 2011). The 
clinical efficacy of self-testing, as evidenced by improved glycaemic control, has an 
important ethical relevance here. If, as is reasonable to assume at this point, SMBG 
may induce negative feelings and fail to enhance patient autonomy and empowerment 
among some patients, the value of self-testing in terms of biomedical outcomes is of 
greater significance. An understanding of the overall impact of self-testing on both 
biochemical and psychosocial markers will assist in assessing the possible burdens of 
self-testing relative to its clinical value. In addition, the lack of conclusive evidence 
regarding the role of SMBG in improving glycaemic control lends greater credibility 
to the need for more qualitative analysis of its impacts and lends support to the aims 
of this study.  
 
The clinical efficacy of self-monitoring of blood glucose levels in different diabetes 
classifications has become a predominant feature of debate and research in diabetes 
management over the last number of years (Klonoff 2008, International Diabetes 
Federation 2009, Kolb et al. 2010, ADA 2013). Available evidence is inconclusive 
with regard to the actual impact of SMBG on glycaemic control, particularly among 
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type 2 diabetics not treated with insulin.13 Inconsistencies are evident in the findings 
of systematic reviews and among individual Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs.)14 
Reviews of evidence undertaken by Welschen et al. (2005), McAndrew et al. (2007), 
Towfigh et al. (2008) and Alleman et al. (2009) offer support for the ongoing use of 
self-testing among type 2 diabetic patients not treated with insulin. However, Clar et 
al.’s later review (2010) concludes that the synthesised evidence did not support 
additional investment in SMBG for these same types of patients. Similarly, Malanda 
et al. (2012) fail to endorse routine blood glucose monitoring among individuals with 
type 2 diabetes following their review of the evidence.  
 
An analysis of specific RCTs among type 2 diabetes not receiving insulin reveals 
similar conflicting results. The Auto-Surveillance Intervention Active Study (AISA) in 
France (Guerci et al. 2003) revealed a statistically significant effect on glycaemic 
control among individuals engaged with self-monitoring. However, the ESMON study 
(O’Kane et al. 2008) showed no statistical difference in glycaemic control between the 
self-monitoring group and those assigned to a non-monitoring control group. 
Similarly, the DiGEM study (Farmer et al. 2009b) found no convincing evidence to 
endorse routine self-monitoring in adults with type 2 diabetes not treated with insulin. 
Findings did not exclude the possibility of favourable clinical outcomes for certain 
sub-groups of patients, but the recommendations did not endorse widespread self-
testing. The DiGEM study has gained considerable attention in the UK, as the 
associated economic analysis did not deem SMBG among type 2 diabetics, not 
receiving insulin, to be cost-effective based on quality adjusted life years (QUALYs) 
and healthcare costs (Simon et al. 2008). This analysis has been supported by 
subsequent HTA (Clar et al. 2010), and endorsed by recent National Health Service 
(NHS) guidance (NHS 2010). The recommendations suggest more prudent decision-
                                                          
13 The need for more frequent blood glucose monitoring among individuals receiving insulin, primarily 
those with type 1 diabetes, is seldom disputed due to insulin’s greater potential to induce 
hypoglycaemia. 
14 The difficulties associated with assessing the impact of SMBG on glycaemic control are 
acknowledged among researchers in the field. Inconclusive evidence has been attributed to 
methodological inconsistencies in trial design (McAndrew 2007, Kloncoff 2008) and the protocols 
applied within systematic reviews (Clar et al. 2010). Farmer et al. (2009b) note that it is difficult to 
design trials, as patients in the monitoring group require information about the testing process and 
interpretation of results, while the control group also require some instruction in self-care activities.  
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making among physicians, and propose that SMBG should only be routinely used in 
individuals with type 2 diabetes who are not treated with insulin, when there is an 
agreed goal to testing. Research pertaining to economic evaluation is ongoing and the 
benefit of urine testing as a replacement for blood glucose monitoring is currently 
being explored (Dallasso et al. 2012).   
 
While self-monitoring has been questioned in the context of type 2 diabetes for some 
time, particularly among those patients not treated with insulin, more recent analysis 
of evidence also questions the clinical value of routine self-testing in other diabetes 
classifications (Kolb et al. 2010). The authors note that as SMBG is not a discrete 
variable, but one component in an overall diabetes management approach, the 
efficiency of SMBG-based management programmes for diabetes is assessed in RCTs, 
as opposed to SMBG itself. Kolb’s basic premise is that self-testing of blood glucose 
levels, in any diabetes classification, should be initiated to enhance understanding of 
diabetes, monitor periods of poor glycaemic control, or prevent hypoglycaemic events 
secondary to anti-diabetic agents in susceptible patients (Kolb et al. 2010). Current 
clinical guidelines support a more patient specific approach to SMBG (IDF 2009, 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 2011, ADA 2013). RCTs 
exploring SMBG versus non-monitoring are lacking for individuals treated with 
insulin. However, due to the greater risk of hypoglycaemia in this client group there 
are ethical issues in assigning any patient to a non-testing group.  
 
2.4.4 Self-testing technology and autonomy in diabetes management: Concluding 
comments 
In conclusion, the evidence to date is inconclusive with regard to the impact of blood 
glucose monitoring on glycaemic control, as a marker of clinical efficacy, or on 
patients’ perceptions of autonomy, empowerment and overall well-being. The cost-
effectiveness of SMBG is also a matter of debate. The impact of SMBG on patient 
empowerment reflects the wider debate regarding self-testing and patient autonomy. 
There is limited qualitative data exploring the psycho-social impact of self-
management on diabetic patients with regard to the adoption of this more autonomous 
role. Research focuses predominantly on the clinical efficacy of SMBG within RCTs 
as evidenced by changes in glycaemic control. The emergence of some recent 
qualitative data associates SMBG with expressions of empowerment, yet also 
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experiences of guilt, frustration and depression. There is evidence of frustration among 
patients when self-monitoring is not adequately supported by healthcare professionals. 
This raises obvious questions about healthcare professionals’ perceptions of their roles 
in self-monitoring. However, only one study reviewed to date explored this dimension 
(Abbot et al. 2007). Peel et al. (2007) note the failure to illicit the views of healthcare 
professionals as a limitation of their study. It is also apparent from the literature that 
methodological problems exist in the design of RCTs investigating the impact of 
SMBG on glycaemic control and that self-testers are not a homogenous group.  
 
2.5 Conclusions from the literature and justification for proposed research 
There is considerable emphasis on patient autonomy within contemporary healthcare 
practice. This is supported by the prevailing policy context and a tendency to exalt 
autonomy as the most important ethical principle. While a greater emphasis on patient 
autonomy may have some intrinsic moral value, the empirical and philosophical 
evidence explored suggests this is not necessarily always congruent with positive 
patient outcomes or meeting one’s professional responsibilities. This model of patient 
autonomy is often associated with increased patient choice, which does not reflect the 
reality of the healthcare environment and the arbitrary nature of choice. The prevailing 
understanding of autonomy in healthcare is rooted in a misguided understanding of 
Kantian philosophy whereby a negative understanding of autonomy translates to an 
isolated decision-making process. Ethical analysis to this point suggests that a 
relational understanding of autonomy may be more congruent with the reality of 
patient choice, the shifting healthcare needs of patients and the professional 
responsibilities of their caregivers.  
 
Available evidence suggests that self-testing is now a relatively prevalent activity. 
Individuals can test for a range of diseases and conditions without leaving their homes. 
The predominant discussion regarding the moral worth of self-testing devices centres 
on their ability to facilitate greater patient autonomy within the healthcare sphere. This 
philosophy underpins the marketing strategies utilised by the designers and 
manufacturers of this technology. In this respect, self-testing represents a specific 
microcosm of a growing model of patient autonomy and its associated tensions. The 
growth in the number and use of self-testing devices reflects a significant shift from a 
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more paternalistic model of patient care, where investigation and diagnosis were the 
sole remit of healthcare professionals. While self-testing devices are associated with 
improved clinical outcomes and have the capacity to enhance patient autonomy within 
an empowerment model, criticisms of the technology also exist. It is noted that self-
testing devices can cause psychological distress due to false positives, can delay 
treatment due to false negatives, may incur unnecessary costs and potentially influence 
the patient/healthcare professional relationship in unintended ways.  
 
The literature, which questions the moral significance of self-testing devices in an 
autonomy context, is primarily discursive and philosophical in nature. When studies 
investigate the autonomy issue, they are primarily quantitative in nature and reveal 
little information about the actual experiences of patients when assuming more or less 
autonomous roles. This highlights a gap in the literature, which the researcher intends 
to address. Research is required to review the psychosocial implications of self-testing 
and the associated individualistic paradigm in healthcare from a qualitative 
perspective. While studies, albeit inconclusive, may reveal positive clinical outcomes 
of self-testing with regard to biochemical markers, research is needed which provides 
an insight into the actual experiences of patients who partake in self-testing.   
 
An ethical appraisal of self-testing tools is warranted from a quality assurance 
perspective in accordance with Health Technology Assessment (HTA). The process of 
HTA is relatively new in Ireland and is led by The Health Information and Quality 
Authority (HIQA) (Government of Ireland 2007). HTA is a form of multi-disciplinary 
mode of policy analysis that explores the clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
health technologies (Saarni et al. 2008). It also considers the legal, ethical, social and 
organisational aspects of technology use. HIQA (2010) notes the need to develop HTA 
in an Irish context. Ethical technology assessment provides a tool to determine 
problematic aspects of technology at an earlier stage (Palm and Hansson 2005, Saarni 
et al. 2008). However, research to date had tended to focus on the clinical outcomes 
and cost effectiveness of technology, with limited appraisal of the social and ethical 
components (Sacchini et al. 2010). In accordance with emerging approaches to HTA 
(van der Burg and Swierstra 2013), it would be useful to engage with the scientific 
community who develop self-testing devices to elicit their vision for self-testing.  
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The diabetic population provides an ideal context in which to explore patient autonomy 
within the self-testing process. The evidence to date is inconclusive with regard to the 
impact of blood glucose monitoring on clinical efficacy, or on patients’ perceptions of 
autonomy, empowerment and more general well-being. In addition, despite patients 
reporting a frustration with the level of support received from healthcare professionals, 
studies reveal little inclusion of healthcare professionals as participants. This literature 
review reveals that technology has an impact on the relationship between patients and 
the healthcare team and that advancing patient autonomy may pose a challenge for 
healthcare professionals. In this context, it would be useful to elicit the perspective of 
healthcare professionals in future research. The literature also notes the limits of RCTs 
in assessing the clinical efficacy of SMBG and the lack of homogeneity among self-
testers as a group.  
 
In conclusion, the contemporary policy context and current empirical and 
philosophical evidence point towards the need for an in-depth qualitative analysis of 
patients’ experiences of autonomy and empowerment within the self-testing process 
to provide insight into the ethics of self-testing. This is particularly apparent in the 
diabetic population, where research is inconclusive regarding the clinical and 
psychosocial outcomes of self-monitoring. The views of healthcare professionals are 
also required to understand the patient experience in light of the relationships they 
share with the healthcare team. It would also be useful to elicit the views of those 
involved in the design of future self-testing devices to determine the extent to which 
patients’ experiences of this technology accord with the vision espoused by the 
designers. 
 
A combined philosophical and empirical analysis is warranted on the basis of this 
review. Agledahl et al. (2011) refer to the dissonance between the current focus on 
autonomy in bioethical discourse and the reality of choice situations in clinical 
practice. The authors acknowledge the valuable contribution of philosophical 
discussion but suggest that empirical work is essential in order to have philosophical 
reflections rooted in the reality of clinical practice. Similarly, Broer et al. (2010) note 
that autonomy is seldom explored in light of the dilemmas associated with particular 
conceptualisations of autonomy in practice. The authors draw on Latour’s (1987) 
actor-network theory to suggest that autonomy cannot be defined without addressing 
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the actors who shape the concept. Empirical work can stem from, and inform, the 
philosophical debate regarding the meaning of autonomy and its application in the 
healthcare context. There is a prevailing assumption that patient autonomy and patient 
choice are good and should be maximized at all cost. This is not necessarily the case. 
Policy needs to be based on a sound philosophical understanding of the concepts it 
seeks to promote. This study seeks to contribute to that knowledge base.  
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SECTION 2: RESEARCH STRATEGY 
CHAPTER 3: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS 
 
If we want to understand man’s existence we must listen to the language 
of objects. If we are describing a subject we must elaborate on the scene 
in which the subject reveals himself. 
 
(van den Berg, 1972/2013)15 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review concluded with a justification for a combined qualitative, 
empirical and philosophical exploration of self-testing among individuals with 
diabetes, to explore the actual experience of autonomy in a specific clinical context. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the various theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings, which support this research strategy. In this sense, this chapter acts as 
a bridge between the literature review and the specific research methods outlined in 
chapter 4. The research strategy employed merges ethical analysis with more 
traditional qualitative empirical methods, to explore the meaning of autonomy in a 
specific clinical context. The influences on the research methodology include the 
empirical bioethics literature, the field of Health Technology Assessment and a 
Heideggerian approach based on the philosophy of technology discourse, 
hermeneutics and interpretive phenomenology. The synergy between these various 
components will become more apparent as the chapter proceeds.  
 
3.2 The ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics: Implications for this study 
The decision to incorporate empirical research questions within this bioethical 
research study was motivated by the aspiration to ground normative discussion in a 
                                                          
15 Quote retrieved online as one of a selection of quotes from phenomenological thinkers. The web-
site is dedicated to the work of Max van Manen, the phenomenologist. Available at 
http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/ (Accessed 24/11/2013). Van den Burg is a 
phenomenological psychologist. For a more detailed account of his perspective and the source of 
this quotation see, Van den Berg J.H. (1972, p.40) A different existence. Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press.  
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particular patient context. This was highlighted within the literature review, where 
criticisms of a purely philosophical approach to patient autonomy were outlined (Broer 
at al. 2010, Agledahl et al. 2011). Traditionally, normative ethics involves the 
application of moral philosophy informed by norms, rules, and duties, to make 
decisions about what one ought to do. However, there has been a shift towards 
empirical work to support this analysis, as the bioethicist is now increasingly engaged 
in field work previously rooted within the realm of social scientists (Holm and Jonas 
2004,16 Widdershoven et al. 2008, Borry et al. 2008, Salloch et al. 2012, Rehmann-
Sutter et al. 2012). Holm (1997) acknowledges the limitations of purely theoretical 
analysis and highlights the significance of the context in the analysis of bioethical 
problems. For Holm, (1997, p.27) moral problems are rooted in the real world of 
practice, therefore empirical work is important to develop moral principles which are 
applicable in a “less than perfect world”. In empirical ethics, empirical research 
provides a “context-sensitive insight into certain moral practices in healthcare” which 
can contribute to normative deliberations (Salloch et al. 2012, p.2).  
 
Empirical ethics can be defined as “a broad category, grasping different interpretations 
of combining or trying to integrate ethics and empirical research” (Borry et al. 2008 
p.39). Borry et al. (2008) trace the emergence of ‘empirical ethics’ as an autonomous 
research field over a period of four decades. The term itself is not new, being used as 
early as 1930 to distinguish empirical and non-empirical philosophy. However, earlier 
roots are found in Kant’s reference to moral anthropology and applied moral 
philosophy. Borry et al.’s paper (2008) outlines the factors, which have contributed to 
the recent interest in empirical bioethics. These include an appeal for evidence-based 
healthcare, an interest in contextualising ethical problems and the growth of clinical 
ethics. Arguably, the development of qualitative research methodologies within the 
social sciences may also be a contributing factor.  
 
In a recently updated version of Methods in Medical Ethics Sugarman and Sulmasy 
(2010, p.17) refer to the “flourishing” of interdisciplinary work in medical ethics and 
list eight ways in which empirical work can contribute to medical ethics. These 
                                                          
16 The papers within this text form part of the EMPIRE project (Empirical methods in bioethics). This 
is a European project dedicated to uncovering ways in which bioethics can contribute to bioethical 
thinking in the context of biotechnology.  
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include, among others: purely descriptive studies about morality; studies which test 
behavioural adherence to established moral norms; studies which establish facts 
relative to moral problems,; empirical data which examines the merits of slippery slope 
arguments; and descriptive studies which assess the likely consequences of moral 
action. However, there is considerable debate regarding 'the empirical turn’ in 
bioethics (Widdershoven et al. 2008).17 Elements of this debate include 
epistemological concerns regarding the merits of an empirical approach in a discipline 
previously dominated by normative analysis, but also disciplinary tensions regarding 
the value of merging philosophical and empirical enquiry. Campbell (2003) refers to 
the relationship between normative and empirical ethics as contentious. In embracing 
empirics, bioethics researchers not only grapple with their own identities, but also face 
opposition from analytic philosophers concerned with the dilution of philosophical 
method, and social scientists protecting their position as the researchers of the 
empirical ‘real world’ dimension of ethical analysis (Hedgecoe 2004, Dunn et al. 2008, 
Molewijk and Firth 2009, Williamson 2010). 
 
Most significant in the debate are the epistemiological issues. There is a fundamental 
epistemological question at stake regarding the relationship between normative and 
descriptive ethics. McMillan and Hope (2008) refer to this as the ‘is-ought’ problem and 
the associated ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Essentially, the ‘is-ought’ problem suggests that 
exclusively ‘is’ premises cannot lead to ‘ought’ conclusions. The basis of the ‘is-ought’ 
problem is found in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/2006) and hence also 
referred to as the Humean Dilemma. The standard Anglo-American interpretation, prior 
to debate in the 1950s, suggested that there was “no logical relation between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ judgements” (Kupperman 2005 p. 343). Searle (1964) expresses the issue in more 
modern terminology noting that no collection of ‘descriptive’ statements can entail an 
‘evaluative’ statement without the introduction of an evaluative premise.  
 
Salloch et al. (2012) present an account of empirical ethics, which provides the novice 
researcher with a sufficiently clear, yet robust guide to undertaking empirical work in 
the field of bioethics. While other papers concentrate on exploring the problems, 
                                                          
17 Widdershoven et al. (2008) use this term in the introduction to their text examining the growth of 
empirical research in psychiatry. The text provides an historical overview of the increasing degree of 
empirical evidence in bioethics and presents some specific empirical studies in psychiatric ethics.  
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Salloch et al. (2102) provide some solutions. The authors criticise studies in empirical 
ethics which either fail to make normative conclusions, or fail to sufficiently delineate 
the relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements when normative conclusions are 
outlined. The authors’ general thesis is that empirical studies in bioethics require 
“considered reference to normative research questions” to ensure quality (p.2). 
Recognising the underlining epistemological issues, the authors emphasise the 
importance of developing a meta-ethical position at the outset, which is observed 
throughout all phases of the research process. This meta-ethical position would justify 
the researcher’s perspective on the nature of empirical and normative collaboration, 
and provide a backdrop against which empirical work proceeds and is later analysed.  
 
A detailed account of my own meta-ethical perspective is available for review as 
Appendix E: ‘Is-ought’ paper.18 Essentially, I adopt a position of neo-naturalism, as 
advocated by Stewart (2009). I argue that Hume’s position is not as absolute as often 
portrayed; the ‘is-ought’ distinction does not preclude utilising empirical work in 
normative judgement. I propose that empirical facts can be utilised to ground ethical 
analysis in the concrete world of experience. This does not necessitate deriving 
normative conclusions directly from facts, but rather involves utilising facts in moral 
reflection and deliberation to arrive at ethical conclusions. Central to the argument 
presented within the detailed paper is that the relational autonomous agent considers 
the facts of the situation one ‘is’ in, in a societal context, in order to determine what 
one ‘ought’ to do. I suggest that complete acceptance of the ‘is-ought’ problem denies 
the process of personal reflection on fact that is implicit within moral decision-making.  
 
This position reflects the views of others who have also grappled with these issues. 
Borry et al. (2004, p.48) suggest that “empirical research cannot by itself determine 
                                                          
18  This paper began as an initial review of epistemological issues related to empirical bioethics and 
has continued to evolve throughout the course of my studies. The attendance at a graduate studies 
Philosophy of Social Science module, under the direction of Dr. Fiachra O’Brolchán, was very helpful 
in providing a specific forum to explore the issues in addition to the supervision process. A meeting 
with Dr. Sabine Salloch, from the Institute for Medical Ethics and History of Medicine, Ruhr University 
Bochum, Germany was extremely useful in crystallising my ideas towards the end of my studies. I am 
grateful to both for their assistance. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the International 
Philosophy of Nursing Conference in Dundee, September 2011. Feedback received from delegates at 
the conference also contributed to the development of the paper. The paper presented in Appendix 
E is an updated version of the paper submitted for the graduate studies module. It is intended that 
this paper will be developed further and submitted for publication on completion of the PhD 
process. 
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what is good or evil, right or wrong” but they do not accept the ‘is-ought’ distinction 
as “absolute” (p.51). In accordance with Borry et al.’s analysis, facts can embody 
normativity and inform our actions but this normativity requires legitimate 
construction through the application of ethical analysis. In this account of empirical 
bioethics both inductive and deductive reasoning is applied whereby one uses the facts 
gained through empirical activity but then subjects those facts to moral enquiry (p.50).  
 
In accordance with Salloch et al.’s (2012) guidance, it is important to consider the 
manner in which this meta-ethical position could be incorporated within the study 
design, and how normative and empirical collaboration could be best achieved. 
McMillan and Hope (2008) present a cyclical model of integrated empirical bioethics 
which facilitates this process. In this model “ethical analysis and empirical data 
collection inform each other in an interactive cycle” (McMillan and Hope 2008, p.19). 
The model incorporates four interactive phases: ethical analysis, identification of 
empirical issues, empirical studies and generation of new data. This new data can then 
be subjected to further ethical analysis as the cycle continues. The model is consistent 
with the meta-ethical position of neo-naturalism that guides this study. McMillan and 
Hope acknowledge the presence of Hume’s ‘is-ought’ problem, but note, similar to the 
analysis presented in Appendix E, that empirical ethics is not condemned to meta-
ethical fallacies when the facts gleaned through empirical investigation are associated 
with a moral premise to arrive at a normative conclusion.  
 
However, while McMillan and Hope’s (2008) cyclical approach provides us with a 
‘process’ of integration, it does not define the precise nature of empirical-normative 
collaboration. Rehmann-Sutter at al. (2012) outline a hermeneutic approach to 
empirical bioethics which provides a sound methodological basis for normative-
empirical collaboration in this study. This approach is appealing as it congruent with 
the meta-ethical position, which guides the empirical-ethical collaboration within the 
study, is congruent with the interpretive, hermeneutic underpinnings of the empirical 
methodology and dovetails coherently with McMillan and Hope’s (2008) cyclical 
model of empirical ethics.19 
                                                          
19 As my thinking progressed throughout the PhD process the synergy between McMillan and Hope’s 
(2008) integrated model of empirical bioethics and the iterative nature of interpretive 
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The features of McMillan and Hope’s (2008) cyclical model of  empirical bioethics, 
and Rehmann-Sutter at al.’s (2012) phenomenologically informed hermeneutic 
approach to bioethics, will be explained in greater depth in chapter 4 as the research 
methodology is outlined in a more mechanistic format. At this point, it is sufficient to 
note that the study is located within the growing field of empirical ethics. McMillan 
and Hope (2008, p.19) suggest that three criteria are necessary to satisfy the use of the 
term ‘empirical ethics’. (1) The project must encompass normative analysis, (2) there 
must be a systematic collection of data and (3) the relationship between the empirical 
and the normative should go beyond a linear association to involve a more cyclical 
relationship. This PhD study meets these criteria through a cyclically integrated 
empirical and ethical analysis of patient autonomy among individuals engaged with 
self-testing technology.  
 
3.3 Technology, ethics and Health Technology Assessment 
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) acknowledges the need for an empirical 
analysis of bioethical issues in technology development. HTA is “a multi-disciplinary 
field of policy analysis [which] studies the implications of the development, diffusion 
and use of health technology” (Saarni et al. 2008, p.617).20 These implications include 
health-related outcomes, and financial, social and ethical concerns. The research 
questions relate to the patients’ interactions with self-testing devices with regard to the 
manner in which these interactions shape expressions of autonomy, are mediated by 
healthcare providers and relate to the vision for self-testing espoused by the scientific 
community involved in the development of new technology. Theoretical discourse 
related to the assessment of technology is therefore particularly relevant in this study.  
 
To date, HTA has primarily been concerned with cost-benefit analysis. Recent 
discussion acknowledges the need to develop a greater evidence base with regard to 
the social and ethical significance of technology (Sacchini et al. 2010). An ethical 
                                                          
phenomenology became more apparent. Rehmann-Sutter et al.’s (2012) paper delineates this 
relationship quite clearly and was extremely helpful in crystallising my emerging ideas in this regard.   
20 The Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) hold responsibility for the development and 
facilitation of HTA in Ireland (Government of Ireland 2007).  
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component within HTA can be useful at the point at which technology is being 
developed to identify problematic aspects at an early stage (Palm and Hansson 2005, 
Saarni et al. 2008). The European network for Health Technology Assessment 
(EUnetHTA 2008)21 presents a core model for the ethical assessment of technology. 
The model seeks to integrate ethical assessment ‘within’ HTA, as opposed to ethical 
assessment that occurs in an ‘add-on’ fashion. The core model suggests a series of 
strategies, which can bef utilised to integrate empirical and ethical analysis and avoid 
the epistemological problems associated with empirical ethics outlined earlier in this 
chapter. However, empirical research in HTA is primarily quantitative in nature. van 
der Burg and Swierstra (2013) acknowledge the ongoing dominant focus on the ‘hard’ 
as opposed to ‘soft’ impacts of technology within HTA. While hard impacts are 
associated with crude measurements related to cost analysis and clinical efficacy, soft 
impacts are concerned with more subtle consequences pertaining to how people live 
their lives.  
 
In Ethics on the Laboratory Floor van der Burg and Swierstra (2013, p.7) outline an 
approach to technology assessment, rooted in the laboratory setting, which “uses moral 
philosophy to distinguish issues related to developing technology that demand ethical 
reflection, and to provide tools to enhance reflection about them among scientists and 
engineers”. This PhD study draws on some of these tools to explore the perspectives 
of the scientific community engaged in the development of diagnostic technologies. 
van der Burg and Swierstra’s (2013) approach remains rooted in the philosophy of 
technology discourse but represents a new frontier in this area of scholarship.  
 
3.4 Philosophy of Technology  
Prior to the advent of a more empirical dimension within HTA, or Science and 
Technology Studies (Sismondo 2010), the appraisal of technology has a long historical 
tradition in theology and philosophy (Mitcham 1990/2003). The philosophy of 
technology discourse, though rooted in the earliest branches of western philosophy, 
represents a growing contemporary field of study exploring the relationship between 
                                                          
21 The European Network for Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA) consists of 34 government 
appointed organisations within Europe who “work together to help developing reliable, timely, 
transparent and transferable information to contribute to HTAs in European countries.” (See 
www.eunethta.net). HIQA in the Irish Context is a member of this network. 
58 
 
humanity and technology. The philosophy of technology represents a specific field of 
philosophy concerned with the impacts of developing technologies on the world we 
inhabit and humanity’s relationship with this technology. Its central tenet is that it 
respects technology as more than a neutral phenomenon and seeks to uncover the 
realities of human-technology relationships (Ihde 2006). While the tools utilised by 
philosophers exploring the technological world do not differ from those used by other 
philosophers, i.e. reason, argument and thought experiments, this field provides the 
researcher with a specific focal point for philosophical discussion and access to a body 
of philosophical literature which deals specifically with this area of specialisation.22 
 
In Three Ways of Being-With Technology Mitcham (1990/2003) provides a succinct 
historical account of the philosophy of technology tradition. Mitcham aligns 
humanity’s engagement with technology to three major movements with particular 
characteristics: ‘ancient skepticism’, ‘Renaissance and Enlightenment optimism’ and 
‘romantic ambiguity’ or a sense of uneasiness. In brief, ancient skepticism refers to 
man’s movement beyond a previous dependence on, or reverence to, God or the gods 
towards a tentative investment in the technological world. Renaissance and 
Enlightenment optimism encompasses progression towards a more favorable account 
of technology whereby man’s social development was perceived as related to his 
technological pursuits. The third movement, romantic ambiguity, became prevalent in 
the mid-eighteenth century as the societal impact of the industrial revolution brought 
about a post Enlightenment more critical view of technology. Mitcham states that a 
sense of Romantic uneasiness towards technology may prevail in the twenty-first 
century whereby we aim to find a middle ground between ancient skepticism and 
Enlightenment optimism.  
 
Deitrich (1995) critiques Mitcham’s ‘historicophilosophical’ analysis. Deitrich’s 
commentary is complementary for the most part. However, while he acknowledges the 
merit of Mitcham’s contribution he notes that it is incomplete. He suggests that 
                                                          
22 The Philosophy of technology discourse has been prominent in my work since the 2nd year of my 
PhD studies. This philosophical understanding of technology has been greatly assisted by links with 
faculty at the Centre for Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences (CEPTES) at the 
University of Twente in the Netherlands and Dr. Simone van der Burg, previously employee at 
Twente, now engaged as a Senior Researcher in Philosophy and Ethics of Medical Technology at IQ 
healthcare in Nijmegen.  
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Mitcham add a fourth dimension which represents a post-modern period in the 
philosophy of technology discourse: post-modern immersion. While ‘post-modern 
immersion’ may not be the most appropriate term, it seems reasonable to suggest, as 
Deitrich does, that an additional movement or classification would be required. This 
‘new’ classification could more suitably encompass the growing body of work 
(including the Ethics on The Laboratory Floor approach described above) which 
examines emerging technologies in the laboratory, and other settings, from a combined 
philosophical and empirical perspective (Mol 2000, Willems 2000, van der Burg and 
Swierstra 2013). While empirical ethics and philosophical approaches to HTA have 
much in common there appears to be little engagement between the discourses.  
 
Mitcham uses Heidegger’s concept of ‘being-with’ technology to frame the three 
movements he refers to. The more contemporary philosophy of technology discourse 
shares a commonality in its reference to the work of Heidegger as a key influence in 
this field of scholarship. Martin Heidegger is acknowledged as one of the forbears of 
contemporary philosophy of technology discourse. Being and Time (BT)23 
(1926/1962) is credited with providing a pioneering account of our engagement with 
things as human beings (Mulhall 2005, Adams 2008). Being and Time, or Sein und 
Zeit, written in 1926, was largely inaccessible to the English-speaking world until the 
translation provided by Macquarrie and Robinson in 1962. The text is viewed on the 
one hand as a difficult, pretentious piece of prose, yet on the other as an intricate, 
influential work of philosophy (Mulhall 2005). Heideggerian philosophy of 
technology encompasses the earlier, classical philosophy of technology discourse in a 
developing body of work which is particularly dominated by North American 
(Mitcham 1990/2003, Ihde 2006) and more recent Dutch perspectives (Willems 2000, 
Verbeek 2005, Mol 2008, van der Burg 2009, Boenink 2012, van der Burg and 
Swierstra 2013).  
 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology cannot be separated from his wider ontological 
and phenomenological perspective. Heidegger advocated a phenomenological 
understanding of the world in view of the things that inhabit it (Adams 2008). 
                                                          
23 Heidegger’s Being and Time will be referred to as BT with the appropriate citation as per 
philosophical convention 
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Heidegger summarises his perspective in his own words in accordance with the maxim 
– To the things themselves (BT 7:28). Heidegger’s ontological position articulated 
within Being and Time is that we are inextricably entwined with the world in which 
we live. In accordance with Heidegger’s understanding of being as ‘Dasein’, meaning 
‘being-there’ or ‘being-in-the world’ (BT 3:15), we encounter the world in a practical 
sense as a world of things which are ‘ready-to-hand’ and imbued with human meaning. 
Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-world’ is central to his understanding of human-technical 
relations. For Heidegger, man’s engagement with technology is not merely technical 
but has “an immediately and intimately social dimension” (Mitcham 1990/2003, 
p.491).  
 
This is apparent in Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology (1954/2003). 
For Heidegger, technology is much more than a means to an end or a human activity. 
Technology is a way of revealing. In accordance with Heidegger’s analysis, if we 
acknowledge this perspective “another whole realm for the essence of technology will 
open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (1954/2003, p.255). In 
referring to technology as a way of revealing, Heidegger is explaining the process of 
moving from a time of concealment to unconcealment. This is Heidegger’s special 
mode of being (Verbeek 2005). This essence of technology as revealing is referred to 
in Heidegger’s earlier work, Being and Time, in the context of the hammer. For 
Heidegger, the hammer’s significance lies in its human engagement; its ‘readiness-to-
hand’. It is only in functioning to hammer a nail the hammer gains meaning in the 
world: 
 
The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of 
it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and 
the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. 
The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the 
hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it 
manifests itself in its own right—we call ‘readiness-to-hand’ (BT, 15:98) 
 
Heidegger’s Dasein or ‘being-in-the world’ relates to the way in which material 
objects gain meaning for us once used for some purpose (Harman 2007). In our ‘ready-
to-hand’ mode, we engage with objects pre-reflectively as, for example, we drive a car 
or turn a key in lock. In addition to ‘ready-to-hand’ as a mode of being, Heidegger also 
refers to ‘unready-to-hand’ and ‘present-to-hand’. The hammer, which is integrated 
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seamlessly in our world as equipment in use, only becomes overtly apparent to us when 
it ceases to work and perform its necessary function. In this sense, the hammer is 
‘unready-to-hand’ just as the car that breaks down and the key that fails to turn. In the 
‘present-to-hand’ mode, we become more immersed in reflection on the object and its 
place in our world. It is now presented to us.  
 
I adopt Heidegger’s hermeneutic and ontological phenomenology as the philosophical 
basis of this study and propose that Heidegger’s ‘being-with’ technology provides a 
coherent platform to examine patients’ relationships with self-testing technology.24 I 
present Mitcham’s analysis in support of this proposal: 
 
The being-with relationship thus disclosed through technical engagements 
is, for Heidegger, primarily social in character; it refers to the social 
character of the world that comes to light through technical practice. Such 
a world is not composed solely of tools and artifacts, but of tools used with 
others and artifacts belonging to others. Technical engagements are not 
just technical but have an immediately and intimately social dimension. 
(Mitcham 1990/2003, p.491) 
 
However, while Heidegger’s philosophy of technology remains as one of the most 
influential positions in the field (Scharff and Dusek 2003), it is not without its critics. 
In What Things Do, Verbeek (2005) offers a critique of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
philosophy of technology. He groups Heidegger with other classical philosophers of 
technology and suggests that the overriding perception of technology as the ‘greatest 
danger’, purported by this group, does not provide a plausible contemporary 
philosophy of artifacts. Verbeek’s main thesis is that Heidegger fails to sustain a 
hermeneutic existentialist philosophy of technology, as his later works display a more 
transcendental influence. While Verbeek (2005, p.95) acknowledges the merit of 
Heidegger’s earlier work, Being and Time, as an investigation of “how actual tools and 
equipment constitute networks of meaning”,  he contends that Heidegger loses this 
focus as his work progresses. Verbeek maintains that the process of ‘releasement’, 
which Heidegger refers to in The Question Concerning Technology (1954/2003), 
represents a distancing from technology that precludes a more existentialist 
engagement.  
                                                          
24 Heidegger’s broader phenomenological and hermeneutic perspectives will be developed as the 
chapter proceeds.  
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However, I propose that Verbeek’s analysis does not act as an obstacle to the adoption 
of Heideggerian philosophy within this study. While Verbeek uses a brief passage 
from Heidegger’s Memorial Address (1955/1966) to support his analysis of The 
Question Concerning Technology, I suggest that when reviewed in its entirety 
Memorial Address presents a more favourable account of ‘releasement’. Heidegger 
suggests “we can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them 
the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.” (Heidegger 
(1955/1966, p. 54). In this sense, it seems inappropriate to suggest, as Verbeek does, 
that it impedes an existentially focused engagement. Rather, I propose that it supports 
a ‘sceptical’ engagement, whereby we critically reflect on all interactions with 
technology to determine those impacts that may otherwise go unnoticed.  
 
Svenaeus (2013) supports this analysis of Heidegger’s position. In applying 
Heidegger’s philosophy to the specific field of medical technology, he contends that 
Heidegger is sometimes inappropriately dismissed as hostile towards science and 
technology. Similar to the interpretation of ‘releasement’ outlined here, Svenaeus 
(2013, p.5) suggests that Heidegger does not propose that we “abstain from all use of 
scientific technology” but rather that we “strive to make this meaning pattern of 
modern technology and science visible through philosophical analysis, and take 
measures to prevent it from becoming the all-encompassing pattern of our being-in-
the-world”. In this sense, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology provides a particularly 
suitable theoretical basis for this study as it supports the examination of patient 
engagement with self-testing devices that is central to the research design.  
 
3.5 Heideggerian phenomenology 
Heideggerian phenomenology, also referred to as hermeneutic phenomenology or 
interpretive phenomenology, involves the study of pre-reflective, pre-ontological lived 
experience (Smythe et al. 2008, van Manen and Adams 2010). Heideggerian 
phenomenology is distinct from Husserlian, or descriptive, phenomenology as it 
explicitly recognizes that lived experience is always subject to interpretation (Laverty 
2003). However, some shared understanding of phenomenology remains among those 
of the descriptive and interpretive traditions. Phenomenology describes things as they 
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appear in consciousness (Moran 1999). In accordance with van Manen (1997), a major 
proponent of phenomenology as a social science research method, it involves 
engagement with the uniqueness of the lived experience. It is concerned with a sense 
of wonder about the world around us and what it means to be human.  
 
Cohen et al. (2000) (drawing on Spielberg’s work) succinctly trace the development 
of phenomenology from the preparatory phase to the German phase and the more 
recent French phase. This also reflects Moran’s (1999) account of the 
phenomenological discourse. Arguably, a fourth could be added, the social science 
research phase, to reflect the use of phenomenological philosophy as an empirical 
research methodology.  
 
Phenomenology, as a philosophy, has its roots in the preparatory work of Brentano, 
the German philosopher, accredited with introducing intentionality to philosophy and 
developing the philosophy of psychology (Heumer 2012). Intentionality remains a key 
feature of phenomenology, whereby all human activity is orientated towards the world 
in a specific way (van Manen 1997). The German phase, with which this thesis is most 
concerned, relates to the work of Edmund Husserl and his student Martin Heidegger. 
Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), relating to the world of lived 
experience, and his eidetic reduction (eidetics), referring to the process of bracketing 
one’s preconceptions to get to the essence of phenomena, are also prevalent features 
of contemporary phenomenological research (van Manen 1997). Heideggerian 
phenomenology departs from the Husserlian tradition most notably in the move 
towards an existentialist, as opposed to transcendental perspective. Heidegger did not 
share Husserl’s requirement for transcendental reduction whereby there is a need to 
extrapolate oneself from the phenomenon under exploration to elicit its essence free 
from personal biases (Lopez and Willis 2004). (These distinctions will be explored 
further below). Finally, the third phase, the French phase refers to the development of 
phenomenology in the work of Marcel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, who developed 
Heidegger’s existentialist perspective.  
 
Macann (1992, p.94) summarises very succinctly the similarities and differences 
between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology: 
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Nowhere is both the affinity with, and the contrast to, Husserlian 
phenomenology more explicitly expressed than in the passage in which 
Heidegger takes up the Husserlian slogan: To the things themselves! – and 
deploys it in a new way. For the ‘things themselves’ concern both 
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology in so  far as both ways of 
doing phenomenology require that we first get back to the things just as 
they present themselves with that immediacy which precludes pre-judice 
and pre-supposition. That Husserl arrives at immediacy through an 
ultimate distancing (Reduction) whereas Heidegger tries to get there 
through a more primordial closing of the distance (Involvement) is no 
more important than the fact that, in one way or another they both seek to 
address the fundamental dictum - To the things themselves! 
 
In this passage, Macann (1992) refers to Heidegger’s account of phenomenology in 
Being and Time. In the closing pages of his introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger 
utilises the term phenomenology to describe his work. He outlines phenomenology as 
the joining of the Greek terms phenomenon and logos whereby phenomenology 
essentially means the science of phenomena. Heidegger departs from a “Husserlian 
preoccupation with eidetics, consciousness and intentionality, in favour of an 
ontological and hermeneutic perspective” (van Manen and Adams 2010, p.450). 
Phenomenon, as defined by Heidegger, refers to “that which shows itself in itself” (BT 
7:29). It is essentially the manifestation of things as they are. Phenomenology is the 
study of what is shown to the world and the unique manner in which it is shown. 
Phenomenology is primarily a philosophical method, but has evolved as a human 
science over time and is utilised as a qualitative research methodology in the social 
sciences (van Manen and Adams 2010). 
 
The focus on the pre-ontological and hermeneutical is distinctly Heideggerian 
(Laverty 2003, Lopez and Willis 2004, Smythe et al. 2008). Heideggerian 
phenomenology is pre-ontological, or pre-reflective, in that it endeavours to capture 
human experience as it lived in the pre-conceptual phase. van Manen and Adams 
(2010, p.450) encapsulate this pre-conceptual understanding in the following extract: 
 
Things are not first of all phenomenon that are constituted in 
consciousness, rather we encounter them immediately in the world where 
we use them. 
 
The phenomenologist endeavours to show our pre-conceptual engagement with 
objects in the world; an engagement previously unexplored. It is in this sense 
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Heidegger awakens us to the experiential use of the hammer, as discussed in the 
account of his philosophy of technology earlier in this chapter (see section 3.4).  
 
Heidegger’s phenomenology is hermeneutic, as opposed to merely descriptive, in so 
far as it contends that all human experience is embedded in a world of meanings. The 
interpretation of meaning by the researcher is a central feature of Heideggerian 
hermeneutic phenomenology (Koch 1994, Crist and Tanner 2003, Smythe et al. 2008). 
Hermeneutics has a historical tradition that extends beyond Heidegger’s philosophy. 
The term hermeneutics came into modern lexicon in the seventeenth century as the 
science of biblical interpretation. However, the historical roots of hermeneutics lie in 
the study of literature among the ancient Greeks and the interpretation of sacred 
scriptures in the Jewish tradition (Crotty 2003). The term hermeneutics derives from 
the Greek word ‘hermeneuein’, meaning to interpret or understand. Hermes, the Greek 
God, was charged with the responsibility of explaining the messages of the gods to 
human beings. Hermeneutics involves the art of understanding or translating text into 
a manner in which it can be understood in everyday usage (Gadamer 2006). 
Essentially, in a research context, hermeneutics involves a focus on meaning and 
interpretation in the pursuit of knowledge (Speziale and Carpenter 2007). The 
approach is suited to the aim of this project, which seeks to elicit the meaning of 
autonomy as experienced by patients in the self-testing process.  
 
3.6 Why Heideggerian phenomenology in this study? 
The various tenets of Heideggerian philosophy explored to this point collectively 
assert its suitability as the methodology to underpin this study. Heideggerian 
phenomenology was chosen for five principal reasons. (1) Heidegger’s 
phenomenological approach offers a means to elicit human experience as a unique 
phenomenon (Speziale and Carpenter 2007, Smythe et al. 2008, van Manen and 
Adams 2010). The meaning of the patient’s experience of autonomy within the self-
testing process is a central research question. This dimension is lacking in the 
qualitative and quantitative studies reviewed. This reflects a wider criticism of the 
dearth of research regarding the individual patient experience in current approaches to 
HTA (Facey et al. 2010). The significance of Heideggerian phenomenology as a 
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philosophical basis for expanding traditional scientific perspectives in medicine is 
acknowledged (Svenaeus 2013).25  
 
(2) The hermeneutic nature of Heideggerian phenomenology provides a means to 
explore the ‘context’ in which the patient experience occurs. The need for a contextual 
understanding of autonomy and self-testing has been noted within the literature review. 
The limitations of a purely philosophical discourse on bioethical issues, and autonomy 
in particular, have been acknowledged (Hedgecoe 2004, Broer et al. 2010, Agledahl 
et al. 2011). Phenomenology provides a process whereby bioethical questions can be 
examined in the real lifeworld setting (Greenfield and Jensen 2010, Rehmann-Sutter 
et al. 2012). Heideggerian phenomenology was specifically chosen because of its 
interpretive or hermeneutic tradition in favour of the transcendental perspective of 
Husserl. Heidegger’s Being-the-world or Dasein asserts that humans cannot 
extrapolate themselves from the world they live in (Lopez and Willis 2004). For 
Heidegger, we are always situated in a contextual world of human experience and 
constitute meaning in this way (Johnson 2000). It is evident from the literature review 
that patients’ experiences of self-testing are mediated to some extent by their 
relationships with healthcare providers. 
 
(3) Heidegger’s philosophical approach resonates with my own views on how we 
construct meaning in the world. I believe that an individual’s experience cannot be 
separated from the social context in which it occurs, and contend that as researchers 
we interpret experience in light of our socio-political and cultural background. The 
Husserlian concept of bracketing is incompatible with my personal sense of identity 
as a researcher. I believe that I am a social being who essentially interprets reality in 
light of past experience and present context. Heideggerian phenomenology 
acknowledges that we are always embedded in the practical world. In this sense, we 
                                                          
25 Here Svenaeus is referring to Heidegger’s Zollikan Seminars. In September 1959 Heidegger began a 
series of seminars with psychiatrists in the Swiss town of Zollikan at the invitation of his friend, and 
admirer of his work, Medard Boss. Over the next decade, Heidegger explored his phenomenological 
philosophy and move towards meditative thinking with invited seminar guests. Central to his work at 
Zollikan was the exploration of the value of Dasein for an alternative view of the body and ill-health. 
Boss notes the uniqueness of these seminars in so far as they represented the engagement of 
individuals from a purely scientific perspective with Heideggerian philosophy. Boss later reflects on 
Heidegger’s contribution as a means to advance the ‘humanization of our world’. (Boss 1987).  
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can never exist in a “presuppositionless world wherein one’s consciousness confers 
meaning on the objects one encounters” (Johnson 2000, p.136).  
 
(4) While Heideggerian phenomenology was originally chosen because of its 
suitability to underpin the empirical component of the study, it later became apparent 
that as a philosophical method this approach also provided a suitable theoretical basis 
to frame the wider study design. Rehmann-Sutter at al. (2012) outline a hermeneutic 
approach to empirical bioethics, which provides a sound methodological basis for 
normative-empirical collaboration in this PhD study. This approach is appealing 
because of its congruence with Heideggerian phenomenology (albeit the authors base 
their approach on Gadamer’s work primarily), but also because it supports the meta-
ethical position (neo-naturalism) which guides the empirical-ethical collaboration 
within the study, dovetailing coherently with McMillan and Hope’s (2008) cyclical 
model of empirical ethics. Rehmann-Sutter et al.’s (2012) approach reflects the central 
tenets of hermeneutic phenomenology in so far as it relies on: the situatedness of 
human experience; the interpretation of this experience; the significance of the 
hermeneutic circle in interpretation and ‘meaning-making’; and the importance of 
resonance as a marker of rigour (Smythe et al. 2008).  
 
(5) Finally, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology discourse, which reflects his wider 
ontological position, is a significant theoretical influence on the study. Heidegger’s 
understanding of our existence in a world of things provides a suitable philosophical 
basis for exploring patients’ experiences of ‘being-with’ technology, and how those 
experiences shape expressions of autonomy.  
 
3.7 Addressing critiques of Heideggerian phenomenology in an empirical 
context 
Just as Heideggerian philosophy of technology has its critics, so too does the 
application of Heideggerian phenomenology in an empirical research context. Crotty 
(1996,1997), for example, presents a scathing critique of Heideggerian scholarship 
within nursing research. Crotty (1997) rejects the ‘new’ phenomenology practiced by 
Benner (1984) and other North American researchers as a mode of enquiry, which has 
lost its historical roots. In accordance with Crotty’s analysis, this work is based on 
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symbolic interactionism and humanistic psychology, whereby one seeks to take the 
place of the ‘other’ and empathise with their experience and worldview. It is this third 
person account of the first person experience with which Crotty takes greatest umbrage 
with. For Crotty, this is a significant departure from European phenomenology, which 
seeks to uncover the phenomena itself and not a subjective account of experience. 
There have been a number of responses to Crotty’s criticism.  
 
Darbyshire et al. (1999) contend that Crotty presents a narrow existentialist account of 
Heideggerian philosophy, and that a subjective account of patient experience is not 
problematic within a nursing discipline. Similarly, Barkway (2001) suggests that this 
‘new’ phenomenology may be appropriate in nursing as an empathetic account of 
phenomena may be the ultimate goal. However, it is also important to consider that 
Heideggerian phenomenology, in accordance with Heidegger’s Dasein, does not seek 
to merely uncover an account of being. This being is always being-in-the-world or 
being in context. In this sense, while the phenomenologist in a nursing context may 
seek the subjective experience, this experience is always interpreted within the social 
context in which it occurs. Heideggerian phenomenology may concern itself with 
individual experience but the meaning of this experience will be interpreted in the 
wider context of the patients’ lives (Johnson 2000). Smythe et al. (2008), whose 
ontological account of phenomenology may accord with Crotty’s ‘new’ 
phenomenology, are committed to the interpretation of meaning in context. Johnson 
(2000) notes that Crotty’s critique of Benner’s work reviews a particular account of 
Heideggerian scholarship as presented by Dreyfus. The author notes that Dreyfus’ 
interpretation of Heidegger is based only on the first division of Being and Time, which 
lacks the richness that could be gleaned from the second division.  
 
However, it is important to note that Darbyshire et al. (1999), Johnson (2000) and 
Barkway (2001) are united in the particular attention they afford to Crotty’s critique. 
Those responding to Crotty that his criticisms merit reflection and that nurse 
researchers should expand their understanding of Heideggerian scholarship prior to 
engaging in Heideggerian research. The details of the research strategy outlined in 
Chapter 4 present a series of procedural steps applied in the use of Heideggerian 
phenomenology in this study. These steps are undertaken to address the criticisms of 
the method’s use in an empirical context and to ensure rigour. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, a number of theoretical and philosophical perspectives are relevant in 
addressing the research aims. These perspectives include the emerging disciplines of 
empirical ethics, HTA and Ethics on The Laboratory Floor, and a more seminal 
Heideggerian influence in the context of the philosophy of technology discourse, 
hermeneutics and phenomenology. The always engaged, hermeneutic nature of 
Heideggerian phenomenology and its ontological understanding of our place in a 
world of ‘things’ provides a suitable theoretical framework to explore patients’ 
experiences of autonomy in engagement with self-testing technology. Heidegger’s 
ontological perspective is incongruent with a complete separation of what ‘is’ and what 
‘ought’ to be. In this sense, there is also a synergy between the model of empirical 
ethics employed and the core tenets of Heideggerian phenomenology. The chapter, 
which follows, outlines how these philosophical and theoretical standpoints are 
adopted in the research strategy. While the study draws on these various 
methodological influences to support the research process, it also has the potential to 
contribute to these discourses and develop the available body of knowledge in this 
regard.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
Empirical bioethics “is neither a substitute for moral philosophy nor does it merely 
service it – it has its own distinctive orientation and purpose” 
 
(Holm and Irving 2004, p.133).  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the interactive processes of philosophical and empirical enquiry 
employed to address the research aim and objectives. It builds on the previous chapter 
as it describes the specific strategies chosen from the range of theoretical and 
philosophical perspectives explored. This chapter elucidates the aim and objectives of 
the study, the research design, the methodologies utilised, the sampling, data collection 
and analysis procedures and the ethical dimensions of the research process.  
 
4.2 Research aim and objectives 
Aim: To examine and contextualise the meaning of patient autonomy in healthcare 
practice through an empirical and ethical analysis of autonomy among individuals 
engaged with self-testing technology  
 
Objectives:  
1. To explore the philosophical basis of patient autonomy in healthcare  
2. To develop an in-depth empirical understanding of patients’ experiences of 
autonomy in engagement with self-testing technology 
3. To ascertain the perspectives of some healthcare professionals and scientific 
community members regarding patient autonomy in the self-testing context 
4. To develop a morally defensible pragmatic account of patient autonomy for 
healthcare practice 
5. To contribute to the current knowledge base regarding: 
a. the application of autonomy in clinical practice 
b. the use of self-testing technology among individuals with diabetes  
c. the broader self-testing and self-management context 
d. empirical ethics and HTA methodology   
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4.3 The research design: A cyclical process of ethical and empirical 
enquiry 
The research design builds on a cyclical model of empirical ethics outlined by 
McMillan and Hope (2008). The model provides a diagrammatic representation of 
normative ethics integrated with empirical data collection to address bioethical 
questions in practice. Figure 2 demonstrates how this model has been applied within 
the study.  
 
Figure 2: Cyclical model of empirical ethics research (Adapted from McMillan 
and Hope 2008) 
 
 
 
ETHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Analysis of autonomy drawing on 
philosophical and empirical 
literature 
(Argument 1) 
 
 
Initial analysis of autonomy 
revisited in light of empirical data 
(Argument 2) 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
 
1. How do patients experience 
autonomy in their 
engagement with self-testing 
technology? 
2. How is this experience 
mediated by healthcare 
professionals? 
3. How does the patient 
experience of autonomy 
relate to the vision for self-
testing espoused by the 
scientific community? 
NEW DATA 
 
 
 
 
Empirical data from patient, 
healthcare professional and 
scientific community interviews 
revealing new understandings of 
autonomy in self-testing 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Heideggerian Phenomenological 
Approach 
 
1. Hermeneutic interviews with 
patients engaged in self-testing 
2. Semi-structured interviews with 
health care professionals 
engaged with patients who self-
test 
3. Focus group with scientific 
community participants who 
have the potential to shape 
future innovation in self-testing 
through their expertise in 
diagnostics 
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The empirical ethics research design involves four interactive phases: ethical analysis, 
identification of empirical issues, empirical studies and generation of new data. The 
combined processes of deductive and inductive enquiry implicit within this design 
provided a strategy to address both the empirical and normative research questions 
within this study. As noted in the preceding chapter empirical methods can contribute 
to bioethics research as they provide contextual data to illuminate normative enquiry 
(Borry et al. 2004, Holm and Irving 2004, de Vries and Gordijn 2009, Salloch et al. 
2012).  
 
The research design can be summarised as follows. The literature review/initial ethical 
analysis of patient autonomy prompted a more in-depth analysis of the nature of patient 
autonomy. Utilising philosophical method, an argument for a relational understanding 
of autonomy was outlined (Argument 1). The initial ethical analysis concluded with 
empirical and normative/ethical questions:  
 
Empirical Questions: How do patients experience autonomy in their 
engagement with self-testing technology? How is this experience mediated 
by healthcare professionals? How does the patient experience of autonomy 
relate to the vision for self-testing devices espoused by the scientific 
community? 
Normative Questions: How may autonomy be operationalised in practice 
to respect both patient autonomy and patient welfare? How may we resolve 
the ‘autonomy conundrum’? 
 
All questions are incorporated within the research objectives. The empirical questions 
were addressed through empirical study. Heideggerian phenomenology was utilised to 
explore the contextualised patient experience of autonomy within the self-testing 
process among individuals with diabetes. Findings generated from the initial analysis 
of patient interviews were utilised to guide semi-structured interviews with 
experienced healthcare professionals involved in diabetes care. A focus group with the 
scientific community was also undertaken utilising patient data/initial analysis to 
formulate questions and generate discussion. The purpose of the additional data sets 
in this study was to assist in the interpretation of patient data. The primacy of the 
patient voice was protected. All data generated was collectively analysed using 
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hermeneutic phenomenology (Crist and Tanner 2003, Smythe et al. 2008) to reveal 
new understandings related to autonomy within the self-testing process.  
 
The resulting understanding of patient experience was subjected to additional ethical 
analysis within an interpretive framework (Rehmann-Sutter et al. 2012) to address the 
normative questions. At this point ethical analysis concluded with a re-appraisal of the 
initial argument and the presentation of Argument 2 within the discussion chapter. This 
argument presents normative conclusions regarding the most appropriate way to 
operationalise autonomy within the healthcare setting and offers some resolution of 
the autonomy conundrum. McMillan and Hope (2008 p.19) note that within an 
empirical bioethics design interaction between the normative and the empirical can 
occur to the point where “the idea of a cycle gives way to a blend”. This blending of 
philosophical and empirical work was integral to the research study and congruent 
with the overarching hermeneutic phenomenological approach. 
 
4.4 Research methodology 
The procedures outlined in the sections that follow primarily refer to the empirical 
work, as significant detail is required to explain the various processes of inquiry. 
However, the research study also includes philosophical enquiry as a research strategy. 
A synopsis of this method is included here to signify its importance in the overall 
design.  
 
4.4.1 Philosophical enquiry 
Philosophical enquiry is utilised throughout the research strategy. Ethical analysis is 
essentially moral philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology, though developed as a 
social science research methodology, originated as a philosophical method (Adams 
2008). Philosophical method involves exploring concepts, uncovering assumptions, 
identifying lines of reasoning and constructing arguments (Scott 2006). The method, 
or form, of philosophy cannot be separated from the content. Reichling (1996) cautions 
us against a quest for a definitive method as this may curb the imaginative discourse 
that philosophical exploration can promote. Warburton (2004) explains that 
philosophical method is developed by the process of ‘doing’ philosophy whereby the 
‘doer’ engages in active reading, active listening, active discussion and active writing. 
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All these activities are implicit within this study and are integral to the hermeneutic 
phenomenological research approach undertaken (Crist and Tanner 2003). The data, 
which informed philosophical analysis in this study, was gleaned from the literature, 
as described in chapter 2, but also from the participants’ data.  
 
There is some debate as to the extent to which philosophical enquiry can be considered 
an actual research method or a form of scholarship (Edgerton 1988). However, 
philosophical method is gaining greater prominence as a method within nursing 
research (Edgerton 1988, Pask 2003, Gray 2004, Scott 2006) and has also been utilised 
by other disciplines (Reichling 1996). There are suggested means to apply rigour in 
philosophical method. Gray suggests that the internal and external consistency of 
arguments can be assessed. Similarly, Reichling (1996, p.119) proposes that the merit 
of philosophical method can be adjudicated by the criteria of “consistency, coherence 
and correspondence”. This perspective is congruent with Rehmann-Sutter’s appeal to 
reasoned argument when merging empirical work with normative analysis. The 
authors contend that conclusions “acquire normative force insofar as they are 
insightful and can convince others” (Rehmann-Sutter at al. 2012, p.445). To this send, 
the study endeavours to exhibit coherency and consistency in argumentation.  
 
4.4.2 Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology 
Heideggerian phenomenology is applied in this study in accordance with the 
interpretive tradition employed by Smythe et al. (2008) and Crist and Tanner (2003).26 
Smythe et al.’s phenomenology embodies the essence of Heideggerian 
phenomenology as both hermeneutic and interpretive. Smythe et al. (2008) view the 
research process as a journey of thinking where the ontologic takes precedence over 
the ontic. While this study also draws on van Manen’s (1997) and Adam’s 
phenomenological perspective (2010), their work is not adopted in its entirety as the 
focus on phenomenological reduction suggests less of an interpretive dimension.27 
                                                          
26 The previous chapter explores the central tenets of Heideggerian phenomenology and delineates 
its suitability to underpin the research approach (see sections 3.4-3.7). This chapter addresses its 
practical application within the study.  
27 Speziale and Carpenter (2007) refer to van Manen’s approach as descriptive phenomenology. 
Other phenomenologists describe van Manen’s phenomenology as hermeneutic phenomenology yet 
note that it combines features of descriptive and interpretive approaches (Cohen et al. 2000, Finlay 
2009). 
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Therefore, while the broader steps of the research process were adopted from van 
Manen’s (1997) approach, the analysis stage is primarily modelled on a process 
outlined by Crist and Tanner which points towards a more hermeneutic approach 
(2003). Crist and Tanner’s process will be explained in association with the overview 
of the analysis process below.  
 
Heideggerian phenomenology is concerned with individual experience yet also the 
social context in which it occurs. As Smythe et al. assert (2008, p.1392), “to remove a 
story from its rich textual background is to remove meaning and thus the possibility of 
understanding the experience as it is lived, for we can only ever live in a context of 
time, place and situational influences”. For this reason, the views of other stakeholders 
were sought in order to assist in illuminating the patient experience. The Heideggerian 
concept of temporality suggests that we always exist in relation, as “the standpoint of 
humans is always to be involved in the practical world of experience” (Johnson 2000, 
p.136).  
 
Human experience in this study is mediated by the patients’ relationships with self-
testing technology, but also by their relationships with the healthcare professionals 
with whom they interact. The literature review highlights that the role of healthcare 
professionals is significant in terms of how patients understand and value the self-
testing process. Peel et al. (2007) note the absence of healthcare professionals’ views 
as a limitation in their study. Semi-structured interviews with healthcare professionals 
took place after the patient interviews. Interview questions were based on the initial 
themes emerging from patient interviews, in addition to findings from the literature 
review. Similarly, members of the scientific community were interviewed in order to 
interpret the patient experience, in light of the vision for self-testing devices expressed 
by individuals with the potential to shape innovation in this area. Interview questions 
for this group were also based on the emerging analysis from patient data.28 
 
van Manen (1997) and van Manen and Adams (2010) outline a series of steps within 
the process of hermeneutical phenomenological research. These steps have been 
                                                          
28 I am grateful to Dr. Pam Ironside at the Institute for Heideggerian Phenomenology, for assisting my 
thinking in this regard. 
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incorporated within the empirical study as part of the overall research design. Step 3 
has been added to include the contextual dimension involving other stakeholders as 
noted above. The various steps are as follows: 
1. Orientating to the phenomenon: This involves being intentional about the 
inquiry, immersing oneself in the literature regarding the phenomenon and 
examining any pre-conceptions.  
2. Collecting lived experience descriptions: This refers to the data collection 
procedures undertaken in order to elicit accounts of human experience.  
3. Collecting the views of other stakeholders engaged with the patient experience: 
This is a distinctive addition to this study, which is undertaken to assist in 
interpreting the patient experience in light of the wider context.  
4. Reading philosophical literature to cultivate interest in the phenomenon: In 
this phase access to the literature is ongoing throughout the research process 
5. Reflecting phenomenologically: This involves engaging in the process of 
hermeneutic analysis to capture the meaning of human experience 
6. Returning to participants: The process can begin again as the participants may 
be re-interviewed to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon following 
initial analysis. (One participant in this study was re-interviewed in accordance 
with this criterion.)  
 
4.5 Research setting, sample and recruitment procedures  
The empirical research took place in the Republic of Ireland. The research setting 
included the outpatient departments of two hospitals to gain access to diabetic patients 
and healthcare professionals associated with their care. Additional details of these 
settings are not provided here to protect their anonymity. The research setting also 
incorporated a scientific institute: The Biomedical Diagnostic Institute (BDI) at Dublin 
City University. BDI is a multidisciplinary research centre engaged in the development 
of point-of-care biomedical diagnostic devices for the clinical setting, but with 
potential extension to the home environment at a future point.29 Collectively these 
research sites represent a significant component of the wider context in which the 
patient experience occurs. On receipt of ethical approval, gatekeeper/access approval 
                                                          
29 The Institute has waived its anonymity.  
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was obtained in all three sites in accordance with the relevant organisations approved 
procedures.30 Ethical approval procedures are detailed below.  
 
Strict homogeneity of sampling is not a key issue in establishing rigour in hermeneutic 
phenomenology (de Witt and Ploeg 2006). The prime motivation in sampling is that 
participants have experienced the phenomenon under investigation (Crist and Tanner 
2003, van Manen and Adams 2010). For this reason, purposive sampling was 
employed in this study. In accordance with this sampling strategy, the patient 
participants were selected based on their previous experience of self-monitoring of 
blood glucose levels. Despite the small sample sizes required in this study, two clinical 
facilities were selected to add greater anonymity to the research findings.  
 
The sample sizes in Heideggerian phenomenology are relatively small due to the focus 
on collecting information-rich data from participants (Connelly 2010). For this reason 
Speziale and Carpenter (2007) suggest that 12-14 participants are generally sufficient 
to elicit the essence of the experience under review. Twelve patients were interviewed. 
A detailed patient participant profile is included as Table 2 in the findings chapter (see 
section 5.2). One patient was re-interviewed to deepen the understanding of the 
phenomenon, as her particular circumstances indicated merit in re-examining her 
experience of autonomy at a later point. Sampling is deemed complete when 
interpretations are clear and new findings fail to appear (Benner 1984). In light of this 
criteria, a sample size of twelve participants was deemed sufficient within the 
supervision process, to elicit an understanding of the phenomenon of autonomy in self-
testing. Patients were recruited from the outpatient departments of both hospitals. This 
included the physician clinics or the smaller diabetic nurse specialist clinics. The 
inclusion criteria for patients were that they should: 
 
 Be engaged in self-testing of blood glucose levels 
 Be over eighteen years of age 
 Have a diagnosis of type 1 or type 2 diabetes mellitus  
 Speak conversational English 
                                                          
30 Copies of gatekeeper approval letters are not attached to preserve anonymity but are available on 
request.  
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 Have given their consent to participate 
 
Patients who met the inclusion criteria were approached, with the assistance of the 
appointed gatekeeper, and provided with a written letter of invitation. Appropriate time 
was given to read the letter, after which I returned to address any queries. Not all 
patients approached agreed to participate.  
 
Healthcare professionals were also purposively selected because of their engagement 
with patients who self-test. The sample size consisted of six experienced healthcare 
professionals who liaise with diabetic patients at the two clinical sites. Non-consultant 
hospital doctors, or non-specialist nurses, were not invited to participate as their level 
of expertise and engagement with patients could be quite different. The sample size 
was therefore dictated by the available personnel who met the inclusion criteria and 
agreed to participate. All eligible individuals were invited to attend by letter. Letters 
were delivered in person at the outpatient sites, or circulated by the appointed 
gatekeeper. The final sample incorporated two consultant endocrinologists and four 
diabetic nurse specialists. Healthcare professionals were interviewed within the 
outpatient setting.  
 
The focus group consisted of eight personnel working in various roles related to 
medical diagnostics. Participants were similarly purposively selected due to their 
expertise in diagnostics. While the participants are currently engaged in the 
development of point of care devices for use in a clinical context, as individuals they 
have the potential to shape innovation in self-testing technology.31 Invitation to 
participate was via the scientific communities group e-mail with the assistance of an 
appointed gatekeeper. Eight individuals agreed to participate. The sample included 
scientific researchers (PhD to post-doctoral level) and associated research and 
development personnel.32 This facilitated a reasonably diverse perspective from across 
the Institute’s various live projects and activities. Morgan (1996) notes that the sample 
size in focus groups can be appropriately determined based on their function within 
the overall research design. This sample size fulfilled this criterion and is compatible 
                                                          
31 For further detail regarding the specific focus of BDI activity, see section 1.3.4.  
32 Specific roles are not included to preserve anonymity.  
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with the numbers deemed satisfactory for focus group participation (Polit and Beck 
2006). 
 
4.6 Data collection procedures 
The data collected was central to the empirical study but also to informing 
philosophical analysis. While this section addresses empirical data collection, the 
importance of the literature as data in contributing to philosophical/ethical analysis is 
also significant as outlined in the introduction to the chapter. Data collection with 
patients involved in-depth unstructured interviews with 12 diabetic patients who self-
test their blood glucose levels. One interview took place in the participant’s own home 
but all others were located in the outpatient setting. One patient was re-interviewed 
resulting in 13 interviews. The questioning technique for patients adopted a 
hermeneutic phenomenological approach involving open-ended questioning in order 
to elicit the patient’s lived experience of self-testing. The Heideggerian perspective of 
Dasein as ‘being in-the-play’ requires that the interview process remains open to what 
may emerge (Smythe et al. 2008).   
 
Smythe et al. draw on Gadamer’s (1960/2003) perspective of a ‘conversation’ in 
preference to conducting a pre-planned interview. For Gadamer (1960/2003, p.383) “a 
genuine conversation is never the one that we want to conduct”. The conversation 
approach facilitates the fostering of a more relaxed relationship between researcher 
and participant and gives the participant the necessary space to tell his or her story 
(McEldowney 2005). An open question, or the phenomenological question is posed to 
participants to commence the conversation and a series of cues may be used to 
encourage participants to elaborate on particular stories (van Manen 1997, Cohen et 
al. 2000). Additional questions may then evolve as the conversation proceeds and 
meanings emerge (Crist and Tanner 2003). The openness of questioning is essential as 
the researcher seeks to ascertain rich descriptions that may reveal hidden meaning, a 
key feature of hermeneutic phenomenology (Johnson 2000). The patient interview 
guide is attached as Appendix F.33 A pilot interview was undertaken initially to assess 
                                                          
33 Some interviews required little more than the opening question depending on the conversational 
style of the interviewee. The detail in the guide is drafted to include possible questions that could be 
utilised as the interview progressed. This level of detail also facilitated a more thorough review of 
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my interview skills and the ability of the method to elicit the data required. I completed 
a self-assessment of the pilot interview in accordance with the reflexive approach 
noted in the introduction. The pilot was also reviewed in association with supervisors 
and resulted in refinement of my interviewing skills. 
 
Semi-structured interviews with healthcare professionals took place following initial 
analysis of patient interviews. Individual interviews were logistically more suitable in 
light of the geographical spread and work commitments of participants. In addition to 
the literature review findings, emerging findings from initial analysis of patient 
interviews were utilised to formulate semi-structured interview questions for the 
healthcare professionals. The interview guide for healthcare professionals is attached 
as Appendix G.  
 
Data was collected from the scientific community participants by means of a focus 
group. The focus group permitted access to a group of individuals with various levels 
of expertise with regard to point of care diagnostic devices.34 There was a potential for 
the community to be cautious due to the fact that the researcher was not engaged with 
the community full time, and operates within another discipline. The focus group can 
facilitate a non-threatening environment which was helpful for both participants and 
researcher (Morgan 1996). Morgan notes that focus groups provide a means whereby 
the researcher can decipher the degree of consensus and diversity among the 
participants (1996, p.139). To this end, the group processes involved in the focus group 
interview were useful to elicit some sense of shared understanding of autonomy and 
self-testing from those individuals with the potential to shape innovation in self-testing 
technology, albeit not their current target end-user. The focus group format was also a 
useful method to facilitate focused reflection among participants. Individual 
participants, though present throughout discussion, were not obliged to speak at any 
point thereby allowing time for consideration in advance of contribution. The aims of 
the focus group, which support the wider study objectives, were as follows: 
 
                                                          
planned interventions by the ethics committee. The interview guide included here is the final draft. 
Initial drafts were modified slightly as the interview process and researcher skill evolved.  
34 For further detail regarding the specific focus of BDI activity, see section 1.3.4.  
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1. To explore the scientific community’s perspective on the application of self-
testing devices in the patient population and associated issues regarding 
patient autonomy  
2. To explore the extent to which the scientific community considers these 
issues as significant and communicate a shared perspective 
3. To promote critical reflection among the group participants with regard to 
the ‘soft’ impacts of technology 
 
The elements of good practice in focus group technique were employed as advocated 
by Krueger and Casey (2000) and Stewart et al. (2007). An initial pilot was undertaken 
to develop skill using ‘mock’ participants and a pseudo-research problem applicable 
to the group. An observer provided constructive feedback, that was used to structure 
and guide the actual focus group. The use of a scribe in the research focus group 
allowed me time to engage more fully with participants and contributed to the early 
analysis stage. Questions for the focus group participants were based on the literature 
and the emerging findings from patient interviews regarding their interaction with self-
testing devices. In addition, practical scenarios, derived from the patient data, were 
utilised to engage the participants and encourage them to reflect on the possible outputs 
of current technological developments.35 The basic premise in the application of any 
scenario is that individuals connect more with contextual narratives when reflecting 
on the world. Fiction is becoming more popular as a means to explore the intricacies 
involved in future technologies (O’Mathúna 2010). Following focus group 
participation, I invited the participants to complete a brief evaluation of their 
experiences via e-mail. This data was also utilised, with the participants’ permission, 
to contribute to the study findings.36 The focus group guide and post focus group 
evaluation is attached as Appendix H.  
                                                          
35 A ‘Futures Workshop’ delivered by Dr. Dónal O’Mathúna and Dr. Simone van der Burg at Dublin 
City University in November 2011 was helpful in exploring these issues. Time spent with researchers 
in emerging technologies at the University of Twente also contributed to the development of this 
aspect of the study. I am grateful to Dr. Marianne Boenink and the post-graduate students at Twente 
for their assistance in this regard.  
36 The focus group evaluation did not form part of the initial methodological procedures. However, in 
keeping with the ‘in-the-play’ nature of hermeneutic phenomenology it was deemed a useful 
strategy as the project progressed. As participants left the interview room, they began to recount 
their experiences of participation. I thought it useful to capture these insights with the participants’ 
permission. As the resulting demand on participants was minimal, it was decided, in discussion with 
supervisors, that the brief online evaluation did not warrant additional ethical approval. 
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Semi-structured interviews and the focus group were recorded with participants’ 
permission. The interplay between patient, healthcare professional and scientific 
community interviews is congruent with the iterative nature of hermeneutic 
phenomenological research (Crist and Tanner 2003, Smythe et al. 2008, Adams 2010) 
and the cyclical character of empirical bioethics (McMillan and Hope 2008) employed 
within this study design. All data contributed to the final analysis procedures.  
 
4.7 Data analysis 
4.7.1Empirical data 
The analysis process in Heideggerian phenomenology is an iterative one, which is 
described by the metaphor of the hermeneutic circle. Essentially parts of the text are 
understood in isolation yet also in terms of the whole i.e. wider transcripts (Cohen et 
al. 2000). It is within this hermeneutic circle that Heideggerian meditative thinking 
occurs. This process of enquiry allows the smallest statements to be interpreted in light 
of the greater cultural context (Cohen et al. 2000). The quest, as advocated by Smythe 
et al. (2008, p.1396) is simply to “let thinking come” as the researcher immerses 
herself in the data. The process of hermeneutic phenomenological enquiry involves a 
“journey” of thinking and continuous cyclical movement from data to reflection and 
reading (Smythe et al. 2008). The series of analysis journal extracts, attached as 
Appendix A, gives some insight into the ‘journey of thinking’ within this study.37 My 
journey resonates with the experiences of other researchers who navigate the fluidity 
of analysis in hermeneutic phenomenology (Duffy 2011)38.  
 
Crist and Tanner (2003) acknowledge the potential challenges associated with this 
fluid-like approach and present a series of phases involved in the analysis process. As 
a novice researcher, these steps were extremely useful and were utilised in the study 
                                                          
37 Interpretive analysis of transcripts was undertaken during my time as a visiting scholar at the 
Hastings Bioethics Centre, New York. This provided an ideal environment for immersion in reading, 
writing and reflection. I also had the opportunity to present my work and have many 
‘phenomenological conversations’ with experts in bioethics. I am grateful to all at the Hastings 
centre for their warm welcome and their willingness to share their expertise.  
38 Dr. Mel Duffy at Dublin City University was generous in sharing her expertise and provided 
valuable assistance at the analysis process. The phenomenological insights gained from Rita Glover 
at Dublin City University were also extremely helpful.  
83 
 
to guide analysis. Crist and Tanner’s approach provides some structure while not 
conflicting with the hermeneutic vision. The interviews with healthcare professionals, 
and focus group with the scientific community participants, were analysed in 
association with the patient data and not as a separate study. Additional stakeholder 
data assisted in the phenomenological reflection stage of analysis which van Manen 
(1997) refers to. Crist and Tanner’s 5 phases for analysis were adapted in this study by 
the introduction of phase 3a to facilitate this process. The various steps undertaken in 
analysis of empirical data are listed below. Appendix 1: Analysis worked example, 
shows how these steps were applied in the study in light of one particular thematic 
understanding.  
 
All interviews were transcribed by a trusted third party and reviewed for accuracy prior 
to analysis. As I listened to each interview, any detail regarding the participants’ para-
language such as sighs, laughs or pauses etc. was noted. Field notes taken following 
each interview were also considered in the analysis process. Appendix J contains the 
interpretive guide that was used to guide the analysis of each transcript.39 The guide 
incorporates the existential themes of corporeality, temporality, spatiality, and 
relationality in accordance with van Manen’s (1997) approach. The terms refer to lived 
body, lived time, lived space and lived relations, respectively. These existential 
elements were apparent among the patients’ experiences.  
 
The phases are as follows: 
Phase 1: Early Focus and Lines of Enquiry: Transcripts of initial patient 
interviews are discussed. This facilitates a critique of interview technique and 
the identification of initial lines of enquiry, which can guide subsequent 
interviews. 
Phase 2: Central Concerns, Exemplars and Paradigm cases: Central concerns, 
themes or meanings emerging from individual participants are identified. Where 
applicable an interpretive team may be involved at this point.40 Exemplars are 
                                                          
39 My attendance at the Heideggerian Institutes Summer School in Indiana under the direction of Dr. 
Pam Ironside was extremely helpful in guiding the analysis process. A presentation by Dr. Susan 
Crowther, of her hermeneutic approach to analysis was pivotal in guiding my approach to analysis. 
The work of Dr. Crowther, and her supervisor, Dr. Liz Smythe is acknowledged in Appendix I.  
40 While an interpretive team can add further insight, it is not a necessary pre-requisite for 
hermeneutic research (Crist and Tanner 2003). 
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extracts from narratives, which characterise common themes. Paradigm cases 
refer to salient stories that are particularly captivating in illuminating the 
phenomenon. Interpretive writing begins at this point consisting of a number of 
pages of main concerns interwoven with significant extracts from individual 
participant’s stories. (In this study, central concerns identified from participants 
were used to guide interview questions for other stakeholders).  
Phase 3: Shared Meanings: As individual meanings become clearer, shared 
meanings are then sought. An interpretive summary is drafted at this point to 
identify links between meanings identified within and across participants’ 
narratives. Initial drafts are re-written and phenomenological reflection is 
ongoing. 
Phase 3a: Shared meanings in context: This phase incorporates analysis of data 
from other stakeholders identifying salience with the shared meanings/themes 
established from patient data. Stakeholder data is utilised to illuminate the 
‘meaning’ of patient experience in light of the associated context. 
Phase 4: Final Interpretations: There may further interviews at this point to 
follow lines of enquiry identified in shared meanings. Phenomenological writing 
are reflection are ongoing. In-depth interpretations of central concerns and 
summaries are produced.  
Phase 5: Dissemination of the Interpretation: Final reports are refined and work 
is disseminated. An audit trail of activities up to this point is maintained.  
 
4.7.2 Ethical Analysis 
Ethical reflection was ongoing throughout the study. The formal process of ethical 
analysis continued once empirical data analysis was complete in accordance with 
McMillan and Hope’s cyclical model (2008). The findings from analysis of patient 
and other stakeholder data were subjected to interpretive analysis as advocated by 
Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012). The ethical questions identified in the initial ethical 
analysis were revisited in light of the empirical data. The findings, which emerge from 
the qualitative data, can contribute to normative judgements through the process of 
reasoned argument, as outlined within the methodological processes identified earlier 
in this chapter. 
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4.8 Rigour 
The issue of rigour in interpretive research is a key consideration as the fluid-like 
nature of data collection and analysis raises questions about the accuracy of findings. 
de Witt and Ploeg (2006) contend that there is need for expressions of rigour that are 
particular to the nature of hermeneutic phenomenological research. Many terms have 
been used as expressions of rigour in an interpretive context, including, ‘resonance’, 
‘atunement’ (Smythe et al. 2008), ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’ (Lincoln and 
Guba 1986), ‘openness’, ‘balanced integration’, ‘concreteness’ and ‘actualization’ (de 
Witt and Ploeg 2006) and ‘credibility’, ‘fittingness’, ‘auditability’ and ‘confirmability’ 
(Sandelowski 1993). Despite the difference in terminology, there is a shared 
understanding that the researcher is obliged to demonstrate the legitimacy of findings. 
Rigour should be integral to the entire research process and not merely a discrete 
dimension that emerges at the analysis stage. Those who defend Heideggerian 
phenomenology in a nursing/healthcare context note that nurse researchers should 
expand their understanding of Heideggerian scholarship to engage accurately with 
Heideggerian research (Darbyshire et al. 1999, Johnson 2000, Barkway 2001). 
Draucker (1999) proposes Heideggerian phenomenology researchers should; outline 
their pre-understandings of the phenomena under exploration; demonstrate the 
convergence of their own understanding and the participant’s experience; outline the 
interpretive processes within the research and utilise Heidegger’s philosophy not 
merely as method but to enrich findings. These processes were applied in this study.  
 
Smith (1998) outlines a number of practical expressions of rigour in his hermeneutic 
study of problem drinkers. These dimensions of rigour are adopted within this study 
with one exception (see Table I: Features of rigour in hermeneutic research): I do not 
incorporate participant validation or member checking. McConnell-Henry et al. (2011) 
contend that member checking diminishes rigour in interpretive research. The patient 
experience, in accordance with Heideggerian phenomenology, is temporally situated 
and is interpreted in light of that temporality. Returning to the participant to validate 
interpretations is a futile exercise as their account of the phenomenon may be quite 
different if asked to verify it at a later stage. However, if there are significant changes 
then returning for an alternative account of the phenomenon may be appropriate to 
elicit a new understanding, in order to further illuminate the phenomenon under 
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investigation (Crist and Tanner 2003, Smythe et al. 2008). One participant (Frances) 
was re-interviewed in accordance with these circumstances. 
 
Table 1: Features of rigour in interpretive research (Adapted from Smith 1998) 
 Trusting relationship with participant 
 Thick, rich, vivid descriptions of phenomena from participants 
 Accurate interview transcription 
 Recognisable descriptions which offer a sense of attunement to the 
phenomena 
 Audit trail (Facilitated by means of an analysis journal in this study) 
 Reflexive journal 
 Independent validation by other researchers (Facilitated through the 
supervision process and ongoing phenomenological conversations at the 
interpretive/analysis phases) 
 Researcher’s own narrative and theoretical perspective is evident in the 
research report 
 
An additional significant feature of rigour in this study was an ongoing immersion in 
learning throughout the research process. Learning was related to both the phenomena 
under exploration and the methodology employed. This was achieved through a 
process of continual knowledge development and knowledge dissemination during the 
PhD process. Details of core aspects of these activities are included as Appendix K.  
4.9 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained from the ethics committee of the Dublin City University 
and the clinical ethics committee of the applicable hospitals sites. A copy of the 
approval letter from the university is included as Appendix L.41 The study did not 
require review by the Irish Medicines Board (IMB 2010). Studies involving devices 
that are already in use with a CE (European Conformity) mark are not subject to review 
by the Board if the study reflects the devices’ intended use. Official gatekeeper access 
to all sites was sought and granted post ethical approval. All potential participants 
received letters/e-mails of invitation, and plain language statements regarding the 
purpose of the research and the procedures involved. Written consent forms were 
signed by all participants. Copies of this documentation are included as Appendices 
M-O.  
                                                          
41 The clinical committee notification is not attached to preserve anonymity. 
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The ethical conduct of any research project goes beyond the attainment of formal 
ethical approval. The research course may change as the study evolves, welfare issues 
for participants may arise and academic integrity may be challenged. All these 
potential issues require a commitment to ethical practice throughout the course of the 
research. To this end, the research was conducted in accordance with a series of 
broader frameworks for research ethics and integrity. These included the University’s 
Code of Good Research Practice (Dublin City University 2008) and Guidance to 
Nurses and Midwives Regarding Ethical Conduct of Nursing and Midwifery Research 
(An Bord Altranais 2007).  
 
The competing roles of ‘nurse as nurse’ versus ‘nurse as researcher’ were an important 
consideration throughout the study. As a registered nurse, it was important to achieve 
a correct balance between adherence to methodological rigour and concern for patient 
welfare (Eide and Kahn 2008). Following review of the pilot interview and initial 
participant interviews, patient information letters were simplified.42 The non-
therapeutic purpose of the interview was further clarified, and I articulated with greater 
clarity the protocol to be followed if a patient was deemed to be at risk. These changes 
necessitated an amended submission to the clinical ethics committee, which was 
approved prior to further patient interviews. If patients raised any queries about their 
diabetes management during the course of the interview, I suggested they contact the 
relevant healthcare professional and supported them in this regard. One patient was 
referred, with his permission, to the unit’s psychologist in light of issues that arose in 
the course of the interview.  
 
Confidentiality of all participants’ data was paramount throughout. Professional 
obligations, which may supersede confidentiality, were explained at the beginning of 
the interview process. Any data collected was treated as confidential and stored 
appropriately in accordance with the Data Protection Act (Government of Ireland 
1988). As a funded researcher, undertaking data collection within a biomedical 
institute, I appreciated the need to be aware of any competing commercial or political 
interests and remain true to the data at all stages of the research process. While the 
thesis critiques the wider technological sphere in healthcare, it was important that any 
                                                          
42 This was explored within the supervision process. 
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discussion accurately reflected the specific expertise of the scientific community 
participants interviewed, the prime focus of their organisations activities and the 
governance structures in place. To ensure respect for participants, footnotes have been 
included within the thesis highlighting the context in which views are expressed.  
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SECTION 3: NEW UNDERSTANDINGS 
CHAPTER 5: AUTONOMY AS LIVED 
 
The phenomenologically orientated researcher engages with these accounts of 
experiences in a way that can articulate important understandings from these 
experiences that may be relevant to others that can take understanding further.  
 
  (Todres 2004, p.50) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a series of understandings, which reflect participants’ 
experiences of ‘being-with’ self-testing technology. The patients’ experiences of 
autonomy in this study exist within a series of interdependent relationships: 
relationship with the self-testing device, relationship with their illness and relationship 
with their healthcare provider. These understandings are collectively represented as 
Autonomy as lived: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing. The 
term ‘understandings’, as opposed to ‘findings’, is used to describe the outcomes of 
the research in congruence with a hermeneutic approach. Within Heideggerian 
phenomenology, the researcher engages hermeneutically with accounts of experience 
to elicit meaning and “offer new understandings to practice” (Smythe 2005, p. 225).  
 
Draucker (1999) urges the hermeneutic phenomenologist to consider Heideggerian 
philosophy not only at the point of data collection, but also at the point of interpretation 
to enrich the study findings. Heideggerian philosophy, in addition to other 
philosophical works, is used to support the interpretative understandings presented in 
this chapter. Heidegger’s account of ‘technology as revealing’ provides a useful 
construct to explain how understanding evolves. (This aspect of Heidegger’s 
philosophy is previously explored in section 3.4). The ‘revealing’ nature of technology 
is noted explicitly in Heidegger’s later work, The Question Concerning Technology 
(1954/2003). For Heidegger, technology is much more than a means to an end or a 
human activity. Technology reveals our ontological being. Those who have adopted 
Heideggerian philosophy as active proponents of hermeneutic phenomenology within 
nursing and other disciplines acknowledge the sense of ‘revealing’ that is implicit 
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within this method (Benner 1984, Ironside 2005, Smythe et al 2008, Diekelmann and 
Diekelmann 2009, van Manen and Adams 2010). Heidegger proposes that we cannot 
separate our ontological selves from our experiences with technology. Our lives are 
shaped by technology in many different ways, which become almost invisible to us as 
we become more immersed in a technological way of being. For example, the way that 
business is conducted in a modern economy is shaped by the technological capabilities 
that influence the mode, tone and speed of communication. Similarly, in this study, the 
participants’ daily lives are shaped by their experiences of ‘being-with’ self-testing 
technology. Therefore, to explore patients’ experiences with technology is, as it were, 
to unearth a channel of discovery, a peephole or conduit, into their deeper, hidden 
selves. In this sense, as per Heidegger’s analysis (1954/2003, p.255), “Technology is 
a mode of revealing”.   
 
The phenomenological exploration of patients’ experiences with self-testing 
technology in this study revealed understandings related to their wider experiences of 
‘being-in-the-world’ with a chronic illness. Their interactions with self-testing devices 
have been shaped by these experiences, yet these experiences are also shaped by their 
engagement with self-testing devices. The participants’ ontological selves are 
interwoven with their technological relations. Focusing on these technological 
relations, as a particular focus of experience, is to reveal the participants’ wider 
ontology, their human mode of being.  
 
5.2 Technology as revealing: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy 
in self-testing 
Figure 3 provides a diagrammatic representation of the understandings arrived at in 
this study. Collectively these understandings are presented as Autonomy as lived: The 
interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing. The term ‘interdependent’ is 
significant as it denotes the context dependent nature of autonomy that is central to the 
study’s findings, and embraces the paradoxical nature of restrained autonomy in 
chronic illness. For these participants their experiences of ‘being-with’ technology are 
quite different in many respects, yet also reveal some shared understandings related to 
their personal engagement with the self-testing device.  
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The phenomenon is presented as an interconnected circular structure of blending 
colours to represent the interdependent nature of the three patient relationships: 
Relationship with device, Relationship with Illness and Relationship with healthcare 
provider. These relationships are not static but continue to evolve and change within 
the individual’s lifeworld. An alteration in any relationship has the potential to impact 
on the patient’s experience of autonomy. Each relationship is presented as a central 
theme consisting of a number of sub-themes, which collectively describe the various 
facets of the overall phenomenon. Themes are not an indication of how many times 
something is said but rather, “an understanding we [as researchers] have seen 
something that matters significantly” (Smythe et al. 2008, p.1392). The various sub-
themes are not necessarily of precise ‘weighting’, but rather represent an essential part 
of the ‘whole’ patient experience. To extend a greater balance among the individual 
themes than the data suggests would be a disingenuous attempt to bring a quantitative 
type order that does not exist in a phenomenological study. The individual themes/sub-
themes, in isolation, do little to explain the phenomenon as it exists in the world. 
However, collectively they “are fasteners, foci, or threads around which the 
phenomenological description is facilitated” (van Manen 1997, p.91).  
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Figure 3: Autonomy as lived: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in 
self-testing 
 
Understandings are portrayed using patient stories or shorter exemplars to elucidate 
meaning. Stories are not always neatly confined to one thematic structure or another. 
The totality of patient experience is central to the existential understanding of illness 
that a phenomenological approach represents. While it is possible to differentiate 
between the existentialist themes (corporeality, spatiality, temporality and 
relationality), one cannot separate them, as collectively they represent an “intricate 
unity which we call the lifeworld” (van Manen 1997, p.105). Therefore, elements of 
patient stories may be repeated to some extent, as they are salient for different reasons 
in the context of the various thematic threads of the overall phenomenon. The other 
stakeholders within this study represent a critical component of the hermeneutic circle 
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in which understanding occurs. Their perspectives are interwoven with the patient 
experience to illuminate the overall phenomenon.  
 
Patient data is identified using a pseudonym e.g. Ann. When the term ‘participant’ is 
used in a general sense it refers to patient participants as they are the central focus of 
the study. A table of patient participants by pseudonym, with details of their diagnosis, 
period since diagnosis, gender and age is included below as Table 2: Patient participant 
profile. Age is given within a particular bracket as opposed to actual age to assist 
anonymity. The table also notes if the patients were receiving insulin therapy at the 
time of their interview, as this is often relevant to their story. As I refer to the patients 
by name in describing understandings, I have also added some more specific 
humanistic data to the biographical account of each participant. This will assist the 
reader in understanding the thematic aspect of the phenomenon in light of the overall 
patient story.  
 
The term scientific community participant was been chosen to represent the various 
focus group participants. Scientific community participants are identified as SCP1-8 
and Healthcare professionals are identified as HCP1-6. Gender or specific role is not 
identified among supporting stakeholders. Despite the added dimension that this could 
bring to interpretation, identification of gender and position in a small purposive 
sampling frame could threaten anonymity. For the purpose of discussion, where 
necessary, all healthcare professionals will be referred to in male terms and all 
scientific community participants as females. 
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Table 2: Patient participant profile 
No
. 
Pseudonym Age at 
time of 
interview 
Gender type 
1/type 
2 
diabete
s 
On 
Insulin? 
Length of 
time 
diagnosed 
at time of 
interview 
Story Synopsis 
1 
 
Ann 55-60 F type 2 No 15 years Ann enjoyed the security and sense of control that self-testing 
brings, but acknowledged it can be demanding on a day-to-day 
basis. She frequently referred to pain in her story but seemed 
reluctant to say self-testing was painful.  
 
2 
 
Betty 40-45 F type 1 Yes 9 years Betty appeared very much in control of her diabetes. She had 
previously completed a self-management programme to titrate 
insulin doses relative to dietary intake and still adopted this 
concept. While acknowledging the ‘bind’ that self-testing can 
be, the flexibility it brings was very important to her. She 
commented on time pressures within the healthcare ‘system’. 
 
3 
 
Colette 55-60 F type 2 No 4 years Colette was very distracted on the day of interview and seemed 
confused by her overall diabetes management. A number of 
social problems were prominent in her life. She reported feeling 
‘down’ and displayed dissatisfaction with the level of support 
from the healthcare team. Colette seemed to have unrealistic 
therapeutic expectations of our interview, which I had to correct 
and direct her towards appropriate support.  
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4 
 
Deirdre 55-60 F type 2 No 9 years A sense of personal responsibility for managing her illness was 
quite prominent in Deirdre’s narrative. She took an active role 
in managing her diabetes and despite acknowledging the 
restraining aspect of frequent self-testing, she enjoyed the 
freedom self-management brings, including a trip to Australia to 
visit family.  
 
5 
 
Eileen 60-65 F type 1 Yes 6 weeks Eileen was newly-diagnosed with diabetes and expressed some 
concern regarding self-testing and insulin administration in 
public. Eileen referred to the ‘clock-watching’ associated with 
self-testing and medication management a number of times 
during interview.  
 
6 
 
Alex 55-60 M type 2 No 7 years At the point of interview, Alex’s pancreatic function was 
decreasing. Prominent in his story was his frustration with his 
current self-testing results and constraining factors within the 
healthcare system, which prevented him from taking greater 
control of his diabetes. Alex also questioned the value of self-
testing versus HbA1c results.  
 
7 
 
Frances 45-50  F type 2 No 9 years Frances expressed various attitudes to self-testing coinciding 
with different points in her illness. The chronicity of her illness 
was quite significant for her. A follow up interview with 
Frances revealed a greater adaptation to her illness, self-testing, 
and adjustment to an alternative treatment regime. The sense of 
control that Frances associated with the administration of insulin 
and self-testing, versus oral medication, was prominent in her 
story. 
 
8 
 
Geraldine 60-65 F type 2 No 15 years Geraldine seemed very accepting of self-testing. It did not 
appear to have a hugely significant role in her life. She appeared 
to be managing her diabetes well with the aid of minimal self-
testing. 
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Bart 55-60 M type 1 Yes 35 years Bart spoke very positively of self-testing and the freedom it 
afforded him to work full time as a taxi driver. This was not 
always the case but evolved over time. 
 
10 
 
Con 50-55 M type 2 No 
(Victosa)43 
6 years Con spoke quite negatively about self-testing during the 
interview. He appeared to have significant difficulty in adjusting 
to a diagnosis of diabetes in addition to other previous health 
problems. I was concerned for Con’s welfare and with his 
permission discussed his concerns with the diabetic nurse 
specialist following interview. 
 
11 
 
Hannah 60-65 F type 2 No 2 months Hannah was also newly-diagnosed with diabetes at the point of 
interview. She did not seem unduly perturbed by her diagnosis 
or the self-testing regime. However, a more careful review of 
her narrative revealed some lack of understanding regarding her 
diabetes. The lack of support from healthcare professionals 
during initial education is evident in her story. 
 
12 
 
Denis 40-45 M type 2 Yes 6 years Denis referred to his diagnosis of depression during his 
interview and the ongoing battle this presented for him, albeit 
acknowledging improvement. He utilised self-testing results 
mainly to maintain his safety as opposed to engaging in more 
elaborate self-management strategies.  
 
 
                                                          
43Victosa is one of the more recent non-insulin based injectables for patients with type 2 diabetes. It is a once daily injection of GLP-1, a synthetic version of a naturally 
occurring hormone, which encourages the beta cells in cells to release insulin. It is used in association with diet and exercise, and possibly oral hypoglycaemics to manage 
blood glucose levels.  
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5.3 Relationship with device 
This facet of the interdependent phenomenon concerns the participants’ relationship 
with the self-testing device. This relationship significantly contributes to the 
participants’ experiences of autonomy and is presented in accordance with four sub-
themes, which reflect different perceptions of the meaning of the device for the 
participants: (1) Knowing the body; (2) Freedom within constraints; (3) Unwelcome 
burdens; and (4) Living with pain and other technical imperfections. The device is 
assimilated in different ways and exists as something different for the various 
participants. The ‘as’ structure (or the thing ‘as’) is a significant tenet of Heideggerian 
philosophy. The hermeneutic phenomenologist is concerned with the tangible reality 
of ‘being-in-the-world’. In this context, as Ironside (2005) explains, the things of the 
world hold varied significance in terms of our engagement with them. There is no 
objective reality to be explored. The ‘as’ structure reflects an understanding of 
phenomena “as something other than fixed or atemporal notions” (Diekelmann and 
Diekelmann 2009, p.8). This theme presents the understandings arrived at following 
exploration of the patient’s engagement ‘with’ the self-testing device as opposed to an 
investigation of the device itself. It is apparent that the patients engaged with the device 
in many different ways. For example, the device existed ‘as’: a window to the internal 
functioning of the body; a means of freedom within certain constraints; a source of 
unwelcome burdens and an imperfect, yet accepted, piece of technology. 
 
5.3.1 Knowing the body 
This sub-theme relates to the participants’ knowledge of their bodies which results 
from use of the self-testing device. The device provides a window to the inner 
workings of their own bodies. This can have both positive and negative outcomes for 
patients in terms of their overall well-being and implications for autonomy. These 
factors will be addressed as the findings’ overview proceeds. However, the ‘knowing’ 
of the body as a dimension of self-testing is salient in itself, regardless of the outcome. 
This ‘knowing’ is presented here. A number of participants refer to the self-testing 
device as a means to confirm what they feel is happening in their bodies. This is evident 
in the narrative below: 
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I can obviously do a test and it will just confirm the way I’m feeling. Either 
I’m feeling low or it’s confirming that I’ve got a low, or I’ve eaten too 
much and it’s sky high and then I dose-adjust and bring it down again ... 
So I can see the benefits of self-testing ... I like the reassurance of the fact 
that it is on the kitchen counter or is in my bag if I want to use it and see 
what my blood sugars are ... So it kind of helps me sometimes if I feel I’ve 
been getting a little bit lax, it kind of makes, you know, kind of makes me 
pull myself together. (Betty) 
 
Betty is a type 1 diabetic, who uses her blood glucose levels to titrate her insulin dose. 
However, even among type 2 diabetics, who do not alter medication relative to results, 
the self-testing device has the same effect on their ‘knowing’ their own body. At three 
separate points in her story Deirdre, a type 2 diabetic, refers to the awareness she 
associates with recording her blood glucose levels: 
 
It keeps you on your toes ... The one thing that you can go by ... It keeps 
me more aware ... (Deirdre) 
 
Interestingly, Frances notes that the previous experience of testing her blood glucose 
levels allowed her to know her body even in the absence of self-testing. It is as if it 
acts as a reference point within which future symptoms can be assimilated. This is 
evident in the following narrative: 
 
I’m very tired and I’m drinking a lot of water and I’m going to the 
bathroom and I’m totally exhausted, you know … I have the symptoms 
again, I feel myself that I had say 8 or 9 or whatever like in 2002 whenever 
I was diagnosed. So I know myself ... I do not even have to test, I know 
myself if I am going low ... (Frances) 
 
This sense of ‘knowing the body’ remains significant for Frances at a repeat interview 
15 months later. Similarly, Bart refers to this sense of understanding his body or being 
‘in-tune’ with it: 
 
I’m very aware of the low feeling and possibly the high feeling as well … 
if I woke in the morning and I had high blood sugars, I’d feel really 
desperate, I do, I can feel it in my body … That’s probably the time that 
I’d really feel it the most, after a night’s sleep. I’d feel it in my legs; I just 
do not feel right having it up so high. (Bart) 
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This sense of ‘knowing’ or awareness, as articulated by the patients, is also 
acknowledged as significant among healthcare professionals. It appears to be one of 
the reasons they encourage self-testing, even among type 2 diabetic patients who do 
not use results to titrate medication. HCP1 sees self-testing as a measure, which keeps 
patients “in-tune” with their diabetes. HCP3 notes that for patients who do not self-
test, regardless of classification, “it’s like being in the fog without fog-lights”. HCP5 
also acknowledges the role of self-testing for type 2 diabetic patients when newly 
diagnosed. Testing will allow patients “to see the impact of various food stuffs on their 
glucose levels” in addition to assisting physician treatment decisions. 
 
The scientific community participants also acknowledge the role of near-patient 
testing, albeit under clinical supervision, in assisting patients to understand their own 
bodies. SCP6 refers to patient trials with a new device under development, which 
monitors ammonia levels, a significant marker of kidney function, among dialysis 
patients.44 In the absence of a point of care device, blood results, and subsequently 
feedback regarding kidney function and response to therapy, are not as readily 
available via the standard hospital laboratory system. SCP6 relates how the device 
offered patients more immediate knowledge of the inner workings of their bodies: 
 
… what they were happy about was that on a daily basis they could 
actually see how their levels were increasing or decreasing and they got a 
better perspective on their dialysis working in their favour, or not in their 
favour, so they could better understand how their kidneys were 
functioning, and if that meal they had last night is actually helping them, 
or hurting them, versus waiting a whole month and a surprise at the end 
of the month versus daily. (SCP6) 
 
                                                          
44 Dialysis is a form of renal replacement therapy whereby patients with kidney failure have their blood 
filtered by a synthetic membrane to remove the toxins and fluids that are harmful to body functioning. 
The point of care urea monitor allows an assessment of ammonia levels and hence acts as a marker of 
dialysis efficacy. The development of this technology has been since publicised. Clinical trials show 
that ammonia results achieved from the breath monitor correlated well with results from standard 
laboratory tests. While the device is currently used within the dialysis unit, the institute also note the 
suitability of the device for possible personal monitoring and the development of future trials in liver 
disease. (See http://www.dcu.ie/research/highlights/2013/september/every-breath-you-take.shtml). 
This technology won first prize in the Universities’ Annual Commercialisation of University Research 
Student Project Awards 2008.  
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This sense of ‘knowing the body’, in association with more frequent monitoring, is 
evident even outside of the diabetic population. Using the example of peak flow 
monitoring in patients with chronic lung disease, Willems (2000) uses Foucault’s 
(1988) Technologies of the Self, to explain the sense of ‘knowing’ oneself that a self-
testing device, in this specific context, can provide. Foucault (1988, p.18/19) explores 
the relationship between “care of self” and “knowledge of oneself”, whereby the 
former was a necessary pre-requisite for the latter. Foucault (1988, p.18) uses the term, 
“technologies of the self” to characterise “a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being” which an individual engages in 
alone, or with assistance, “so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality”. Willems (2000) refers 
to Foucault’s Technologies of the Self at a number of points, to explain the ‘self-
knowing’ associated with self-measurement in chronic lung disease. Central to this are 
the various bodily techniques involved [self-testing and observation] and the 
importance of writing, [documenting values obtained] as a path to self-knowledge.45  
 
In current self-management practices, as Willems (2000, p.35) explains, previous 
techniques such as introspection have been replaced by “a material device”. The 
ongoing use of modern technologies of the self, such as self-monitoring, results in 
knowing one’s body: “patients gradually learn to predict peak flow values” (p.35). 
While patients initially rely on measurements more than on their feelings of body 
disturbance, after a period of time “felt disturbances become modified by previous 
measurements” (Willems 2000, p.23). The relevance of physiological ‘felt’ 
disturbances is learned over time through the process of self-testing, and associated 
written accounts of acquired values. Willems explains this in the context of one 
particular patient, Charles: 
 
In Charles’ example the role of the technology in the practice of living 
with his disease shifts in the course of time. Peak flow has become a way 
of feeling for him; the correct knowledge of lung-function has become part 
of his body competencies. The device itself has acquired a different 
function from what it initially was supposed to do: it has become, just like 
                                                          
45 In Technologies of the Self, Foucault (1988) outlines these strategies in detail drawing on various 
references to self-knowing within ancient Greco-Roman philosophy and early Christian writings (see 
Foucault 1988, p.19). A more elaborate account of Foucault’s treatise is beyond the scope here.   
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the techniques Foucault describes, a device to learn to understand what is 
going on inside him. (Willems 2000, p.33) 
 
In this way, as Foucault explains, the care of self becomes “medical care”. The patient 
becomes the “doctor of oneself” (Foucault 1988, p.31).46 Interestingly, HCP2 refers 
specifically to self-testing as an activity which facilities patients to “become their own 
doctors”. Participants in this study reacted differently to this sense of ‘Knowing the 
body’‘. This depended on how the participants integrated the device and its associated 
ability to create an awareness of their bodies into their own lives. The two sub-themes 
that follow, Freedom within constraints and Unwelcome burdens, address these issues.  
 
5.3.2 Freedom within constraints 
For many of the participants in this study the device enabled them to exercise greater 
freedom, or control, over their lives, as it encourages and facilitates self-management. 
The ‘knowing’ of their bodies, as recounted above enabled them to self-manage their 
illness effectively and live their lives more freely or independently. However, what is 
obvious in some participants’ stories is that this ‘freedom’ is achieved through 
acceptance of the constraints associated with the device. As participants recounted 
positive experiences of self-testing, other accounts of the device as a taskmaster, or 
watchdog of sorts, are also evident. Here the device demands ongoing attention from 
participants and may provide negative feedback. This watchdog and associated 
constraints are acknowledged, but accepted, as they provide patients with a means to 
assess and manage their diabetes. There are particular relational perspectives at play 
here in terms of the existential experience of illness. As participants refer to greater 
freedom, it is often with regard to the relational aspects of their existence, their 
interactions with friends, family and work colleagues.  
 
A number of the participants relate personal stories, which support self-testing as a 
positive influence on their ability to live a full life with diabetes. Deirdre’s experience 
                                                          
46 The use of Foucault’s work in this context is acknowledged as Willems’s (2000) thesis. However, 
Foucault’s original text was consulted to establish the wider context. Therefore, primary references 
are utilised here.  
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of travelling to see her family in Australia is significant in this regard. Managing her 
diabetes with the aid of self-testing gave her the freedom to travel this distance:  
 
I’ve been to Australia twice and I’ve been away a few times with it, so all 
in all I’m able to cope with it and I’m able to get on with my life. (Deirdre) 
 
Deirdre is specific about the role self-testing plays in this freedom: “It helps you to live 
I suppose and to get on with your life”. However, Deirdre is not without reservations, 
she refers to the complexities associated with planning her travels as a diabetic who 
self-tests. Yet, despite misgivings, Deirdre prefers that the activity is available to her: 
 
I’d like to say I could get up in the morning and say I do not have to do it 
... .You live with it, you have to live with it, you have to get your head 
around it, you have to get used to it. (Deirdre) 
 
The significance of self-testing in Deirdre’s daily life is apparent in the following 
extract:  
 
[Self-testing] is the most important part of my day at the moment. From 
once I test that it’s within reason, and if it isn’t, if I find it is climbing to 8 
or 9, I cut back then straight away. That is what it’s about. That’s able to 
tell you if your blood sugar level is going up. Well then, what did you do? 
You know exactly what you have done so cut that out now today and watch 
what you’re doing. That’s what that’s about. That’s where self-testing 
comes in. (Deirdre) 
 
Deirdre sees the monitor as more than a device to test blood glucose levels. For her it 
is an important management tool, an incentive towards appropriate diabetes 
management. Deirdre is not a silent bystander in the management of her diabetes. She 
takes an active role in assessing the blood glucose levels, considering the possible 
reasons for elevation and deciding appropriate actions to resolve the issue. However, 
there is an element of control evident in the language, which Deirdre uses to describe 
the role of the device. The device keeps her “on her toes” and “on the straight and 
narrow”. This suggests a watchdog of sorts, which exerts a restraining influence.  
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This Freedom within constraints is also apparent in Ann’s story, a participant with 
type 2 diabetes. Similar to Deirdre, the sense of ‘knowing’ associated with the device 
acts as a mode of reassurance and a motivating tool for Ann, despite some misgivings 
about the process. She uses language similar to that employed by Deirdre to articulate 
the function of the device for her: 
 
It isn’t something I look forward to but it really does give me an incentive 
to make sure and I know how things are and I feel more secure that I know 
what the reading is … I mean because you know, when you test your blood, 
and the reading is not right then you start taking action either maybe not 
eating as much or cutting out something, or making sure it comes down to 
a correct reading. It’s the one thing that keeps me on the straight and 
narrow. (Ann) 
 
The freedom associated with self-testing in participants’ lives is very evident in Bart’s 
story:  
 
… there was a period of time when I used not check it that often and I have 
a feeling that my blood sugars were all over the place. Up and down, in 
and out, one way or another, but over the past 3 or 4 years, I’ve been 
checking it 4 times a day at least and I find that I’m after hitting the stage 
now where I can really keep them where I want and I just find it of great 
benefit … (Bart) 
 
Field notes reveal that Bart’s enthusiasm and sense of being in control was palpable 
during the interview. Bart works as a taxi driver and is a type 1 diabetic. The self-
testing device enables him to work full-time and plan his daily activity, including 
dietary needs. It appears from Bart’s story that he feels empowered by the device. Bart 
makes specific reference to the accessibility of the device and the advantages that this 
brings. When asked about the possibility of ceasing self-testing and attending more 
regularly for clinic visits Bart notes the following: 
 
Can’t you see that even its disruption, disruption of the day? [Attending a 
clinic visit] I mean I’ve taken the afternoon off work now and I mean, I 
should be working today and if I had to visit the hospital I’d be losing a 
lot more time at work between one thing and another. So it’s much more 
convenient testing it myself … (Bart) 
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Similarly, Betty speaks positively about the freedom that self-testing affords her, 
particularly with regard to going out to dinner with friends. Betty is a type 1 diabetic 
who self-tests twice a day and as she deems necessary. The device gives her the 
‘flexibility’ to live her life and certainly seems to facilitate greater control. Betty had 
completed the DAFNE (dose adjusting for normal eating) programme as a newly 
diagnosed diabetic. Essentially, DAFNE educates individuals about type 1 diabetes 
and how to titrate insulin doses relative to carbohydrate intake. DAFNE facilitates a 
greater flexibility in dietary intake. In this way, patients are empowered to manage 
their diabetes less restrictively, which can have positive outcomes, both from a 
biomedical and psychosocial perspective (Speight et al. 2010).47 Even though Betty no 
longer links with a centre that offers the DAFNE programme, the principles she 
learned on this course remain relevant for her in self-managing her diabetes.  
 
However, it is apparent that this is control within certain limits. Betty recounts a 
number of times in her story that she finds self-testing “a bind” in some respects:  
 
I find the blood testing side of it more of a bind than the actual 
administering of my insulin. I find it kind of, I won’t say time consuming, 
but in day to day life when you’re flitting maybe to work and you’ve got a 
quick break, by the time you get your monitor out and get your strip out 
and do your blood test, you know it’s, I’m not very good for doing my blood 
testing on a regular basis for that reason. I find it just a little bit of a, a bit 
of mission, you know when I just want to do my insulin, eat my lunch, get 
my pen, dial up my insulin and away I go. So I find the blood testing more 
restrictive on my day-to-day planning of my day I suppose. (Betty) 
 
This ‘bind’, or time factor, associated with the device is perhaps more applicable in 
participants who test more regularly, and require blood glucose readings to titrate 
insulin levels. This is evident in Eileen’s story. Eileen, albeit newly diagnosed with 
diabetes, refers to a recent trip to London with her daughter. Although the self-testing 
device enabled her to travel abroad, suggesting greater independence, it also dictated 
the sequence of her day. At numerous points, Eileen refers to the role of the clock in 
her day-to-day activities: “I watch myself all the time, I look at the clock”. Frances 
uses the term “regimented” specifically at four points in her narrative as she explains 
                                                          
47 For more information on DAFNE, see http://www.dafne.uk.com. 
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her engagement with the self-testing device. Similarly, albeit not on insulin, Alex notes 
that “the routine is a bit of an issue” when trying to manage his working day. Here 
again the existential dimension of illness is evident as there is a temporal significance 
in the patients’ experiences. The regimental nature of self-testing and insulin 
administration leads to an alternative perception of time. This is a further example of 
the constraining nature of self-testing. Patients are constrained by routine 
requirements. Morris (2008) refers to this existential appreciation of time in the 
specific context of individuals with diabetes. Morris draws on the work of Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty to explain the different ‘sense’ of time experienced by individuals 
with chronic illness:  
 
… she or he cannot be improvident with respect to time, and cannot be 
heedless of time in its objective flow as measured by the clock, because 
she or he must always be clocking the next dose, treatment or turn of the 
disease. Rather than casting her or his own net of projects in a temporally 
improvisational way, she or he is caught in what I call a provisional time 
that already looks forward to the next dose as already foreseen. (Morris 
2008, p.4)  
 
This “caught in time” reflects the “bind” which Betty refers to, and encompasses some 
of the restrictions associated with the device, even while it facilitates greater control 
for participants.48  
 
This sense of ‘contingently being-in-control’49 is also evident in other patient 
narratives, albeit to a more limited degree. Denis, a patient with type 2 diabetes, but 
receiving insulin therapy for greater glycaemic control, notes the role of the device in 
assisting him to live with his diabetes. Denis self-tests 4 times a day and refers 
specifically to the role of the monitor in detecting hypoglycaemia which allows him to 
take action to prevent deterioration: “it would help me an awful lot … once I take it I 
can feel if it goes below 4 and I take something to eat”. Denis does not engage in the 
degree of self-management with regard to medication or dietary changes, referred to 
                                                          
48 The temporal reality of chronic illness, as an enduring presence, was significant for many of the 
participants in this study and will be addressed further in accordance with the theme: ‘This thing’ as 
ever present. 
49 This articulation of ‘being-in-control’ is chosen specifically as it reflects the Heideggerian 
temporality of a sense of control that is transient and part of ‘being-in-the-world’, enmeshed in it,  at 
one point in time 
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by other participants above. However, the monitor keeps him safe and enables him to 
engage in his daily activities. HCP5 notes the importance of monitoring as a safety 
mechanism in patients who are receiving insulin, or related therapies, with a risk of 
hypoglycaemia. It is interesting to note that Denis openly refers to his ongoing struggle 
with depression. This suggests it is possible to integrate self-testing successfully in 
patients’ lives even in the face of adversity.  
 
Self-testing as a means of enabling greater freedom for participants corresponds with 
the perspective presented by other stakeholders when they discuss the purpose of self-
testing. The terms “control” (HCP1), “empowering” (HCP2), and “self-managing” 
(HCP3) are all evident among healthcare professionals’ transcripts. HCP2 summarises 
the purpose of self-testing as “empowering the patient into self-management”. The 
patient stories noted above support the role of the self-testing device in assisting patient 
control, empowerment and self-management and ultimately autonomy. The freedom 
afforded by a self-testing device is also espoused by the scientific community 
participants. Focus group participants in this study refer to the “accessibility” of a self-
testing device as an important factor (SCP2) and the sense of “partnership with the 
healthcare provider” that the device can facilitate (SCP1). SCP5 refers to the 
“immediate access to information” which the device facilitates and how this can be 
utilised to “evaluate their [the users] own state at any time”.  
 
It is evident from the patient narratives above, and supported by the wider stakeholder 
context, that the self-testing devices can assist participants to assume greater control 
of their diabetes management. This in turn facilitates a greater degree of freedom in 
managing daily activities and interactions with others. In this sense, the vision for self-
testing as espoused by the designers of self-testing devices is real. The participants 
referred to above do not see self-testing as solely an exercise in data compilation to 
hand to the healthcare professional. They regard the device as a tool to assist in the 
management of their condition and subsequently to facilitate greater control or 
autonomy in their daily lives. However, while the device can enable the participants 
to take control, it also constrains their daily lives to some extent. It is apparent that 
participants value the freedom that the device facilitates while also acknowledging its 
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restraining nature. There is a paradox here, but one that makes sense in the context of 
particular philosophical conceptualisations of autonomy.  
 
There is a distinction between being free to do as one wishes and being autonomous. I 
suggest that the ‘freedoms’ which the participants enjoy are evidence of autonomy 
within the self-testing process. Freedom exists within constraints. Autonomy exists 
without absolute freedom. This crucial distinction between positive and negative 
freedom is often lacking in dominant perceptions of autonomy. Autonomy is often 
misconstrued as being synonymous with freedom; a freedom associated with the 
absence of restraints. Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative liberty, or 
freedom, is helpful here. In Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin (1969) delineates between 
a sense of positive freedom, associated with self-rule or mastery, and negative freedom 
associated with non-interference by others. While there is evidence of self-mastery in 
the participants’ stories, there is also evidence of constraints. The participants’ 
freedom, or autonomy, is achieved through accepting that they have certain behaviours 
to adhere to in order to keep them well. The device is a “bind”, an inconvenience, or a 
form of interference for participants that places certain demands on them, yet these 
demands allow them to live more independent lives.  
 
This alternative construction of autonomy accords with Dworkin’s (1998) perspective 
as outlined in the literature review. For Dworkin, freedom is not a pre-requisite for 
autonomy. Autonomy can be promoted by the denial of one’s liberty. In this sense, we 
act on our higher order desires by deciding that certain behaviours are forbidden. The 
diabetic patient who subscribes to an onerous self-testing and dietary regime is one 
such example. Mars et al. (2008) support the theoretical basis of this paradox in a 
chronic illness context. The authors propose that dependence can be compatible with 
autonomy whereby “autonomy may be promoted by increasing people’s opportunities 
to arrange their lives” (Mars et al 2008, p.337). The self-testing device allows 
participants in this study such opportunities. It allows Deirdre and Eileen the 
opportunity to travel, it enables Bart to operate his taxi business and it assists Betty to 
have dinner out with friends.  
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5.3.3 Unwelcome burdens 
The experience of self-testing, this ‘knowing’ the body, does not result in favourable 
outcomes for all participants. For some, the device resulted in more negative 
experiences. These experiences are represented in this sub-theme as Unwelcome 
burdens. The ‘Unwelcome burdens’ outlined here are distinct from the various 
interferences or demands that the device imposes, which the participants accept. These 
burdens include feelings of uncertainty or confusion, guilt, embarrassment, distress 
and frustration, which the participants experience in their engagement with the device. 
The possibility of such burdens is also recognised by other stakeholders within the 
study. Their perspectives are interwoven with the participants’ experience to extend 
understanding.   
 
A sense of uncertainty, associated with a lack of understanding, is apparent in Colette’s 
narrative. Colette is a patient with type 2 diabetes, diagnosed for four years at the time 
of interview. Colette sees the monitor merely as a tool to record blood glucose levels, 
not necessarily a precursor for personal decision-making. Colette does not report any 
difficulty with the physical process of self-testing: “I’ve no problem with that.”  
However, she seems to have minimal understanding of her diabetes or the current 
nature of her blood glucose levels: “I can’t see how my blood is so high like. That’s 
what’s worrying me the most”. This suggests an overall confusion in relation to self-
testing. The recording, for the most part, is only purposeful for Colette in so far as she 
gathers data to give to the healthcare professional: “I have it recorded every day. I have 
to put it in the book every whole day. Four times a day. I’ve to go back then and I show 
it to the doctor.” It appears that Colette is ‘self-testing’ but not ‘self-managing’. 
Colette does not understand the significance of the readings or their correlation with 
her diet and medication. Colette does however suggest some minor role for self-testing 
from a safety point of view: 
 
It does help because you know what it is, whether it is up or down, do you 
know what I mean? Cause if you do not test it, you won’t know what it is. 
I could be down on the floor in two minutes like; do you know what I mean? 
(Colette) 
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Throughout her narrative, Colette refers to three recent episodes of hypoglycaemia, 
which suggests that her diabetes is not being managed well. The absence of self-
management and lack of understanding in Colette’s story may be associated with a 
lack of education, an inability to assimilate information given, a failure to accept any 
personal responsibility for her own health, or the myriad of other problems that she 
spoke so openly about during the course of the interview. Colette refers to housing, 
family, other health related issues and “feeling down” related to a recent bereavement. 
These issues will be explored as the wider aspects of the phenomenon are further 
outlined. For the purpose of discussion here, it is significant that for Colette, self-
testing does not promote freedom and empowerment as in other participants, but 
creates confusion. Colette is unable to explain high readings, which appears to distress 
her, and liaises with healthcare professionals in order to initiate any change in 
management.  
 
Colette’s scenario is reflective of the type of patient for whom self-testing is not a 
means of enhancing autonomy. Other stakeholders in this study acknowledge that self-
testing can be harmful, when results create anxiety but do not result in corrective 
action. HCP3 refers to this category of the patient population: 
 
… patients who would be testing 7/8 times a day and not doing anything 
‘with’ [emphasis] the reading, as in the case of the type 2 where they can’t 
actually, they have got so hung up on this being the be all and end all of 
their care, that this is going to fix things when in fact it’s possibly their 
diet they should be more focused on. … Personalities are different 
obviously in people, there are some people who get completely wrapped 
up on self-testing when they should be focusing their energies on another 
aspect of their care so that can be a disadvantage to some people. (HCP3) 
 
These sentiments very much echo the reality of Colette’s story.50 The scientific 
community participants, while aware of the possible role of self-testing devices in 
patient empowerment, are not naive to the more negative consequences that may result. 
                                                          
50 Colette’s general demeanour and lack of insight into diabetes and its overall management prompted 
me to spend some time with her after the interview ended. I advised her to seek assistance from the 
diabetic nurse specialist and dietician with regard to clarifying aspects of her diabetes treatment and 
discussing other personal concerns with them. This was a particular example of the ethical 
commitment to participants throughout the research process.  
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Similar to healthcare professionals, they acknowledge the anxiety that can be 
associated with self-testing, particularly when results are not interpreted correctly: 
 
I mean a patient can have a bit of a flip-out if they see something going up 
but medically it might be completely under the radar, it might be noise, but 
the patient might be worried, or the opposite, the patient might get 
complacent if they see something going up or down. So access to 
information as [SCP5] said is quite important – it does empower the 
patient. But maybe down the line and when a device is more accessible to 
a wider public, it is quite possible that the doctor, or like I said the 
practitioner, might have to give them levels of ‘look do not freak out if this 
goes up’. If it goes up 20 fold let us know, if it goes up 2 fold it’s just noise 
or the other way round ... (SCP2) 
 
A number of healthcare professionals refer to the use of specific blood glucose level 
targets to assist patients in interpreting their results and recognising ‘at risk’ figures. 
This interpretation does not seem to be understood by Colette or may not have been 
provided.  
 
Some participants refer to a sense of embarrassment in their engagement with the self-
testing device. Both Betty and Geraldine refer to the fact that they prefer not to test 
during their working day. This is not necessarily because their colleagues are unaware 
of their diagnosis, but rather because it results in a degree of self-exposure that may 
not be necessary:  
 
It’s [self-testing] not something you can do very discreetly and at the end 
of the day, you know, the whole world does not need to know, especially at 
work … (Betty) 
 
For others, the exposure associated with self-testing is more significant in terms of the 
limits it places on their daily activities and interaction with others. Con refers to this 
explicitly. The self-testing process seems to exclude Con from some social activities: 
 
I play a lot of pitch and putt and we normally have coffee, biscuits when 
the day is done. ... I can’t because I must go home and test my blood. (Con) 
 
He expresses a personal preference for carrying out self-testing in private but also 
notes that some of his sporting companions might “object”. His wife, who remained 
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present during the interview with his permission, also noted: “they’d be watching”. 
Similarly, Eileen, a newly diagnosed type 1 diabetic, refers to the embarrassment 
associated with self-testing and injecting herself with insulin. She relates a recent 
conversation with her daughter, who encouraged her to have dinner in a restaurant 
during a recent weekend away. Eileen conceded but noted her reluctance, and the fact 
that she was “hiding in a corner” and kept her handbag in front of her during the 
process. HCP5 acknowledges the sense of embarrassment that can be associated with 
self-testing, as noted by participants in this study: “some of them are conscious of not 
doing in public it means that they need to carry equipment with them every time”. 
 
The self-testing, and sometimes insulin administration, associated with diabetes 
represents an outward sign of an otherwise ‘unseen’ chronic illness. Vickers (2001) 
presents a phenomenological study of individuals who experience ‘unseen’ chronic 
illness in the work environment and the implications that this has for them. Her study 
offers some interesting insights to assist interpretation here. Drawing on the work of 
Parsons (1951) and others, Vickers (2001, p.3) asserts that ill health is problematic in 
a functionalist society where “any level of illness that takes the person below optimal 
capacity becomes a problem”. Vickers’ study reveals a series of harms inflicted on 
individuals in the work place where their capacity to function is at odds with the 
capitalist ideology of the modern working world. Vickers focuses on those illnesses 
which are unseen and do not display outward signs of ill-health. Vickers incorporates 
diabetes in a list of such illnesses. In making the ‘unseen’ seen through the process of 
self-testing, the participants in this study are potentially exposing themselves to the 
negative responses that Vickers portrays.  
 
Con, like other participants, struggles with the chronic nature of his condition, a 
condition which does not result in acute visible manifestations of ill-health; it differs 
from his cancer and previous stroke, but is ever-present and potentially life-threatening 
and debilitating. Con notes, despite his obvious distress, “I don’t feel I have a 
condition”. This sense of ‘unseen’ chronic illness, as something that is different, is also 
alluded to by the healthcare professionals in this study. HCP3 refers to diabetes as “the 
misunderstood condition”, while HCP2 refers to the diabetic patient as “different but 
not different”. By engaging in self-testing the participants in this study are making the 
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‘difference’ more explicit and exposing themselves, as distinct from their work 
colleagues or other contemporaries.  
 
Participants also associate a certain amount of guilt and self-chastisement with self-
testing. Frances refers to her reaction to a high blood glucose reading as follows: 
 
First of all I’m cross. … I would feel a little bit stressed when I see high 
sugars because. … I like to be in control. (Frances) 
 
Frances refers to being ‘cross’ at two different points in her narrative. She also uses 
the word ‘strayed’ - “I would never have strayed” - suggesting that she associates 
deviance with non-compliance and high blood glucose levels. Alex’s narrative also 
portrays a sense of self-chastisement associated with his blood sugar levels, despite 
adhering to medical advice: 
 
I’ve made a lot of changes even in the last 6 months, all of which have 
worked. All the other benefits of doing that have come through, the weight 
control, the cholesterol [reduction].… They’re the positives of it. Except 
my reading … and my doctor is telling me that I shouldn’t beat myself up 
about that because what’s happening, they predicted would happen. 
(Alex) 
 
Willems’s (2000) refers to the sense of blame that can exist within self-management 
programmes and the associated alteration in the patient/clinician relationship. When 
self-management programmes are in place, decline in one’s health status can be 
attributed to the patient’s failure to attend to certain prescribed regimes:  
 
Deterioration cannot solely be blamed on the disease anymore. There is 
some paradox in the account of the disease that is part of monitoring and 
self-management: on the one hand monitoring programs create and 
maintain an image of asthma as a treacherous and capricious disease that 
needs constant surveillance, while on the other hand they make people and 
technologies accountable whenever it is not successfully brought under 
control. (Willems 2000, p.30) 
 
HCP6 supports this perspective. HCP6 recognises guilt as present among patients 
when sharing blood glucose results in the clinic setting. He notes that patients “may 
feel abashed if they hadn’t made a greater effort”. Patients and clinicians now 
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“shoulder the expectation” (Willems 2000, p.30) that illness can be controlled by self-
management programmes. When illness is not controlled, as exemplified by high 
blood glucose readings in this study, the participants can experience feelings of blame 
or guilt, despite the fact that the deterioration may be inevitable, due to declining 
pancreatic function.  
 
An additional consequence of self-management in this regard is that the roles of patient 
and clinician shift. “Self-management results in a redistribution of characteristics and 
competencies between physicians and patients” (Willems 2000, p.30). This 
redistribution is an example of the ‘soft’ impacts51 of technology which occur over 
time and are not considered at the trial stages of development. Mol (2000) articulates 
the unintended outcomes of technological interventions, specifically in the context of 
blood glucose monitoring. Echoing Willems’s perspective, Mol (2000, p.48) refers to 
the “unexpected effects” of technologies which “generate forms of pain and pleasure 
which nobody predicted”. Evidence of such unintended ‘pain’ is demonstrated among 
other experiences recounted in this study. 
 
The process of self-testing can invoke greater distress for others. Con, a fifty-year-old 
man with type 2 diabetes refers to self-testing in primarily negative terms at the point 
of interview. Con reveals his ‘being-with’ the self-testing device in a manner that 
suggests the device has a debilitating impact on him. Con associates very little control 
with the self-testing process, albeit perhaps the role it plays in preventing more 
frequent hospital visits. He does not refer explicitly to the role of the device as an aid 
to self-management at any point in his narrative and, for the most part, he seems to be 
experiencing a general lack of control: 
 
I used be so competitive growing up and not giving in to things and I 
always had a good attitude. … I never had the attitude well, we’ll give up, 
but this thing is getting the best of me, I feel. Through all my sicknesses, 
I’ve never had an attitude to say well you know, give up. I say well, this is 
part of life, what’s thrown at you, you know it’s better to be thrown at me 
than someone else. but this diabetes is getting the best of me, I think. (Con) 
                                                          
51 Soft-impacts of technology involve more cultural issues related to “changes in our way of 
perceiving, acting, valuing, hoping and relating” in comparison to more ‘hard’ impacts related to 
technological hazards and economic benefits (van der Burg and Swierstra 2013, p.4).  
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Other negative experiences of self-testing are evident in Alex’s story. Alex, a type 2 
diabetic, associates a sense of frustration with monitoring and recording blood glucose 
levels at the point when his metabolic functioning is decreasing. For Alex, self-testing 
is not promoting personal freedom, but rather acting as a visual sign of his deteriorating 
health status. Alex relates how the self-testing serves no purpose other than “an 
opportunity to frustrate [myself] even more”.  
 
HCP6 refers to a scenario very similar to Alex’s engagement with the device: 
 
If somebody is getting highs all the time … if they are trying to do their 
best and it’s not working out, sugars aren’t improving, people might, I 
wouldn’t say give up but might get disheartened, there are higher levels of 
depression in diabetes as it is a chronic illness, lack of improvements in 
BMs [colloquial term for blood glucose levels based on previous 
manufacturer’s initials] despite them making an effort, can be 
disheartening. (HCP6) 
 
This also reflects the blame-invoking scenario as noted by Willems above.  
 
All six healthcare professionals interviewed in the study note categories of patients for 
whom self-testing may not work well. HCP2 uses the word “burden” specifically to 
describe the impact of self-testing on some individuals. There is a general 
understanding that self-testing should be an individualised decision. This 
individualised approach to self-testing is evident in the following account: 
 
Some people can have personality problems where there are very anxious 
people, if they are very elderly in some cases. If they see a high reading, it 
can have a huge impact on them. So I think in that case if somebody is just 
on diet and occasionally they have a reading of nine, but most of the time 
they are within target for us, that one high reading makes them very 
unsettled and they may restrict their food which may not be good 
nutritionally for them, or for their health. In that case, there is more need 
for community involvement or maybe just more support from the family. 
They may look at their overall HbA1c rather than doing frequent blood 
sugars, which may distress them. (HCP4) 
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While there does not seem to be a formal review of the specific value of self-testing 
for patients, HCP2 notes that when difficulties arise “it’s all about compromise and 
discussion”. HCP5 refers to such discussion and notes that: 
 
In some of our type 2s who are very stable, or very elderly, and not at risk 
of hypoglycaemia we would be quite happy if, on consultation with the 
patient, they were reluctant to continue testing we would be quite happy to 
discontinue it. (HCP5) 
 
HCP3 notes that the clinic endeavours to facilitate a return visit for type 2 diabetics 
after their initial education. This visit would ideally address the issue of self-testing, 
but due to limited resources, such follow-up visits do not always occur. HCP6 also 
notes the difficulties experienced by some patients and comments that a formal review 
system is “maybe something we should look at”. In addition to HCP3, HCP4 also 
relates the need to discontinue self-testing for some patients: 
 
We have had some people that were so distressed by readings, the 
occasional high reading, and it was causing them severe anxiety, and their 
actual status, their diabetes status was quite good, that we would actually 
suggest, instead of getting themselves upset, that they would attend their 
GP occasionally for the occasional test and have their HbA1c done and 
forget about the testing – it wouldn’t be a huge number – a minority. 
(HCP4) 
 
However, the general philosophy among healthcare professionals interviewed in this 
study appears to be that self-testing is “offered to anybody who has any type of 
diabetes” (HCP3). HCP3 acknowledges the lack of a specific protocol in this regard 
and suggests the need for a more standardised approach: 
 
There is no protocol, it’s all discretionary, at the discretion of the nurse or 
healthcare professional the patient will meet. … It would be good to have 
a standard protocol or policy for maybe those who don’t need to test seven 
or eight times a day, but still have the opportunity to test to avoid that, you 
know, confrontation with it down the line. (HCP3) 
 
However, there are real difficulties in moving towards a more policy/protocol 
orientated approach, as pointed out by HCP5. Despite protocols for testing in type 1 
patients, patients with insulin pumps and those with gestational diabetes, a protocol 
for individuals with type 2 is more difficult: 
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… type 2 involves a very heterogeneous group of conditions all classed 
under one term. Management should be individualised so therefore we 
don’t have any set protocol for any patient as such in relation to testing, 
we try to individualise their therapy according to what stage they’re at … 
(HCP5) 
 
The unwelcome burdens associated with self-testing among participants in this study 
reflect negative feelings associated with illness in a more general sense. The 
sentiments of confusion, guilt, embarrassment, distress, anxiety and frustration 
experienced by the participants are components of what Biro (2012, p.41) refers to as 
the “anatomy of illness”. In accordance with Biro’s analysis, illness can be:  
 
... represented by a series of enlarging, concentric circles set in motion by 
a source - disease - that keeps on repeating itself, from the body to the 
person to the person’s standing in the world and back again. Each circle is 
characterized by a single felt quality: alienation. Something in my body 
does not feel right, I do not feel right, I do not feel like other people. This 
expanding sense of alienation gives rise to the constellation of feelings that 
make up the emotional landscape of illness: fear, anger, vulnerability, 
helplessness, shame, guilt, jealousy, and above all, isolation and 
loneliness. 
  
However, while these emotions may be symptomatic of broader problems associated 
with one’s illness, what is apparent in the interpretation above, and relevant to the 
current sub-theme under discussion, is that, for these participants, the self-testing 
process potentiates the emotions, or brings them to the fore. The interconnectedness 
of the participants’ experiences of diabetes and their engagement with the self-testing 
device is a central feature of the wider interdependent phenomenon. This aspect of the 
phenomenon will be dealt with more explicitly in terms of the participants’ 
relationships with their illness in accordance with the sub-theme: ‘This Thing’ as ever-
present. 
 
The scientific community participants, as noted above, do acknowledge that negative 
emotions can be experienced by patients when utilising self-testing devices. Echoing 
the experience of Colette above, SCP1 recognises the potential for varied individual 
responses to the self-testing process: 
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But ultimately, I think if a doctor is going to put a patient on to a 
monitoring programme they are going to have to evaluate the patient in 
terms of whether that monitoring programme is going to be of use to them. 
And that long term use is not just going to be about the very hard 
biochemistry. Is it going to keep their glucose levels, their HbA1c levels 
down, the glucose levels in check, or is the poor so-and-so literally going 
to be living from one finger stick to the next and worrying about what is 
going on in between? In which case that can be more harmful to their long-
term health than any benefit that could be derived from being on a 
monitoring programme. (SCP1) 
 
However, despite this acknowledgement, it was apparent that the subjective individual 
response to a diagnostic device did not form part of the research process ‘within’ the 
laboratory setting. In the main, as is not unusual, because of their work at the proof of 
concept and early validation stage, the scientific community participants in this study 
were not directly engaged with patients, and were primarily concerned with clinical 
accuracy and reproducibility of test results. This is apparent in the following extract:  
 
... we wouldn’t actually see our patients very often, people like you 
[referring to the researcher] who would, may be involved, would have more 
access to the patients but we do not – we would never see them. We know 
they are there, we know the final outcome is with the patients but we 
wouldn’t have that much interaction with them. (SCP3)52 
 
Mindful of the problems associated with continuous access to blood values, and 
associated pancreatic function, by participants in this study, I asked SCP6 if any of the 
patients noted anything disconcerting about having continuous access to their 
ammonia levels (and subsequently kidney function). SCP6 responded as follows: 
 
                                                          
52It is important to acknowledge that scientific researchers working in the laboratory setting are 
engaged in specific components of work packages, which have been agreed in accordance with the 
Institute’s clinical, academic and scientific partnership. The clinical need for any research programme 
is validated in advance. The specific work focus of the scientific community participants in this study 
is at the early proof of concept stage as outlined in section 1.3.4. The proof of concept phase is 
followed by further technical validation, clinical validation and eventually end product design. Initial 
funding is usually designed to facilitate proof of concept studies and early validation of an innovative 
technology (clinical and technical). Where a device is being designed for patient use specifically, due 
care and consideration would be taken to ensure that it is fit for purpose, for example the ease of use 
of the device, meaningfulness and relevance of the data generated etc. However, while further 
research may be undertaken beyond the proof of concept stage, it is arguably preferable to engage 
with patients initially, and explore the impact that more readily available results may have on them. 
This debate is continued within the discussion phase of the thesis in section 6.3.4. 
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Not that I noticed – a lot of it was basically blood work and waiting for 
results to come back. Having the results almost instantly, whether they 
were positive or negative results, it was comforting. It is not invasive at all 
so you are actually monitoring biomarkers – biomarkers on the breath, 
which means there is little discomfort at all – it is literally blowing into a 
tube. (SC6) 
 
In light of the primarily objective nature of this response, and additional data reported 
by the researcher relating to the physical comfort of the device, I initiated conversation 
about the nature of data collected and asked about the inclusion of any qualitative 
assessment. SC6 responded as follows: 
 
It was mostly quantitative just because of the research perspective of the 
whole thing ... there was very little qualitative data from their voices and 
feedback from the whole thing simply because it was such an early stage 
of the project. It would be better, in my opinion, to have that further down 
the line when it is more of a regularly used device versus a six-month trial 
period. (SC6) 
 
This highlights the almost exclusively quantitative and efficacy-focused nature of the 
assessment of diagnostic devices at clinical trial stage. 
 
This is not to suggest that the scientific community participants were not interested in 
the patient perspective. Focus group participants (SCP4, SCP3, and SCP5) noted the 
inclusion of the patient perspective in numerous discussion fora within the scientific 
community: 
 
And they [end-user applications] are definitely discussed in the review 
process, we’ve just had our Scientific Advisory Board, our Industrial 
Advisory Board and our Academic Advisory Board and they definitely ask 
those questions: ‘what is the purpose of the work you do?’ and I think that 
does apply to everybody. (SCP3) 
 
The importance of the patient’s perspective within the organisation’s educational 
programmes was also noted.53 It is rather that the frame of reference, within which 
participants assimilated the patient perspective, did not always seem to be particularly 
                                                          
53 The institute includes workshops on the social and ethical dimensions of diagnostic devices as a 
component of its MSc programme. 
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attuned to the wider affective dimensions of the diagnostic or testing process. The 
general assumption is that more frequent and more accessible testing, once convenient 
and as non-invasive as possible, is always in the patient’s best interest. These 
sentiments are expressed by SCP1 as she outlines her vision for a connected health 
system of patient monitoring with the assistance of diagnostic devices: 
 
That will facilitate more frequent monitoring of a person’s condition. And 
the assumption is that that would be better for that person’s health in the 
long-term. Because not only will you get the more frequent monitoring 
which of itself is probably going to be better for the patient but you get a 
better patient buy-in or you get a better patient adherence to management 
of that condition overall. (SCP1) 
 
While this statement most certainly appears to concur with some of the participants’ 
stories in this study, the ‘unwelcome burdens’ as experienced by Colette, Con, Frances 
and Alex, suggest that this is not true in all cases, at all times. Interestingly, the 
scientific community participants acknowledge that their perspective may be unilateral 
in some respects and would value a challenge to their primarily scientific outlook. 
Following the focus group, I asked the scientific community participants to evaluate 
their participation (see evaluation form included in Appendix H). This response from 
SCP2 echoes some of the other respondents’ views: 
 
The experience was quite positive as many aspects of the philosophy of 
POC [point of care] self-diagnosis were discussed from a perspective that 
we would not often consider. Many of us consider our roles to be that of a 
developer, in that it is our remit to “make the thing work”. Until the later 
stages of development, we may not apply much consideration to the 
experience of the end-user who will ultimately have the highest interaction 
with the device. (SCP2)54 
 
This discussion is also pertinent to the next thematic component of the phenomenon, 
which outlines difficulties encountered by the participants in their relationship with 
the device, related to its technical capabilities.  
 
                                                          
54 The experience of SCP2 here is not unusual in the wider context of innovation and device 
development. See footnote 50 above.  
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In light of the negative experiences recounted by participants in this study, it seems 
surprising that self-testing would be routinely recommended, particularly when there 
is an acknowledgement within the healthcare community that self-testing may not 
always have value. There is a general agreement among healthcare professionals in 
this study that, while self-testing is mandatory among individuals with type 1 diabetes 
and other patients receiving hypoglycaemic agents, it may have some value but is not 
obligatory among type 2 patients who are not receiving such pharmacological agents. 
HCP3 explains, similar to what much of current evidence suggests, that in type 2 
patients when HbA1c is well-controlled  and other physiological parameters such as 
cholesterol, blood pressure and lipids are satisfactory that self-testing is not an absolute 
requirement. Similarly, HCP5 notes that “in type 2 diabetes patients, who are not on 
oral agents that have a risk of hypoglycaemia, the role is relatively limited”. If self-
testing is not necessary for physiological well-being, and may harm psychological 
well-being in some patients, it begs the question as to why does it continue to be routine 
practice for patients with type 2 diabetes. 
 
5.3.4 Living with pain and other technical imperfections 
This sub-theme addresses a number of technical difficulties that the patients 
experience in their engagement with the device. The patients, for the most part, are 
accepting of these imperfections but acknowledge their existence. Most relevant is the 
experience of pain, which is inevitable, as the monitoring device is invasive. Other 
difficulties include interrelated issues such as: the size of the device, the cumbersome 
nature of the component parts, and the time required to elicit a result. Collectively, 
these issues represent problems with the indiscreet nature of the self-testing process. 
Both the healthcare professionals and the scientific community participants offer some 
insights with regard to the technical aspects of the device, which are interwoven with 
the patient experience. 
 
Pain in self-testing is noted by a number of participants in the study, but is most 
prominent in Ann’s story. Anne’s narrative represents both a denial and an 
acknowledgement of the problem:  
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You see some people have a fear of needles and that and they think it hurts 
but it does not hurt [raised voice]. Now initially when I started first I 
thought ‘Oh my God Ah! [emphasis], I used to be pricking my finger and 
even the thought of it was desperate. When I was admitted to hospital first, 
and of course it was tested several times during the day, I used to nearly 
get sick when I’d see it [the lancet] coming. Now I do not take any notice 
of it and it does not hurt [raised voice]. (Ann) 
 
In order to acquire blood for self-testing purposes patients are required to pierce their 
skin by use of a small needle, referred to as a ‘lancet’. At four different times in the 
interview, Ann refers to the fact that self-testing “does not hurt”. However, she does 
refer to the fact that she “does not like needles” but continues to self-test because of 
the health implications of not adhering to the advised management programme. Ann’s 
comments at the close of the interview refer to a need for non-invasive monitoring 
which would not require a blood sample: 
 
If there was a way without actually pricking on the surface of the skin, if 
there was some kind of monitor that you could say just put in on, and you 
could, through sensors or whatever, draw the reading. (Ann) 
 
The experience of pain is also noted by other participants. Con refers to the pain 
associated with self-testing as particularly problematic, in light of his previous stroke, 
which means he can only self-test on one hand, resulting in it “becoming like a pin-
cushion”. Frances also acknowledges the pain factor but does not see this as a deterrent 
to self-testing.  
 
HCP6 notes that many of the patients are surprised to find self-testing more painful 
than the actual injection of insulin, and that the experience of pain may prevent more 
frequent monitoring. In acknowledging the pain associated with self-testing, HCP5 
notes an additional problem. As patients’ fingertips become compromised due to 
frequent monitoring, this may affect their ability to read braille at a later stage should 
they develop blindness through retinopathy, which is a long-term complication of 
diabetes. HCP5 and HCP6 echo Anne’s hope for a system of non-invasive monitoring. 
 
122 
 
 
The scientific community participants noted that many of the developments in 
diagnostics they are currently engaged with require a blood sample, and therefore, 
invasive monitoring. There was some acknowledgement of pain as an issue in self-
testing, as SCP6 referred to the non-invasive nature of the breath-monitoring device 
under development. One participant noted the development of a device in another 
institution that would test biomarkers on saliva.  
 
Apart from pain, participants also noted other issues regarding the device. Betty notes 
that the device now requires less blood to elicit a result, and that in general “the 
monitors have become smaller and lighter, more user-friendly”. Denis also refers to 
the reduced quantity of blood now required to test. Ann refers to how the device has 
“modernised”, and Frances notes the continuous reduction in testing time. However, 
despite Betty’s acknowledgements of developments, she refers to further 
improvements that could be made, particularly with regard to the cumbersome nature 
of the device due to a number of separate parts, and the impact that this has on the 
ability to self-test discreetly. 
 
The lack of discretion in the process, due to the cumbersome nature of the device, may 
contribute to the sense of embarrassment experienced by participants as noted earlier, 
and the reluctance to test in the work environment: 
 
I can do a shift when I may be on a 15 minute break and to sort of get the 
monitor out, physically have what I need to eat in the 15 [minutes], and 
then administer my insulin, you know, you’re on a very tight time-scale 
and like that, if you’re in a cloak room or whatever and someone says “and 
what are you doing?” (Betty) 
 
Also referring to the time factor involved, Frances notes that she would like the 
monitor to be more “instantaneous” in producing a reading. Con notes the 
awkwardness of his most recent monitor. While accepting the value of a self-
calibrating device, he refers to its more cumbersome nature: “a bit awkward” to be 
carrying around. Similarly, Alex also notes the size of the device, its component parts 
and the impact this may have on his testing regime: 
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I’d have gone away for the weekend and  left it at home, or I’ve gone to 
work and  left it at home, it’s not, I mean, I don’t carry a man bag or 
anything like that, it’s not small. You know if you had something that’s 
tidier, you know, and I believe that there’s something being developed that 
would make it a lot easier, and maybe I wouldn’t be forgetting it. (Alex) 
 
Frances’s reference to a free sample monitor in her second interview highlights her 
role as a discerning customer who values various aspects of the device design: 
 
… it is very compact and it is a lovely machine and you have a little 
monitor – its only I’d say the thickness of your two smallest fingers it is 
very very sleek. But to actually test with the finger yoke is terrible! It is so 
sharp and I think it is at the first setting I have you would actually draw 
about quarter of a pint of blood; there is so much of it. It is a fabulous little 
monitor but to do the finger pricking you actually would die. The next time 
I go up and he is above now towards the end of the year I’m just going to 
tell him. (Frances 2) 
 
Not all participants note difficulties with the device. Despite some acknowledgement 
of the “finger pricking” Deirdre comments: “I do not think they could make it any 
easier”. Similarly Denis, Hannah and Geraldine are quite matter of fact about their use 
of the device. However, it is apparent that technical aspects of the device can create 
difficulties for some participants, influencing the patient experience and, in some 
cases, the time and frequency of their testing.  
 
When asked, the scientific community participants in this study articulated various 
views about the important aspects of a device from the patient perspective. In addition 
to a non-invasive technology, these included a “fool proof device” (SCP3), and a 
device which is professional looking from an aesthetic perspective (SCP1). SCP6 
notes: “one thing that is always overlooked is ease of use and comfort for the patient”. 
It appears, with the exception of SCP6, that the focus group participants were not 
directly engaged with patients in a manner that could elicit this type of information. It 
is important to note that for the most part, the work in which focus group participants 
were engaged with took place within a laboratory setting that is never accessed by the 
patient population (see section 1.3.4). When clinical trials take place, they occur in 
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other centres or the hospital.55 In the evaluation following the focus group, SCP2 notes 
the value of patient engagement and wider stakeholder interaction, in addressing 
patients’ technological concerns. However, interestingly, SCP2 also notes the value of 
such engagement as a means to foster an appreciation of the complexities involved in 
technological applications.  
I would suggest that such discussions be in two formats. The first could be 
similar to what we did as part of the focus group, in that we discuss our 
opinions and view of the application. However, I think that this would only 
be useful if these discussions were brought to a second level of group that 
would also have representation from investigators from the “flip-side” - 
nurses, GPs, manufacturers or perhaps patients. Here, the challenges from 
both sides of the POC experience could be made clear to the other. On the 
development side, we sometimes forget that the instrument will be used by 
non-technically minded persons, and on the deployment side, the 
difficulties of miniaturisation and speed may be explained. If there were 
all-inclusive discussions such as this … from time-to-time, I would feel it 
would be quite a positive development. (SCP2) 
 
In summation, the patients in this study recounted various aspects of their individual 
relationships with the self-testing device, which may support or negate the experience 
of autonomy. Such experiences are, on some occasions, but not always, understood by 
the healthcare professionals or the scientific community participants. Once a device is 
in use, it can affect the patient’s daily life in ways that were not envisaged at the point 
of development. The scientific community participants appreciate the importance of 
the patient context; however, the research processes involved at the development stage 
of a device will not necessarily elicit contextual information about the individual 
patient experience. The experience of engagement through the process of a focus group 
in this study suggests that interaction and reflection regarding the ‘soft’ impacts of 
technologies may benefit the scientific community participants and, ultimately, the 
patient experience. In addition, further interaction among all stakeholders may create 
a greater understanding of the complexities involved at the design stage.  
 
                                                          
55 The clinical partners, in accordance with the institute’s governance structures have responsibility 
for validating the clinical need for projects and overseeing/directing appropriate clinical use of the 
end-product. However, the extent to which application of the end-product based on its clinical 
efficacy is sufficient, without a more psychosocial assessment of its effects, is a matter of debate. 
This point will be re-visited at the discussion stage. 
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5.4 Relationship with illness 
This thematic component of the interdependent phenomenon concerns the 
participant’s relationship with his or her illness. This relationship affects the 
experience of autonomy. The participants experienced this relationship in three 
distinct, yet interrelated, ways. Firstly, for some, there is evidence of accepting their 
diagnosis and taking ownership of the management of their health. The sub-theme 
Taking control explores this perspective. Secondly, significant among participants is 
that their experiences of autonomy in self-testing cannot be separated from their wider 
experiences of living with chronic illness and diabetes. A sense of chronicity was 
prominent among a number of participants as addressed in the sub-theme; ‘This Thing’ 
as ever present. Thirdly, the illness’s course, and other life events, can affect one’s 
experience of autonomy over time. This aspect of the phenomenon is addressed by the 
sub-theme, Autonomy as contingent in chronic illness. The sub-themes within this 
relationship encompass various temporal and corporeal perspectives in terms of the 
existential experience of illness. These existential perspectives will be noted 
throughout, in addition to the insights from other stakeholders, to illuminate this aspect 
of the overall phenomenon.  
 
5.4.1 Taking control 
The issue of control, referred to throughout many narratives, is quite significant in 
interpreting participants’ stories. This is distinct from the experience of ‘being-in-
control’, and the sense of positive freedom or autonomy, which it affords participants, 
as noted in Freedom within constraints. Here I refer to the conscious act of ‘taking 
control’; an acceptance of the self-testing regime and associated diabetes management. 
The participants who experience a sense of freedom or empowerment, associated with 
the self-testing device, refer specifically to accepting responsibility for their own 
illness. There is an obvious sense of taking ownership of their illness in their narratives. 
They all see self-testing as something for them, a means of taking an active role in 
their diabetes management. This reflects an important dimension of the interdependent 
phenomenon of autonomy within the self-testing process.  
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This sense of taking control is particularly apparent in Deirdre’s narrative when she 
refers to the self-testing process: 
 
... I’m doing something for me. … It’s up to me. ... You have to self-test and 
you have to able to read it and you have to be able to tell yourself if it’s 
going up, why is it going up?... As I said it’s down to you, it’s down to me, 
it’s my life. I mean, what can you do, what can you say at the end of the 
day? It’s down to me and that’s it. … I do not think they can make it any 
easier than what it is; I think that the home testing as I’m doing is brilliant. 
(Deirdre)  
 
Deirdre is a lady in her fifties with type 2 diabetes for the last 9 years. She self-tests 
her blood glucose levels once a day in the morning. Deirdre’s acceptance of 
responsibility for undertaking self-testing and managing her diabetes is evident in the 
extract above and was palpable all during the interview. Field notes on the day make 
this point and note that the interview cast self-testing in a positive light. Deirdre lives 
independently. Her grown up children now live away from home. Deirdre, as noted 
earlier, is not without criticism of the self-testing process; she refers to it as a 
‘nuisance’ at one point, but this does not prevent her from speaking positively about 
its contribution to her well-being. Deirdre tests once a day and uses this reading as an 
ongoing marker to evaluate her health. 
 
In a similar manner, Betty, who also expressed positive accounts of self-testing, refers 
to personal responsibility in her narrative. Betty refers to self-testing as an activity that 
is: “more for you than for the medics”, a process that assists in “your day to day 
management of your diabetes”. In the same way, Ann notes that she would “question” 
a healthcare system, which did not facilitate self-testing among diabetics as “the 
ultimate responsibility is with yourself”. Geraldine’s thoughts on the self-testing 
process are similar: “I think it’s good because at least we’re able to keep control of it 
ourselves you know”. Geraldine, like Deirdre, self-tests once a day only, while 
acknowledging that perhaps more frequent testing may be useful. Even Denis, who 
exhibits a more limited sense of autonomy than others do, notes the following: “I 
prefer to do things for myself.”  
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Likewise, Bart refers to the sense of personal control that he associates with regularly 
checking his blood sugar levels. Bart points to a particular interaction with a healthcare 
provider as a turning point, which marked a shift in his thoughts about his illness from 
a time when he used to adopt a “harum scarum” [ad hoc] approach to his present more 
diligent self-management techniques: 
 
I’d say, that’s a long time ago now, and I was very ‘harum-scarum’ about 
it. I’d check them today and I mightn’t check them for 3 or 4 days again 
and you know it might be the odd check every now and then, but I’ve 
definitely got into a stage now where I just can’t visualise not checking 
them (Bart) 
 
With regard to his change of attitude, Bart notes: “I do not know what frame of mind I 
am after coming into”. This ‘frame of mind’, this taking control, in association with 
the education received, has obvious benefits for Bart with regard to his diabetes 
management. In the absence of this change of attitude, and Bart’s keen interest to take 
control of his diabetes, any amount of educational input may not have the same impact. 
This is a particular example of the interdependent nature of the phenomenon of 
autonomy in self-testing. While Bart’s relationship with the device was positively 
assisted by the education he received from his healthcare provider, his relationship 
with his own illness, his taking control, allowed him to maximise the potential of that 
information.  
 
The degree to which individuals feel that life events are within their control is viewed 
as an essential element of coping in the context of chronic illness. This characteristic 
is referred to as an internal locus of control. The ‘locus of control’ construct was 
developed by Rotter (1966 cited in Lange and Tiggemann 1981) and is generally 
understood to refer to the degree to which one considers life events to be within one’s 
control (an internal locus of control), or dependant on fate or chance (an external locus 
of control). One of the healthcare professionals in this study noted that active patient 
management is “integral to the management of diabetes” as “diabetes can only be 
managed if there is a full buy-in from the individual with the condition” (HCP5). This 
perspective was very much echoed by other healthcare professionals. HCP6 views self-
testing as a “very important part of being in charge”. HCP3 refers specifically to the 
importance of patients seeing self-testing as an activity that is for their benefit, as noted 
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by the participants above. There is no point in patients taking recordings to please their 
healthcare professional or even falsifying records to achieve this end:  
 
Taking it because they feel the nurse might like to see a whole bunch of 
readings, this thing of ‘here are my readings, here are my numbers’, and 
did they do anything with their insulin? No! [Emphasis] doing it because 
they are trying to please the doctor or the nurse. Patients feel they are 
doing it for you, the nurse or the doctor, certain personalities of 
patients…not all patients. They are trying to please you [emphasis] that 
they have everything written down. I have seen books falsified, if you know 
what I mean, there couldn’t be the same number practically across for a 
whole week in the same coloured pen. (HCP3) 
 
Based on their narratives Betty, Ann, Bart, Geraldine and Deirdre appear to be 
representative of personality types who welcome being in control, and positively take 
control of their illnesses. Lange and Tiggemann’s (1981, p.398) synopsis of the locus 
of control construct accords well with the sense of control portrayed by these 
participants: 
 
 those individuals who have an internal locus of control have a belief that 
rewards follow on from, or are dependent on, their own behaviour. They 
believe that their actions can affect the course of their lives.  
 
5.4.2 ‘This Thing’ as ever present  
This sub-theme is central to the interdependent nature of autonomy in self-testing 
revealed in this study. For some of the participants it was difficult to differentiate their 
experiences of self-testing from their wider experiences of living with diabetes. I 
suggest that it is impossible, and even epistemologically flawed, to present a 
phenomenological account of self-testing in diabetes without reference to the 
overarching experience of chronic illness. The participants’ experience of chronicity 
is revealed here in their accounts of self-testing. There is an evident temporality in 
their narratives as their sense of time is shaped by the ever-present nature of chronic 
illness. The future-directedness with which they live their lives is also apparent as they 
act today to prevent future complications. The participants’ spatial existence is also 
revealed as the presence of the self-testing device, and subsequent readings, act as a 
visible representation and reminder of an otherwise ‘hidden’ illness. It is within this 
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sub-theme that the ontological revealing associated with one’s engagement with things 
is most apparent. In accordance with a Heideggerian (1954/2003) understanding of the 
world, our engagement with technology reveals our ontological selves. Asking 
participants in this study about their engagement with self-testing technology revealed 
much about their ontological disposition as individuals living with chronic illness. 
 
This is most apparent in Con’s story, an individual with type 2 diabetes. Con’s story 
was briefly outlined earlier in this chapter as an example of the ‘unwelcome burdens’ 
associated with self-testing devices. Con has previously survived a cancer diagnosis, 
and has limited use of one hand due to a previous cardio-vascular accident. Very 
prevalent in Con’s narrative is his struggle with a diagnosis of diabetes and its chronic 
nature, in light of his other healthcare problems. This struggle is interwoven with his 
experience of self-testing and cannot be divorced from it. As Con refers to ‘this thing’ 
in his narrative outlined below, it is impossible to decipher if he is referring to the self-
testing device or his diabetes:  
 
Well, when I get up it’s the first thing in the drawer that’s looking at me, 
my self-testing kit. I do not really understand. They tell me the lower my 
blood sugar level is the better. I do not really know I’m only going by what 
the nurses say. I just can’t get my head round ‘this thing’ that I have it. 
There are certain times I look at the tester kit and I say well, you know if 
only I hadn’t got it that would be one less thing. (Con) 
 
At another point in the interview Con notes his acceptance of other life events, but has 
difficulty with this diagnosis: 
 
I don’t regret my life, I wouldn’t change it for anything, but since I had 
this diabetes it’s really taken over. Self-testing, appointments with Doctor 
x, appointments with the nurse. I thought I was finished all that with the 
cancer and now it’s back again. ... I’m being reminded every day – I have 
to test. (Con) 
 
Field notes following Con’s interview refer to a concern about his general welfare and 
a referral, with his permission, to the diabetic nurse specialist to explore some of these 
issues with the diabetic support team. For Con, it appeared that his diabetes diagnosis 
and engagement with the device signified the ‘last straw’ in terms of his ill-health. 
This is an enduring issue for Con as he is not newly-diagnosed. He is experiencing an 
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ongoing difficulty in adjusting to his diagnosis, palpable in his hesitant tone and his 
words; “I just can’t get my head around this thing that I have it. This thing comes along 
and sets me back”. Also, he seems to separate his illness from himself, referring to it 
in third person terms such as: as “this thing”, “this diabetes”. The chronicity of the 
disease is very problematic for him: 
 
I’m just fed up of all the time being ... you know, constantly worried about 
my health. ...Once I get over one thing it’s another bad thing. (Con) 
 
Frances’s story reveals a similar struggle with the chronicity of her condition. The 
ever-present nature of the illness became all consuming for her:  
 
I want to just forget about this for a couple of months. I mean I would have 
been very good, fairly good at walking and doing exercise but you get sick 
of that too. It’s very hard to stay focused, that’s what I’m saying, you know 
the whole time. (Frances) 
 
Frances refers to discontinuing self-testing for a while, despite acknowledging the 
benefits of it. Again, Frances’s relationship with self-testing is interlinked with her 
experience of chronic illness. Frances relates being “fed up with the whole process of 
the testing, of being the diabetic”. Con’s and Frances’s experiences accord with 
Toombs’s phenomenological account of incurable illness: 
 
The experience of illness is always the experience of ‘having’ and ‘being 
had’. I not only have an illness it also ‘has’ me. (Toombs 2002, p.127) 
 
Con, Frances (and Colette as noted earlier) refer to being consumed by their illness. 
There are temporal considerations at play here, related to the experience of chronicity. 
For Con, his illness does not have a fixed time scale, whereby if he does certain things, 
and accords with certain measures, he will ‘recover’ as in his experience of cancer and 
a brain injury, albeit to a lesser extent. There is no chemotherapy or rehabilitation 
programme that will eliminate diabetes. Previous methods of taking control do not 
work here: “this diabetes is getting the best of me, I think”. Heideggerian temporality 
refers to the existential experience of lived time. Heidegger’s concept of time involves 
a three-fold structure of past, present and future, referred to as Heidegger’s Care 
structure. This is central to Heidegger’s overall understanding of Dasein, as ‘being-
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in-the-world’. Dasein, Care and temporality are all intrinsically interwoven in 
Heidegger’s philosophy. “For Heidegger, care is the meaning of Dasein” and “the 
primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (Dotray 2010, p.50).56  
 
Time as temporality means that my existence, my human mode of being involves a 
non-linear fusion of my past, present and future. Reflecting this existentialist 
temporality, Con comes to this diagnosis with his past history of illness experience, he 
struggles with the present, and he seems to rebel against the ongoing, never-ending 
future of his diabetes. Frances notes being distressed by the ongoing nature of her 
illness also and the difficulty associated with keeping focused indefinitely. Colette, 
who seemed to understand very little about her diabetes, is caught in a whirlwind of 
confusion and, in some ways her struggle seems to be potentiated by her lack of 
understanding.  
 
All healthcare professionals refer to the sense of anxiety that is related to self-testing 
when it becomes almost obsessional. This may well be the case for Con: “when I get 
up it’s the first thing in the drawer that’s looking at me, my self-testing kit”. HCP3 
notes: 
 
I have seen over my career in diabetes … there are certain personalities 
who cannot cope with the extra strain of it. In one instance I can think of 
having to take the actual glucometer off the patient, because she had 
become withdrawn, depressed. … when we examined what was the causing 
factor it was the self-testing, it wasn’t the taking of the tablet, it wasn’t the 
diet, so you have to be mindful that it is not always beneficial to one’s well-
being, but obviously we have to advocate it in the event of people who need 
to know and we are trying to advance self-management to be able to self-
care. (HCP3) 
 
HCP3 comments later in the narrative that this lady’s difficulties subsided once self-
testing was discontinued, and her type 2 diabetes was managed successfully through 
clinic visits and less regular HbA1c level testing. As Con does not use his self-testing 
                                                          
56 Dotray’s paper provides a succinct overview of Heidegger’s temporality, which was most helpful in 
understanding this element of Heidegger’s philosophy. Within his paper, Dotray (2010) compares 
Heidegger’s concept of time with that of McTaggart’s. A thorough analysis of McTaggart’s 
perspective, or Dotray’s conclusions, is beyond the scope of this work. However, Dotray’s overview 
of Heidegger’s contribution to the philosophy of time was most beneficial.  
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to titrate insulin doses, discontinuing self-testing is a possibility for him. It is 
interesting to note that Frances’s doctor prescribed oral hypoglycaemics for her 
diabetes, instead of insulin, due to her lack of adherence to self-testing. As her blood 
glucose levels could be managed without insulin, a self-testing regime would then not 
be as important in her management plan, thereby relieving the anxiety associated with 
it. This would also prevent a possible hypoglycaemic event if insulin were given 
without detecting low blood glucose levels. Frances notes in her narrative that during 
the period when she discontinued self-testing, she continued to administer the same 
amount of insulin every day.  
 
For Con, Frances and Alex, it is as if the self-testing device signifies an external 
representation of their diabetes diagnosis and causes distress in this regard. This is an 
example of a more negative impact of Knowing the body. The extent to which 
participants come to ‘know’ the inner workings of their bodies as more ‘visible’ 
entities is relevant existentially from a temporal, spatial and corporeal perspective. 
Heidegger’s modes of being, as discussed in chapter 3, ‘ready-to-hand’, ‘unready-to-
hand’ and ‘present-to-hand’ are relevant here. The self-testing device brings the 
patient’s blood glucose level and associated pancreatic function, into the ‘present-to-
hand’ mode (Heidegger 1927/1962). Equipment that is ‘ready-to-hand’ is always in 
use for some purpose and is engaged with the user to the point of invisibility. One does 
not consider the lock that opens the door, or the heel of a shoe, as of any significance 
until they become deficient. It is in the ‘unready-to-hand’ mode that the world becomes 
apparent or ‘present-at-hand’: 
 
Cars break down; hammers fall apart or wine glasses shatter; bodily organs 
suddenly fail us. It is mostly in these moments that equipment becomes 
conspicuous and draws our attention to it. (Harman 2007, p.63) 
 
Body function, previously existing as ‘ready-to-hand’, and invisible, is now ‘present-
at-hand’ through the use of the self-testing device. In this sense the extent to which 
participants come to ‘know’ the inner workings of their bodies as more ‘visible’ 
entities is also relevant existentially from a temporal and spatial perspective. Illness 
states obliterate the previous “taken-for-grantedness” associated with one’s body and 
it now becomes “the unwelcome focus of one’s attention” (Toombs 2002, p.126). 
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Albeit welcome, or unwelcome, the experience of one’s body is now central to one’s 
sense of space. For Con, Alex and Frances, the self-testing process, as facilitated by 
the device, is a reminder of a diabetes diagnosis, a chronic condition. It brings to the 
fore decreasing pancreatic functioning, the implications of a body with diabetes and 
the never-ending series of tasks associated with this chronic condition.  
 
During the focus group interview with the scientific community participants, I shared 
a synopsis of Con’s story, anonymously, and some of his narrative. After a brief period 
of personal reflection on his story, the scientific community participants acknowledged 
the link between self-testing and the chronicity of his diagnosis for Con. This is 
summarised by SCP5 as follows: 
 
This self-testing is one thing that he wanted to cut out of his life, to have 
less reminder of this constant misfortune. (SCP5) 
 
SCP3 also appreciated the interweaving that occurred with self-testing and illness: 
 
… it’s the actual disease, like every time I’m testing I’m reminded that I’m 
different that I have this problem. (SCP3) 
 
However, there was some reluctance to associate Con’s experience of self-testing with 
his distress: “I don’t think it shows the disadvantage of the self-testing, it shows the 
situation in which that person has to do it” (SCP5). There is some evidence here of a 
tendency to separate Con’s self-testing regime from his wider experience of illness. 
This does not reflect the experiences of patients interviewed in this study.  
 
HCP1 positively describes the role of self-testing in reminding patients they have 
diabetes. However, while this may act as a motivating factor in adopting healthier 
behaviours, as noted earlier, it may have more debilitating consequences for others in 
terms of crystallising, or revealing, the chronicity of their condition. This is central to 
one’s sense of space. SCP2 makes the interesting associated observation that ‘seeing’ 
the result is significant: 
 
I think maybe one of his problems is that he is seeing the result. You could 
self-test and if the device would, by whatever technology is there, send the 
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result to the doctor. rather than – he seems to be obsessing about the result. 
(SCP2) 
 
Another dimension to the participants’ experiences of self-testing, which is interwoven 
with the experience of chronicity, is the awareness of the potential for long-term 
complications and the importance of self-testing in this regard. A number of the female 
participants note concerns in this regard. Frances expresses a fear of developing 
complications in the future and being unable to live independently: 
 
I was hospitalised for the first week of it [diabetes diagnosis] and I saw the 
women inside there who were in their 60s and you know, it probably did 
frighten me a bit because one of the ladies, a lovely lady, she couldn’t even 
test because she couldn’t see. She kind of, you know, didn’t look after 
herself and her son had to come in and test her and I did find that very 
hard. Because I don’t really, if I’m not going to be in good control of it, 
I’m just afraid. Because I think in the long term you can’t be depending on 
children or making people feel that, you know, I have this thing about 
losing my eyesight with it. (Frances) 
 
There are a number of long-term complications associated with type 1 and type 2 
diabetes. Blood vessels, eyes (retinopathy), heart, nerve pathways (nephropathy) and 
kidneys (nephropathy) can all become irreversibly damaged if diabetes is poorly 
controlled (WHO 2012). Maintaining good glycaemic control is a key factor in 
preventing micro-vascular and neurological complications of diabetes (IDF 2011). 
Self-management, which incorporates a self-testing regime, and interpretation of 
results, is recognised as a means of maintaining ‘in-range’ blood glucose levels. 
Adhering to the self-testing process, and associated medication regime, is in many 
ways future orientated. Caution with regard to one’s health today may prevent 
complications in the future.  
 
Toomb’s personal phenomenological account of living with multiple sclerosis offers 
some interesting insights here from a temporal perspective. Toombs (2002, p.129) 
refers to the constant “future-directedness” with which we live our lives when 
diagnosed with a chronic illness. One’s personal sense of time is altered. Time takes 
on a new significance:  
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In our culture we think of time as a series of more or less discrete moments 
along a timeline of past, present and future. With the prospect of increasing 
debility the future assumes an inherently problematic and threatening 
character. So pervasive is this threat that the future engulfs the present. 
(Toombs 2002, p.128) 
 
The fear of developing future complications associated with their diabetes diagnosis 
engulfs the present for some of the participants within this study. Toomb’s analysis 
reflects Heidegger’s concept of time as ‘temporality’. As outlined previously, this is 
not ‘clock time’, in terms of how time is generally understood in common vernacular, 
but rather represents time as ‘lived’ in an existential sense. The patient experiences 
recounted here also reflect the sense of “provisional time” described by Morris (2008, 
p.4) whereby the chronically ill individual is submerged in a sense of time associated 
with the “next dose, treatment or turn of the disease”.  
 
The chronicity of diabetes and its never-ending nature is also noted by the healthcare 
professionals in the study. Interestingly, HCP3’s account refers to this as a struggle for 
both patients and healthcare professionals: 
 
…it’s a chronic ongoing struggle, if you want to call it a struggle, that’s 
probably the wrong word but, you have to constantly keep on top of it and 
you are going to constantly have the same people running into the same 
type of difficulties year on, year in. That’s trying on the patient but it’s also 
trying on the HCP because you may have said exactly the same thing, and 
gone through the exact same thing but in two years’ time most likely you 
will doing the same thing with that same person because it’s ongoing. 
(HCP3) 
 
It is apparent that participants recount experiences of chronic illness when asked about 
engagement with self-testing devices. The participants’ ontological realities are 
exposed in a manner that highlights the interdependent nature of autonomy in self-
testing. The patients’ experiences of self-testing, and subsequent presence or absence 
of autonomy, is interwoven with their lives as individuals with diabetes. The never-
ending presence of ‘this thing’, ‘this diabetes’ shapes the participants’ experience of 
self-testing. While for some participants, the experience may be characterised as a 
future-orientated concern with controlling their diabetes in the present, for others it 
involves a more negative perception of self-testing as a reminder of chronic illness. 
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The participants’ experiences were not static. Their sense of chronicity and 
engagement with self-testing changed over time. This represents another significant 
aspect of the overall phenomenon that will be addressed in the section which follows.  
 
5.4.3 Autonomy as contingent in chronic illness 
This sub-theme relates to the fact that one cannot always be autonomous, despite the 
intention and encouragement to act in this way. This relates to corporeal concerns 
regarding the ill body and contextual issues related to the complexities associated with 
a chronic illness diagnosis, its course over time, and other life events. While some 
patients expressed an enthusiasm for accepting more autonomous roles associated with 
self-testing, this was not always realised during periods of decreasing pancreatic 
function. The situated nature of illness is also significant in this sub-theme. The ability 
to be autonomous changes over time for some participants, related to one’s point in 
the illness trajectory57 and other various life events. The progression from initial 
disequilibrium at the time of diagnosis, to later acceptance of the disease and becoming 
more autonomous in its management, is common across a number of participants. 
However, difficulties in adaptation to illness are also evident in other narratives. The 
stories of Alex and Frances are particularly of relevance here as their narrative displays 
a clear shift in their ability to ‘take control’ of their illness at different times. Healthcare 
professionals and the scientific community participants all recognise the ‘individual’ 
nature of illness and its contextual dimensions – however this recognition occurs to 
varying degrees. 
 
The gradual adaptation to a diagnosis of diabetes, and associated self-testing activities, 
is apparent across a number of patient narratives. Deirdre, Ann, Bart and Geraldine all 
relate how, despite a sense of disequilibrium at the point of diagnosis, they adapted 
over time and began to accept a more autonomous role in the management of their 
illness. Ann notes how self-testing, which was initially very difficult, became “part of 
everyday life.” Here Deirdre refers specifically to her initial challenges with self-
                                                          
57 Corbin and Strauss (1992) use the term ‘trajectory’ to refer to the experience of illness that occurs 
in the life course of individuals with chronic illness. This experience is presented as a series of stages, 
which are non-linear and reflect the alteration in adaptation to illness that occurs over time. It 
reflects the social impact of illness on the individual in addition to physical experiences.    
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testing, both from a psychomotor and psychological perspective and her eventual 
adaptation: 
 
I found it very hard in the start. I found it very hard with the machine. I 
found it hard, I found it hard to do it because I hadn’t being doing it and 
it was something I had to get into and for the first 12 months I really did 
not take it serious enough. You know, I just continued eating things that I 
shouldn’t have been eating whereas now I wouldn’t eat sweet things. I 
have a sweet tooth ... whereas now, I’d be more aware of that. Whereas in 
the start it was very, very hard. The first 12 months was very hard and I 
found it very hard to get into it. But now it’s just second nature to me. 
(Deirdre) 
 
However, for Collette and Con, as evidenced in their stories within the sub-theme: 
Unwelcome burdens, a sense of acceptance and adaptation has not occurred as their 
diagnosis continues to cause distress. Colette has a number of social problems related 
to housing, interactions with her neighbours, which may influence her ability to adapt 
to her illness. For Con, his issues relate to his previous past history of illness and his 
associated difficulty with the chronicity of a diabetes diagnosis, which may not seem 
as significant, but demands ongoing attention.  
 
Alex’s story helps to illuminate the intricacies associated with autonomy in chronic 
illness. Alex has been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes for eight years. At this outpatient 
visit, where I interviewed him, he is planning to discuss deteriorating blood glucose 
levels with the doctor and may be commencing on insulin: 
 
I know while they keep ramping up the medication, it’s inevitable that I’m 
going to have to go on insulin and it’s the fact that my pancreas is 
deteriorating to some extent. So the self-testing, all it is, is an opportunity 
at this stage to frustrate myself even more because I know damn well they 
[blood sugar levels] are never going to be where they should be. (Alex) 
 
Alex presented as a very articulate businessman, who seemed happy that someone had 
asked him about the self-testing process, as he had lots to say. My immediate reaction 
was that technology was not promoting autonomy in this specific context. The self-
testing device seemed merely a tool of frustration, appearing to have no positive 
outcomes for Alex at the point of interview. It appears that self-testing merely tracked 
the progression of his diabetes - the ongoing deterioration of his pancreas. It is 
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apparent, from other parts of his story that Alex attempted to bring his business-like 
sense of order to his illness. Alex expressed a wish to rationalise schedules of testing, 
move to a more efficient computerised system and increase availability of necessary 
equipment. Alex expresses some frustration with the ‘system’ in this regard, 
particularly in the context of requiring a repeat prescription for test strips: 
 
I’ve run out of strips and while I have a repeat prescription, the repeat 
prescription is there for the medication because they might want to change 
it. The strips and the testing strips are on it as well and really I should 
have a permanent supply of those. … I’ve had ones and I discovered that 
the code was gone…I put it in and the computer strip that’s on it then it 
won’t read, because of the expiry date. … They’re small things now but 
they have happened and the result is I might not be able to get to a doctor 
for 4 days for some particular reason, I could be working, I could be away 
or something, so I’ve no testing [equipment]. (Alex) 
 
While objectively, these initiatives may be conducive to developing a more 
autonomous role in illness management this will not detract from the fact that, 
regardless of when or how efficiently levels are recorded, his blood sugar levels 
continue to rise. Alex sought to be more autonomous in terms of seeking out 
information and organising the self-testing process but the ‘system’, for him, does not 
allow it. However, while organisational issues may prove resolvable, I suggest, based 
on the data above, that it is the downward spiralling nature of his blood glucose 
regulation that provides the greatest impediment to autonomy, and represents the 
source of most frustration at this point. Alex can control many things but not his 
decreasing metabolic function. 
 
Frances shares similarities with Alex, in that she seems to welcome the autonomy 
associated with self-testing yet also struggles with it, albeit for different reasons. 
Frances refers to a desire to be in control at numerous points throughout her narrative. 
Frances has been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes for over nine years. On the day of 
interview, she was at the outpatient clinic to discuss having her medication regime 
altered from oral hypoglycaemic therapy to insulin. Frances had previously been on 
insulin therapy, but her consultant suggested changing to oral medication for a period 
of time. The decision to alter her treatment was influenced by her non-adherence to 
self-testing. (Administration of insulin in the absence of checking blood glucose levels 
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can increase the risk of hypoglycaemia and potentially prove fatal). Frances refers to 
a previous point in her illness when she was on insulin therapy as both a positive and 
negative experience. The following extract displays evidence of her taking a more 
autonomous role in association with self-testing: 
 
... I know personally when I was on insulin I had way better control . . . it 
was super because I was always under 7[HbA1c level] and I did not mind 
doing it. (Frances) 
 
However, despite this positive experience, Frances refers to the chronic illness-related 
issues that caused her to stop self-testing for a while and lose her enthusiasm for self-
management: 
 
… this year hasn’t been very good for me, just for no apparent reason, I 
just do not know why... I did test for the couple of months and then kind of 
some way in April May and June, I just did not bother so when my HbA1c 
came back at 7.7 I was nearly distraught. ... I was on insulin at that time, 
but I think I just got fed up of the whole thing. Even my own GP said to 
me, it was just like I just said; ‘that’s it, I’m sick of this’ (Frances) 
 
It appears that, despite a desire for control, Frances does not experience this on a 
continuous basis.  
 
I invited Frances to attend for a second interview. The second interview took place 15 
months later. The purpose of the repeat interview was to explore her experience of 
self-testing at a later point in time when her treatment regime was altered. At the time 
of the initial interview, Frances anticipated meeting with her consultant and perhaps 
being prescribed insulin, as her blood glucose levels had deteriorated. Frances 
envisaged that this would work better for her and that self-testing would have more 
relevance. However, despite a short period on insulin and oral medication, insulin was 
later discontinued and Frances’s medication regime was altered to include a more 
recent oral therapy: Januvia. Despite not remaining on insulin, as was her wish, 
Frances refers to self-testing in a very positive light at the second interview. Frances 
tests less frequently than previously, based on health care professionals’ advice, 
relying more on quarterly HbA1c results, but has the ability to self-test when required. 
At this point, while Frances continues to acknowledge the lack of dietary flexibility 
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associated with medication-based therapy, and notes some concerns about the 
aftertaste from the medication, she does report the value of self-testing. The following 
extract synopsises the value that Frances associates with self-testing, albeit less 
frequently: 
 
… when I had surgery last week it brought it back to me the importance of 
self-testing because I have been sauntering along with the last seven or 
eight months and I didn’t have to do it because I’ve been fine. but when 
something crops up like that you have to be very vigilant and it is not so 
much that you want to be in control of that situation it is the fact that you 
know the figure that you get is telling you what way your body is. (Frances 
2) 
 
It is evident that despite testing less regularly, the self-testing device is an important 
tool in Frances’ overall management of her diabetes. It is also significant that in the 
repeat interview Frances refers to issues at the time of, and prior to, the initial interview 
that may have influenced her experience of self-testing and her control of her diabetes. 
While Frances previously referred to her struggle with the chronicity of her condition, 
at the second interview she also refers to “going through the menopause”, “different 
things happening and different stressors” and the fact that younger people could 
“adapt better”. This adds further support to the contingent nature of autonomy in the 
self-testing process, as a number of contextual factors impact on the individual 
experience of illness.  
 
It seems that for Alex and Frances, regardless of a desire for control and order, which 
would fit quite well with increasing patient autonomy through self-testing, autonomy 
is not necessarily manifested throughout their experience. Alex’s worsening condition, 
his annoyance with the healthcare system in terms of access to equipment/technology 
to manage his illness effectively, and Frances’ sense of angst regarding the chronicity 
of her condition, and other contextual factors, all conspire to limit the extent to which 
these participants can be autonomous at various points in time. They may ‘intend’ to 
be autonomous but their temporal and corporeal experiences, as individuals living with 
chronic illness, impede their ability to be so at certain points.  
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There is an awareness of the temporal experience of illness both among healthcare 
professionals and the scientific community participants interviewed in this study. 
Healthcare professionals acknowledge that self-testing is not a “one-size-fits-all” 
activity (HCP2), as individual nuances alter personal engagement with the self-testing 
process. A number of these individual circumstances have already been alluded to. 
Similarly, the scientific community participants note the individual nature of a self-
testing regime: 
 
Every device I think, whether it is going to monitor frequently, where it’s going 
to be deployed, whether it is going to prescribe, it’s a case by case basis and it 
is very difficult to generalise. (SCP2) 
 
The changing perspectives of Alex and Frances reflect theoretical work on the nature 
of the chronic illness experience. Corbin and Strauss (1992) outline a chronic illness 
trajectory framework for use by nurses in a chronic illness context. The essence of the 
trajectory is that chronic illness follows a particular course, or a series of stages, which 
are non-linear and reflect different phases in adaptation to illness in addition to clinical 
presentation. As well as acknowledging that the experience of chronic illness changes 
over time, the model also recognises the unpredictable, subjective nature of 
experience; trajectories are often uncertain and require the involvement of individual, 
family and healthcare workers to shape them. 
 
Burton (2000, p.597) applies this theory to the stroke rehabilitation area and presents 
the following synopsis: 
 
The phases of an illness trajectory do not represent a rigid framework for 
the linear consideration of a patient's response to illness. Each phase, for 
example, may include several sub-phases which include movement in 
either direction along a trajectory which can be of considerable duration. 
This dynamism reflects the continual nature of adaptation that 
characterizes living with chronic illness. 
 
Evidence of this continual adaptation and times of crisis are evident in both Frances’s 
and Alex’s narratives. While Corbin and Strauss’s model (1992) refers to the stages of 
illness in primarily medicalised terms (e.g. pre-trajectory, stable, crisis, acute, 
unstable), albeit acknowledging more psychosocial influences, Roy’s adaptation 
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model (Roy and Andrews 2008) provides more psychosocial markers of adjustment to 
chronic illness which lend further support to the interpretation presented here. In 
accordance with Roy’s theory of adaptation, the person exists as a biopsychosocial 
being, in constant interaction with an ever-changing environment. This environment 
presents focal, contextual and residual stimuli. In order to cope with one’s changing 
surroundings the individual uses a series of innate and acquired adaptation 
mechanisms. Roy’s perspective fits well with the accounts of experience offered by 
Con and Colette in this study, whose ability to adapt to a diabetes diagnosis, and 
associated self-testing, is affected by a myriad of psychosocial factors. An inability to 
adapt successfully to changing environmental stimuli is also evident in both Frances’s 
and Alex’s narratives at various points in their illness trajectory. In this sense, Corbin 
and Strauss’s (1992) trajectory of illness can be used in association with Roy’s 
adaptation model to interpret the experience of autonomy in self-testing as contingent 
on a number of factors related to the individual’s existential existence.  
 
An existential understanding of the ‘body as lived’ can also offer some insights here, 
as the physical experience of illness encompasses corporeal concerns which can 
impact on one’s experience of autonomy. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition 
of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty (1945/2003) outlines his account of the embodied mind in 
Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty’s central thesis is that one’s body is 
central to individual perception and one’s place in the world. There is no separate 
external reality for the participants in this study when one’s body is dealing with the 
physical experience of hyperglycaemia, associated with diabetes mellitus, and the 
mental anguish that is often linked with chronic illness. These participants’ attempts 
to be autonomous within this bodily existence are not always successful. The accounts 
of autonomy in an illness context explored by Mol (2008) and Thomasma (1984) 
support an understanding of autonomy that is different in illness. The patient as citizen, 
and associated autonomy, is a problematic concept for Mol (2008), while the ill body 
offers challenges to autonomy for Thomasma (1984). This phenomenological 
understanding of the ill body is central to the overall interpretation of Autonomy as 
lived within this study and will be revisited in the discussion chapter.  
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The patient narratives in this study present an understanding of autonomy in self-
testing that is contingent on the individual’s experience of illness and other contextual 
factors over time. The individual’s experience of self-testing, autonomy, diabetes and 
other life events are continuously interwoven. The contingent nature of autonomy in 
self-testing represents an important facet to The interdependent phenomenon of 
autonomy in self-testing. This sense of Autonomy as lived has a number of corporeal 
and temporal dimensions.  
 
5.5 Relationship with healthcare provider 
This theme within The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing 
encompasses three distinct, yet interwoven, aspects of the patients’ interactions with 
their healthcare provider. The term ‘healthcare provider’ is used deliberately to 
encompass the individual healthcare professionals with whom patients interact, but 
also the wider healthcare ‘system’. Both interactions are significant for the participants 
in this study. It is apparent in patients’ stories that they refer to their relationships with 
healthcare professionals most particularly in the context of education to support self-
testing. The extent and nature of education experienced by patients varied 
considerably. These aspects of the patients’ stories are addressed in the sub-themes, 
Empowered by education and No room at the inn respectively. This sub-theme also 
addresses the degree to which autonomy is supported in interactions with healthcare 
professionals. While healthcare professionals use the rhetoric of autonomy, the actual 
‘practice’ appears to be different as their stories unfold. These considerations will be 
addressed in the final sub-theme of this dimension: Autonomy versus covert 
paternalism.  
 
5.5.1 Empowered by education 
The role of education in assisting patients to become more autonomous in the 
management of their diabetes was a prominent aspect of the wider phenomenon. Some 
patients experienced structured education programmes that augmented their ability to 
self-care. Even in the absence of structured programmes, a number of patients referred 
to the importance of follow-up access to healthcare professionals in the outpatient 
setting to supplement initial education. Additional information assisted patients in 
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maximising the potential of the self-testing process and consequently managing their 
diabetes more autonomously.  
 
Betty, the patient with type 1 diabetes, who experienced a sense of personal freedom 
associated with self-testing, referred to her exposure to a specific DAFNE education 
programme following diagnosis. As previously outlined, the DAFNE programme 
teaches patients to adjust their insulin relative to their food intake, thereby providing 
greater flexibility in dietary intake. Here Betty gives an overview of DAFNE and her 
exposure to it: 
 
It’s called dose adjusting for your food and it basically, it taught you to 
read labelling about carbohydrates and you know, their rule of thumb was 
for every like 10g of carbohydrate, you needed a unit of insulin to break 
that carbohydrate down. Now obviously again, there’s leeway for error in 
that. So it basically meant that I wasn’t told you know, you take 6 units in 
the morning, you take 4 units at lunch and you take 8 units with your 
dinner. I was told to adjust my insulin to what I ate. (Betty) 
 
Despite the lack of opportunity to up-date her skills in the DAFNE method since 
relocating to Ireland, Betty does utilise the essential principles learned to enable her to 
live more autonomously. This is evident where Betty adjusted her insulin dose to 
facilitate eating out with friends. For Betty, the skills in self-management learned in 
the DAFNE programme give her the confidence to live more independently: “I’m not 
afraid, I’m not set on you take 4 units, you take 6 units ... I take what I think I should 
take.” 
 
Another participant, Ann, who also speaks very positively about self-testing, noted her 
experience with a structured education programme for type 2 diabetics. This 
programme, called X-PERT, is supported by the HSE, though UK-based, and 
delivered in the community, primarily by dieticians. X-PERT assists patients in 
understanding type 2 diabetes and in developing self-management techniques with 
regard to dietary requirements and exercise.58 Ann notes how her presuppositions 
about diabetes were altered following attendance at the programme: 
                                                          
58 For further information on X-PERT  see http://www.xperthealth.org.uk/ and 
http://www.sicp.ie/en/PatientServices/InformationLeaflets/PDFFile_17206_en.pdf  
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I keep away from sweets because of the diabetes but what surprised me 
more than anything were the carbs [carbohydrate] like potatoes and all 
that, the effect they have on diabetes. (Ann)  
 
A number of healthcare professionals refer to the structured education programmes 
that may be available in-house or externally. Apart from DAFNE and the X-PERT 
programme, there is also the DESMOND59 programme for type 2 diabetics, an NHS 
devised programme, and BERGER60, which involves an intensive overview of 
carbohydrate counting and insulin adjusting for type 1 diabetics (HCP3). HCP3 notes 
that while self-testing is an integral part of the BERGER programme, it is not a very 
prominent component of the type 2 DESMOND programme which focuses more on 
“lifestyle choice, healthy living, activity and diet.” Healthcare professionals note that 
not all patients are suitable for intensive education. HCP3 notes that patients are 
offered places on the BERGER programme if they are “categorised as more ready for 
the information” due to its in-depth nature. HCP1 also suggests that insulin-adjusting 
programmes are unsuitable for some patients who may be unable to assimilate 
information, or may not want further insight into their diabetes.61 There are also 
practical issues associated with attendance at structured education programmes. HCP1 
notes the difficulty with accessing places at structured education programmes, apart 
from the more widely geographically available X-PERT programme. He also refers to 
the problem, for some patients, in getting time off work to attend these programmes 
(which can take place over a number of days).  
 
Not all patients recounted attendance at specific education programmes. However, a 
number of patients refer to the importance of follow-up education in the outpatient 
setting from diabetic nurse specialists or dieticians. Alex, a type 2 diabetic refers to 
the initial “information overload” and confusion when diagnosed, and the importance 
of follow-on access to one key person who could explain things to him: 
                                                          
59 Further detail on DESMOND is available as follows: http://www.desmond-
project.org.uk/programmes-271.html  
60 The BERGER program was created by acclaimed German diabetologist Dr Michael Berger. Many of 
its principles have been incorporated into the DAFNE programme. 
61 The pre-selection of candidates for structured education programmes by healthcare providers is a 
significant point which will be addressed later in this chapter in accordance with the theme: 
Autonomy versus covert paternalism 
146 
 
 
You’re kind of bombarded with a lot of information at the start. I was 
hospitalised when I was diagnosed with diabetes because I did not know 
what was wrong with me, and there’s a lot of information coming at you 
... You’d probably get about ten pamphlets going through what diabetes 
is. But you are better off having one person; you know giving you that 
detail. I have [dietician’s name] here who’s very good at manning the diet 
and so on. I learned things I would never have learned in the pamphlets. 
(Alex) 
 
Bart, the taxi driver, who titrated insulin doses to enable him to live more 
independently, also speaks very positively of the education he received from a nurse 
during a follow-up clinic visit. Education, and subsequent understanding in relation to 
carbohydrate metabolism and insulin physiology, is integral to Bart’s independence as 
a type 1 diabetic. Bart recognises the contribution of the diabetic nurse specialist in 
this regard:  
 
I was always wondering about how much insulin I should, who worked out 
how much insulin I should take, I always wondered about that, where that 
equation came from … but I asked one of the nurses one day about it and 
she really gave me a real insight into it and how it was worked out and 
how many units of insulin, it’s per your body mass and one thing and 
another right? … So I, after speaking to the nurse about it and when she 
explained to me about, about how it was worked out with one thing and 
another, with the units I was taking, I just felt much more comfortable on 
it. (Bart) 
 
Healthcare professionals also recognise the importance of ongoing information and 
availability in assisting patients with their diabetes management. HCP2 notes that 
education delivery is often ‘piecemeal’ to avoid information overload: 
 
It’s ongoing. You never sit down and say I have to decide today how much 
you are going to take in. If you are sitting there with a non-interested look 
on your face you are not going to learn a whole pile so an awful lot of the 
information we give is piecemeal. I might today show you how to use the 
glucometer the next time we might discuss the blood sugars, why they are 
high, why they are low. That’s the way the education process works with 
most of the diabetics, its drip-feed really. If we were to do it all in one 
session it would be way too much. (HCP2) 
 
Healthcare professionals acknowledge the importance of an individualised approach 
in terms of the nature and depth of information delivered, and the decision to refer 
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individuals for more structured education as noted above. There is a general agreement 
among healthcare professionals in this study that education and understanding is 
fundamental to the success of self-testing programmes. HCP1 notes that it is 
problematic when patients get varied advice about how often to test, yet are not told 
why. The ‘why’ is integral to a successful self-testing programme. This is best 
summarised by HCP4 in the following extract: 
 
I think if somebody knows how often to test and what the targets are, and 
what they are aiming for in the short-term and the long-term, I think testing 
is a good thing. (HCP4) 
 
There is additional evidence of patients being empowered by education within patient 
narratives. The availability of blood glucose results equips patients with information 
to initiate discussion with their healthcare provider, and manage their diabetes in a 
partnership arrangement. This is not the type of relationship illustrated by Colette, as 
noted earlier, who continually awaits direction from a healthcare professional, but 
rather the type of interaction that Deirdre refers to in the following account:  
 
I’m able to keep on top of it and if I do need any assistance or help I can 
always ring up the doctor and say “it’s 12.5 today.  Will I come and visit 
you”. … So to me I think at the end of the day, that the self-testing way is 
a very good way and it’s a reliable way. If the person that’s doing it 
realises that. Because at the end of the day it’s your health, my health, it’s 
up to me and it’s my way of keeping check of things and I do think that it’s 
the best way to go about it. (Deirdre) 
 
The results of self-testing prompt patients to contact their healthcare provider if results 
are high and are useful in face-to-face interaction. Many of the participants in this 
study refer to the use of blood glucose values in the consultation process. However, 
the results of self-testing can also be useful when engaging with non-specialists. The 
role of the device in assisting patient empowerment in this regard is endorsed by 
HCP4: 
 
[Self-testing] empowers them to actually make choices and take action and 
also helps them to talk to other healthcare professionals like doctors, or 
like GPs who may not have a huge interest in diabetes. At least it gives 
them [a way]to kind of say well I’m really worried about this, because I 
know my target should be such and such and every day my reading is nine 
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and I am really worried about it that’s why I am here today. I really think 
it gives them a bit of power. (HCP4) 
 
HCP4 observes that not all healthcare providers are particularly familiar with the 
intricacies of diabetes management. In this sense, the availability of ‘hard’ data 
achieved through the self-testing process facilitates a greater power-base, and therefore 
empowerment, for the patient in the patient/clinician interaction. The role of a 
diagnostic device in this respect is also noted by members of the scientific community. 
As previously noted, SCP6 has been working on clinical trials of a new device which 
will monitor patients’ ammonia levels non-invasively. Eventhough this device is 
currently operated on near-patient basis under clinical supervision, SCP6 notes that 
patients engagement with the device “gave them more knowledge about how to 
converse with their clinician”.  
 
This particular aspect of the educational process highlights how those interviewed 
viewed information as a significant factor in patient empowerment and maximising 
autonomy. Health care professionals can empower patients to take more control over 
their lives through educational initiatives, and such initiatives potentially enable 
patients to assume more egalitarian positions in their interactions with healthcare 
professionals. The wider impact of knowledge as power is significant here. Foucault’s 
post-structural understanding of power is helpful in this regard:  
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, 
the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980, p.131) 
 
Traditionally, medicine operated within a system whereby patients sought healthcare 
from doctors who provided it. The emphasis on self-management programmes has 
altered this balance to the extent that self-management creates a shift in the 
competencies of doctors and patients (Willems 2000). The use of a shared language is 
one particular example of where this ‘shifting’ of competencies occurs. In discussing 
blood glucose values, patients now use the type of medical or scientific language 
previously within the realm of healthcare professionals. It also allows patients to move 
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beyond subjective descriptions of how they ‘feel’ to present more quantitative data 
about how they objectively ‘are’. In this sense, drawing on Foucault’s perspective 
above, the discourse which the patients now adopt allows them to engage with the 
‘truths’ respected by the medical world and therefore potentially increase their 
personal power base, their autonomy, in this regard. While one may argue that 
healthcare professionals should pay more attention to an individual’s subjective 
experience, the ability of patients to align subjective feelings with scientific data is 
helpful. This is evident in the following extract from Frances: 
 
… it’s just to prove to the doctors as well when I go in now that, you know, 
these are the results and they were all high. It proves a point for everyone. 
(Frances)  
 
As previously noted, Frances does not necessarily require ‘readings’ to assess her own 
health; “I don’t even have to test, I know myself if I am going low”. However, she does 
acknowledge the benefit of this ‘hard’ data in interactions with her doctor.  
 
However, not all patients in this study recount empowered educational experiences 
which enhance self-care and autonomy. The relationship with healthcare professionals 
is expressed quite differently by other participants. It is apparent in some patients’ 
stories that their level of knowledge and understanding is limited. However, this may 
be a feature of particular individuals; their ability to understand, and their level of 
engagement, and not related to the degree of education provided. SCP1 notes during 
the focus group interview that information itself gleaned through the self-testing 
process is neither “good or bad, it’s information; it is how it’s used”. There is an 
acknowledgement among healthcare professionals that “some patients never fully 
grasp the meaning of self-management” (HCP2). This sense is shared by HCP4, who 
notes that there are “some people no matter how much information you give that will 
not take it on board.” This ‘taking on board’ is significant in terms of the wider 
interdependent phenomenon of autonomy as discussed earlier in the theme Taking 
control. However, even among those patients who appear to understand certain aspects 
of their diabetes quite well, there is also some confusion evident in their narratives 
about their self-testing regime.  
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This adds an interesting dimension to the study as a degree of disempowerment can be 
associated with self-testing in the absence of proper education. There are two particular 
issues highlighted within the study where additional information would have resulted 
in a greater understanding for the patient and addressed some of the associated 
confusion and frustration. Alex expressed his frustration with the need for manual 
recordings when technological advances enable the downloading of readings directly 
onto a computer and print-out. However, when asked about the preferred format of 
results, HCP5 provides a very reasonable explanation: 
 
It’s certainly helpful if they can bring their record with them, we prefer it 
written down at  appropriate times so we can evaluate which time of the 
day,  pre or post meals is most problematic and should first be targeted, 
so for us rather than bringing in a meter we prefer a written record of the 
results, some of the meters can be downloaded online and that is fine too 
but it’s just we need to be very clear with the timings of them that they are 
accurate number one so we can determine which are pre and post which 
particular meals (HCP 5) 
 
HCP1 also refers to the failure of computer-based readings solely to give detail 
regarding the nuances of diet and other patient behaviour.  
 
As a further example of a mismatch in patient understanding and healthcare 
professional perspective there is a scepticism among patients about the value that 
healthcare professionals actually place on blood glucose levels that are measured by 
self-testing. Alex summarises this as follows: 
 
I’ve definitely picked up over the years from doctors you know, that self-
testing, really those results, they’re not as important as the blood test one. 
The blood test, it’s called a, is it H? [researcher responds HbA1c] Yeah … 
That’s the one that really captures the ability of the body to deal with the 
glucose and all that type of thing. And so in a sense, that seems to make 
more sense to me as well, that if there was some maybe weekly blood test 
or something like that, that would probably become a more accurate, 
better system than maybe the ability of the self-testing glucose readings. 
Maybe! You know I’ve no medical background but I’ve definitely picked 
up, I mean I’ve gone to my doctor at times with readings and I’ve shown 
them to him and eh, I won’t say they’re dismissed, they do have some, they 
must have some ability but it’s the blood ones themselves [HbA1c], they 
are the ones that he will always talk about. (Alex) 
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However, healthcare professionals, albeit acknowledging the objectivity of HbA1c 
values, explain various reasons during interview as to why self-monitoring of blood 
glucose levels is important, in both patients with type 1 and type 2 diabetes. While 
HbA1c values are viewed as the “gold standard” (HCP2) there is a recognition that 
they are “not perfect” (HCP2) in all respects. Despite the more apparent need for 
regular monitoring in individuals with type 1 diabetes and gestational diabetes, daily 
blood glucose levels are deemed useful to detect: “trends” in blood glucose control 
(HCP6), “intermittent highs”, “dips” (HCP3) and “hidden hypoglycaemia” (HCP4). 
HCP3 summarises various reasons for self-testing in the following extract: 
 
I think you have to look at both [self-testing and HbA1c] because 
sometimes the HbA1c could be reflected within the normal parameters, 
and then on their day-to-day book, or meter, they could be quite high, we 
have patients today that spring to mind that we were wondering, her day-
to-day readings are high but her overall test is normal, and they would be 
tested for other endocrine disorders, such as Addison’s, Cushing’s etc. etc. 
(HCP3) 
 
Despite obvious reasons for more regular testing, this appears not to have been 
explained to the patients in this study, or not understood by them. In this sense, patients 
are more disempowered than empowered, as their educational needs are not fully met. 
A greater understanding of the need for self-monitoring in specific patient contexts 
may assist the patient’s ‘buy-in’ and contribute to a greater experience of autonomy in 
self-testing. 
 
5.5.2 No room at the inn 
This sub-theme refers to the insufficient access to healthcare professionals and 
services, which is prominent across many patients’ narratives and the associated 
impact of this on their experience of autonomy in self-testing. For some patients, this 
lack of engagement with healthcare providers contributed to their confusion about 
diabetes and self-testing. However, for others it was merely acknowledged as an 
unavoidable factor in times of economic constraints. Even among those participants 
who seem to manage their diabetes well and use self-testing effectively, there was a 
sense that the health service had little time for them. No room at the inn emerged as a 
salient aspect of the wider phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing. This perspective 
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was supported by the healthcare professionals in the study, who frequently referred to 
the lack of resources available within the health service, and the associated 
implications for educational initiatives and other support services. An interesting 
dimension to this sub-theme is the associated understanding from the healthcare 
professionals’ perspective that resources may be more readily available should self-
testing technology be employed in a more selective manner. 
 
Hannah had been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes only two months before the interview 
took place. The interview was recorded at her first visit to the out-patient clinic since 
her discharge as an in-patient. In her story, Hannah refers to her initial exposure to 
self-testing within the hospital setting, where a nurse showed her how to perform the 
test. The nurse however did not return to see her for further instruction or evaluation, 
which Hannah attributes to her lack of time: 
 
Well, I didn’t know how to do it. It was Nurse x came and showed me and 
then even when I went home, you see I was above in the acute centre so 
when they sent me home, you know they didn’t have the time and Nurse x 
was supposed to come back to me and she didn’t get the time, but I figured 
it out for myself … from the instructions, the books they gave me before I 
left the hospital. I just read through them … it was grand, it was no 
problem. …  
 
Hannah relates that she did not receive any further teaching regarding the device from 
her local GP office, but was assisted by her sister who is a nurse. Field notes taken on 
the day noted that Hannah seemed undeterred by her diabetes and the self-testing 
regime, as evidenced by her narrative above. She continuously recounted her 
experience of self-testing in a very matter of fact manner. Hannah refers to the self-
testing process as “grand” or “very, very easy” and describes the procedure in the 
following way: “I get the machine and I just prick my finger and take my blood twice 
a day morning and evening”. 
 
Hannah notes how she utilises the blood sugar results to make dietary adjustments: 
 
  ... if I’m over the top with sugar levels, I can cut back. You know if I find 
it’s too high, I could cut back what I eat. I do not eat sweet things, well I 
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do, but I eat sugar-free things. But if I find I’m eating too much of them, I 
can cut back if the sugar level is too high. (Hannah) 
 
However, despite her ostensibly relaxed attitude to self-testing and her utilisation of 
results, there is evidence in her narrative of that her diabetes is not being effectively 
managed. This became more apparent during further immersion in the data and 
ongoing interpretation. Hannah noted consistently high blood glucose readings: “10 is 
the lowest and 20, 21 is [the highest] Nurse x just did it now, its high again. Hannah 
appreciates that the norm is between 4 and 7 and was having her medication regime 
altered at the clinic on the day of interview. It may be that Hannah’s blood glucose 
levels are fluctuating as medication is being titrated in the early stages post diagnosis. 
However, Hannah, by her own admission, is practically self-taught and may not be 
completing the self-testing procedure correctly. In addition, Hannah may not be 
managing her dietary intake as well as she suggests. The reference to “sugar-free 
biscuits” in her narrative suggests the use of foods labelled as ‘diabetic foods’, which 
are not recommended as they are generally high in fat and contain sugar replacements.  
 
Colette is a patient with type 2 diabetes who was diagnosed four years at the point of 
interview. Colette’s knowledge of her diabetes, and the role of the self-testing process 
to manage her illness, were both limited. Initial contact with Colette showed that she 
was eager to talk about her diabetes. Field notes, taken on the day, note that she seemed 
to have therapeutic expectations of our interview - despite having read the information 
leaflet.62 At the time of interview, I thought Colette was very distracted and had little 
to contribute to the study. However, as I listened back to Colette’s story, I realised that 
Colette had much to say about the experience of self-testing. Her eagerness to talk was 
very salient. She seemed anxious to engage in further discussion with healthcare 
professionals about her diabetes:  
 
They have never checked out my bloods right since I got the diabetes and 
I have it with four years next February. … It should have been looked after, 
                                                          
62 Following the interview with Colette, I reviewed my patient information leaflets and removed 
reference to my nursing qualifications. From an ethical perspective, It was decided within the 
supervision process that this may prevent therapeutic expectations by participants. Despite being 
explicit about my role as researcher, it was reasonable, as evidenced in Colette’s situation that even 
an indication of nursing expertise may result in additional expectations.  
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it should have been really checked out right. I mean I do not know is it 
going or coming I am with the diabetes. I wonder do they, because no one 
has spoken to me about it only you. I mean they should take me into the 
hospital; they should have sorted it all out (Colette) 
 
Similarly, the stories of distress and frustration told by Con and Alex were not 
communicated to health care professionals prior to the point of interview. The 
interview process possibly for the first time, gave these participants an opportunity to 
talk about their personal experience of living with self-testing and diabetes.  
 
The core issue for Con however did not seem to be managing his diabetes, and the 
factually related physiological details, but rather having the diagnosis in the first place. 
Con was experiencing emotional problems related to his diabetes and an overall 
chronic illness diagnosis. The salient point here is not that those issues existed, as this 
has been previously explored, but rather that Con had not had an opportunity to engage 
in discussion about those issues at the clinic previously. While the clinic deals with 
blood values and medication, it may not always explore the personal stories of living 
with chronic illness. Once the possibility of discussion with a professional about his 
emotional issues was introduced to Con post-interview, he was eager to engage in this 
process. It is unfortunate that without the research project these issues possibly would 
not have come to the fore. Similarly, Alex was very eager to talk about self-testing and 
his wider experience of diabetes. Field notes post interview note that; “It seemed as if 
Alex had been waiting for somebody to ask him about self-testing”. This reflects the 
eagerness with which Colette engaged in conversation.  
 
These stories resonate with other patient perspectives on engagement with the health 
services in times of chronic illness. Toombs (2002, p.130), in a personal analysis of 
the chronic illness experience suggests that individuals require “a genuine recognition 
that what is happening to them is significant not just in medical but in existential 
terms”. As a physician, Brody (2002, p.132) makes a compelling case for the 
importance of the individual patient story in the clinician/patient relationship: 
 
As a general rule, patients will be more inclined to get better when they 
are provided with satisfactory explanations for what bothers them, sense 
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care and concern among those around them, and are helped to achieve a 
sense of mastery, or control over their illness and its symptoms. Patients 
will become worse when the illness remains mysterious and frightening, 
when they sense social isolation and lack of support, and when the illness 
is accompanied by a feeling of helplessness.  
 
Brody acknowledges that physicians interview patients to elicit their ‘history’, but this 
is often done by asking technical and closed questions which “never hear the patient 
story of illness” (2002, p.134). This failure to engage more fully with the patient 
narrative does little, in his analysis, to address the isolation and disengagement that is 
central to human suffering.63  
 
The need for patients to obtain psychological support, and the inadequacy of the 
system to provide it is acknowledged by healthcare professionals: 
 
… some people will still want to come here again even though they have 
been through the education and that’s more because there is very little 
psychological support for people with diabetes. A lot of the time it’s 
around behaviour change and how to support people with behaviour 
change and as such we can do a certain amount for them, but we are not 
really trained to do the counselling aspect and I think that’s a huge gap. 
(HCP4) 
 
HCP4 refers to limitations within the patient/clinician encounter and notes unrealistic 
expectations of what the service can actually provide: 
 
I think if people have unrealistic expectations about what people can do 
on an individual consultation, like in every walk of life you have people 
who have unrealistic expectations, even when you explain how the service 
works and what they can expect from you, and what you can expect from 
them, even when you say it, they may not take that on board and we all 
have patients within our service who are very difficult to deal with, and I 
mean it’s a continuous kind of circle that they go thorough and they 
constantly come back to us and go and it’s the same issues all the time. I 
think that’s just human life and it just shows here the same as everywhere 
else to be honest (HCP4) 
 
                                                          
63 Brody offers some useful examples of how to adopt this narrative approach, which will be 
explored within the discussion chapter.  
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Perhaps expectations, like Colette’s, for greater time with the healthcare service are 
unrealistic, or the service is unsatisfactory. Regardless of the specifics, there is a 
mismatch between what the patient wants and what the healthcare service can provide 
in this case. Other healthcare professionals seem more open to the need for discussion 
beyond clinical issues during patient engagement. HCP2 expresses her dissatisfaction 
with certain consultation practices: 
 
The first thing they [the patients] are asked is ‘Did you bring your book’, 
no ‘hello, how are you, how are things going for you’…only ‘did you bring 
your book’. Then they look at the book and there is no discussion, only up 
the insulin here, or down there. There is no discussion about why it was 
high or what happened.….We cannot lose sight of the fact that people are 
people first and they are not somebody who is testing blood sugars, we 
have to see people as people first and diabetics after. I even hate the word 
diabetic because it’s a person with diabetes, not a diabetic. I wouldn’t like 
it if I walked in and the first thing the doctor said to me was ‘Did you bring 
your book’ (HCP2) 
 
However, even among those patients who seem to manage their diabetes quite well, 
and don’t express a wish for greater engagement with services, their narratives 
revealed a sense that the healthcare system has very little time for them due to current 
financial constraints. Deirdre refers specifically to self-testing as a process to reduce 
healthcare costs: 
 
I’m not costing the state anything like I would be if I wasn’t self-testing 
and going to the clinic more often. After all, they’re cutting back on 
everything and wouldn’t that be a more expensive way of going about it? 
So the way I’m doing it is less expensive … (Deirdre) 
 
Betty also refers to time constraints within the outpatient environment and the 
experience of “going through a system”. Acknowledging the constraints within the 
‘system’ Betty notes her reluctance to explore issues with the team: 
 
The clinic is just under the restraints of time management I suppose. As 
you can see from the clinic today, they’re extremely busy. The volume of 
people that they’re trying to put through in a 3-hour window, and not let 
anyone go home feeling that they’ve missed, maybe something medically, 
or missed an opportunity with them. They are under a lot of time restraints 
and time pressures so I just think the clinic isn’t really … I won’t say I 
wouldn’t bring up an issue if I had [an issue of concern], I would bring up 
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an issue but at the same time I wouldn’t be idling with my issues, I would 
take it to my GP. (Betty) 
 
Similar to HCP4’s account, the lack of time to provide sufficient support to patients is 
acknowledged by all health care providers interviewed. HCP5 refers to the need for 
“prioritisation” within a hospital clinic system with a “focus on more complicated 
patients” while other patients are cared for in the community. However, the diabetic 
nurse specialists who extend their services to community-based ‘outreach’ clinics, also 
note the lack of services they can provide. It is important to note that the outreach nurse 
facility is not a separate service: the nurses who manage the outreach services are those 
who support the hospital acute and outpatient setting.64 When asked if there was a 
diabetic nurse specialist relationship with all patients who attend the outpatient clinics, 
HCP2 commented: 
 
No we couldn’t see everybody. There are thousands in the county. We do 
outreach clinics and we see a lot of patients there also. In one area alone 
[name of small town location] I have well over 200 patients there. We now 
have patients starting on insulin and other treatments in the outreach 
clinics. … A GP might also send a patient in for our assessment. … We 
are very stretched and when you are that stretched you are not going to 
give your best service to anybody . (HCP2) 
 
HCP1 also refers to the difficulty with patient interaction and education in terms of the 
availability of time, space and privacy in a busy clinic setting. The variety of treatments 
available, and the diverse education required, also poses a challenge. At no point did 
healthcare professionals display a lack of understanding about the importance of 
patient education. There is an acknowledgement among those interviewed that an 
individualised approach to care and a gradual approach to information sharing is the 
best approach. However, it appears that despite the acknowledgement of the 
importance of individualised, ongoing support for patients, this is not necessarily 
forthcoming for all patients. Some feel that the system has no time for them; there is 
No room at the inn. 
                                                          
64 It is important to acknowledge that many individuals with diabetes are primarily treated in the 
community setting through GP practices and a growing number of primary care centres. Such sites 
were not the focus of this study.  
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An interesting dimension to this aspect of the phenomenon is that healthcare 
professionals, while noting the lack of resources, also acknowledge some of the waste 
that is associated with self-testing. The self-testing process is a costly enterprise. The 
economic value of self-testing is best summarised by HCP5:  
 
I think it’s very patient population dependent; it’s cost effective in 
preventing type 1 patients from having a car accident. It is cost-effective 
in pregnant women in preventing pregnancy loss and ensuring the best 
possible outcome for the baby. In patients who are not on agents that have 
a risk of hypoglycaemia associated with them I think it would probably be 
hard to argue about cost-effectiveness. (HCP5) 
 
However, HCP5 does note that self-testing may have some value in individuals with 
type 2 diabetes initially, to develop an understanding of the relationship between blood 
glucose values and various foods and to decide on medication dosage. HCP6 supports 
self-testing in terms of the possible impact on reducing long-term complications, 
noting the economic drain that “one complication, one small problem” can cause. 
HCP1 is quite succinct in her economic assessment of self-testing: 
 
It’s of no economic benefit for people to be self-testing if they are not going 
to act on the results that they get. (HCP1). 
 
This echoes Colette’s situation who does not appreciate the significance of results 
related to personal behaviour.  
 
Interestingly, in direct response to the economic value of self-testing, HCP2 refers to 
the waste that arises from the availability of a never-ending choice of free monitors 
which results in a “new toy” scenario. Monitors are “used for a period of time and then 
discarded”. Similarly, HCP4 notes, “There are too many people with too many 
meters”. Monitors, available from marketing promotions and pharmacies, are 
accumulated and later discarded. While the medical device companies may distribute 
the monitors free of charge, the potential financial return is significant, as patients will 
need to use the model-specific strips on a long-term basis to utilise the monitor. HCP3 
was quite vociferous about this point during interview when asked if self-testing is 
cost effective: 
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Not in all scenarios, because there is abuse, and when there’s abuse there 
is waste and where there is waste there is overspend…Unfortunately 
patients are offered a meter with me today and then in 6 weeks’ time they 
may go to the chemist and there will be another one offered, and then they 
might come back to clinic and there may be another one offered. I have 
heard of patients with seven and eight meters at home and probably strips 
being dispensed for each one, and each set of strips could be up to 50 
Euros a bottle and we have no policing over that. I put my hand up…I think 
I have being saying since the start I would have a bee in my bonnet about 
the need for dare I say all the pharmaceutical promotion of the different 
monitors. (HCP3) 
 
It is significant that self-testing may have real clinical value, but the ability to 
maximise that value is threatened by a non-regulated system of device distribution. 
There is a paradox here. HCP6 notes that the availability of free testing strips for 
individuals with gestational diabetes was under threat in the region, at the point of 
interview. As gestational diabetes is not categorised as a long-term illness patients do 
not qualify for free testing strips. It appears that non-specific widespread availability 
of self-testing in the wider diabetic patient population may restrict the availability of 
resources in individuals where it is most required.65 
 
There was some evidence of a financial/marketing focus in data from the scientific 
community participants interviewed. SCP1 acknowledged the need to target new 
technologies specifically towards a suitable audience to assist in uptake by industry: 
 
Getting more information on end-user applications may help to direct the 
development of these technologies into areas where the chances of uptake 
by industry are optimised, and also indicate what areas of industry the 
technologies should be pitched at. (SCP1) 
 
                                                          
65 This issue became more prevalent during the final stages of the study. An editorial in Diabetes Digest, 
notes that due to economic stresses, those who buy healthcare are leaning on industry to provide 
cheaper glucose testing strips. Kerr (2013) points to the difficulties associated with current ISO 
standards for testing strips, which may not be sufficient to detect potentially harmful hypoglycaemia 
in all cases. He suggests that in the future physicians may be charged with deciding which tests strips 
to utilise for individual patients, depending on the risk of hypoglycaemia. Concurrently, the European 
Association for the Study of Diabetes (2013) has called for greater regulation among the medical 
device industry in the context of blood glucose monitoring and associated devices.  
(For detail see http://www.dagensdiabetes.se/home/forskning/964-medical-devices-in-diabetes-
care-a-statement-on-behalf-of-the-european-association-for-the-study-of-diabetes.html)  
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The need to develop technologies that assist in economic growth is also apparent: 
 
... obviously we are funded by [name of funding body] so they are a 
stakeholder they want results, they want money for the economy, for the 
Irish economy so hopefully we’re going to create some jobs or educate the 
people so that they can create jobs and have an impact there. (SCP3)  
 
Scientific community participants interviewed in this study are following a programme 
of work mandated by senior management in accordance with the institute’s governance 
structures. Decisions regarding the commercial feasibility and clinical application of 
technologies are made at corporate level, and any government-funded programmes 
have been pre-approved by the funding body. However, regardless of where decisions 
are made the emphasis on revenue is apparent in the comments above. I do not suggest 
that a focus on revenue may affect the integrity of work packages, or outputs, in the 
context of the organisation involved in the study. The funding body which supports 
activity within this organisation is committed to both societal and economic impact 
and the research processes, previously outlined within the thesis, are committed to 
clinically lead projects.  My point here relates to a wider issue of concern regarding 
direct-to-consumer marketing of self-testing devices. Government policy encourages 
those involved in technological innovation, particularly within the medical device 
industry, to maximise commercial outputs (Forfás 2012). However, the availability of 
such products to the wider public, in the absence of a discerning distribution pattern, 
may negatively affect overall healthcare costs, as evidenced in the discussion above 
regarding specific cost issues in self-monitoring of blood levels. In the absence of 
appropriate governance structures revenue could potentially take precedence over 
clinical efficacy and patients’ best interests.66  
                                                          
66 There is a wider moral issue here regarding the overall spending on technology in healthcare relative 
to other ‘goods’. For an extended discussion on these issues and an introduction to the debate see: 
Callahan, D. 2009. Taming the beloved beast: How medical technology costs are destroying our 
healthcare system. Princeton: Princeton University Press. In contrast to this criticism is the ongoing 
development of regulation, and good practice guidelines in the medical devices industry. The Irish 
Medical Devices Association (IMDA) unanimously adopted its Code of Ethical Business Practice at its 
2012 general meeting. Adherence to the code is compulsory for IMDA members 
(http://www.ibec.com/Sectors/IMDA/COE.nsf/vPages/Code_of_ethics~introduction/$file/Summary.
pdf). It is within the remit of individual medical device organisations to contribute to economic growth 
in an ethically sound way. The moral debate can be extended to include the societal benefits 
associated with profitable enterprise and associated job creation. The medical device industry is 
recognised as a significant factor in the resurgence of the Irish economy.  
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5.5.3 Autonomy versus covert paternalism 
Also significant, in terms of patients’ stories and the healthcare professional 
perspective, is the degree to which autonomy is actually supported. This support varied 
between healthcare professionals. While some use the rhetoric of autonomy, the 
practice appears to be different. This sub-theme also refers to the paradox that is 
implicit within self-testing devices: they seek to promote autonomy but may actually 
invoke greater paternalism in terms of imposing surveillance. The scientific 
community participants also offer some interesting insights in this regard. While they 
refer to the empowerment philosophy of self-testing technologies, the extent to which 
they believe patients should actually manage their own health is limited in some 
respects. This particular aspect of the wider phenomenon is based more on the 
understandings gleaned from other stakeholders, rather than the patient participants. 
However, these understandings represent an important aspect of the overall 
phenomenon as they explain why, despite the presence of a self-testing agenda, and a 
policy of patient empowerment through self-management practices, autonomy may 
not necessarily be realised. 
 
The sense of empowerment that participants associated with educational initiatives 
within the sub-theme Empowered by education provides evidence that autonomy is 
supported by some healthcare professionals. The sub-theme Freedom within 
constraints also supports the degree of autonomy, albeit not absolute, that the self-
testing process facilitates for patients as they exert some control over their daily lives, 
while living with the constraints imposed by self-testing and a diagnosis of chronic 
illness. However, in exploring the context in which self-testing occurs, what becomes 
apparent is that autonomy is not always actively encouraged by those who espouse it. 
The extent to which healthcare professionals support patient autonomy varies 
considerably.  
 
HCP1 revealed support for patient autonomy when asked about the benefits of self-
testing: 
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It’s about keeping them [the patients] in control, what they consider 
control. ... Our ideas do not mean they are everybody else’s ideas about 
diabetes. ... They have to make the choice, we mightn’t agree but... 
 
The remainder of the interview reveals a genuine sense of ‘living’ this philosophy in 
his interaction with patients. It is not particularly the element of ‘choice’ here, which 
signifies this statement as supporting autonomy, but rather the acknowledgement of 
the importance of the patient perspective. HCP1 refers to patients doing “off the wall 
things” and the associated dangers. However, there is evidence of respecting and 
working ‘with’ patients to achieve positive health related outcomes, despite their 
actions. HCP1 refers to a man who refused to commence insulin for type 1 diabetes, 
alternatively opting to ingest seeds, which he purchased over the internet. He also 
refers to a young girl who administered less insulin than advised, in order to prevent 
putting on weight. In both cases, HCP1 continued to engage with patients and advise 
them that they would require insulin eventually despite their refusal to comply with 
prescribed regimes. Eventually, both patients agreed to adopt the current evidence-
based treatment for diabetes. HCP1 notes how the man who had ingested seeds for a 
period of time “kept himself off insulin for another year”, albeit not in great health. He 
notes that he “eventually came around because he was feeling terrible and took the 
insulin”. Perhaps one could argue that a year less on insulin, and his personal decision 
to start insulin, with the support of a healthcare professional, resulted in a greater ‘buy-
in’ long-term than an initial enforced regime. A continuous dialogue between patient 
and healthcare professional resulted in good outcomes, which respected patient 
autonomy, healthcare professional responsibilities and patient welfare.  
 
I asked healthcare professionals if patients taking more control of their illness ever 
posed a challenge for them. The tensions between supporting patient autonomy and 
discharging one’s professional responsibilities are evident in the following response: 
 
I suppose the only challenge I could think of is that they take it to the 
extremes and they are on the internet and they are listening to old wives’ 
tales and doing all sorts of things, and while we know the guidelines and 
can individualise them to the said patient, sometimes the said patient 
thinks they know more than you know – that can be a negative aspect 
(HCP2) 
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The use of the internet among the patient population and the challenges it poses, was 
referred to consistently by the healthcare professionals interviewed. HCP3 refers to the 
“world wide web” in quite emphatic terms. The use of the word ‘police’ in suggesting 
a controlling influence is a significant choice of word in the following extract:  
 
Obviously the problem now is with the WORLD WIDE WEB [emphasis], 
we have all sorts of enquiries about different sorts of [monitors], I had two 
already this morning about some meter that’s on the market that I am not 
even aware of, it’s very difficult  to police it. (HCP3) 
 
However, there is also some understanding about the need to respect the patient’s 
knowledge and address their concerns regarding information received through other 
sources: 
 
I think it’s very important that we respect the knowledge that patients have 
because they are living with it on a day to day basis and certainly a number 
of our insulin pump patients will probably know more about their diabetes 
management than we would know about it, but I don’t think it’s a 
challenge. I think we should work together to try to work for the best 
possible outcome, so it shouldn’t be something that we feel threatened or 
challenged by. (HCP5) 
 
Maintaining engagement with patients, regardless of their choices, is also evident in 
the following narrative from HCP2: 
 
Time, time, you let them have their rant and rave or whatever they feel they 
should be doing, going to somebody down the road who has plumes of 
smoke ... but you keep them coming back. ... It just takes people time to 
accept (HCP2) 
 
HCP2 refers to his engagement with patients as one of “coaxing” the patient into 
adopting behaviours that he believed to be in their best interest. The extent to which 
‘coaxing’ involves support for autonomy is questionable. In addition, the language of 
the quotation suggests a degree of irrationality in the patient perspective. 
 
Frances’s story reveals a dialogue with her healthcare provider regarding the preferred 
treatment for her diabetes. Frances expressed a preference for insulin treatment in 
order to allow her more flexibility with her dietary intake. However, Frances’s story 
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also reveals that she stopped self-testing for a period and administered the same dose 
of insulin every day. This could be detrimental to her health. For this reason, her 
doctor, on review of her blood glucose levels, changed her medication regime to oral 
medication. At the second interview Frances related how in conversation with her 
doctor she “dug [her] heels in a bit” regarding her request to go back on an insulin 
regime. Frances’s account of her interaction with her doctor reflects a sense of 
‘working with’ patients to which the healthcare professionals in this study refer. 
Despite Frances’s wish to resume insulin therapy this did not occur. However, her 
narrative reveals an overall satisfaction with the outcome:   
 
I know since I went on the medication, the last 5 to 6 months have been 
good. You know, there hasn’t been any ups and downs because my body 
has got used to a lot of the medication. It takes time for the medication to 
work, in fairness to Dr X she said if this doesn’t work you can go back on 
your insulin, but like she knew because of her profession, it was going to 
work. It was the time, like a sentence, the time you have to put into it, but 
now that transition is done so I don’t really mind. The only thing is the 
taste, the aftertaste of the tablets, if that is all I have to worry about it’s 
grand. (Frances)   
 
The healthcare professional in this case seems to exhibit more of a real engagement 
‘with’ the patient than the previous example. This narrative also acknowledges the 
positive outcomes associated with discarding personal preferences in favour of 
professional recommendations. It also shows patient respect for ‘professional’ 
knowledge with regard to treatment decisions. 
 
The narratives above reflect the tensions that exist for healthcare professionals as they 
negotiate respect for autonomy and patient preferences with their professional 
responsibility. These tensions reflect the reality of autonomy in a healthcare situation 
where professional obligations, as outlined in nursing and medical codes of practice, 
and evidence-based protocols demand that professionals think beyond patient 
preferences in the delivery of care. This indicates a relational understanding of 
autonomy as introduced in the initial ethical analysis at the closing stages of the 
literature review (see section 2.2.3). There are echoes of Holm’s (1997) ‘protective 
responsibility’ here. ‘Protective responsibility’ does not accept autonomy as absolute 
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but recognises that something else may be required to maximise patient well-being in 
times of ill health. Holm (1997, p.127) explains the term as follows: 
 
When you meet the patient you meet another human being who is 
vulnerable, who often trusts you, and whose life you can influence in a 
significant way. This creates a special responsibility towards the other 
human being, which can be difficult to understand for outsiders, but which 
> 
Protective responsibility may provide a suitable model to bridge the abyss that exists 
between the more stringent positions of autonomy and paternalism. However, the 
degree of influence and mutual respect within the relationship is significant. These 
issues will be revisited in the discussion chapter. 
 
The healthcare system itself can fail to support autonomy and be covertly paternalistic 
in how self-testing is managed. This is apparent in Alex’s situation noted earlier, where 
he sought to be more autonomous in terms of seeking out information and organising 
the self-testing process. However, for him, the ‘system’ does not allow it. A particular 
source of frustration for Alex was the lack of repeat prescriptions, which impeded his 
ability to continue self-testing: 
 
It just makes more sense to me that the equipment that you need should be 
available to you. It would make sense if I could walk into my chemist and 
just pick it up and likewise, they have my long-term illness card in my 
chemist, I should be able to walk in and just pick up the strips in my view, 
without a prescription... (Alex) 
 
The rhetoric of autonomy exists, but paternalism continues to permeate the healthcare 
system. Despite Alex’s long-term diagnosis, he requires the ongoing written approval 
of medical personnel to acquire self-testing equipment. Other evidence of this ‘covert’ 
paternalism, as alluded to previously, is evident among healthcare professionals as 
they report the ‘allocation’ of patients to specific education programmes or specific 
self-testing devices. In the context of the monitor: 
 
I wouldn’t always offer patient choice. I would usually tend to pick 
something that I would feel would suit a patient. That’s not the right way 
but most patients when they are diagnosed would ask “What do you 
think?” and they are happy for me to choose for them. … I would always 
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feel that if the patient is finding it difficult to assimilate their diagnosis and 
they are quite tearful and upset, you might offer them the simplest thing 
for the moment, until such time as they digest it and that might take a year, 
it might take six months, it might take 6 weeks, and you might upgrade 
then…likewise in the older population I am personally inclined to pick the 
simplest [monitor]. (HCP3) 
 
In this sense, the healthcare professional could be viewed as being overly paternalistic 
or it may reflect a care-based interaction, based on notions of beneficence as opposed 
to autonomy, as alluded to in the context of ‘protective responsibility’ above. The 
perspective whereby healthcare professionals decide what ‘options’ are to be made 
available to patients further asserts that the healthcare professional is the ‘person in 
charge’. For reasons, which may be morally justifiable in some contexts, the healthcare 
professional takes the lead in the patient/healthcare professional relationship. This 
resonates with Mol’s (2008) perspective on the problematic nature of citizenship in a 
patient context, as noted in accordance with the theme, Autonomy as contingent in 
chronic illness. It is reasonable to suggest that the patient may be more accurately 
construed as a ‘subject’ as opposed to a ‘citizen’ in this context. 
 
Another dimension to the sub-theme Autonomy versus covert paternalism relates to 
the capabilities of the self-testing device itself. While the device can assist in 
promoting autonomy, by enabling patients to self-manage their blood glucose levels, 
the type of information generated can also act as a form of surveillance. There is some 
sense of this surveillance in the patient experiences recounted in Freedom within 
constraints. Through the process of self-monitoring and reporting, healthcare 
professionals can intrude on the home life of the diabetic patient and assess the extent 
to which they are compliant with treatment measures. This is even more pronounced 
with advanced computerised technology. While Alex would like to have blood glucose 
readings computerised in order to enable a more seamless transfer of information from 
the monitor to the healthcare team, Betty is reluctant to welcome such advances:  
 
I know my GP is a bit into, sort of you know, “Oh we’ll get you a monitor 
that I can upload it onto the computer”, and I’m thinking “Oh my God, 
you know this is scary, she’ll be able to check me way too much!” [Laughs] 
(Betty) 
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Even when using a manually filled log book Frances refers to the surveillance that the 
self-testing promotes: “… it’s like having to report to someone all the time”. HCP1 
acknowledges the sense of surveillance that can be associated with self-testing, albeit 
not for all patients: 
 
Some people come in and they love to show you their book, their results. 
They feel good when they show you their results and you think; ‘This is the 
two of us doing it not just the person with the diabetes’. For other people 
I don’t know does it put a barrier there that ‘this guy is only checking up 
on me’ which I suppose in a certain way we are. (HCP1) 
 
HCP1’s extended narrative suggests that the degree of surveillance is real and is 
compounded by an interest in more long-term HbA1c results. Healthcare professionals 
interviewed refer to the scepticism with which they view “pristine” logbooks with a 
series of “strange results” (HCP1), “all filled in the same biro” (HCP6). Despite 
acknowledging the value of intermittent self-testing results, there is a general 
agreement among healthcare professionals in this study that HbA1c results will give a 
more accurate recording of results over time. These results are: “objective, laboratory 
based, reflecting more sugars than are represented in a diary no matter how often the 
patient does it” (HCP6). This lends further support to the notion of particular ‘truths’ 
being more acceptable to professionals, as discussed earlier in association with 
Foucault’s analysis of the politics of truth and power.   
 
Another dimension to the covert paternalism explored in this sub-theme, is that a self-
testing device has the potential to limit the participant’s ability to be autonomous 
depending on how it is employed. While the scientific community participants refer to 
the role of self-testing devices in creating empowerment, their narratives suggest that 
this empowerment should have certain limits. In contrast, for the most part, the 
healthcare professionals associate the most effective self-testing processes with 
combined self-management practices. This ‘caution’ from the scientific community 
participants is evidenced below, when SCP2 was asked to develop her ideas around 
interpretation of results:  
 
Yeah, just so the patient does not feel they need to interpret or that they do 
not interpret at the back of their mind and either get worried or complacent 
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about various different things. That could be a thing with self-diagnosis in 
the future. Just let the doctors be doctors and let the patient still be a 
patient while still empowering the patient with information. (SCP2) 
 
This suggests that patients go through the ‘semblance’ of empowerment, but that test 
interpretation and subsequent treatment decisions remain within the remit of the 
doctor. It also suggests a similar concern for individual welfare, versus enhanced 
autonomy, among the scientific community. There is further suggestion of instilling a 
‘feeling’ of empowerment as opposed to a reality: 
 
The patient as we say is empowered, they are actually doing something, 
they are not just lying in a bed having IVs put into them and then the doctor 
coming and bringing you off for the mystical tests ‘we have to do tests’. A 
patient who does something themselves gets a number, whether they 
understand the number or not, they feel they are contributing ... (SCP4) 
 
SCP3 refers to the autonomy issue in the context of information: “comes down to 
ownership of information. It comes down to whether people think you should have 
ownership of information or not”. There is debate among the participants regarding 
the extent to which patients should have sole ownership of information gleaned 
through self-testing. Acknowledging the disadvantages associated with self-testing in 
the absence of professional support SCP5 suggests the need for some sort of “tagging” 
system that would allow tracking of individuals who may self-test and realise that they 
have increased markers for cancer. This tracking system would facilitate follow up in 
patients who may ignore results, “go into depression and decide not to do anything 
about it” (SCP5) but require treatment or psychological support. 
 
A sense of covert paternalism may become more common in future technological 
developments. A lesser role for patients in interpreting results seems to underpin the 
ethos of a ‘Connected Health’ approach to diagnosis and follow-up care, in accordance 
with the views of one participant. She refers to a specific ‘vision’  
 
… to put healthcare more into the hands of the patient rather than the 
healthcare provider – no, to include the patient more in the partnership 
with the healthcare provider. We call this connected health, in other words 
a lot of the testing and monitoring that would normally be done by a 
patient, going to their healthcare provider. [The testing] will actually be 
done by the person at home and then those results transmitted to the 
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healthcare provider. That will facilitate more frequent monitoring of a 
person’s condition and the assumption is that that would be better for that 
person’s health in the long term. Because not only will you get the more 
frequent monitoring which of itself is probably going to be better for the 
patient, but you get a better patient buy-in or you get a better patient 
adherence to management of that condition overall. (SCP1) 
 
I would argue however, based on the experiences reported by some individuals in this 
study, that the ‘buy-in’ from the patient in this scenario could be quite limited if they 
are not involved in interpretation of results and associated decision-making. I suggest 
that in not asking different types of patients directly about these issues, the wider 
medical device industry may underestimate the role that patients can take with regard 
to the use of technology in their care. It is significant that the participants in this study 
are primarily involved in the development of point of care devices for use under 
clinician supervision as explained in section 1.3.4. This ‘focus’ may legitimately limit 
their appreciation of a possible greater role for patients in interpretation and 
management of results.  
 
In conclusion, I propose that the experiences of patients in this study, and the 
associated perspectives offered by other healthcare professionals suggest that while 
the rhetoric of patient autonomy and empowerment exists, there is a degree of covert 
paternalism in the interactions of patients with their healthcare professionals and the 
wider healthcare system. In addition, some degree of paradox is present, as the 
technology that is deemed to empower patients may actually involve greater 
surveillance. Furthermore, while a move towards connected health systems, which 
limit the patient’s role in interpretation of results, may be an excellent way forward for 
some patients, it may potentially disempower others who are capable of greater self-
management as evidenced by the experiences of some of the participants in this study. 
It is important to note that I do not apportion negative connotations to this covert 
paternalism but merely acknowledge that it exists.  
 
5.6 Conclusion: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing 
This chapter has revealed a series of ‘understandings’ related to the patients’ existential 
experiences of ‘being-with’ self-testing technology. These understandings collectively 
represent Autonomy as lived: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-
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Testing. This interdependent phenomenon is underpinned by three thematic 
components or relationships: Relationship with device; Relationship with illness; and 
Relationship with healthcare provider. Each of these themes encompasses a number 
of distinct sub-themes that collectively represent the wider phenomenon. The term 
‘interdependence’ is significant, as autonomy is best realised when there is a particular 
fusion of the three relationships. Any individual component of the relationship may 
influence, and be influenced by, the other two and may affect the experience of 
autonomy.  
 
Interdependence is also significant as it implies that autonomy is not conceptualised in 
a negative sense, as meaning freedom from constraints, but rather that autonomy is 
present through self-mastery, and self-determination, which can exist ‘within’ certain 
constraints. The extent to which individuals self-impose, and accept certain restraints, 
influences the degree of autonomy they experience. Autonomy is not something that 
we can ‘create’ through technological advances. It requires a particular series of social 
interactions, and personal circumstances, in addition to technological capabilities. 
Autonomy as lived is context dependent. This interpretation of the lived experience of 
autonomy within the self-testing process contributes to the current understanding of 
autonomy in healthcare. It is also significant in terms of the development and use of 
self-testing technology. Such significance will be discussed in the chapter that follows.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION/ETHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
…  the philosophical exercise is to identify the weakness of the conceptual 
apparatus that supports current practice; to argue for reformulations 
that allow reform; to present a moral compass to find our way in a social 
system of extraordinary complexity. 
 
(Tauber 2005, p.24) 
6.1 Introduction  
The empirical component of this study interprets the patient experience of autonomy 
in self-testing as Autonomy as lived: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in 
self-testing. The basis of this phenomenon is that participants experience autonomy 
within a series of interdependent relationships: Relationship with device; Relationship 
with healthcare provider; and Relationship with illness. This contextualised 
understanding of autonomy is situated in the real world of participants with diabetes 
engaged with self-testing technology. The purpose of this chapter is to engage in 
philosophical/ethical analysis and explore the normative implications of this 
understanding of autonomy for bioethics and healthcare practice. I return here to the 
autonomy conundrum (the extent to which autonomy should triumph over other ethical 
principles) as a moral problem, outlined at the outset of the study, and explore the 
contribution that this empirical work has to offer in accordance with the empirical-
ethical mode of collaboration outlined by Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012).   
 
Empirical work in bioethics has been criticised for failing to address the normative 
implications of empirical findings (Salloch et al. 2012). The application of McMillan 
and Hope’s (2008) model of empirical bioethics in this study averts such criticism. 
This discussion closes the cycle at the point where an ethical analysis of new data 
generated can illuminate normative enquiry. In this study, the normative contribution 
is to extend the existing understanding of autonomy in bioethics. As the discussion 
unfolds, I will draw on the concept of Autonomy as lived to outline an alternative 
construction of autonomy for bioethics. I do not claim to draw generalisable 
conclusions about autonomy that are directly transferable from this population to 
multiple settings. As is the purpose of interpretive phenomenological research, these 
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understandings are temporally located, in accordance with Heideggerian philosophy, 
and have the potential to evolve through further research (Todres 2004). 
 
However, while recognising the limitations of qualitative work, and the 
epistemological problems associated with empirical ethics, I suggest that the empirical 
findings can inform normative ethics for two principal reasons. Firstly, this claim is 
congruent with the understanding of empirical bioethics underpinning the study. In 
chapter three, I reject the absoluteness of the ‘is-ought’ problem and argued for a meta-
ethical position of neo-naturalism as outlined by Stewart (2009). Put more succinctly, 
outlining normative implications does not suggest a rejection of the ‘is-ought’ 
distinction, but rather suggests that what ‘is’ has some contribution to make to what 
‘ought’ to be (McMillan and Hope 2008, Salloch et al. 2012) (see section 3.3).  
 
Secondly, the application of reasoned argument distinguishes the transfer of 
knowledge in this study from immediate assumptions of generalisability. Rehmann-
Sutter et al.’s (2012) phenomenologically informed hermeneutic model of empirical-
normative collaboration, relies on reasoned argument to utilise empirical data to make 
normative conclusions. This is compatible with the identified need to link empirical 
facts to normative conclusions by means of evaluative premises. Holm (1997 p.209) 
argues that if we interpret generalisability, not in a quantitative sense, but rather as 
meaning “transfer knowledge to other settings” then the findings of empirical studies 
can be ‘generalised’. Holm, similar to Rehmann-Sutter et al., acknowledges the 
importance of argumentation in order to generalise from one setting to another. This 
argument should “show that the situation we generalise from is similar in the relevant 
respects to the situation we wish to generalise to” (Holm 1997, p.209).  
 
The ‘merit’ of argumentation is central to Rehmann-Sutter et al.’s method. Empirical 
work is utilised to “kick-start” reflection. The task for the researcher lies in 
reconstructing the empirical facts within the case to be argued and presenting this case 
in a manner that makes sense to the reader. The merit of the normative conclusion rests 
on the quality of the researcher’s argument. The qualitative data “contributes to the 
conditions that make it possible to evaluate these arguments  and the conclusions 
drawn from them, but as ethical researchers making normative claims, we cannot hide 
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behind our interviewees or what they have said” (Rehmann-Sutter et al. 2012, p.440). 
The argument is owned by the researcher.  
 
The chapter has four core sections. In the initial section, I summarise the situated 
understandings of Autonomy as lived, which the empirical study brings. The second 
section proceeds to explore the significance of this empirical contribution in light of 
existing perceptions of autonomy in bioethics and concludes with a summary of 
autonomy as conceptualised in this study. In the third section, I suggest a ‘working’ 
account of autonomy for healthcare practice that will enable healthcare professionals 
to operationalise an understanding of Autonomy as lived. Here I return to the original 
ethical analysis undertaken at the outset of the study prior to empirical investigation. I 
utilise the empirical facts of this research to construct an argument, which has 
normative relevance beyond this study. The ‘revised’ argument presented in this 
chapter does not disregard previous considerations, but rather suggests that the original 
analysis merits consideration, as other perspectives are also valid in light of the 
empirical data and subsequent discussion. In conclusion, I argue for an alternative 
operational account of autonomy for bioethics, negotiated autonomy, which draws on 
the study findings and acknowledges the strengths and limitations of previous 
bioethical perspectives.  
 
The chapter concludes with a refinement of the understanding of autonomy originally 
presented. In this sense McMillan and Hope’s (2008) cyclical model of empirical 
ethics is fully realised. The basic tenets of interpretive phenomenology are also 
fulfilled as pre-understandings are altered based on the new understandings that 
emerge from the empirical study. Data from the empirical study is utilised throughout 
to support discussion and argument. While the study primarily has normative 
implications with regard to extending the understanding of autonomy in a clinical 
context, there are also more practical considerations to explore. The study findings 
have particular resonance in the context of diabetes care due to the sample population. 
In order to avoid repetition, and maintain the central focus of discussion, the findings 
in a diabetes context are not explored separately, but interlinked with the wider 
autonomy discussion in respect of illness experience, interaction with healthcare 
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providers and technology use. The study also raises a number of issues of significance 
with regard to human-technical relations, which are similarly interwoven.  
 
6.2 Summarising Autonomy as lived 
The overarching contribution of the empirical study is that of Autonomy as lived – a 
contextual understanding of autonomy in self-testing that cannot be sufficiently 
defined by appeals to positive or negative perceptions of liberty alone. In their 
everyday ‘being-with’ self-testing technology in the social world, the participants 
related varied experiences of autonomy within a series of interdependent relationships. 
While this perspective has previous resonance in the chronic illness literature (Agich 
1995, Mars et al. 2007, Mars et al. 2008, Delmar et al. 2006), care of the older adult 
(Agich 2003) and the field of mental illness (Schlimme 2012), I have not found 
previous studies which specifically conceptualise autonomy in this way in the context 
of self-testing technology. Mars et al. (2007) included individuals with diabetes in their 
study of autonomy in chronic illness. However, the use of a technological device was 
not explicit within the study. Karlsson et al. (2008) undertook a phenomenological 
analysis of the transition towards autonomy among teenagers with type 1 diabetes. The 
study focused on acquiring autonomy in self-management as a developmental process, 
and did not explore the implications of the self-testing specifically (Karlsson et al. 
2008). However, the study does lend support to the interdependent phenomenon of 
autonomy outlined here. The overriding theme of “hovering between individual 
actions and support of others” was utilised to describe the transition to autonomy 
among participants (Karlsson et al. 2008, p.566).   
 
The normative contribution of this study lies in its illumination of autonomy in a 
specific clinical context. The understanding of autonomy in self-testing, as outlined 
within the various themes and sub-themes, collectively presents an account of 
autonomy in the real world of healthcare practice. The points of understanding can be 
summarised as follows: (1) Autonomy is context dependent and related to the 
individual’s experience of illness. Autonomy is not something that could be prescribed 
by healthcare professionals or created solely by technological advances. The sense of 
autonomy experienced by participants was contingent on personal issues related to: 
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their overall stage in their illness trajectory; their experiences of chronicity; and their 
willingness to take an active role in the management of their own health. This 
understanding of autonomy reflects the contextual, interdependent nature of autonomy 
that is central to a Heideggerian understanding of our connectivity to the world around 
us. (2) Autonomy, for many participants in this study, exists as Freedom within 
constraints whereby the device supports autonomy in some respects, but within a 
wider system of control. While the participants express a sense of freedom or control, 
there is an accompanying acknowledgement of the demands imposed by the self-
testing device and the wider associated experiences of illness and chronicity. 
 
(3) Autonomy exists within a series of interdependent relationships. Autonomy does 
not necessarily require isolated decision-making. This study highlights that 
engagement, or influence from others, often rejected in a libertarian sense, is not only 
permissible, but necessary to enable autonomous behaviour. In this study, the 
significance of external ‘influence’ is evident in the presence or absence, of: a 
supportive healthcare professional; access to health services; meaningful educational 
assistance; and accommodating, user-friendly technology. The extent to which 
healthcare professionals provide ‘real’ support for autonomy, relative to professional 
obligations towards patient welfare, encompasses an important dimension of this 
‘influence’. (4) The technological capabilities of a device influence the degree of 
autonomy that patients experience. The device enables participants to know their own 
body and initiate self-assessment and possible self-management techniques, albeit 
acknowledging some complaints regarding the device. The device also has the 
paradoxical potential to simultaneously support autonomy and induce surveillance. 
The device is also instrumental in causing unwelcome burdens for some participants 
that are inextricably linked with their overall illness and life experiences.  
 
In summation, Autonomy as lived presents autonomy as an interdependent, 
contextualised process. This ‘process’ relies on an ongoing sense of mutual 
responsibility and understanding between patients and healthcare professionals and is 
not confined to discrete moments of choice. However, this interdependence goes 
beyond the patient/healthcare professional relationship. One’s personal relationships 
with her illness and the self-testing device are also significant. In this continuum, some 
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individuals exhibit greater control over their lives than others, yet also, a particular 
individual can be more autonomous at different points in time relative to a range of 
contextual factors.   
 
6.3 Conceptualising Autonomy as lived  
6.3.1 Autonomy, self and illness: Freedom and constraints co-existing 
In this study, the participants who experience autonomy relate a positive synergy 
between all three interdependent relationships. The participants’ interactions with the 
self-testing technology are important for their overall experiences of autonomy. 
Relationship with illness, associated with a sense of acceptance, self-efficacy and a 
willingness to take control of their illness is also significant. In addition, one’s ability 
to be autonomous depends on her particular stage in a personal illness trajectory. The 
relationship with one’s associated health care providers, particularly with regard to 
education, is also an important factor in the overall experience of autonomy. The extent 
to which participants are offered tangible support in being autonomous, and educated 
sufficiently are integral to the participant’s experience of autonomy. The experiences 
of autonomy recounted by those interviewed include: the flexibility to dine out with 
friends; the freedom to travel abroad more confidently; the ability to operate a 
business; and the opportunity to remain in full-time employment. The ability of the 
self-testing device to facilitate greater control and enable self-management for patients 
is also evident in data from other stakeholders. The role of the self-testing device in 
increasing empowerment, control and a sense of freedom for participants in this study 
resonates with the findings of other studies. 
 
Barnard’s et al. (2010) survey of 289 individuals with type 2 diabetes found that 80% 
of participants reported a high satisfaction with self-monitoring of blood glucose 
(SMBG) and reported feeling more ‘in control’ of their diabetes when engaged in self-
monitoring. The positive association between self-testing in diabetes care and patient 
control and empowerment is also evident elsewhere in the literature. The qualitative 
component of the DiGEM study observed ‘empowerment’ as another core theme 
emanating from patient data (Farmer et al. 2009b). Specific aspects of empowerment 
listed by the researchers included: convenience of self-testing; link with initiation of 
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physician communication; and role in informing healthcare decisions. These elements 
of empowerment are evident among the participants in this study. Empowerment is 
assisted by appropriate education. This will be explored later in this chapter as the 
significance of interaction with healthcare professionals is examined. 
 
However, even for those participants who appear to exercise greater control, there is 
an acknowledgement that this ‘control’ or ‘freedom’ existed within certain constraints 
imposed by the demands of the device, and associated self-monitoring programme, or, 
the wider experience of illness and chronicity. Mol’s (2000) account of autonomy in 
her empirical/philosophical analysis of blood glucose measurement is similar to that 
presented in this study. Mol (2000, p.18) notes that “the autonomy of a self-regulating 
diabetes patient is of a complex kind”. The use of a self-monitoring device facilitates 
certain liberties, “but not freedom” (p.17). This reflects the sense of Freedom within 
constraints experienced by participants in this study. The freedom which participants 
gain is achieved only by mastering and utilising a series of time-consuming, sometimes 
inconvenient self-management techniques, previously only understood by healthcare 
professionals. Mol’s (2000, p.18) account very succinctly articulates this somewhat 
dichotomous position where one gains a number of liberties “but another rule takes 
over”: 
 
For someone with diabetes who is engaged in self-regulation it is no longer 
necessary to follow ‘doctor’s orders’ which means that a lot of autonomy 
‘vis-á-vis’ professionals is gained. But handling this autonomy is not a 
matter of living out the whimsicalities of some wild untamed self. Instead, 
the self must come to behave like a professional.  
 
As Mol (2000, p.21) notes an individual may have gained autonomy but such 
autonomy is accompanied by a series of “new obligations”.  
 
While recent empirical evidence with regard to the impact of self-monitoring on 
glycaemic control and patient satisfaction does not make specific reference to the 
concept of Freedom within constraints revealed within this study, analysis of the 
overall findings of the DiGEM trial (Farmer et al. 2009b) lends some support to the 
co-existence of dependence/independence presented here. While the qualitative 
element of the DiGEM study reported the experience of empowerment among 
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individuals, analysis of questionnaires about health related beliefs did not find an 
increase in perceived control over diabetes. It could be, as portrayed by participants in 
this study, that while self-monitoring yields some sense of control for participants, as 
evidenced in accounts of empowerment during interview, this could not negate the 
overall sense of restraint associated with a diagnosis of chronic illness. Somewhat 
similarly, O’Kane et al. (2008) surmise that the higher depression scores among 
individuals in their trial of self-monitoring versus non-monitoring may be associated 
with the strict discipline of a self-monitoring regime, as opposed to feelings of absolute 
powerlessness.  
 
This Freedom within constraints is also echoed in empirical work that explores the use 
of medical technology, beyond blood-glucose monitoring devices, in patients’ homes. 
Lehoux (2004, p.7) explored the home-use of four different technologies (IV therapy, 
parenteral nutrition, oxygen therapy and peritoneal dialysis) using a symbolic 
interactionist approach and concluded that technology “simultaneously improves and 
constrains patients’ lives”. Fex et al. (2009) utilised descriptive phenomenology to 
explore the lived experiences of individuals using technology at home. Even though 
the technology was of a more advanced nature than that of the blood glucose meter, 
(including ventilation, home dialysis and oxygen therapy), there are similarities in the 
patients’ experiences of autonomy. The researchers utilise the terms “feeling tied up” 
and “feeling free” to explain a particular facet of the participants’ experiences of 
technology in the home. The sense of ‘feeling tied up’ related, among other things, to 
the way in which the use of the technology directed the participants’ social activities 
and demanded rigid schedules. This reflects the experiences of participants in this 
study. “Feeling free” also shares similarities with the aspects of Freedom within 
constraints identified in this study. Fex et al. (2009, p.2815), explain this ‘freedom’ as 
follows, noting that there are existential dimensions at play: 
 
Freedom was experienced in the ability to depart from set routines and to 
be able to adjust the time, duration and frequency of treatment to fit in with 
social activities or work …Feeling free in spatial terms involved the 
freedom of having the possibility of being at home and indeed outdoors, 
without being restricted to hospital care. Feeling free in relation to others 
involved the will and increased capacity to manage things for oneself, to 
be in control of day-to-day activities and to be less dependent on others.  
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There is wider understanding in the literature that freedom, or independence, is not 
always possible when living with a chronic illness, or the limitations associated with 
long-term care in old age, thereby requiring a re-conceptualisation of autonomy in 
practice (Agich 1995, Delmar et al. 2006, Mars et al. 2007, Mars et al. 2008, Schlimee 
2012). This understanding is central to a phenomenological account of living ‘with’ 
illness and the extent to which one’s experience of illness impacts on one’s expression 
of autonomy (Agich 1995). Agich (2003, p.123) uses the term ‘actual autonomy’, as 
preferential to other conceptualisations and theories, to describe “what autonomy 
actually means in the every-day world of long-term care” where a “wide chasm exists 
between ideal competence and actual incompetence”.67 Agich notes that dependence 
is integral to human development. “Human life and hence, human development are 
essentially phenomena that involve interdependence” (2003, p.103).  
 
For Agich (2003), the dependence associated with human development is more 
pronounced in ill health where there is an associated “dissolution of the unity of body 
and self” (p.104). This perspective resonates with the interpretation of the lived body 
within this study, and has implications for autonomy in accordance with the sub-theme, 
Autonomy as contingent in chronic illness. The earlier, yet enduring, work of 
Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988) supports an understanding of autonomy as 
compromised in ill health where beneficence requires greater consideration. 
Thomasma (1984) refers to his work with Pellegrino concerning the dichotomy that 
exists between promoting patient autonomy, on the one hand, and the realities of the 
doctor/patient relationship, on the other. Most relevant here is Thomasma’s (1984, p.2) 
reference to the “wounded state of humanity” associated with disease and the limits 
that this places on personal autonomy:  
 
Mols’s (2008) concern with ‘patients as citizens’ is also relevant in this context. Mol 
believes we are only capable of citizenship with the healthy part of our bodies. For 
Mol, citizenship signifies control, freedom and civilisation (meaning that our bodily 
functions and passions are kept under control). However, as she observes, these traits 
are not always possible for an individual with illness. This perspective resonates with 
                                                          
67Agich’s work will be explored in greater detail as final conceptualisations of autonomy are offered 
later in discussion. 
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the experience of frustration among some participants related to variations in health 
status and unfavourable self-testing results. This is noted elsewhere in the self-testing 
literature. French et al. (2008) reporting on the more qualitative aspects of the DiGEM 
study, suggest that diabetics who are eager to pursue health-related behaviours can be 
demotivated by self-testing when the results do not accord with what the patients 
perceive to be their recent glucose-reducing behaviours. Similarly, Barnard et al. 
(2010) note that one of the patients in their study referred to self-testing as “dispiriting 
and demotivating” when results failed to improve over time despite adherence to 
medication.  
 
This study’s findings also share a number of similarities with the work of Mars et al. 
(2007) who undertook a grounded theory study to examine how people with Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) or type 2 diabetes experience autonomy. The 
study concluded that chronic illness limits one’s experience of autonomy in two ways. 
Firstly, it prompts a reappraisal of life’s activities in light of ill-health and secondly, it 
limits one’s opportunities. The former aspect was more prominent among the 
participants with diabetes, which the authors associate with the “tangibility of long-
term consequences” (Mars et al. 2007, p. 490). The future-directedness of the actions 
of an individual seeking to avoid the long-term consequences of diabetes was also a 
feature of this study and served as an additional example of Freedom within 
constraints. 
 
The altered sense of autonomy experienced over time by participants acts as further 
testament to the ‘reappraisal of life’s activities’ which Mars et al. (2007) refer to in the 
context of chronic illness. Self-testing becomes more frustrating for Alex as his 
pancreatic function diminished. Frances continuously re-appraises her adherence to 
prescribed therapy, and self-testing protocols, relative to her own personal relationship 
with her illness. The temporal experience of illness is particularly relevant in this 
regard as various life events impact on her perception of illness and her coping 
responses. More recent research also supports the extent to which temporal concerns 
are important in one’s overall chronic illness experience. Karademas et al. (2009, 
p.406) make the following observation: 
 
181 
 
 
… the experience of chronic illness does not take place in a vacuum, but 
is bursting into the patient’s life context. In the same vein, it is also possible 
that perceptions a person holds about illness and the specific ways he/she 
chooses to deal with it are associated with the stress experienced in other 
domains of life, such as work or family.  
 
However, despite the acknowledgement of the constraints which diabetes, chronicity 
and self-testing ensue, there is evidence of greater autonomy, ‘contingently-being-in-
control’, among some participants. Significant in their stories, as revealed in the sub-
theme, Taking control, is their willingness to actively take control of their illness and 
a corresponding belief that this was possible. One’s locus of control refers to the extent 
to which he/she believes life events to be within personal control (an internal locus of 
control), or dependant on fate or chance (an external locus of control) (Lange and 
Tiggemann 1981). The importance of personal control in the context of chronic illness 
is evident elsewhere in the literature. A greater internal locus of control, in the specific 
context of individuals with diabetes, has been positively correlated with adherence to 
treatment regimes and positive clinical outcomes (Morowatisharifabad et al. 2010).  
 
Toombs (2002) refers to ‘being in control’ specifically in the context of her 
phenomenological account of living with chronic illness. She points to the sense of 
indestructibility that is central to being human and how the experience of illness 
challenges this perspective. To realise “that one’s body cannot be ‘fixed’ is to 
experience the most extraordinary sense of loss of control, of powerlessness, of 
helplessness” (p.127). Toombs (p.130) links this sense of powerlessness to alienation 
from one’s body, highlighting the importance of “becoming attuned to one’s body” as 
a means of addressing this sense of alienation: “the act of taking the body back gives 
one a sense of control”. This is apparent in the stories of the participants noted in 
Freedom within constraints who speak so positively about the self-testing experience, 
and their ability to take control of their diabetes through knowledge of their bodies - 
knowledge of their blood glucose levels. For these patients, knowing their body is a 
positive experience, which allows them greater freedom in the context of their daily 
lives. This reflects the importance of the corporeal dimension of illness for the 
participants in this study. Toombs’s account of her own existential struggle with illness 
provides us with a means of understanding why self-testing, when accompanied with 
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a preference for being in control, is a positive experience for this group of patients and 
promotes autonomy. 
 
Recognising that one always has the capacity and opportunity to make 
meaningful choices (even though such choices may be severely 
circumscribed) is essential for the task of preserving self-integrity 
(healing). (Toombs 2002, p.131) 
 
This sentiment very much echoes the views of Mars et al. (2008) who propose that 
autonomy can be increased by maximising opportunities through which individuals 
can control their lives. The patient’s dependence on self-testing, as articulated in 
Freedom within constraints, may not be seen as constraining if it is self-imposed. 
Rather, self-testing can provide an opportunity for the patient to make “meaningful 
choices”, as Toombs suggests. In this sense autonomy, along with self-integrity, can 
be promoted and preserved. In order to experience a sense of autonomy in self-testing, 
within the associated constraints of chronic illness, participants actively ‘taking 
control’ of their ill health is a significant factor. The experience of autonomy in self-
testing for these participants is an existential one with corporeal, relational, spatial and 
temporal dimensions. Despite having the desire and the requisite equipment to 
facilitate autonomy and self-management, autonomy may not necessarily occur.  
 
6.3.2 Autonomy and engagement with healthcare professionals 
Central to the participants’ experiences of autonomy is their relationship with 
individual healthcare professionals and with the wider healthcare system, as outlined 
within the theme, Relationship with healthcare provider. This particular aspect of The 
interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing highlights the significance of 
patient education and information in patient empowerment and maximising autonomy. 
However, also apparent in some patient narratives was that they valued the interaction 
with healthcare professionals beyond mere education, and noted the lack of access to 
the healthcare community within the current health care system. This study revealed 
patient stories that did not seem to be told in the general consultation process, despite 
their importance in the overall patient context. In this sense, a more mutual sharing of 
knowledge may be required to maximise patient autonomy. This discussion is mostly 
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based on the sub-themes, Empowered by education and No room at the inn; however, 
some elements of other thematic understandings are also interwoven.  
 
Within a number of patient narratives, the role of a healthcare professional in 
transferring information regarding the self-testing process, and associated diabetes 
management, is integral to a positive experience of autonomy in self-testing. The role 
of individualised education to enable patients to understand and react to blood glucose 
levels is commented on by all six healthcare professionals in the study. There is a 
general understanding among healthcare professionals interviewed that the difference 
between self-monitoring and self-managing centres on the degree of education 
provided and the corresponding patient understanding. The importance of education 
in terms of patient empowerment in diabetes management, and its impact on the overall 
efficacy of SMBG, is a prominent theme in recent systematic reviews and current 
clinical guidelines (Clar et al. 2010, IDF 2009, Parkin et al. 2012, ADA 2013).  
 
Participants in this study express a concern that the healthcare team have little interest 
in self-monitoring data and rely on HbA1c results to monitor progress. Clar et al.’s 
(2010) systematic review of qualitative evidence pertaining to self-monitoring 
supports this analysis. Peel at al. (2007) observed similar concerns among participants 
in their study, noting that patients sometimes ceased self-testing due to the perceived 
uninterest of healthcare professionals. However, when interviewed about the value of 
self-monitoring results, healthcare professionals in this study note the clinical 
relevance of specifically timed and more regular readings of blood glucose in specific 
patient contexts. It appears that healthcare professionals may value patient readings 
and act on results, but fail to communicate this to patients. Care protocols and 
guidelines may actually be effective, but fail in the absence of effective 
communication. Dialogue with patients in this regard is listed as a recommendation in 
Peel et al.’s (2007) study. While the researchers acknowledge the non-inclusion of 
healthcare professionals in their study as a limitation, the perspective of healthcare 
professionals obtained in this study supports this recommendation. 
 
Empowerment is a term used by healthcare professionals when applying the 
philosophical concept of autonomy to a contextualised patient care scenario. Abbot et 
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al. (2007) specifically make this specific link in the context of diabetes care. Holström 
and Röing (2010) suggest that empowerment is a recent phenomenon in healthcare, 
associated with patient-centeredness and autonomy. The term empowerment has its 
basis in political freedom as an alternative to oppression, and is most commonly 
associated with the critical social theory of Paulo Freire68 (Anderson and Funnell 
2010). The notion of autonomy as empowerment is consistent with a growing 
discourse in healthcare, whereby patient autonomy is given precedence over other 
ethical concepts, and often equated with independence and freedom to choose 
(Campbell 2011). The claim is that empowering individuals assists them to act more 
independently in a healthcare context, as it increases opportunities for greater 
autonomy and involvement in decision-making (Holström and Röing 2010). HCP4 
specifically refers to empowerment in this context, noting that self-testing “empowers 
them [patients] to actually make choices and take action”. 
 
Also implicit within this study is the role of education and knowledge in enabling 
patients to exert more power in their interactions with healthcare professionals. 
Foucault’s work is appropriate here to explore the relevance of education within an 
autonomy framework. Foucault’s enduring philosophical contribution lies in his post-
structural concern with power. 69 Knowledge, for Foucault is seen as a route to power 
– power is not a fixed entity. The curtailment of knowledge can limit the autonomy of 
individuals, as they are ill-equipped with the “techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth” (Foucault 1980, p.131). In a diabetic context, these 
techniques and procedures involve practical knowledge about self-testing, yet also a 
more theoretical understanding of glucose physiology. Attaining this knowledge 
assists individuals to exert greater autonomy in their daily lives, yet also assists them 
to engage in discussion with healthcare professionals in a more confident and 
productive way. This type of interaction is seen in both Alex’s and Frances’s accounts 
of dialogue within the consultation process.  
                                                          
68 The significance of Freire’s work will be developed as this discussion continues  
69 “Originally labelled a structuralist, the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault came to be 
seen as the most important representative of the post-structuralist movement. He agreed that 
language and society were shaped by rule-governed systems, but he disagreed with the structuralists 
on two counts. Firstly, he did not think that there were definite underlying structures that could 
explain the human condition and secondly he thought that it was impossible to step outside of 
discourse and survey the situation objectively”. (See http://www.philosopher.org.uk/poststr.htm).  
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Bradbury-Jones et al. (2008) explore Foucault’s understanding of power in a clinical 
context noting two perspectives as of particular relevance: disciplinary power and 
knowledge-power relationships. The latter is of significance in this discussion. The 
authors show how Foucault’s philosophy of power, as distinct from a Freirean concept 
of empowerment, can assist in the empowerment of nurses and patients. Bradbury-
Jones et al. (2008) explain that in accordance with a Foucauldian lens certain 
discourses are accorded status as ‘truth’ and assume a position of power, while other 
sources of knowledge may be less respected and disqualified. In this respect, 
Bradbury-Jones et al. (2008) distinguish between the power of nursing knowledge 
versus medical knowledge, and the power imbalance between patient knowledge and 
that of the healthcare team. The authors encourage nurses to be alert to disqualified 
knowledge in the context of themselves and patients, and consider how both they and 
patients could be disenfranchised within less respected discourses. Applying Bradbury 
et al.’s analysis, I suggest that as patients become more familiar with medical and 
nursing discourses the power imbalance may begin to shift as their opportunities for 
empowerment are increased as within this study.  
 
However, looking at the issue through a post-structural lens, I suggest that being 
‘required’ to adopt the language of another could be perceived differently as 
demeaning and disempowering. This analysis does not contradict Bradbury et al.’s 
position but rather acts as an extension of it. The authors encourage nurses to reflect 
on knowledge-power relationships and suggest that an understanding of these 
relationships can promote empowerment. Learning the language of another is not 
necessarily problematic if there is a mutual recognition of the value of an alternative 
discourse. Knowledge transfer needs to involve a two-way process. In this sense, while 
patients are more suitably equipped to engage in discussion with their healthcare 
professionals, the dialogue will only become of more enduring value if there is a 
corresponding willingness among healthcare professionals to understand the patient 
story. Freire’s (1970/2012) approach to empowerment can be used, in association with 
Foucault’s post-structural understanding of power, to engage with patients in a way 
that empowers them and maximises their autonomy. 
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In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire (1970/2012) signifies the importance of 
education as a means to empowerment. While Freire’s work emerged through an 
understanding of the role of education in empowerment in a political sense, his work 
has an enduring appeal in a broader pedagogical context. His theoretical perspective is 
relevant here in terms of understanding the role of education within the experience of 
autonomy in self-testing, yet also the importance of real engagement with the other. 
Freire’s concept of dialogical practice is significant here. Freire’s work offers an 
interesting contribution as it refers to the ‘manner’ in which an empowering education 
process could evolve. Freire’s work has been previously applied by others to underpin 
a suitable model of empowerment in diabetes education, whereby the focus is on 
maximising user’s autonomy and not compliance with prescribed treatment (Anderson 
and Funnell 2010). For Freire, the essence of education is not to bring those 
marginalised into the fold but rather to alter the fold so that it appreciates their 
contribution: 
 
The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not “marginal,” are not people 
living “outside” society. They have always been “inside” – inside the 
structure which made them “beings for others.” The solution is not to 
integrate them into the structure of oppression, but to transform the 
structure so that they can become “beings for themselves.” (Freire 
1970/2012, p.74) 
 
The experiences of individuals in this study, and the enthusiastic manner in which 
some patients share these experiences, suggest that while education is of critical 
importance in supporting autonomy, additional supportive engagement is also 
required. There is a need to listen to the patient’s story. This aspect of the phenomenon 
is explored within the theme: No room at the inn. What is most salient here is that these 
stories might never have been told in the absence of the research study. This signals 
the need for interaction with patients that offers meaningful engagement with them 
and their story - Freire’s dialogical practice (1970/2012) offers a means to progress 
this type of engagement.   
 
However, there are difficulties associated with educational provision and wider patient 
engagement. While all healthcare professionals interviewed note the importance of 
educational initiatives, time and financial constraints are also evident. The sub-theme 
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‘No room at the inn’ explores the extent to which the lack of availability of healthcare 
professionals is acknowledged by both patients and the healthcare team. The time 
pressures faced by healthcare professionals in this study, and their acknowledgement 
of insufficient opportunity to engage with patients on a more psychosocial level, 
mirrors the broader contemporary concerns of nurses. A study, undertaken in the UK, 
as part of the European Seventh Framework research programme in nurse forecasting, 
RN4CAST,70 points to ‘care left undone’ by nurses due to a lack of time (Ball et al. 
2013). Activities most frequently left undone by nurses were comforting or interacting 
with patients (66%) and educating patients (52%). These findings were replicated in 
the more recently published Irish results (Scott et al. 2014). A recent study exploring 
patients’ abilities to assimilate DAFNE principles into their everyday lives highlights 
the importance of engagement with healthcare professionals in addition to other factors 
(Murphy et al. 2011). Five factors were seen as important in facilitating this 
adjustment: embedded knowledge, continued responsive support, enduring 
motivation, a relationship shift and being empowered. This study lends further support 
for the interconnecting series of factors necessary for successful self-care management 
as explored previously in the discussion.  
 
HCP4 acknowledges specifically the lack of psychological support available for 
individuals with diabetes. However, the lack of engagement with the more affective 
aspects of the patient’s history cannot be attributed solely to a lack of time. There is 
some indication in the data that it is not always perceived as necessary. Patients’ 
expectations may be viewed as unrealistic. In a ‘tongue and cheek’ reference to the 
perceived hierarchy of ‘scientific’ data, Brody suggests that the physician who does 
not pay heed to the patient story as a significant source of data, “might as well go into 
the laboratory and try to study slides through a dirty microscopic lens” (2002, p.134). 
Brody asserts the significance of the patient’s narrative that involves a shift in how we 
perceive medicine. For Brody, medicine is less about “biomedical abnormalities” and 
more about “what the patient is thinking” (2002, p.138). 
 
                                                          
70 For an account of this European study see Sermeus W., Aiken L.H.; Van Den Heede K. et al. & 
RN4CAST consortium (2010) Nurse forecasting in Europe (RN4CAST): Rational, design and 
methodology. BMC Nursing, 10, 6. Available online at: 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6955-10-6.pdf (Accessed November 7th 2013).  
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Supporting this analysis in a specific diabetes context, Abbot et al. (2007) suggest that 
an unnecessary focus on the technicalities of self-monitoring precludes a more detailed 
engagement with patients regarding other aspects of their care. The authors propose 
that self-monitoring may serve as a “proxy” for patient engagement (Abbot et al. 2007, 
p.10). The patient story is however essential to the overall success of self-monitoring 
and one’s ability to exercise autonomy. This is central to The interdependent 
phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing presented in this study and the associated 
existential understanding of chronic illness. The realities of everyday life impact on 
the patient’s ability to act autonomously, as patients are obliged to “internalise medical 
acquiescence in relation to the erratic character of life” (Mol 2000, p.19). An 
understanding of Autonomy as lived, as outlined in this study, emphasises the 
contingent nature of patient autonomy relative to their personal experience of illness. 
Trento et al. (2008) support the importance of psychosocial care in the management of 
diabetes and the impact of emotional issues on capacity for self-care: 
 
To help persons with diabetes manage their condition, health professionals 
need to widen their understanding of human behaviour. Caring for diabetes 
is radically different from the treatment of acute illnesses, and therefore 
requires a different conceptual framework to inform the operator’s 
behavioural, educational and clinical approaches.... Emotional responses 
appear to be closely connected with attitudes towards the disease reflecting 
the patients’ psychological adjustments and how much responsibility they 
are prepared to assume for self-management. (Trento et al. 2008, p.86) 
 
In accordance with the phenomenological analysis in this study, it could be argued that 
the existential experience of acute illness may not be entirely different to that 
experienced by diabetic patients, as issues with regard to the ‘lived body’ in illness are 
similar in some respects, regardless of the illness course.  
 
To conclude, key factors in the patient experience of Autonomy as lived are related to 
their interaction with healthcare professionals. This includes the role of healthcare 
professionals in patient empowerment through the process of education. Education 
provides patients with the knowledge and practical skills necessary to engage in more 
autonomous behaviour, and plays a role in shifting the balance of power between 
patients and healthcare professionals, as it provides patients with access to a respected 
discourse. Also significant in interaction with healthcare professionals is the lack of 
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engagement in more psychosocial dialogue. Due to a lack of time, or a lack of 
perceived importance, this prevents the healthcare professional from capturing the 
existential nature of the patient’s illness, and impedes the mutual interaction that is 
central to patient empowerment. These factors are important considerations in terms 
of operationalising Autonomy as lived in practice, and will be addressed as discussion 
proceeds.  
 
6.3.3 Respecting autonomy in different ways 
The sub-theme of Autonomy versus covert paternalism particularly highlights the 
contextual reality of respecting patient autonomy in the healthcare setting, and the 
tensions that can be associated with this from a healthcare professional perspective. 
While healthcare professionals may profess a rhetoric of patient empowerment and 
autonomy, in the lived world of practice this can be an onerous task, which may 
conflict with other morally justifiable values related to considerations of patient well-
being, preventing harm and professional responsibility. Such considerations influence 
the manner in which patient autonomy is respected in healthcare and the nature of 
patient choice. The wider sense of power inherent in the healthcare system is also 
evident in Alex’s frustrations regarding the failure of the system to facilitate easier 
access to necessary supplies. This impacts on his autonomous behaviour. As noted in 
the findings chapter the question of paternalism is raised as an observation and not as 
a criticism. This section teases out some of the more paternalistic concerns that may 
motivate an alternative perspective on patient autonomy 
 
The empirical study highlights a number of instances where patient autonomy becomes 
problematic for healthcare professionals. There appear to be two competing concerns 
or values at play here: a concern for patient autonomy and an acknowledgement of 
one’s professional role to act in the patient’s best interest. Is it morally permissible to 
‘coax’ patients into doing what healthcare professionals believe to be in their best 
interests? There is evidence of this approach among the healthcare professionals 
interviewed in this study. However, the manner in which healthcare professionals 
engage with patients to influence a change in behaviour exhibits subtle differences. 
Some healthcare professional’s narratives suggest a greater understanding and respect 
for the patients’ story than others, and a more nuanced approach in addressing issues 
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of concern. I suggest at this point that these subtle differences are significant and will 
return to them as an alternative construction of autonomy is developed.  
 
For now, I draw on the earlier analysis of autonomy presented at the outset of the study. 
In specific reference to patient autonomy and the clinical relationship Olsen (2003, p. 
705) refers to “the ethical use of influence” within a patient/clinician context. Olsen 
proposes that influence is not only ‘intrinsic’ but ‘desirable’ within the clinical 
relationship. Olsen’s discussion centres on the process of coercion in mental health 
practice whereby the use of coercion is justified in a rights-based approach. In 
accordance with this approach, the patient is seen as an autonomous self-governing 
agent who has the right to act free from external influence. In this context, coercion is 
justified only if the patient lacks capacity to make a judgement or may cause harm to 
himself, or others. Olsen offers an alternative relational approach whereby influence 
is seen as a constant feature of the clinical relationship and treatment decisions are 
continuous and subjective. The relational approach demands that every action of 
influence, despite its magnitude, is assessed for its ethical suitability. Therefore, 
respect for patients is paramount throughout and the power relationships are 
continuously acknowledged. In accordance with this understanding of ‘ethical 
influence’, healthcare professionals seek to protect patient welfare in their interactions 
with patients.  
 
Dooley and McCarthy (2012) support an interdependent approach in healthcare 
decision-making. The authors suggest that persuasion is legitimate in the 
patient/healthcare professional relationship, but that coercion and manipulation are 
not. They recommend a dialogical approach based on shared communication and 
professional engagement. This resonates with the relational accounts of autonomy 
within the literature review whereby concern for the other takes precedence over a 
blind reverence to autonomy. ‘Protective responsibility’ (Holm 1997), ‘protective 
empowering’ (Chiovitti 2008) and a ‘logic of care’ (Mol 2008) all suggest that more 
is required. Participants in Chiovitti’s study (2008, p.210) “described a consistent 
interplay between protecting and empowering patients”. Healthcare professionals in 
this study display a similar interplay in the context of diabetes care. Downie (1998) 
contends that a degree of paternalism is inherent within a professional relationship, 
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whereby the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence may on occasion take 
precedence over respect for individual autonomy. This perspective in the literature – 
the need for healthcare professionals to move beyond an unwavering reverence of 
patient autonomy - supports The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-
testing in this study. Autonomy is revealed as an interdependent, contextual process 
whereby healthcare professionals recognise their professional responsibilities towards 
patient welfare, and may on occasion minimise patient autonomy in their practice, or 
facilitate autonomy through supportive interactions.  
 
The restriction, or promotion, of patient autonomy arises in the study in situations of 
choice. While HCP1 refers to the importance of patients making choices relative to 
their own perspective, and supports this position in much of his narrative, there is some 
evidence to the contrary within his perspective, and that of other healthcare 
professionals. His interactions with the patient who initially resisted insulin 
administration provides an example of this. Similarly, references to ‘coaxing’ the 
patient and ‘keeping them coming back’ by other participants suggests a process which 
eventually results in patients ‘choosing’ the options healthcare professionals believe 
to be in their best interests. There is also evidence of limiting the degree of choice 
afforded to patients with regard to the selection of a specific blood glucose monitor. 
This decision is made depending on the healthcare professionals understanding of the 
abilities of individual patients. As a registered nurse, I can resonate with this. If an 
individual may be further confused by the ‘burden’ of greater choice, I believe it 
morally defensible to limit their anxieties and share a monitor with them which does 
not impede their participation in self-testing but limits the technological capabilities it 
offers. The study also highlighted the subjectivity associated with the decision to 
extend a patient’s level of education and possibly invite him/her to attend for structured 
education programmes. While this may be permissible, and sensible, in some patient 
perspectives, it is also possible that healthcare professionals are underestimating the 
abilities of patients in these examples. It may be that such practices are not examples 
of individualistic care, but rather constrain autonomy among a group whose degree of 
control is already compromised.  
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The ‘nature’ of patient choice in healthcare has been recognised elsewhere in the 
literature. There is an understanding that choices occur over time, and are influenced 
by healthcare professionals in different ways (Kukla 2005, Agledahl et al. 2011, Upton 
et al. 2011). Mol’s (2008) ‘logic of care’ is presented as an alternative discourse to ‘a 
logic of choice’. Mol’s central argument is that more choice does not lead to better 
care and actually may negatively affect care. Upton et al. (2011) interviewed nurses 
about their interactions with patients regarding the selection of an inhaler for asthma 
management. Similar to the healthcare professionals in this study, the actual choice 
which patients were presented with was already mediated by the nurses in light of their 
assessment of patient need. Olsen (2003) sees influence as a constant feature of the 
patient/healthcare professional relationship, while Tauber (2005) refers to the 
inescapable dependence implicit in medical practice.  
 
Kukla (2005) supports this analysis in the context of obstetric care. Kukla contends 
that an understanding of autonomy, as related to considerations of self-determination 
and informed consent in moments of discrete choice, is not a realistic interpretation of 
how autonomy is exercised in the healthcare environment. Kukla (2005, p.36) seeks 
to “decouple self-determination from autonomy, and to suggest an alternative working 
notion of autonomy that is not restricted to expression in punctate [once-off] 
decisions”. Her account of the ongoing interaction between healthcare professionals 
and patients resonates with the process of communication and negotiation of care 
practices within this study:  
 
Notice that pregnant women are responsible for a great deal of ongoing 
self-management. Far from being the merely passive objects of medical 
care that they are deplored as being in some feminist discussions, pregnant 
women are expected to be active, self-disciplining participants in their own 
prenatal health care. At the same time, this extra-clinical, ongoing self-care 
is not independent of the professional, institutionalized health care 
delivery system, for these practices are both recommended and monitored 
by health professionals, and pregnant women are held accountable to these 
professionals for their self-management in routine and regular ways. 
Indeed, we regard checking in with and being properly monitored by 
medical professionals as essential to responsible health practice during 
pregnancy. This means that much of the care that falls under the purview 
of health care professionals and institutions actually goes on outside the 
clinic, and the responsibility for its execution is largely placed on patients 
themselves. (Kukla 2005, p.36) 
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Self-care was similarly directed and monitored by healthcare professionals in this 
study. As Kukla’s analysis suggests (p.37), “a neat continuum between self-
determination and paternalistic displacement of agency is an inadequate tool for 
measuring many healthcare activities”. Kukla’s account very much reflects the 
interdependence that is central to the phenomenon of Autonomy as lived and the 
associated co-existence of freedom and constraints. The dietary constraints and the 
‘bind’ of self-testing which participants engaged in this study resonates with the self-
care activities employed by pregnant women. As Kukla (2005, p. 37) explains, these 
“healthcare practices pervasively involve a mix of self-management and accountability 
to medical authority”. Kukla’s observations provide an alternative understanding of 
influence in healthcare professional/patient interactions. Kukla proceeds to explore the 
responsibility of patients in their relationship with healthcare providers in terms of a 
particular understanding of autonomy: ‘conscientious autonomy’. This will be 
addressed later in the discussion.  
 
As a final point, an interesting dimension to this discussion is that Frances valued the 
role of her healthcare professional in not conceding to her request to recommence 
insulin. Frances preferred the flexibility in her dietary intake that insulin facilitated 
and sought to recommence insulin. However, despite her physician’s refusal to 
prescribe insulin at that point, as time progressed Frances noted being pleased with the 
outcome of the consultation. She had adjusted to the oral medication regime and 
particularly noted the expertise of the healthcare professional whose knowledge 
facilitated this outcome. Had Frances’s physician been an advocate of autonomy, 
above other morally justifiable principles of beneficence and non-maleficence, this 
outcome might not have ensued.  
 
This echoes Brody’s (2002) perspective that in the healthcare arena patients may prefer 
their physicians to be powerful and willingly accept more subservient roles. Patients, 
in Brody’s analysis do not seek out powerless physicians. On the contrary, patients 
“seek out the most powerful physicians and want very much for the physician to use 
that power on their behalf” (Brody 2002, p. 135). Empirical evidence offers some 
support for this perspective. Salloch et al. (2013) note that patients in their study, 
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diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, valued the professional opinion of their attending 
physicians, and placed a significant degree of trust in them, with regard to treatment 
decisions, particularly in the earlier stages of diagnosis. Similarly, Madsen et al. (2007) 
interviewed patients with ovarian or breast cancer about their experiences and 
perceptions of being asked to participate in a randomised controlled trial. The 
researchers refer to “loneliness of autonomy” as a unanimous experience among all 
patients related to their lack of knowledge and other resources required to make an 
informed choice. This ‘loneliness’ is evident in the following extract: 
 
I couldn’t decide - I wanted the doctor to decide which treatment was the 
best for me . . .I just remember that I chose my own treatment, and I didn’t 
feel good about that at all . . .I was really surprised that they put me in that 
situation with such a serious disease, and want me to make choices about 
my own disease. It had an incredible effect on me, I felt bad about it, and 
I couldn’t get the doctor to just give me advice … (Ida [breast cancer, trial 
decliner, ovarian radiation] (Madsen et al. 2007, p.54)   
 
In conclusion, in the real world in which patient autonomy exists, or does not exist, 
healthcare professionals value patient autonomy, but they also value patient well-being 
and the significance of their professional responsibilities. The nature of patient choice 
is sometimes restricted to promote patient well-being and prevent harm, while 
interactions with patients are motivated towards compliance with best-practice for 
similar reasons. As in the case of the patient examples outlined here, real autonomy 
involves a negotiation between patient and healthcare provider in recognising when 
expectations and desires may require reassessment. Patient autonomy is not best 
represented as a feature in unique moments of discrete choice. In long-term care a 
‘process’ of ongoing interaction more accurately reflects the reality. HCP1 continued 
to see his patient who was on a self-imposed diet of seeds despite his professional 
misgivings, while Frances continued to engage with her healthcare provider and follow 
the plan of care prescribed despite her personal desire for alternative treatment. The 
nature of patient choice is sometimes curtailed in the real world of practice. An 
understanding of Autonomy as lived recognises the positive moral motivation behind 
such restriction, yet also acknowledges the potential for an inappropriate use of power 
if such limitations are not employed in tandem with patient engagement and 
assessment.  
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6.3.4 Technology, autonomy and the social world 
Technology is a non-neutral entity. Its use occurs within the social world and there is 
a reciprocal relationship between technology and the social world. One’s place in the 
world shapes one’s use of technology; one’s use of technology can in turn shape one’s 
place in the world. This was evident among participants in this study whose 
engagement with the self-testing device was shaped by, and influenced, their personal 
circumstances. Deirdre’s eagerness to manage her own health added meaning to the 
use of the device for her, while Con’s use of the self-testing device reinforced his 
negative feelings about the chronicity of his diabetes. This human-technical interface 
underpins the lack of neutrality in the application of technological devices. In short, 
because technology is used by real people in dynamic situations, technology has the 
potential to do things we intend it to do, not do things we intend it to do, and do things 
we never intended it to do.  
 
While acknowledging associated difficulties, Gubala et al (2011) associate self-testing 
technologies, in the context of chronic monitoring, with assisting individuals to 
manage their own health (Gubala et al. 2011). While this was true for some of the 
participants in this study, it was not necessarily the case for all participants. This 
section explores more specifically the human-technical relations, which the study 
findings portray, and their implications for autonomy. While the nature of human-
technical relations in the study centred on the use of a blood glucose monitoring device 
by individuals with diabetes, the discussion will have some resonance for the wider 
community involved in the development of future diagnostic and chronic illness 
monitoring devices.  
 
The nature of human-technical relations underlines the philosophy of technology 
discourse, which essentially sees technology as a non-neutral entity (see section 3.4 
for a more detailed analysis of this discourse). This study adds to the work already 
undertaken by philosophers of technology, who have embraced empirical methods to 
illuminate theoretical discussion (Mol 2000, Willems 2000, van der Burg 2009, 
Boenink 2012, van der Burg and Swierstra 2013). Mol (2000 p.10) used the term 
“empirical ethics” to describe her use of real world situations to engage in 
philosophical work regarding the moral value of diagnostic devices. In an earlier 
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empirical exploration of the use of blood glucose monitors among individuals with 
diabetes Mol (2000, p.9) contends that “diagnostic devices actively intervene in the 
situations in which they are put to use”. This is also true for this study. Echoing many 
of the observations made here Mol (2000, p.12) notes: 
 
And thus blood glucose measurement is not only a matter of producing 
numbers. It has many more aspects. Economy is one of them. As are the 
stresses and strains that come with it. The pain of pricking in fingers. And 
the practicalities of measuring. 
 
The appropriate question to ask, as Mol (2000, p.20) suggests, is not “What does this 
technology do?” but rather, “What may this technology do under which specific 
circumstances?” Here I attempt to pose some answers to this question in the specific 
context of the self-testing device and patient autonomy.   
 
As a starting point technology has the potential to promote autonomy as intended but 
only in certain circumstances. As previously explored, the self-testing device 
promoted autonomy for some participants, albeit a freedom with certain constraints. 
For those individuals there was a positive synergy between the individuals’ 
relationships with the device, their illness and health care providers. A central feature 
of this autonomy was the initial awareness of their bodies, which the self-testing device 
facilitated. The ability of self-testing to enable participants to be more aware of their 
bodies, their diabetes, and their blood glucose readings, was positively recounted by 
some participants in this study and noted within the theme: Knowing the body. This 
aspect of self-testing is also acknowledged elsewhere in the literature. The qualitative 
component of the DiGEM study (Farmer et al. 2009b) interviewed 40 patients about 
their experiences of self-testing. ‘Awareness’ emerged as one of the three thematic 
findings of the qualitative analysis. Participants noted the role of monitoring in 
assisting them to understand the relationship between blood glucose levels and felt 
symptoms and the physiology of blood glucose control with regard to lifestyle 
behaviours.  
 
Peel et al. (2007) specially refer to participants’ increased awareness of their bodily 
signs as they are engaged in self-testing over time. For some participants their 
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subjective knowledge of their blood glucose levels led to a reduction or cessation of 
self-testing. Participants within Peel at al.’s (2007) study noted the reassurance of self-
monitoring and listed this as one of the reasons to continue the process. The DiGEM 
study also noted the sense of reassurance that awareness of their blood glucose levels 
created for patients, and the role of self-monitoring as a motivating factor in adopting 
more healthy behaviours (Farmer et al. 2009b). In this study, Ann refers specifically 
to the role of self-monitoring in creating awareness and its significance in incentivising 
her to live a healthier lifestyle. Her perspective very much resonates with one of the 
participants in the DiGEM study who notes: 
 
I think you can certainly tell whether you’ve eaten the wrong things. Or 
whether you’ve overdone it and then you obviously need to go and correct 
that by doing exercise or being extremely good you know. (D33, 45-year-
old-woman, DiGEM study, Farmer et al. 2009b) 
 
The role of self-monitoring in assisting patients to evaluate the effect of behaviour 
changes was also highlighted in Barnard et al.’s (2010) survey of patients with type 2 
diabetes. However, the study also highlighted that few individuals utilised results to 
alter medication. The authors note that this is not uncommon, as oral medication is 
generally not altered by patients. For many of the participants in this study the 
awareness of their blood glucose levels was positively evaluated. The more negative 
experiences associated with awareness will be addressed as the discussion proceeds, 
but  for some of the patients who referred to knowing their bodies in more favourable 
terms, their experiences of autonomy were more pronounced.  
 
However, technology will not always do what we intend it to do if there is a problem 
in one of the interdependent relationships. There are many different facets to these 
relationships, as explored within the findings chapter, which impact on the extent to 
which a self-testing device promotes self-management and autonomy. This matrix of 
interdependence, as presented in Figure 3 in the previous chapter, is theoretically, and 
sometimes graphically, reflected in other studies that address patients’ engagement 
with technology in a self-management context.  
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Lehoux (2004) points to a number of technical and human dimensions that collectively 
shape user-friendliness in technology. These include technical dimensions, such as the 
functionality of the device and its physical properties, and human dimensions such as 
the user’s knowledge, skills, sociality, self-image and self-efficacy. Lehoux associates 
self-efficacy with patient autonomy. The human dimensions within this study have 
already been explored in detail in this chapter and share many similarities with those 
identified by Lehoux. The technical aspects of the device were also significant for 
participants in this study. However, for the most part participants seemed to accept any 
less-than-ideal technical issues as part of the ‘bind’ of the self-testing process. Practical 
details regarding the device such as its size, its number of component parts, its potential 
to induce pain and its visibility may not just impact on the degree of comfort, which 
users experience, but may also, influence their decision to use it at all.  
 
In this sense, the practical aspects of the device are significant in its ability to facilitate 
more autonomous roles. While advances in technology are acknowledged, many 
participants refer to the cumbersome nature of the device, particularly with regard to 
the number of component parts. Participants also relate their desire for more 
instantaneous, discreet and less invasive monitors. The importance of such 
practicalities to patients is noted in other research. Mol (2000, p.20) suggests, “fighting 
with a burdensome machine may spoil the day. So it is quite likely that tiny 
practicalities are responsible for the success or failure of an apparatus”. Similar to the 
participants in this study, previous research has shown that while participants associate 
pain with self-testing it does not cause them to cease monitoring (Farmer et al. 2009b). 
Both healthcare professionals and the scientific community participants acknowledge 
the pain factor and the need for developments in this regard. The wider diagnostic 
community are currently exploring the possibilities of non-invasive monitoring, and 
appreciate its importance among diabetic populations (Gubala et al. 2011). 
 
An interesting dimension is that technology may do things we never intended it to do. 
Distress, anxiety and guilt, as outlined in accordance with the theme Unwelcome 
burdens, are examples of this. The experience of anxiety among individuals who self-
test has been reported elsewhere in the literature (Barnard et al. 2010). Similarly, 
feelings of guilt and self-chastisement are noted in other studies (Peel et al. 2007, 
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Farmer et al. 2009b, Clar et al. 2010, Barnard et al. 2010). As explored within the 
analysis stage, Willems (2000), in a broader self-management context, highlights the 
association between self-management strategies and personal blame for poor medical 
outcomes. As patients are more involved in their medical care, there can be a tendency 
to apportion blame to one’s self, when strategies employed do not result in more 
favourable results, despite the possible non-behaviour related causes. In a shifting of 
roles, patients share the responsibility for health management along with the healthcare 
team and correspondingly share accountability when the disease is not ‘effectively’ 
controlled. Peel et al. (2007) make the point that the sense of failure experienced by 
individuals with diabetes may be inappropriate. While health related behaviours might 
be of benefit in terms of overall blood glucose control, as evidenced by HbA1c, their 
impact may not be seen in more immediate self-testing results.  
 
The continual awareness of one’s blood glucose levels also has the impact of 
increasing one’s perceptions of chronicity. This is a significant factor in mediating the 
participants’ experiences of autonomy and reflects findings in other studies. Harris and 
Cracknell (2005) note that patients expressed relief at not having to continuously self-
test, and equated this relief with the tendency for self-monitoring to reinforce 
perceptions of ill-health. Similarly, Thompson et al. (2013) highlights that home-based 
blood pressure monitoring acts as an unwelcome reminder of ill health among 
participants. Echoing the sentiments expressed by Con in this study, one of the female 
participants in the DiGEM study describes self-testing in the following manner: 
 
…a sort of reminder of the fact that you know that I I’ve got something 
wrong with me…I don’t like to be reminded particularly. (D15, 67-year-
old-woman, group 2, Farmer et al. 2009b) 
 
This reflects the spatial dimensions of the self-testing experience as explored in 
interpretation in the previous chapter. Through engagement with the self-testing 
device, the presence of diabetes and the ill body are no longer ‘invisible’ states. High 
blood sugar readings make the reality of a diabetes diagnosis and ill health more 
apparent. The ‘ill’ body, previously hidden and ‘ready-to-hand’, is now revealed in its 
‘unready-to-hand’ mode and becomes ‘present-to-hand’ through use of the self-testing 
device (Heidegger 1927/1962). 
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An interesting dimension of the device with regard to its human-technical relations is 
that it has the ability to simultaneously promote and constrain one’s freedom. Previous 
studies have found that freedom and restraint co-exist in terms of home technology 
use, which reflects a complex understanding of the association between technology 
and autonomy (Mol 2000, Lehoux 2004, Fex et al. 2009, Thompson et al. 2013). 
Hofmann (2003) coined the term ‘technological paternalism’ to expand traditional 
notions of paternalism. “Technological paternalism” extends paternalism “beyond 
intentional reduction of individual autonomy to also include altered autonomy due to 
epistemiological and societal frameworks” (such as technology) (Hofmann 2003, 
p.351). Essentially, technology alters the landscape in which patients and healthcare 
professionals interact. I suggest that the potential surveillance role of technology, as 
identified in this study, provides an example of the altered epistemic and social 
structures to which Hoffman refers. Willems (2000) refers specifically to the 
surveillance induced by a peak flow breath-monitoring device. Willems compares the 
self-monitoring device to a “Trojan horse” (p.29) which intrudes into patients’ home 
lives, and limits their privacy with regard to compliance with prescribed self-
management strategies.  
 
The scientific community focus group participants vary with regard to the extent to 
which they believe patients should be autonomous in their care and the role of 
technology in this regard. There is a tension between the patient having greater 
ownership of results and their ability to manage results effectively. This may be 
attributed to their role in developing point-of-care devices for use under clinician 
supervision, as opposed to self-testing devices. One participant supported the 
movement towards a connected health agenda, whereby patients would be required 
only to take a result and not actually interpret it. I suggest that this development, if 
indiscriminately employed, could potentially disempower patients. While some 
patients would value a smaller role in interpretation, a connected health agenda could 
potentially remove the sense of ‘being-in-control’ that the monitor allows for others. 
The value that participants place on self-testing, as noted in their narratives, is not 
merely that it allows them to physically test at home, but rather that it permits them to 
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live more autonomously with their diabetes, through taking an active management role 
in their illness.  
 
It is also significant that despite the various human-technical interactions revealed in 
this study, including negative experiences, there was no evidence of a formal review 
of the self-testing process. Healthcare professionals acknowledge that self-testing may 
need to be discontinued for some individuals with type 2 diabetes who experience 
difficulty. Any issues are addressed once they arose in consultation, but this was not 
in response to a structured evaluation of self-testing. HCP3 noted that desirable follow-
up with patients, who had recently commenced self-testing, did not take always place 
due to time constraints. There was limited reference to specific guidelines or particular 
research studies with regard to self-testing among HCPs when asked, despite relating 
knowledge of current evidence during interview. The varied experiences of patients in 
this study support recent guidelines that stress the importance of individuality with 
regard to the use of self-monitoring (International Diabetes Federation 2009, American 
Diabetes Association 2013). NICE (2011) guidelines also suggest that self-testing be 
evaluated annually to determine how results are managed, the likely benefit of 
continued self-testing and the impact of self-testing on the patient’s quality of life.  
 
It is apparent from the discussion here, that while the use of the self-testing device 
promoted autonomy for some participants and assisted them to live more independent 
lives, this did not occur in all cases. The varied experiences of participants engaged 
with self-testing technology in this study, point towards the ontological implications 
of technology that may often go unnoticed, and are seldom anticipated. For Heidegger, 
(1955/1966, p.50), the ‘greatest danger’ of technology is that it would shape our being 
in ways which we would not notice as “the power concealed in modern technology 
determines the relation of man to that which exists”. More modern philosophers of 
technology refer to these ‘unintended consequences’ as the ‘soft’ impacts of 
technology. Such impacts occur over time and are not considered at the trial stages of 
development. Soft-impacts of technology involve more cultural issues related to 
“changes in our way of perceiving, acting, valuing, hoping and relating” in comparison 
to more ‘hard’ impacts related to technological hazards and economic benefits (van 
der Burg and Swierstra 2013, p.4). Mol (2006) articulates the unintended outcomes of 
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technological interventions specifically in the context of blood glucose monitoring. 
Echoing Willems’ (2000) perspective, Mol (2006, p.48) refers to the “unexpected 
effects” of technologies which “generate forms of pain and pleasure which nobody 
predicted”. Evidence of such unintended ‘pain’ is evident among the participant 
experiences recounted in this study.  
What is significant here is that those involved in the early stage of device development, 
the scientific community participants interviewed in this study, did not engage with 
patients in a manner that may potentially highlight some of these consequences, even 
at the earlier proof of concept stage. It is not that the scientific community participants 
were insensitive to the potential difficulties which may arise for patients, but rather 
that their frame of reference was more focused on quantitative efficacy based 
outcomes: the hard impacts of technology. The role of the laboratory scientists in this 
study was not unusual. Their prime role in ensuring clinical accuracy and 
reproducibility of results explains their quantitative focus.  
 
The scientific community participants are working in the laboratory setting on research 
programmes agreed through the Institute’s clinical, academic and scientific 
partnership. Primary intelligence gleaned from patients, but in most cases indirectly 
from clinical research leads, and secondary desk-top research, is utilised to validate 
new programmes, highlight limitations in current technologies and apply for funding. 
However, the extent to which initial validation is sufficient, in the absence of further 
more qualitative investigation is debatable. While the researchers interviewed in this 
study are primarily involved with ‘getting the science right’, and ensuring the device’s 
suitability for clinician use (see section 1.3.4), there are implications of this science, 
that may impact on a patient’s day to day experience of the device, in ways which may 
not be imagined without more focused exploration. For example, in the context of the 
connected health discussion above, while some patients may value a less autonomous 
role, others may be disempowered if they lose the ability to interpret results. In the 
absence of engagement with the patient perspective beyond clinical efficacy, there may 
be a mismatch between innovation and specific patient need. As an additional example, 
should the urea breath monitor be utilised as a personal monitoring device in the future, 
this may have implications for patients whose ammonia levels are not significant 
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enough for emergency dialysis, but may cause concern over a weekend situation when, 
depending on geographical location, the dialysis unit may be closed. Conversely, for 
a growing number of patients who undertake haemodialysis in the home environment, 
the ability to self-test dialysis efficacy following treatment, may provide reassurance 
and self-management opportunities for patients similar to the participants in this study. 
These ‘soft’ impacts of technology cannot be imagined without greater patient 
engagement or reflection.  
 
The scientific community participants seemed to welcome further engagement with 
the patient experience. Participants positively evaluated their experiences in the focus 
group. The focus group interaction was viewed as an opportunity to reflect on the end-
user applications to a greater extent as opposed to primarily considering how things 
work. SCP2 also made the interesting point that collaboration could occur in both 
directions, whereby scientists could engage with end-user stakeholders, but yet also 
these stakeholders could engage with scientists to more fully understand the 
technological know-how underpinning certain aspects of device construction.  
 
In summation, technology in this study, as an integral component of The 
interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing, both constrained and 
promoted the autonomy of its users. The impact on autonomy, as reflected in other 
studies, depended on the individual patient’s relationship with the device relative to 
other factors. It is also apparent that the technology resulted in both intended and 
unintended consequences for users. A series of interacting factors were necessary for 
the technology to work as desired and positively impact on patient autonomy. This 
reflects the analysis of autonomy as an interdependent phenomenon, as presented in 
this study, and develops a greater understanding of autonomy in a clinical context. The 
discussion also has relevance for healthcare professionals in the specific context of 
diabetes management, yet also in a broader self-management framework when home-
based technology is an integral part of care. The discussion is also pertinent for those 
working in the scientific community as it suggests the need for greater reflection and 
engagement with the soft impacts of technology.  
 
204 
 
 
6.3.5 Final thoughts: Conceptualising Autonomy as lived 
In general, the study findings support an interdependent understanding of autonomy. 
Autonomy is context dependent and cannot be created solely by use of a technical 
device, as it is more relationally constituted. Autonomy exists within constraints, 
including those internally imposed by the existential experience of illness and is 
dependent on real patient engagement and a recognition of mutual responsibility 
between patient and healthcare professional. This sense of autonomy correlates with 
more relational perceptions of autonomy, in comparison to an autonomy associated 
with negative freedom, often subscribed to in current health care policy and practice. 
Such perspectives often rely on a misguided understanding of Kantian philosophy 
associated with independence, isolated decision-making and freedom of choice. The 
reality of autonomy for participants in this study, who take some control in the 
presence of various constraints, is quite different to the self-determining individual 
who, in accordance with Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p.101), “acts freely in 
accordance with a self-chosen plan”. This study adds to the philosophical analysis 
already in the bioethics literature which suggests that autonomy needs to be understood 
in a different way (Meyers 1989, Holm 1997, Downie 1998, Seedhouse 1998, O’Neill 
2002, Scott et al. 2003a, Christman 2004, Tauber 2005, Whitney and McCullough 
2007, Moreno 2007, Harnett and Greaney 2008, Kearns et al 2010, Chiovitti 2011, 
Agledahl et al. 2011, Greaney et al. 2012).  
 
As previously noted the concept of ‘actual autonomy’ as advocated by Agich (1995, 
2003) provides a means of understanding the expressions of autonomy revealed by 
participants in this study. However, at this point I propose that this relevance goes 
beyond support for the individual theme of Autonomy within constraints to incorporate 
the wider phenomenon. Agich coined the term ‘actual autonomy’ as “central to any 
philosophical theory that adequately accounts for autonomy as a concrete feature of 
persons developing, interacting and living in the world of everyday life” (2010, p.110).  
The conceptualisation of ‘actual autonomy’ came about through Agich’s empirical and 
philosophical work exploring expressions of autonomy in long-term care and care of 
the older adult (1995, 2003). He subsequently applied this treatise on autonomy and 
long-term care to other settings including chronic illness (1995). ‘Actual autonomy’ 
holds much resonance for the findings in this study as it reflects an autonomy that is 
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in some ways constrained, is context dependent and relies on a degree of 
interdependence:  
 
Actual autonomy is the term I came to use to characterize the non-ideal 
expressions of autonomy in everyday life. So regarded, the concept of 
actual autonomy has to account for the fact that, as individuals, we develop 
relationally and that our actions, beliefs and thoughts are invariably shaped 
by biological, psychological as well as social factors. (Agich 2010 p. 109) 
 
Agich was concerned that the manner in which autonomy was conceptualised in the 
ethics literature did not take account of patient narratives and was overly concerned 
with the polarised positions of positive and negative liberty.71 Agich proposes that a 
more realistic account of autonomy, ‘actual autonomy’ does not reject the value of 
liberty, but embraces the notion of relationality that is central to more positive 
accounts. A phenomenological understanding of existence is central to Agich’s 
perspective. He utilises the concepts of temporality and affectivity to explain the 
context-dependent nature of autonomy in chronic illness. For Agich (1995, p.137), 
“actual autonomy is not best understood in terms of decisional nodes but in the daily 
ebb and flow of action and experience”.  
 
Agich’s account of ‘actual autonomy’ supports the understanding of Autonomy as lived 
or autonomy as an interdependent phenomenon, as revealed in this study. What 
therefore does the concept of Autonomy as lived offer to the autonomy conundrum 
identified at the outset of this study? How can healthcare professionals operationalise 
an understanding of Autonomy as lived in the everyday world of practice? What does 
the existing bioethics literature have to offer in this regard and what else is required? 
I now turn to these questions.  
 
                                                          
71In a later commentary of his work, Agich (2010) acknowledges that as his research took place in the 
mid-eighties, the subsequent development of feminist ethics has resulted in a more relational 
perspective on autonomy in the ethics literature. I would also add that the subsequent growth of 
empirical bioethics (see section 3.2) makes his work more revolutionary in that time.  
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6.4 Revisiting the autonomy conundrum 
Autonomy as lived is different to autonomy as frequently conceptualised in a healthcare 
context. The interdependent expression of autonomy within this study, as a contextual 
process based on mutual responsibility, does not accord with many of the negatively 
orientated accounts of autonomy referred to in the bioethics literature. However, from 
the analysis to this point, I suggest that alternative accounts of autonomy (which 
recognise and morally defend the need for interdependence and healthcare professional 
influence) may also fall short of a pragmatic account of patient autonomy in healthcare, 
despite their obvious appeal in some respects.72 In order to present an alternative 
‘working’ account of patient autonomy, which recognises the empirical findings and 
acknowledges the strengths and limitations of other prevailing accounts, I return here 
to the initial ethical analysis of autonomy presented in chapter two (see section 2.2.3). 
The empirical work, and subsequent discussion, necessitates refinement and 
development of this initial analysis, as McMillan and Hope’s (2008) model of 
empirical ethics proposes it should. The original argument can be outlined as follows: 
 
Initial argument: 
Premise 1: Current healthcare ethics and recent social policy documents 
uphold patient autonomy as a paramount ethical principle.  
 
Premise 2: This model of autonomy goes beyond merely encouraging 
participation as autonomy is increasingly portrayed as individual freedom 
to choose.  
 
Premise 3: Such a model is not a suitable benchmark for healthcare policy, 
or professionals, because (a) it represents a one-dimensional, sometimes 
misguided, perception of autonomy associated with the absence of 
constraints and (b) it denies important considerations of relationality, care 
and responsibility, which may better serve patients. 
 
Conclusion: Therefore, healthcare practice and policy, which uphold the 
primacy of autonomy and equate it with increased patient choice and 
freedom in decision-making, should be reviewed, or at least accepted with 
caution. 
 
                                                          
72 From this point I refer to such accounts of autonomy as ‘moderate’ accounts, reflecting a less 
emphatic appeal to autonomy in light of other concerns. 
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I propose at this point that the initial argument retains its validity, in light of the 
supporting premises (this study further supports the moral imperative of healthcare 
professionals to look beyond negative perceptions of autonomy towards patient 
welfare), but that other considerations, gleaned through empirical investigation, now 
render this original analysis incomplete. An understanding of autonomy as occurring 
in tandem with constraints, and the contextual nature of autonomy in light of the 
existential reality of the patient experience, also merit consideration. Other 
perspectives, notably the importance of meaningful patient engagement and patient 
responsibility for their own healthcare are also of significance. This understanding of 
Autonomy as lived, in association with the analysis of the bioethics literature to this 
point merits a reappraisal of the initial argument. The revised argument represents an 
extension, as opposed to a rejection, of the earlier argument. 
  
The initial two premises remain factually correct, as more recent additions to 
healthcare policy and ethical guidance suggest the ongoing prominence of autonomy 
as an ethical principle, and continue, for the most part, to associate this autonomy with 
independence and freedom in decision-making (Health Service Executive 2013, 
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland 2013). The third and fourth premises also 
retain their significance. As analysis to this point suggests, negative accounts of 
autonomy are not representative of Autonomy as lived and care, relationality and 
responsibility remain important considerations in healthcare practice. The need to 
exercise caution with regard to elaborated accounts of patient autonomy, based on 
freedom to choose, remain well founded on the basis of this study. However, further 
consideration is required to outline how Autonomy as lived can best be respected or 
operationalised in the healthcare context. The original argument concluded with 
preliminary considerations regarding a more suitable account of autonomy for clinical 
practice. I now seek to extend these preliminary considerations in light of the empirical 
work and further discussion. I therefore present the following argument as an extension 
to the original: 
 
Revised argument 
Premise 1: A significant body of philosophical and empirical work 
recognises the limitations of negative accounts of patient autonomy, which 
focus on independence and freedom in decision-making. This body of 
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literature represents a more moderated account of autonomy, which points 
to the distinct role of healthcare professionals, and may require their 
influence based on considerations of care, relationality and responsibility.  
 
Premise 2: Such accounts are insufficient, in isolation, to operationalise 
the understanding of Autonomy as lived presented in this study as (a) some 
may promote a return to paternalism, in an authoritarian sense, which I 
suggest is not in the best interests of patients or healthcare practice, and 
(b) other accounts, while representing a worthwhile contribution to the 
understanding of autonomy in the real world of practice, do not sufficiently 
encompass the contextual, patient-orientated, phenomenon of Autonomy 
as lived identified within this study  
 
Premise 3: Autonomy as lived presents autonomy as an interdependent, 
contextual process, which relies on real engagement with patients, an 
understanding of the existential constraints on autonomy associated with 
ill-health, and a sense of mutual responsibility among patients and 
healthcare professionals to maximise patient welfare. 
 
Premise 4: Interdependence, engagement, understanding and a sense of 
mutual responsibility, suggest that autonomy involves a collaborative, 
negotiated process. 
 
Conclusion: An understanding of autonomy as a ‘negotiated’ concept 
more accurately reflects the reality of Autonomy as lived and represents a 
more pragmatic account of autonomy for application in healthcare 
practice.   
 
6.4.1 Should we resurrect paternalism? 
As the initial argument suggests, the bioethics literature has afforded particular 
attention to recognising the limitations of more negatively orientated accounts of 
autonomy, which focus on patient independence and freedom to choose in healthcare. 
I refer to such interpretations of patient autonomy as ‘moderated’ accounts. While 
deliberating on an account of autonomy that would best provide a ‘workable’ 
interpretation of Autonomy as lived, a return to paternalism was considered, as many 
‘moderated’, or muted accounts of autonomy use language that is more suggestive of 
paternalism than autonomy. Terms such as ‘beneficence-in-trust’ (Pellegrino and 
Thomasma 1988), ‘professional beneficence’ (Gaylin and Jennings 1996), ‘protective 
responsibility’ (Holm 1997), ‘principled autonomy’ (O’Neill 2002), ‘conscientious 
autonomy’ (Kukla 2005); ‘an ethics of responsibility’ (Tauber 2005) and ‘protective 
209 
 
 
empowering’ (Chiovitti 2008), are all indicative of a paternalistic appeal73 to 
beneficence and non-maleficence, based on the professional responsibilities of 
healthcare professionals. Autonomy is not of paramount importance. Protection, 
responsibility and care are common themes among these various discourses.  
 
In addition to the concepts of care, protection and professional responsibility noted in 
the accounts of patient engagement above, Autonomy as lived suggests that other 
concepts are also significant, interdependence, engagement, understanding and mutual 
responsibility. In an effort to encompass these constructs the terms ‘engaged 
paternalism’, ‘collaborative paternalism’, ‘permissive paternalism’ or ‘respectful 
paternalism’ were considered as possible operational concepts. Why not reconfigure 
paternalism if the language of autonomy is inadequate to support the contextual reality 
of the patient/healthcare professional relationship? A retreat to paternalism may 
suggest a leap too far, depending on how the concept is defined and understood, but is 
none the less worthy of consideration. Should we resurrect paternalism? I intend to 
show here that this would be unwise. While many of its central tenets are worthy of 
consideration, a determined return to paternalism may signal an endorsement of an 
authoritarian healthcare system, which could potentially be as unacceptable as an over 
reliance on exaggerated libertarian accounts of autonomy.  
 
A more comprehensive review of paternalism is warranted at this point. Beauchamp 
and Childress (2013, p.215) note the association between paternalism in healthcare and 
its lexical root as a form of parental administration, whereby “the analogy is that a 
professional has superior training, knowledge, and insight and is thus in an 
authoritative position to determine the patient’s best interests”. The appeal of 
paternalism in healthcare has diminished over time. However, Szerletics (2011, p. 2) 
notes that while paternalism has developed more negative connotations in accordance 
with the enlightenment project, and the more recent emergence of modern liberalism, 
this was not always the case.74 
                                                          
73 I am not suggesting here that these accounts endorse a return to paternalism, rather that, directly 
or indirectly, behaviours which could be viewed as paternalistic are supported.  
74 Szerletics’s comprehensive account of paternalism was undertaken under the auspices of the 
Essex Autonomy Project previously alluded to in this study. While I summarise some of his 
210 
 
 
 
Although the present attitude to paternalism is determined by these 
modernistic assumptions [the triumph of individualism and distrust of 
authority], paternalistic behaviour has not always been associated with 
pejorative connotations. Aristotle, for example suggested that the polis 
does not only have the right to act paternalistically toward its citizens, but 
often has a duty to do so. (Szerletics 2011, p.3)  
 
Szerletics (2011, p.4) proposes that paternalism involves two core elements: “(1) the 
interference with the subject’s autonomy and, (2) the benevolent aim of preventing 
self-harm or promoting benefit”. It appears that, depending on the prevailing historical 
context, the former or the latter element may receive greater prominence at one point 
in time, i.e. an appeal to autonomy or benevolence. There is some evidence of a 
cautious resurgence of paternalism in the mid-eighties, as autonomy gained 
momentum in healthcare ethics (O’Neill 1984, Gillon 1985). However, the concept 
has now, for the most part, receded into the background to the point where paternalism 
is typically viewed as the antonym of autonomy, and classified as an “out of favour” 
(Gaylin and Jennings 1996, p.54), or “historically perverse concept” (Drolet and White 
2012 p.583).  
 
While paternalism can be classified in various ways (Szerletics 2011), in the wider 
bioethics literature the distinction between soft and hard paternalism has received 
greatest prominence (Dooley and McCarthy 2012, Beauchamp and Childress 2013). 
The capacity, and associated voluntariness of the individual whose will is overwritten 
is central to distinguishing between soft (weak) and hard (strong) paternalism 
(Szerletics 2011). While Beauchamp and Childress (2013) note the conditions 
necessary to justify hard paternalism,75 there is a prevailing view that ‘soft’ 
paternalism is morally justified but ‘hard’ paternalism, which involves overriding the 
actions of a competent individual, is not. Dooley and McCarthy (2012, p.12) 
specifically refer to weak (soft) paternalism as “justified paternalism” which 
“overrides a non-autonomous person’s decisions or controls their actions in order to 
protect them from harm or promote their good”. While acknowledging that the 
                                                          
observations here, a more thorough account of paternalism, and its various classifications, is beyond 
the scope of this work. Szerletics provides an excellent resource for further reading.  
75 See discussion p. 221/221 ‘Justified hard paternalism’ 
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distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ paternalism represents a significant element of 
the bioethics debate, I propose that such a distinction is unhelpful in the context of the 
current discussion, as ‘weak paternalism’ may be construed as ‘not’ involving 
paternalistic behaviour as it does not involve denial of autonomy.  
 
The core issue under discussion here is whether paternalism should be officially 
reinstated as a means to encompass an operational account of Autonomy as lived. This 
operationalised concept requires a means of reconciling respect for patient autonomy 
with the professional demands of beneficence and non-maleficence in the real world 
of practice. This creates tensions that are central to the autonomy conundrum identified 
in this study. Soft (weak) paternalism, involves no such tensions as it “does not involve 
a deep conflict between the principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence” 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.217). Therefore, for the remainder of the 
discussion I assume paternalism to consist of two principal elements, as Szerletics 
(2011) suggests; an interference with autonomy and the benevolent goal of promoting 
benefit or preventing harm. While not diminishing the significance of patient 
autonomy, I do not differentiate between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ paternalism beyond this 
point.  
 
Despite a general understanding that paternalism has fallen from grace, ongoing 
empirical work, including the current study, suggests that paternalistic considerations 
are very much at play in healthcare practice (Holm 1997, Chiovitti 2008, Lynöe et al. 
2010). The reality of the healthcare environment suggests that the polarisation of 
autonomy and paternalism is unhelpful and impractical (Kukla 2005). The more 
moderated accounts of autonomy, outlined at the outset of this discussion, represent a 
deliberate attempt to bridge this gap and present ‘a middle ground’, which more 
accurately reflects the reality of the professional/client relationship in the healthcare 
environment. It is difficult however, to decide the extent to which the pendulum should 
swing in favour of either a more paternalistic, or autonomy-based understanding. The 
terminology utilised in the various accounts do not incorporate the word ‘paternalism’ 
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despite the obvious inclusion of paternalistic elements.76 It is as if the sentiments of 
paternalism are employed without a return to paternalism, per se, or use of the actual 
word.  
 
A recent study by Lynöe at al. (2010) makes this point explicitly. The researchers 
developed a tool to measure ‘disguised paternalism’ using the ‘disguised paternalism 
index’. The index measured ‘disguised paternalism’ relative to the extent to which 
physicians prioritised non-maleficence over considerations of autonomy. The study 
concluded that only 3-4% of participants openly supported a paternalistic argument 
with regard to physician-assisted suicide, despite the presence of ‘disguised 
paternalism’. While a more elaborate account of the study is beyond discussion here, 
it is sufficient to note that the study supports the significance of non-maleficence as a 
core issue for current physicians in clinical practice, despite the prominence of an 
autonomy rhetoric. The authors surmise that paternalism is disguised, since to support 
it more openly would go against current social norms. I believe there is particular merit 
in this assumption based on my observations in this study. The theme Autonomy versus 
covert paternalism, supports the appeal of paternalistic considerations among some 
healthcare professionals interviewed despite the wider parlance of autonomy. It is as 
if paternalistic considerations have gone ‘underground’ in some respects. Professional 
bodies endorse an autonomy focused healthcare culture despite the more paternalistic 
concerns of some healthcare professionals.  
 
The legal context represents a significant marker of prevailing social mores. Irish law, 
reflecting the broader westernised context, has exhibited increasing support for patient 
autonomy in the context of healthcare practice. The Mental Health Act (Government 
of Ireland 2001) and the more recent Assisted Decision-Making (capacity) Bill 
(Department of Justice and Equality 2013) demonstrates an incremental support for 
patient self-determination in mental illness and other contexts where vulnerability may 
be established. However, there is evidence of some incongruence between legislative 
intent and interpretation in case law. A review of the Interim Report of the Steering 
                                                          
76 It is important to note that among empirical studies, the terminology used has evolved through 
analysis of data from the healthcare professional participants. In this sense, it is the participants who 
have exhibited a reluctance to name paternalism more overtly. 
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Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001 (DoH 2012b) supports this 
analysis.  
 
The Mental Health Act 2001 introduced a human rights ethos into our 
mental health law. It was anticipated that the introduction in the Act of the 
statutory “best interests” principle would lead to a new emphasis on the 
rights of the patient, but the reality is that the principle has been interpreted 
by the Courts in a paternalistic manner. This paternalistic interpretation of 
the 2001 Act is undermining the significant advances in mental health law 
which the Act was intended to enshrine, and has given rise to concerns that 
the human rights aspects of the legislation have been diluted and 
diminished.77 
 
It seems that the courts have endorsed the paternalistic intent of healthcare 
professionals in practice to some extent. This supports the analysis within this study 
that a rhetoric of autonomy prevails, in the legislation in this context, despite a more 
paternalistic reality. However, in the broader legislative framework, a patient’s right 
to self-determination and autonomy is required of healthcare professionals by law, in 
accordance with a human rights discourse. Yet, for the individual healthcare 
professional, this may not necessarily alter an inherent motivation towards care and 
protection. As Tauber (2005, p.140) suggests, “the moral calculus of care doesn’t 
change, only its legal implementation”.  
 
It appears therefore, from the analysis to this point, that paternalistic considerations 
are present in current healthcare practice, philosophical debate, and legal discourse, 
despite a reluctance to endorse paternalism in an overt way (albeit acknowledging the 
courts’ paternalistic interpretations of mental health legislation noted above). 
However, this is not to suggest that respect for autonomy is obliterated, merely that it 
is afforded less supremacy in contextual settings. There is, it seems, a distinction 
between respecting one’s right to autonomy and respecting autonomous choices. This 
is congruent with a distinction made by Seedhouse (1998) between respecting and 
creating autonomy. Creating autonomy may involve not granting an individual all their 
choices. In keeping with the distinction between positive and negative liberty outlined 
earlier in this chapter, denial of one’s choices may maximise one’s autonomy overall.  
                                                          
77 For a more detailed review of judgement in relevant case see the report p.10 
214 
 
 
 
In a somewhat similar analysis, Freyenhagen and O’Shea (2013) recognise the 
limitations of procedural accounts of autonomy in law, which, once certain criteria are 
satisfied, suggest non-interference with one’s choices, regardless of the implications 
of those choices for the individual’s welfare. (This reflects Donnelly’s (2010) analysis 
of capacity as a “flawed gatekeeper”). However, the authors are also concerned that 
restraining one’s autonomy because they make ‘unsuitable’ choices, as in substantive 
accounts, may “be unduly paternalistic, even authoritarian, and open the door to abuses 
of power” (p.65). The offer “indirect substantivism” as a possible alternative, a mid-
way point of sorts, which seeks to “rehabilitate substantivism” (p.65). I propose that 
this ‘indirect substantivism’ is yet another means of addressing the ‘autonomy 
conundrum’, and another example of a more ‘moderated’ account of autonomy. It 
seeks to recognise autonomy, yet also promote welfare. However, while ‘indirect 
substantivism’ may be too abstract a concept for application in the clinical context, 
there are certain features of this account which are worthy of consideration. I will 
return to this later in the discussion.  
 
Some ‘moderated’ accounts of autonomy make more overt reference to paternalism, 
and are worthy of consideration at this point. Van De Veer’s (1986) ‘Autonomy 
respecting paternalism’ and, more recently, Drolet and White’s (2012) ‘selective 
paternalism’ are such examples. While Van De Veer’s (1986) ‘autonomy respecting 
paternalism’ holds initial appeal, on closer analysis it is apparent that he defers to 
consent based paternalism which does not justify paternalistic action on the basis of a 
duty to promote welfare or prevent harm. The individual’s ‘self-direction’, and not 
considerations of beneficence and non-maleficence, is Van De Veer’s primary goal. I 
propose therefore that Van De Veer’s (1986) account is unhelpful as an operational 
concept as it does not support situations where healthcare professionals are faced with 
the need to choose between patient autonomy and patient welfare, particularly in the 
context of competent patients.  
 
Another construct, “selective paternalism” is presented as a means to “describe the 
practice of situational decision-making by physicians” (Drolet and White 2012, p.583). 
This appears, at the outset, to provide a more appropriate means of operationalising 
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Autonomy as lived in a clinical context. The authors incorporate beneficence and non-
maleficence as grounds for paternalistic action and focus on the process of decision-
making in a clinical context. Paternalism is defined as “choosing a course of action in 
the patient’s best interest but without the patient’s consent” (Drolet and White 2012, 
p.583). However, here I turn briefly to part (b) of the second premise, and suggest that 
this means of addressing the autonomy problem in practice is not sufficiently patient-
orientated to support the interdependence that is central to an understanding of 
Autonomy as lived. Drolet and White (2012) present their proposal with the aid of a 
diagrammatic framework to explain how selective paternalism could work in practice. 
The graphic outlines a number of factors that the healthcare professional contributes 
to the decision-making process: personal values, medical knowledge, standard of care 
and evidence-based medicine. However, by comparison the patient perspective is 
associated only with one element: personal values. The patient’s knowledge base is 
not acknowledged.  
 
As suggested in part (a) of the second premise of the argument outlined above, 
‘moderated’ accounts of autonomy may sway so far towards a paternalistic perspective 
that they represent a return to an authoritarian health service. Even proponents of more 
‘moderated’ accounts of autonomy acknowledge that in the absence of sufficient 
respect for autonomy the distinction between a more nuanced understanding of 
autonomy and paternalism may be lost (Holm 1997). This is the main reason why I 
resist a return to paternalism to provide a workable understanding of Autonomy as 
lived. I present one particular case as an example of this.  
 
In The Perversion of Autonomy Gaylin and Jennings (1996, p.55) lament the passing 
of a more paternalistic approach to healthcare in the following account: 
 
In dealings between professionals and clients a conscious concern for 
autonomy has lead clients to lead a more active and controlling role. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the practice of medicine, where an 
ethical and legal emphasis on the patient’s right to ‘informed consent’ has 
supplanted the days of the benevolent physician … It is easy to see ways 
in which this represents a gain; individuals are better protected from the 
exploitation inherent in the unequal power of the professional-client 
relationship. It is less easy, but no less important, to see what has been lost. 
Professional beneficence and dedication to the well-being of the client has 
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suffered considerably from the recent autonomy orientated adversarial 
atmosphere.  
 
This lament is appealing in many respects as it refers to the core of the autonomy 
conundrum in healthcare practice – how to negotiate two imperatives: respect for client 
autonomy with a professional duty to care for others. The authors suggest the need for 
a ‘common sense morality’, as “common sense tells us to reach out to those in need, 
to step up and take charge of a situation when we can clearly see disaster impending 
or needless hurt coming” (p.3). The authors’ thesis is that a prevailing “culture of 
autonomy” promotes a “decadence” (p.5) and sense of abandonment, which is not in 
the best interests of society or the individual.  
 
The authors make a distinction between the ‘morality of interdependence’ (and 
associated mutual responsibility) and a libertarian conception of autonomy. This 
distinction supports the understanding of Autonomy as lived presented in this study. 
However, despite its many appealing factors, a more thorough analysis of The 
Perversion of Autonomy suggests that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the authors are 
concerned with social control to a greater extent than is consistent with a fundamental 
respect for autonomy. The following extract supports this analysis: 
 
There is something immoral about spending millions, even hundreds of 
millions, of dollars on programs to “educate” people to change their 
behaviour, when we know that what is necessary is either intimidation or 
coercion. (Gaylin and Jennings 1996, p.22) 
 
Therefore, despite their proposal that the criticism of paternalism is well founded, I 
suggest that in reality, Gaylin and Jennings support a return to a more paternalistic 
model of healthcare, in an authoritarian, as opposed to benevolent, sense.78  
 
At this point in the argument, I conclude that certain moderated accounts of autonomy 
have many appealing traits that could usefully be employed to support a workable 
definition of Autonomy as lived in practice. However, despite their incorporation of 
                                                          
78 It is important to acknowledge that in the public health sphere, to which the authors generally 
refer, there is more acceptance of a utilitarian approach to ethics. Nonetheless, I do support their 
overall appraisal of the autonomy/paternalism conundrum.  
217 
 
 
values such as care, protection and harm prevention, which could potentially justify a 
resurrection of paternalism, I reject a more overt return to paternalism as a means of 
operationalising autonomy concerns in practice. Even  more ‘moderated’ accounts of 
autonomy, which appear at the outset to support autonomy and value interdependence 
and mutual responsibility, could potentially promote a return to an authoritarian, 
coercive paternalism as outlined in the example above. I therefore conclude that 
paternalism should not be resurrected as a means to underpin patient/healthcare 
professional interaction.  
 
As previously discussed, paternalism has its roots in governmental, parental and later 
physician-based authority. Any concerted return to paternalism has the potential to 
extol authority and control over other considerations. I propose that what is required 
is a modest understanding of autonomy as opposed to a tempered conception of 
paternalism; an understanding of autonomy, which recognises the caring elements of 
paternalism, without a return to paternalism per se. A more considered account of 
autonomy is warranted which applies some paternalistic ideals of care, protection and 
responsibility in a broader autonomy-based framework. The various ‘moderated’ 
accounts of autonomy explored in some depth to this point offer possible 
considerations, but not comprehensive solutions. I now return to part (b) of the second 
premise in the argument outlined above, which suggests that any of the moderated 
accounts of autonomy explored are not sufficient in isolation, as they do not 
satisfactorily encompass the contextual, interdependent, patient-orientated 
phenomenon of Autonomy as lived identified within this study 
 
6.4.2 Not just about healthcare professionals: The importance of engagement with and by 
patients 
Autonomy as lived represents an interdependent understanding of autonomy that is 
reliant on engagement with patients to appreciate the existential reality of their daily 
lives when living with ill-health. However, it also demands that patients engage with 
healthcare professionals and accept responsibility for their own health and well-being. 
It is for this reason particularly that I find some attempts to deal with the autonomy 
conundrum problematic, as they lack sufficient orientation toward the patient 
perspective. This is the basis of part (b) of the second premise outlined above.  
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Chiovitti’s ‘protective empowering’ (2008) and Holm’s ‘protective responsibility’ 
(1997) have been explored earlier in this chapter as useful constructs in understanding 
the nature of autonomy in practice. While Chiovitti’s work is based in a psychiatric 
setting, it retains relevance here as it explores the core of the autonomy conundrum: 
balancing concern for patient welfare with respect for autonomy. However, I propose 
that more is required in order to adequately respect Autonomy as lived in everyday 
practice. The core limitation with these perspectives is that while they acknowledge 
patient vulnerability, and healthcare professional responsibility, they do not 
sufficiently acknowledge patient capability and responsibility. This is an observation 
as opposed to a criticism; the lack of a patient focus is understandable when one 
considers the origins of these perspectives, neither of which emanated from a 
deliberate analysis of patient autonomy in practice. ‘Protective responsibility’ emerged 
as a core category in Holm’s (1997) grounded theory study of the moral reasoning of 
healthcare professionals based on their self-reported accounts. Similarly, Chiovitti’s 
(2008) theory of ‘protective empowering’ was constructed following interviews with 
registered nurses to identify the meaning of caring for patients in a psychiatric setting. 
As both constructs were devised in light of insights from healthcare professional 
participants, it is reasonable that they would be more orientated towards this 
perspective. Holm (1997) describes ‘protective responsibility’ as a virtue held by 
healthcare professionals based on deontological considerations of a professional duty 
to care. I believe this virtue is an important dimension to respecting Autonomy as lived 
but an understanding of the patient perspective is also an equally important dimension.  
 
As portrayed in the study findings, Autonomy as lived recognises the importance of 
the patient actively taking control of the management of her illness. Those individuals 
who verbalised a preference for being more actively involved, as noted within the 
theme Taking control, indicated greater experiences of empowerment and autonomy 
related to self-testing. This aspect of the phenomenon was interpreted in accordance 
with the locus of control construct (Rotter 1966 cited in Lange and Tiggemann 1981). 
This suggests that those individuals who believe life events to be within their control 
cope more effectively with a chronic illness. The association between the active role 
of the participant and the sustainable use of technology in healthcare is noted by Barker 
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(2011). Barker points to the active participation of the patient as a core component of 
a successful and viable healthcare system. In accordance with analysis to this point, it 
is reasonable to accept that in addressing the autonomy conundrum in practice an 
understanding of patient vulnerability is essential. However, I propose that this 
understanding is incomplete without a corresponding appreciation of the inherent 
capabilities of patients to manage their own health, and their corresponding 
responsibilities in this regard.  
 
Kukla (2005) uses the term ‘conscientious autonomy’ to describe the process of 
patients becoming actively involved in their own healthcare in a responsible way. As 
previously explored within his chapter, Kukla (2005) is also concerned with how 
healthcare professionals reconcile patient autonomy with professional responsibility. 
For Kukla (2005, p.38), Beauchamp and Childress’s (2001) suggestion of non-
interference as a marker of autonomy, is “impractical and problematic in many 
domains of health care practice”. Conscientious autonomy “involves a particular type 
of responsibility”: it implies “being responsible in our actions to standards to which 
we are committed” (p.38). This is significant, as it demands not merely that patients 
are involved in their care but that they adhere to certain standards of behaviour. 
Conscientious autonomy may involve patients adhering to healthcare regimes they 
view as undesirable in pursuit of good health. Kukla (2005, p.38) uses the expectant 
mother as an example.  
 
… the conscientious expectant mother will usually watch her diet, take 
childbirth classes, document fetal kicks, show up to doctor’s appointments, 
and so on. Usually, she does these things neither because they represent 
her own self-chosen plan, nor because she is coerced into doing so, but 
because she is committed to the rightness of these practices and takes 
responsibility for diligently carrying them out. 
 
This example reflects the experience of participants in this study who refer to the ‘bind’ 
of self-testing, yet continue to engage with the practice in pursuit of health goals. In 
accordance with the theme Freedom within constraints, the autonomous patient takes 
control of her illness while also exercising self-control with regard to dietary 
restrictions and self-testing practices. Kukla’s conscientious autonomy is a “limited 
autonomy”, underpinned by “responsible, committed action” which may on occasion 
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“involve the displacement of decisions and deference to experts” (p.39). It involves an 
ongoing process that moves beyond protecting patients’ self-determination. It requires 
healthcare professionals to respect patient capabilities and assist them in understanding 
and managing their health. However, despite its obvious merits, on occasion Kukla’s 
conscientious autonomy strays into more paternalistic ground. At one point Kukla 
refers to the weakness of character that may preclude patients from conscientiousness. 
While Kukla may correctly incorporate patient capabilities, I suggest that 
vulnerabilities are not always understood. However, the concept of conscientious 
autonomy is worthy of consideration as it suggests that patients do not merely have 
certain rights but also that they have certain responsibilities. What is important is that 
in care decisions patient capabilities are balanced with any vulnerabilities.  
 
This echoes a particular theme in the literature that receives less prominence than other 
discourses, presumably, because it is politically incorrect. Redlich (2001, p.5) notes 
that in an increasingly medicalised society “we believe we can commit any health 
crime we wish, and that somehow, as by magic, medicine will wipe it out”. A sense of 
personal responsibility is lost. A review of the 2002 European Charter of Human 
Rights suggests that patient rights may be articulated to the detriment of a more 
pronounced understanding of patient responsibilities (O’Mathúna et al. 2005). Barker 
(2011) offers a similar analysis to Redlich, ten years later, in the wake of further 
technological advances in healthcare. In this extract, Barker refers to personal health 
prevention and echoes much of Kukla’s and Redlich’s sentiments: 
 
We should treat our bodies as least as well as we do a new car or any other 
expensive piece of machinery – with daily care, regular preventative 
maintenance and careful attention to any signs of trouble. Huge spending 
on health magazines, health clubs and ‘nutraceuticals’ shows that we 
desperately want to be healthy and vigorous. But somehow, when it comes 
to painful action or self-denial to prevent disease occurring, we close our 
eyes and hope for the best. (Barker 2011, p.100) 
 
Listing the strategies essential for effective patient engagement in healthcare Barker 
notes ‘skill and will’ as core components. In Barker’s analysis it is not sufficient to 
merely tell individuals to take responsibility for their health; “they need goals, and the 
information, tools, expertise, resources and incentives to pursue them” (Barker 2011, 
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p.69). This explains why a blood glucose monitor accompanied by a wider self-
management ethos, will not necessarily enhance autonomy, or improve blood glucose 
levels.  
 
This suggests the need for engagement with patients to decipher their needs and assist 
them in this regard. However, engagement is required not merely ‘by’ patients but 
‘with’ patients. The existential experience of illness outlined earlier in this chapter, 
which influenced the participants’ experiences of autonomy, suggests the need to 
engage with patients to ascertain their personal life story and support them individually 
in this regard. The significance of the patient narrative has been previously explored 
from a physician (Brody 2002) and patient perspective (Toombs 2002). In order to 
determine the extent to which patients are vulnerable or more capable at a certain point 
in their illness trajectory it is necessary to hear their story. This can assist in 
determining their place in the autonomy continuum.  
 
6.5 An operational account of autonomy for practice: ‘Negotiated autonomy’ 
as a possible solution 
6.5.1 Why Negotiated autonomy? What does it mean? 
I now offer a possible solution to the autonomy conundrum in practice: negotiated 
autonomy. In order to justify this claim it is necessary to summarise discussion to this 
point. What has been leaned about autonomy in the process of reconstructing the 
empirical findings within reasoned argument? How can we operationalise this 
understanding in a manner that has normative value for practice?  
 
This chapter initially summarised the basic tenets of autonomy as revealed within 
Autonomy as lived: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing. This 
understanding presents autonomy in self-testing as an interdependent, contextualised 
phenomenon which occurs within constraints and exists on a continuum mediated by 
the individual existential experience of illness and other life events. An individual’s 
relationship with the self-testing device, her own illness and associated healthcare 
providers were all significant factors in the experience of autonomy. Discussion has 
identified that the findings of this study resonate with the experiences of other 
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individuals with diabetes engaged in the self-testing process. In order to explore the 
relevance of this account of autonomy in the wider bioethics context the central aspects 
of the phenomenon were then explored in light of the existing bioethics literature. A 
number of core concepts were identified in the course of this discussion. These 
included: the significance of care, relationality and responsibility in professional 
caring; the limitations of negative perceptions of autonomy; the associated arbitrary 
nature of choice in the healthcare environment and the role of influence in 
patient/healthcare professional interaction; the difficulties associated with autonomy 
in times of ill-health and the value patients place on professional expertise. Other 
significant issues included: the importance of an existential understanding of illness 
which mediates the experience of autonomy; the significance of engagement with 
patients from an educational perspective, but also to understand their personal story; 
the shifting competencies of patients from vulnerability to greater capability; the 
importance of patient responsibility and the value of patient knowledge; and finally 
the significance of the things in the world, e.g. technology in shaping our experience 
of autonomy.  
 
In light of this conceptualisation of autonomy, the initial ethical argument was re-
visited in order to incorporate these new insights. The basic thrust of the revised 
argument was that while the literature had much to offer in terms of operationalising 
this account of autonomy (in terms of moderated accounts of autonomy) something 
more was required. A return to paternalism was considered and rejected. While many 
of the tenets associated with this construct had value for operationalising Autonomy as 
lived, the potential for a return to an authoritarian system of ‘Dr. knows best’ was 
deemed problematic. In addition, more moderated accounts of autonomy were not 
always sufficiently orientated towards the patient perspective or congruent with the 
contextual account of autonomy presented in this study. In order to encompass the 
various interdependent tenets of autonomy as conceptualised in this study, and address 
the limitations in the current perceptions of autonomy, an alternative account of 
autonomy is presented here as a pragmatic understanding of autonomy for healthcare 
practice. This account is ‘negotiated autonomy’. The term ‘negotiation’ emerged 
through the iterative processes of reading, writing, reflecting and conversing that are 
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integral to hermeneutic phenomenology, a sometimes tedious task of ‘letting thinking 
come’ (Smythe et al. 2008).  
 
Negotiated autonomy appreciates the need for some paternalistic ideals but within an 
overall autonomy framework. It avoids the use of the word ‘paternalism’ to prevent a 
potential return to an overarching rhetoric of ‘doctor (or nurse) knows best’. 
Negotiation signifies an appeal to dialogue and engagement; paternalism does not. 
Negotiated autonomy supports autonomy as an interdependent process where patients 
and healthcare professionals hold mutual responsibilities, and are afforded mutual 
respect. Negotiated autonomy recognises the vulnerability of patients, yet also their 
capabilities. It appreciates that the existential reality of Autonomy as lived in practice 
demands an ongoing engagement with the patient to hear their story and agree a place 
in the autonomy-paternalism continuum. Negotiated autonomy also has the capacity 
to incorporate ‘self-negotiation’, whereby, as in this study, patients relinquish certain 
freedoms to attain others. Negotiated autonomy respects autonomy, but recognises 
other values of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. It is not based on authority 
but on respect for individuals, their welfare and their potential. It is essentially patient-
orientated, while encompassing respect for the healthcare professional’s role. 
Negotiated autonomy sees autonomy as significant within the wider process of 
healthcare and not merely a factor in discrete moments of choice and decision-making. 
Negotiated autonomy was therefore selected in preference to ‘engaged autonomy’, 
‘collaborative autonomy’, and ‘responsible autonomy’, other possible terms that 
include indirect reference to ‘paternalism’.  
 
While the term ‘negotiated autonomy’ has not been utilised specifically in a healthcare 
context there is evidence of an appeal to negotiated autonomy in political discourse. 
Tang and Tang (2001) outline how two tribal villages in Taiwan have regained 
autonomy in the wake of external intrusion. The authors comment that success is 
attributable to a negotiation process whereby villagers willingly developed mutually 
beneficial relationships with external stakeholders. Dolan (2013, p.69) refers to 
autonomy as a “negotiated concept” in a political sense. Using informed consent as an 
operational account of autonomy, Dolan outlines how the evolving guidance for 
informed consent acts as testament to autonomy as a negotiated or “malleable term” 
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which is altered by the prevailing “apparatuses of the state” (pp.69-70). In this sense, 
Dolan highlights the definition of autonomy as negotiated as opposed to individual 
processes of interaction.  
 
Redman’s (2005) outlines ‘negotiated compliance’ to refer to the patient’s adherence 
to a plan of treatment negotiated with their healthcare professional. Albeit, not using 
the term-negotiated autonomy per se, there are echoes of its sentiments in Davies and 
Elwyn’s account of ‘optional autonomy’, which seeks to decipher the degree of 
autonomy in decision-making that patients desire in light of broader constraints on 
their freedom of choice. Dudzinski and Shannon (2006) utilise the term ‘negotiated 
reliance’ to describe their considered approach to a competent adult’s refusal of 
nursing care. The situation involved a dying patient, considerably obese, who refused 
wound care and regular turning due to the pain involved, despite the healthcare team’s 
pharmacological efforts. This created distress for nurses as it led to the patient lying in 
her own excrement and further compromised her skin integrity. In this regard, the 
authors raised particular concerns about the patient’s right to refuse nursing care; 
despite established legal precedent, that medical care could be refused. Following a 
thorough analysis of the pertinent issues (beyond the scope of this discussion) the 
authors engaged in a process of negotiation with the patient which they refer to as 
‘negotiated reliance’. This involved the nurses relinquishing their desire for more 
frequent changing of position, while the patient agreed to be turned once daily despite 
her expressed wish to the contrary. Dudzinski and Shannon (2006, p.618) describe the 
process of negotiated reliance as follows: 
 
A negotiated reliance approach conscientiously strives for a more even 
handed negotiation between respect for autonomy, respect for 
vulnerability and respect for others. It recognizes the reliance of the patient 
on her care providers and the necessity of the person to be cared for in 
defining the role of the care provider. It combines empowerment and 
dependence by requiring negotiation from the competent patient while 
attempting to minimize harm. It presupposes a relationship of care and 
intimacy that acknowledges the increased power that health care providers 
enjoy in that relationship. It allows for more therapeutic and reciprocal 
responses than other approaches. A negotiated reliance approach may 
permit invasion of privacy and force, but, rather than to advance a 
paternalistic agenda, to advance a shared and negotiated agenda. 
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Many aspects of this approach are appealing in light of discussion in this study. 
However, I take issue with the concept of ‘force’ and have some reservations about 
the manner in which the power of healthcare professionals is outlined. The concept of 
‘real negotiation’ by practitioners however, is particularly appealing. Negotiated 
reliance seeks to achieve a compromise that infringes on the patient’s autonomy to the 
least degree possible, but also demands that healthcare professionals make “an 
equivalent sacrifices” (p.618).  
 
Negotiated autonomy adopts many of the principles elucidated by Dudzinski and 
Shannon (2006) but not all. Negotiated autonomy involves a similar yet different 
approach. Negotiated autonomy is underpinned by a contextual account of autonomy, 
Autonomy as lived. It recognises autonomy as relational (Meyers 1989) and occurring 
in the real world, where actual autonomy may be different from ideal autonomy (Agich 
2005). It appreciates more substantive accounts of autonomy and recognises that while 
patient decisions may be rational; this is not sufficient grounds to accept them without 
question (Freyenhagen and O’Shea 2013). It supports a ‘logic of care’ as opposed to a 
blind adherence to a ‘logic of choice’ (Mol 2008). Negotiated autonomy does not 
condone force in competent adults and is underpinned by mutual respect and 
understanding. The discussion to this point contains a number of concepts that 
collectively support an understanding of negotiated autonomy. While many of the 
moderated accounts of autonomy explored in discussion are insufficient in isolation to 
provide a means to operationalise autonomy as lived, collectively they represent a 
theoretical scaffolding to support a process of negotiated autonomy. Negotiated 
autonomy demands the same commitments and behaviours from patients and 
healthcare professionals.  
 
6.5.2 Understanding and respecting negotiated autonomy 
A graphic representation of negotiated autonomy is presented in Figure 4 below. 
Negotiated autonomy comprises five core, interwoven concepts, which reflect the 
various conceptualisations of autonomy, deemed central to an understanding of 
Autonomy as lived. These concepts draw on the empirical findings in this study and 
the normative discussion that follows. The various elements are, openness to 
negotiation, respect for autonomy, respect for the other story, acceptance of personal 
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responsibility, and a commitment to dialogical practice. All five are required in order 
for negotiated autonomy to be fully realised.  
 
Figure 4: Negotiated Autonomy 
 
Open to negotiation 
An essential component of negotiated autonomy is that healthcare professionals are 
open to the concept. In the absence of an understanding of the value of negotiation and 
a willingness to engage with the practice, negotiated autonomy will not be realised. A 
degree of humility is significant in this regard. Badaracco (2002) presents modesty as 
an essential component of the moral leader. Modesty is presented as a ‘quiet virtue’, 
which involves the agent recognising that they do not have all the answers and 
remaining open to new ways of thinking and acting. A willingness to negotiate with 
patients to find a common ground between what the best-evidence suggests, and what 
patients may request is an essential component of negotiated autonomy. There was 
evidence of this type of interaction in the interplay between patients and healthcare 
professionals in this study. 
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It is also important for patients to appreciate the need for negotiation when their 
expressed wishes do not accord with medical advice, or available services, in some 
respects. In accordance with the concept of ‘negotiated reliance’ (Dudzinski and 
Shannon 2006) outlined above, patients may need to relinquish some of their 
immediate preferences in meaningful dialogue with healthcare professionals. Frances 
was open to negotiating with her consultant regarding treatment options despite her 
explicit preference for one modality. Negotiation may also be involved initially as 
patients determine the extent to which they seek to be autonomous within the decision-
making process.  
 
Respect for autonomy 
At the outset, respect for autonomy in accordance with a true Kantian approach is a 
significant pre-requisite. In this sense, autonomy is not an isolated individual concept, 
as often interpreted, but involves an appreciation of other moral agents. One of the 
most recent philosophers to comment on misinterpretations of Kantian autonomy is 
Onora O’Neill. In Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, O’Neill (2002, p.74) takes issue 
with a number of distinguished philosophers who isolate Kant as a major proponent of 
individual autonomy. O’Neill argues that Kant’s unique understanding of autonomy is 
“quite different from the ethically inadequate conceptions of individual autonomy so 
commonly ascribed to him”, and that a careful reading of Kant’s work provides no 
evidence for a Kantian autonomy rooted in individualism. The term ‘autonomous 
individuals’ is not found within Kant’s writings. Rather, as O’Neill explains, he refers 
to the ‘autonomy of principles’ associated with a duty towards others and respect for 
their rights. Based on her analysis, O’Neill presents the notion of ‘principled 
autonomy’ which is most strongly associated with the principle of obligation. In this 
sense, the basis for negotiated autonomy is a respect for autonomy which also 
recognises obligation.  
 
This understanding of autonomy does not support an isolated autonomy which 
demands respect for individual choices and the absence of any influence. However, it 
does demand the ethical use of influence as presented by Olsen (2003). For Olsen, as 
previously explored, influence is an ongoing feature of patient/healthcare professional 
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interaction. It involves a relational approach whereby every action of influence, despite 
its magnitude, is assessed for its ethical suitability. Chiovitti (2011) presents a series 
of reflective questions, which could be usefully employed in this context to ensure that 
negotiated autonomy does not become paternalism disguised in other language. The 
questions encourage the healthcare professional to deliberate on the motivation for 
their actions prior to adopting a more ‘protective’ interaction with patients.  
 
It is essential that patients appreciate the significance of autonomy. Healthcare 
professionals, various patient charters, bills of rights and advocacy groups can assist 
patients in understanding their right to dignity, and real engagement with decisions 
affecting their health. However, it is also essential that patients appreciate that respect 
for their autonomy may not necessarily be diminished, should their healthcare 
professional, or significant other, take a greater lead at certain points in their illness 
trajectory. Chronic illness, as evidenced in this study, can be mapped by varying 
periods of independence and dependence. Exercising one’s autonomy may suggest that 
they voluntarily assume less autonomous roles at different points in time.  
 
Respect for the other story 
Respect for the other story is a significant element of negotiated autonomy. It involves 
healthcare professionals respecting the individual story of patients; the personal 
narrative that each patient brings to a healthcare situation. The patient’s personal story, 
relative to their own illness trajectory will influence their place on the autonomy 
continuum. Respect for the patient’s story is grounded in the work of Brody (2002) 
and Toombs (2002) explored earlier in discussion. However, the need for respecting 
the ‘other’ is mutual. It also encompasses patients appreciating the professional 
responsibilities of healthcare personnel, which may conflict with the patient’s exercise 
of free choices. 
 
Acceptance of personal responsibility 
Negotiated autonomy involves acceptance of personal responsibility by both patients 
and healthcare professionals. Kukla’s (2005) conscientious autonomy as outlined 
earlier in discussion could be suitably employed here to underpin the patient 
responsibilities towards their own health, while O’Neill’s (2002) principled autonomy, 
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with a focus on obligation could underpin the responsibilities of healthcare 
professionals. Holm’s (2007) protective responsibility and Chiovotti’s protecting 
empowering (2008) could also be incorporated as a means to encompass the healthcare 
professional’s responsibility to avoid harm and promote patient well-being within an 
overall autonomy respecting framework. The process of negotiation will involve 
patients accepting responsibility for acknowledging when they may need more 
assistance in decision-making. Also, acceptance of personal responsibility involves the 
healthcare professional recognising when they are not best placed to assist in the 
negotiating process. 
 
Commitment to dialogical practice 
Finally, both parties must engage in dialogical practice. This can facilitate moving 
beyond a contractual account of the caring relationship (Tauber 2005). This dialogical 
practice promotes interdependence in decision-making and draws on the work of 
Brody (2002) and Freire (1970/2012) to promote a genuine sharing of language, 
knowledge and beliefs. How can we best engage with patients in a manner that respects 
their personal narrative, encourages their autonomy relative to that narrative and 
provides supportive education?  
 
Here I return to Freire’s work. His dialogical practice suggests an approach to 
education and engagement that could address the apparent disconnect between patient 
and healthcare professionals often present in healthcare. For Freire (1970/2012, p.75) 
the pedagogy of dialogical practice involves a real sharing between teacher and student 
which appreciates the ontological position of being “with” the world, not merely “in” 
the world. Freire refers to the role of the “humanist revolutionary educator” as follows: 
 
From the outset her efforts must coincide with those of the students to 
engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual humanization.... To 
achieve this they must be partners with the students in their relations with 
them. (Freire 1970/2012, p.75) 
 
Earlier discussion noted the need for mutual learning in the patient/healthcare 
professional encounter; a learning underpinned by an acknowledgement of the patient 
story. While healthcare professionals may know many things, they may not necessarily 
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know ‘more’ than patients. Chiovitti’s (2008) theory of ‘protective empowering’ 
incorporates ‘Viewing the patient as knowledgeable’ as a sub-category of the central 
category of ‘Respecting the patient’. In this sense, “nurses blended their knowledge 
with patient’s knowledge to help patients consider information available so that 
patients could decide how they wanted to be in their situation” (Chiovitti 2008, p.211). 
To assume, as a healthcare professional, that one knows more than patients, is arrogant 
in some respects, yet also possibly sensible in an alternative situation. With regard to 
some treatment decisions, the formal education and broad experience of healthcare 
professionals may mean they do know more about the options available, particularly 
with regard to technical aspects of care (Gillon 1985). However, they may not know 
more about the benefit of these options for particular patients if they fail to fully engage 
with them. The patient is an ‘expert’ in relation to their own life path.  
 
Tauber (2005) is explicit with regard to the need to connect with the patient in the 
context of the autonomy conundrum. In Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of 
Responsibility Tauber calls for a “humane medicine” (p.43) which acknowledges the 
limits of reductionist approaches, and appreciates the need for a more psycho-social 
understanding of the patient situation. Tauber urges healthcare professionals to reassert 
the covenant model with patients, which transforms autonomy and beneficence into a 
pattern of mutual support as opposed to adversarial concepts. This type of model, as 
opposed to more conventional contractual models would assert responsibility “in 
alignment with the claims of autonomy” (p.19), and avoid more consumer-orientated 
considerations. In this sense, professional responsibility for patient welfare and respect 
for autonomy can co-exist. Dooley and McCarthy (2012) present a similar account of 
approaching autonomy and decision-making as an interdependent process. 
Recognising the importance of the patient narrative, similar to the analysis presented 
here, Dooley and McCarthy draw on Brody’s account of dialogical practice as a means 
of promoting patient autonomy. Brody (2002, p.136) outlines a number of elements 
that can contribute to dialogical practice through a “joint construction of narrative”. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, negotiated autonomy is proposed here as a suitable means to 
operationalise Autonomy as lived in healthcare practice. In respecting autonomy as a 
contextual interdependent process, it exemplifies a pragmatic account of autonomy for 
clinical practice, which encapsulates the strength of current understandings in 
bioethics and addresses their imitations. Negotiated autonomy represents a normative 
proposal for healthcare practice based on the empirical findings of this study, though 
not drawn ‘directly’ from them.  
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Technology is at times pivotal in increasing patient’s autonomy and enabling them to 
participate in the social world, but it also imposes heavy restrictions that are 
intimately woven with the characteristics of the disease itself and with the patient’s 
own life trajectory.  
(Lehoux et al. 2004, p.641) 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarises the research study and explores the contribution of the study 
findings to the existing literature. The overarching contribution of the study lies in its 
illumination of autonomy in practice. The research concludes with an understanding 
of Autonomy as lived as an interdependent phenomenon, which can best be 
operationalised by means of negotiated autonomy. Negotiated autonomy provides a 
means to address the autonomy conundrum as identified in the introduction. The study 
also contributes to the current literature in empirical bioethics research, human 
technical relations and self-management policy and practice in diabetes care. These 
methodological and pragmatic contributions will be explored as the discussion 
proceeds. The chapter also explores the limitations of the research study and outlines 
a series of recommendations for bioethics scholarship, healthcare policy and practice 
and further research.  
 
In accordance with interpretive phenomenological research, understandings will 
always be tentative and open to new interpretation as further empirical and 
philosophical work evolves (Ironside 2005). This phenomenological understanding of 
Autonomy as lived is not presented as a generalised and irrefutable account of 
autonomy in practice. For Smythe et al. (2008, p.1393) “insight gleaned” [through 
phenomenological research] is not about the ‘generalised’ or ‘normalised’ person who 
is in fact, no one, but what shows ‘me’ how better to understand human experiences”. 
In the previous chapter, empirical findings are subjected to reasoned argument to 
support the normative and associated pragmatic conclusions outlined. This 
relationship between empirical work and normative analysis enables the transfer of 
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empirical knowledge to new settings and minimises epistemological concerns 
regarding the ‘disconnect’ between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in empirical bioethics (Holm 1997, 
Rehmann-Sutter et al. 2012). This study extends our understanding of autonomy in a 
clinical context. What is important is that the understandings of autonomy gleaned 
through empirical and philosophical exploration in this study have resonance for 
others, who may incorporate these understandings in their practice.  
 
7.2 Study summary and conclusions 
The increasing prominence of autonomy as an ethical principle in bioethics, and 
healthcare policy and practice can create tensions for practitioners and potential 
anxieties for patients. I refer to this as the autonomy conundrum. This study examines 
the principle of autonomy in practice through a philosophical and empirical analysis 
of autonomy in engagement with self-testing technology. McMillan and Hope’s (2008) 
empirical ethics design is utilised to underpin the methodological processes. The initial 
ethical analysis raises concerns about the prevailing understanding of autonomy in 
healthcare whereby autonomy is equated with negative liberty, an absence of 
constraints, isolated decision-making and ‘free choice’. The analysis argues that an 
alternative understanding of autonomy is required to incorporate the concepts of 
relationality, care and responsibility that are central to human interaction.  
 
An empirical investigation then explores the meaning of autonomy among individuals 
engaged with self-testing technology. Interpretative phenomenology is utilised to elicit 
the experience of autonomy among 12 individuals with diabetes engaged with the self-
testing process. Data collection is by means of hermeneutic interviewing. Data from 
prominent stakeholders - healthcare professionals and scientific community members 
is also sought to illuminate the patient experience. Data is collectively analysed using 
an approach advocated by Crist and Tanner (2003).  
 
This interpretive analysis of patient autonomy in engagement with self-testing 
technology reveals an understanding of Autonomy as lived: The interdependent 
phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing. In accordance with this interdependent 
phenomenon, the patient experiences autonomy in self-testing as a series of three 
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interdependent relationships: Relationship with device; Relationship with illness; and 
Relationship with healthcare provider. The term ‘interdependence’ is significant, as 
autonomy is maximised when there is a particular fusion of the three relationships. 
Interdependence is also significant as it implies that autonomy is not conceptualised in 
a negative sense, as freedom from constraints, but rather that autonomy is achieved  
through self-mastery and self-determination, which can exist ‘within’ certain 
constraints. The extent to which individuals self-impose and accept certain restraints 
influences the degree of autonomy they experience. Autonomy is not something that 
can be ‘created’ through technological advances or self-management policies. It 
requires a particular synergy of all three interdependent relationships. Autonomy for 
these participants involves ‘contingently being-in-control’ and exists within a 
continuum. 
 
This empirical understanding of autonomy is then subjected to further ethical analysis 
in accordance with Rehmann-Sutter et al.’s (2012) model of empirical-normative 
collaboration. The initial argument is revised to incorporate the findings of empirical 
work and new insights gained through further philosophical enquiry. This analysis 
conceptualises Autonomy as lived in light of the existing bioethics literature, and seeks 
to develop a morally defensible means to operationalise this understanding of 
autonomy in practice. Autonomy as lived conceptualises autonomy as a contextualised, 
relational process that occurs within constrains, exists as a continuum and involves a 
degree of influence. In chronic illness, it involves a ‘process’ of interaction between 
the patient and healthcare provider and cannot be fully understood in terms of discrete 
moments of choice. Operationalising Autonomy as lived requires that the 
patient/healthcare provider relationship is underpinned by the ethical use of influence, 
engagement with the other, a sense of mutual responsibility and an overarching respect 
for autonomy. In conclusion, an understanding of autonomy as a negotiated concept is 
presented as a morally defensible means of operationalising Autonomy as lived.  
 
7.3 Acknowledging methodological limitations  
Phenomenological research, as with other qualitative methods of enquiry, seeks to 
extend our understanding of human experience. It does not provide a means to 
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generalise or quantify the world in which we live (Smythe et al. 2008). The qualitative 
study findings are viewed in this light and are presented as a tentative, temporal, 
interpretive account of how autonomy is experienced in practice. The qualitative 
nature of the work is highlighted here as something that needs to be understood as 
opposed to a limitation per se. However, there are some limitations within the study 
that merit consideration.  
 
The findings ascertain the perspective of individuals in one western country only, at 
two hospitals and one research centre, and therefore a degree of cultural bias needs to 
be considered when interpreting these results. Experiences and subsequent 
understandings of autonomy in other cultures may be quite different. The sample sizes 
are small and therefore preclude broad generalisations. However, the study yields rich 
data regarding the experience of autonomy among those interviewed. In addition, the 
empirical work is analysed in association with reasoned argument to illuminate the 
philosophical issues and draw defensible normative conclusions (Rehmann-Sutter et 
al. 2012). There may be criticisms of the decision to incorporate individuals with type 
1 and type 2 diabetes within the study design. However, the study did not set out to 
provide generalisable conclusions with regard to specific diabetic classifications, but 
rather to extend the understanding of autonomy among individuals with diabetes 
engaged with self-testing technology. The study did not include assessment of HbA1c 
to assess biomedical outcomes. This analysis could have enabled exploration of the 
extent to which participants’ experiences of autonomy correlated with ‘clinical 
efficacy’, in addition to self-reported wellness. 
 
There is a possibility that the scientific community participants and healthcare 
professionals may have responded in interview in ways they deemed socially desirable. 
This is known as the social desirability response bias (Polit and Beck 2006). However, 
in light of the variety of responses, and the resonance with previous studies, this is less 
likely. Clinical research leaders or senior management staff were not in attendance at 
the scientific community focus group. While acknowledging this as a potential 
limitation of the study, proponents of focus group methodology suggest that data is 
more reflective of real concerns/issues if senior and more junior personnel are not 
interviewed simultaneously (Morgan 1996).  
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There was not a direct synergy between the patient group interviewed, and the potential 
recipients of emerging technologies, with which the scientific community participants 
were engaged. As explored within the thesis, the scientists interviewed were 
developing point of care devices for near patient use under clinician supervision, as 
opposed to self-testing devices. However, as individuals the group had various 
expertise in diagnostic devices and have the potential to shape innovation in self-
testing technology. The self-testing/patient autonomy focus was kept centre stage 
within the focus group with the assistance of pre-prepared questions, additional probes 
and the use of a scribe to enable the researcher to concentrate on maintaining focused 
dialogue. In addition, vignettes drawn from patient data were utilised to promote 
generic reflection on the use of self-tests. It is important to note however, that 
responses may have been different if participants had specific expertise in self-testing 
devices.  
 
7.4 Recommendations based on new understandings  
This section presents a series of recommendations based on the normative analysis of 
autonomy. The findings have implications for bioethics scholarship; philosophical 
understandings of autonomy in healthcare policy and practice; the clinical application 
of self-monitoring programmes in diabetes management; and the scientific community 
with regard to the development of future self-testing technologies.   
 
7.4.1 Recommendations for bioethics and healthcare policy and practice: Conceptualising 
and operationalising Autonomy as lived 
The normative contribution of this study lies in the extended understanding of 
autonomy, which it provides. The research supports the concern in the philosophical 
literature regarding the prominence of negatively orientated accounts of autonomy. It 
is important that bioethics discourse continues to recognise and challenge the 
limitations, and often incorrect assumptions, associated with negative accounts of 
autonomy. The dominant understanding of autonomy as synonymous with non-
interference, informed consent, isolated decision-making and discrete moments of 
choice requires reassessment. Autonomy for the participants in this study is 
relationally constituted, interdependent and contingent on one’s existential experience 
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of illness. A re-conceptualisation of autonomy as Autonomy as lived provides a more 
suitable framework to underpin healthcare policy and practice. This construction of 
autonomy extends the phenomenological understanding of lived autonomy within the 
existing literature (Agich 2003, 2005, Schlimme 2012). 
 
It is essential that healthcare professionals consider the patient’s contribution, the 
influence of others and temporal aspects of illness and other life events in determining 
one’s autonomy competencies. The autonomy conundrum represents a real problem 
for healthcare professionals as they seek to reconcile their professional and caring 
responsibilities with a growing emphasis on an isolated patient autonomy. The 
autonomy conundrum can be addressed in practice by promoting an understanding of 
autonomy as a negotiated concept. In accordance with this framework, healthcare 
professionals possess a degree of influence within the caring relationship based on 
professional obligations and expertise. Central to negotiated autonomy is an 
overarching respect for autonomy, respect for the patient’s story and a willingness to 
engage on an ideological and practical level. The graphic representation of negotiated 
autonomy provides a tangible model to assist practitioners in this regard. Negotiated 
autonomy requires ongoing dialogue to navigate patients’ support and responsibility 
in addition to that of their caregivers.  
 
Negotiated autonomy also has relevance for patients with regard to how they might 
more favourably navigate the healthcare system. Patients need to be reminded that 
while independence and autonomy can be therapeutic, dependence and greater reliance 
on healthcare professionals is not forbidden and may be required to a greater or lesser 
extent throughout their illness course. Patients should be encouraged to accept 
responsibility for their health but expect adequate support in this endeavour. Patients 
need to understand the limits of medicine, along with its potential, and appreciate the 
constraints of healthcare professionals in this regard. An appreciation of the 
professional obligations of healthcare professionals, which may preclude them from 
certain actions, is also important. Patients should be encouraged to engage with 
healthcare professionals regarding the extent to which they wish to be autonomous in 
healthcare decisions. Patients should be reminded that their story is important and 
deserves to be heard.  
238 
 
 
The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing within this study suggests 
that policy-makers and healthcare professionals acknowledge the very different 
experiences, capabilities and wishes of patients when promoting autonomy and self-
care. An understanding of the interdependent elements essential for effective self-
management will enable an individualised assessment of patients prior to 
commencement of more autonomous roles and self-care strategies. In the absence of 
this broader assessment an indiscriminate policy of self-management has the potential 
to compromise the well-being of certain individuals who are unsuited to the self-
care/extended autonomy agenda for a variety of reasons (Newbould et al. 2006). The 
continuum of autonomy, as experienced by participants in this study, suggests that 
varied degrees of autonomy are possible and that autonomy competencies can change 
over time. This suggests the need for continuous assessment of patients to determine 
fluctuating autonomy competencies and self-care capabilities, based on their illness 
trajectory and other life events.  
 
An understanding of the paradox of controlled freedom in chronic illness is also 
important. Healthcare professionals should seek to maximise the ‘possible’ freedoms 
available to individuals to minimise the constraining nature of ill-health. It is critical 
that the role of technology in both assisting and constraining autonomy is understood. 
Autonomy can never be a pre-determined outcome of technology use. While 
technology, as evidenced in this study, can be an excellent tool to assist in self-
management and maximise autonomy in this regard, it may also induce change in the 
patient/healthcare provider relationship in non-intended ways and result in unwelcome 
burdens. Reflection on the costs of technology relative to other healthcare ‘goods’ is 
advised. Further developments in Health Technology Assessment (HTA) methodology 
are required to accurately assess the impact of technology on ethical, economic and 
psychosocial dimensions of practice.  
 
Finally, it is important that those who educate undergraduate healthcare professionals, 
clinicians and academics, incorporate the significance of the patient’s story and the 
existential dimensions of illness in their teaching. The reality of chronic illness for 
patients and their families is not always understood by healthcare professionals – 
patients are not always asked the questions that may elicit this type of information. 
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Toombs (2002, p.132) suggests that “understanding these various facets of loss of 
wholeness can provide important insights into ways to initiate the process of healing” 
as The patient stories in this study reveal various experiences of illness which may 
have remained ‘unsaid’ in the absence of the interview process.  
 
7.4.2 Recommendations for the management of self-monitoring programmes in diabetes 
care: One size does not fit all 
The experiences of participants engaged with self-testing technology in this study 
revealed understandings, which have significance within a diabetes management 
context. The findings are not generalisable to a specific diabetic population, but do 
have relevance in extending the understanding of the qualitative impacts of self-
monitoring among this client group. The lack of available evidence to support SMBG 
in both diabetes classifications highlights the importance of research related to the 
more psychosocial outcomes. The lived experience of individuals with diabetes in this 
study can illuminate this issue. 
 
Essentially, the patient interaction with self-testing devices in this study revealed both 
positive and negative experiences dependent on a series of contextual factors. These 
experiences share many similarities with those highlighted in previous studies. The 
findings in this study suggest the need for pre-assessment of individuals to determine 
their suitability for self-monitoring in light of the interdependent structures required. 
An assessment of one’s locus of control, cognitive understanding of self-monitoring, 
technical skill and the degree of follow up care required, and practically possible, is 
important. An assessment of the individual’s life story in the context of diabetes 
management is also required. Protocols should distinguish between self-monitoring 
and self-managing. In accordance with current practice guidelines, self-monitoring 
should only be initiated in situations with pre-determined goals of care (IDF 2009, 
ADA 2013). As the ability to self-monitor and self-manage are temporally contingent, 
and may induce some feelings of distress, an annual review of self-monitoring as per 
NICE (2011) is recommended. Engagement with patients in order to understand their 
existential experience of illness, relative to self-testing and other aspects of diabetes 
care, is recommended as opposed to a narrow focus on self-testing results per se. 
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7.4.3 Recommendations for the development of self-testing technology: Understanding 
technology in play 
The interdependent nature of autonomy in engagement with the self-testing device is 
significant. The study extends the understanding of human-technical relationships in 
this regard. This understanding has implications for those developing future self-
testing technologies, or diagnostic devices that have the potential to be utilised by 
patients at a future point. Engagement with patients/end-users during device 
development is recommended. This engagement requires assessment beyond the 
clinical efficacy of the device to incorporate broader elements of the patient 
experience. Acknowledgement of the patient experience, at an earlier stage in the 
development of healthcare technologies, will facilitate technological innovation based 
on sound ideas regarding the complex reality of living with disease and may minimise 
the ‘soft impacts’ of technology (van der Burg and Swierstra 2013). Further 
engagement in focused reflection, on the psychosocial dimensions of technology, by 
those engaged in scientific discovery is advised. Extending the role of social scientists 
and ethicists in research and development ‘within’ the laboratory setting could 
facilitate this type of reflection. It is not that the scientists in this study lacked reflective 
capacities. Similar to van der Burg’s (2009, p.11) analysis, the scientists’ imagination 
was focused “narrowly on technological devices and how they can be improved”. 
Feedback from those who participated in the focus group suggests that they value an 
opportunity to reflect on the more psychosocial aspects of emerging technologies. 
 
The interdependent nature of autonomy in self-testing is an important consideration 
when marketing self-testing devices and developing promotional and educational 
material. The success of the device in the participants’ daily lives is dependent on a 
series of interacting relationships and competencies. Collaboration with patients and 
healthcare professionals at this point will assist in the effective integration of the 
device in a clinical context. It is also important that the scientific community does not 
underestimate the impact of the physicality of the device on users. Spatial 
considerations related to the ‘present-to-hand mode’ (Heidegger 1927/1962) of self-
testing devices impact on the patient’s home-life and may crystallise her experience of 
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ill-health. The importance of the practicalities of the device should not be underrated. 
As evidenced in the experiences of participants in this study, what may appear to be 
minor details about the device – size, number of components, visibility – may not just 
impact on the degree of comfort which the user experiences but may impact on their 
decision to use it at all.  
 
The study also points towards specific recommendations with regard to developments 
in blood glucose monitors. Pain associated with invasive self-testing remains a 
significant issue for patients, thereby reinforcing the significance of innovation in non-
invasive devices. Those involved in the development of self-testing devices might also 
consider advancements in urine monitoring devices as opposed to blood glucose 
assessment. Recent economic evaluation suggests that SMBG is not economically 
sustainable (Farmer at al. 2009b, Clar et al. 2010). Assessment of glucose levels using 
urine testing systems is currently being revisited within a wider policy context in the 
UK (Dallasso et al. 2012).  
 
7.4.4 Recommendations for future research: Towards new understandings  
The inclusion of a possible future research agenda reflects the ongoing cyclical nature 
of McMillan and Hope’s (2008) model of empirical ethics, whereby the ethical 
analysis presented here can suggest further empirical questions. The identification of 
future research possibilities is also congruent with the evolving nature of hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Todres 2004). The current study shows how empirical bioethics can 
combine empirical and philosophical work to explore ethical problems in the real 
world of practice. Further studies in this regard, within a wider research team, could 
serve the dual purpose of illuminating and addressing tangible ethical problems and 
bridging the gap between philosophers and social scientists. It is important that 
researchers are specific regarding the precise nature of empirical-normative 
collaboration within studies to avoid epistemological problems and strengthen 
scholarship in this area (Rehmann-Sutter et al. 2012, Salloch et al. 2012).  
 
This study supports previous calls for more qualitative research among all 
classifications of the diabetic community to identify the impact of self-monitoring on 
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individual patients. The researchers in the DiGEM study (Farmer et al. 2009a) note the 
importance of further work to identify those ‘particular’ patients for whom SMBG 
improves glycaemic control. The research team has outlined a new protocol for a 
systematic review of trials of SMBG in non-insulin treated type 2 diabetics, which 
would incorporate individual patient data meta-analyses to investigate specific sub-
groups of patients for whom self-monitoring may be beneficial. More in-depth analysis 
of the experience of living with diabetes will also broaden our understanding of the 
complex nature of chronic illness and its temporal nature.  
 
Extended research collaboration between scientists, social scientists and 
philosophers/ethicists is advised to enable the development of technologies that are 
not only clinically effective, but take cognisance of the wider ethical and psychosocial 
dimensions of technology use. This study also points towards the importance of 
developing the HTA agenda and extending the types of methodologies employed. The 
lack of qualitative and ethical analysis in HTA is acknowledged (Sacchini et al. 2010). 
Empirical bioethics can assist in this regard.  
 
Understandings gleaned through interpretive phenomenology will always be tentative 
and open to further clarification (Ironside 2005, Smythe et al 2008). In this light, the 
concept of negotiated autonomy, merits future research to examine and evaluate its 
merit in the practice context.  
 
7.5 Summary 
This research study illuminates the ethical principle of autonomy in a specific 
healthcare context and, following reasoned argument, provides a pragmatic means to 
operationalise autonomy in practice. It relates the lived experience of autonomy among 
a group of patients engaged with the self-testing process. The study highlights the 
contextual nature of autonomy in self-testing whereby patients experience autonomy 
as a series of three interdependent relationships: Relationship with device, Relationship 
with illness and Relationship with healthcare provider. The study challenges the 
prevailing understanding of autonomy in healthcare and provides new insights to assist 
our normative deliberations when faced with ethical problems in practice. These 
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insights develop current ‘moderated’ accounts of autonomy. An understanding of 
Autonomy as lived: The interdependent phenomenon of autonomy in self-testing has 
the potential to resonate with policy makers, healthcare professionals and the scientific 
community on a more pragmatic level, regarding the actual experience of individuals 
engaged in self-testing, self-care and the role of technology in this regard. The 
operationalisation of autonomy as a negotiated concept is offered as a tangible means 
to address the autonomy conundrum, and facilitate mutual respect for the ethical 
principles of autonomy and beneficence in the patient/healthcare professional 
relationship. The graphic representation of the varied elements of negotiated autonomy 
provides a conceptual tool to assist practitioners in this regard.  
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix A: Analysis journal extracts 
 
22nd June 2012 – Hastings Centre, New York  
Long Day! But getting places with more shared meanings emerging and a more in-depth 
interpretive focus...Links with philosophy emerging too... 
Reading – ‘Being and Time’ chapter from Harmon text – Literature search re ‘the body’ 
and Merleau-Ponty/Gadamer (Papers saved for later reading) 
Writing – Frances – Moving to interpretation – Developing connections with 
philosophical texts and shared meanings with Alex and others... 
Engaging – Lunch time presenter re the ethics of pharmaceutical industry. Raised some 
dubious practices (Seed research, advertising re illness claims pre FDA approval and drug 
advertising, medicalisation by the pharmaceutical industry). Suggested an ethical 
framework for the industry/Included ‘Autonomy’ and suggested it was being upheld by 
DTC marketing – Not so sure about this! – I think respect for autonomy would be best 
upheld by ‘responsible’ DTC marketing … In many cases DTC marketing exploits 
autonomy as opposed to respecting it... 
Reflecting – Understanding more about Dasein within Heidegger’s philosophy and links 
to other concepts – e.g. ready-to-hand  
Some in-depth reflection re Frances - autonomy, ‘desired’ autonomy, autonomy and ill 
bodies (Links with Willems, Merleau-Ponty, and Thomasma papers), autonomy 
preferences (being in control) and possible treatment preferences (does Insulin perhaps 
just suit some patients better and should this be considered? – OR – Is the self-testing 
regieme ‘enframing’ (as Heidegger suggests) the diabetic self and invoking a ‘wish’ for an 
insulin regieme merely to have testing make more sense?) 
 
 
1st  December 2012  - Analusis continued Ireland 
A day of much thinking and reflecting but little writing! 
Writing - Began to redraft opening section to explain more clearly, why I chose to use the 
term 'understandings' in light of the nature of Heideggerian research.  
Reading - Re-read Smythe's "The thinking of research" (2005) and sections of Heidegger's 
'Memorial Address' re meditative thinking to assist in explaining why understandings is 
right and how these understandings are arrived at. Attempted to 'unpack' Les Todres 
comment as M.D. suggested 
Reflecting/Thinking - As a typical example of 'letting thinking come' as Smythe suggests 
- I woke up this morning thinking that Betty's story re having dinner out (which I worked 
on Thursday), Bart's story re working as a taxi driver and Deirdre's story re going to 
Australia are typical exemplars of - the 'freedom to live theme' which I have articulated... 
Will develop this section too... 
Also thought some more re Heidegger's 'Technology as revealing' concept as an 
overarching 'theme' or conceptual framework to present the research understandings… 
Came up with a new ‘circular’ scheme to explain data – wonder re existentialist themes 
but this is it for now… 
 
 
Update 28th/ 29th January, 2013 
Writing, listening, reading, re-reading, thinking, changing 
Significant progress made over the last two weeks. Comments of both supervisors were 
noted and amendments made to December draft of findings chapter. Any outstanding 
issues for consideration were flagged – e.g. diagrammatic representation. I continued to 
analyse HCP interviews and link data with themes from patient data. It is possible to 
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identify salience in all interviews with regard to the patient stories.  I am currently 
completing the final HCP interview, HCP6, and feel that saturation of some sorts has been 
achieved. The themes have not been altered significantly but acknowledging the HCP 
perspective within the hermeneutic circle did merit some consideration on the wording of 
themes e.g. see note from working findings chapter:  
 
Is ‘Freedom to live etc.’ sub-theme also related to autonomy as expressed by the patient 
while the ‘Autonomy versus covert paternalism’ sub-theme is something else related to 
how autonomous HCP’s really are? Must also address somewhere the struggle for the 
HCP re doing what the patient wants and doing ‘right’ – perhaps in the ‘Autonomy versus 
paternalism’ section and not refer to it as ‘covert’ but merge this concept of into 
discussion linking it with surveillance. 
 
The last couple of weeks have been focused on bringing wholeness to the analysis process 
in order to complete this stage, essentially being satisfied that I have captured the salient 
aspects of patients’ experiences and the related perspectives from other stakeholders. This 
is an ethical issue for me. I wouldn’t be content with the overall analysis, and therefore the 
study in general, if I felt the analysis process was less than complete. Bringing this sense 
of completion or ‘wholeness’ involved revisiting those interviews that I had analysed at an 
earlier stage where I elicited ‘early lines of enquiry’ as Crist and Tanner suggest. I looked 
at those transcripts again taking a more interpretive approach, van Manen’s 
phenomenological reflection, and considered the shared meanings which had emerged in 
the interpretive analysis of later interviews. In this way I have moved from early lines of 
enquiry, to interpretive analysis, to shared meanings and back again. This involved 
looking at, and listening to, the transcripts / interviews again individually, yet also the 
participants as a whole. Revisiting early lines of enquiry did involve some shifts in 
thinking e.g. see note re Colette’s story: 
 
 
Update Sunday February 3rd 2013 
Progressing, stalling, doubting, focusing, revisiting, thinking, reading, mapping, writing 
Synthesis is a challenge – while the nature of the existentialist themes makes them suitable 
for capturing the patients’ experiences in this study, their interwoven nature means that 
assigning stories to various themes becomes difficulty e.g. temporal and relational 
understandings are often interwoven. However, to tell the ‘story’ with clarity I continue to 
develop the existentialist thematic presentation. I am working on a mind-map where I 
bring shared meanings and associated HCP / SC (Scientific Community) data together to 
encompass the skeleton of a theme / sub-theme. (Yet again, while this will work, I have 
reflected on how much easier a qualitative data package may be if employed at the start!).  
 
The themes ‘Promoting autonomy v covert paternalism’ and ‘Education processes and 
autonomy’ have been interwoven within a broader  ‘Relationship with healthcare 
provider’ theme in order to ensure their inclusion yet also encompass discussion of 
broader issues regarding the relationship. The ‘Contemporary economic perspectives’ 
theme has now been discarded and ideas interwoven with ‘Relationship with healthcare 
professional’ and ‘Relationship with self-testing devise’. Retaining the latter theme was an 
important dimension to remaining true to the study / data as the ‘being-with-technology’ 
was central to the overall thrust of the study. Also, patients had a lot to say about the 
devise itself and these stories can be interpreted in light of many complementary and 
contradictory insights from HCP’S and members of the scientific community. While the 
economic issues were certainly a key issue within the participants’ stories they existed in 
so far as they shaped their ideas about their relationships with healthcare providers yet 
also the role of the devise.  
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I spent almost two full days with focus group data looking for salience with shared  
meanings among patients stores and how their vision ‘fits’ with the patient perspective 
and that of HCP’s. There is some very interesting data which could, as supervisors 
suggested re HCP’s, make an interesting study on its own. However, for the purpose of 
this study I continued to look for salience with patient data. (See typed analysis notes). A 
particular finding of interest was the fact that the SC, although they speak of 
empowerment, may underestimate the ability of patients to be in control. Further 
interpretation of results by the HCP, through a ‘connected health’ system may actually 
demotivate patients and not facilitate the ‘real’ sense of autonomy that seems to be a 
feature of some of the participants in this study.  
 Reflection initiates caution (among participants) more so than possibilities! 
 
Update Tuesday March 19th 2013 – Post hermeneutic conversation… 
I continued to work under the new structure and patient stories now ‘fit’ much better. 
Theme titles have been altered again - see current outline below. Reverted to ‘No room at 
the inn’ to include other participants who also felt health service had no time for them but 
didn’t seem lost in transit e.g. Betty. Also – renamed titles to incorporate the ‘as’ structure 
– device as… 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Themes within tripartite relationship of autonomy in self-testing 
 
However, the above ideas are already ‘shifting’. Work colleague read a draft this week.  
Lengthy conversation ensued re title of themes and interpretation to date. Some challenges 
still remain re avoiding repetition, e.g. A Path to Freedom / Taking control. Also, an 
interesting point resurfaced in the course of conversation – the ‘surveillance’ issue and 
link with earlier ideas in preliminary lines of enquiry re the device as a ‘watchdog’ – is it 
perhaps not only the HCP that may be engaged in surveillance but the device itself? Is the 
device about freedom for Ann or does it provide a form of surveillance which is limiting / 
almost suffocating?  It does seem to be a reassurance though for her though –Must think 
about this some more. Perhaps it involves living with imperfection? Earlier interpretation 
of the device and the autonomy continuum may be more appropriate? In that piece I saw 
the device as motivating for Ann but not necessarily empowering. Re-reading Ann and 
Deirdre again - is it about the device as a taskmaster – fitting with previous accounts of 
self-chastisement! But yet she doesn’t want to lose it – speaks positively of it also.  
 
 
  
DEVICE 'as'
• A window to 
the body
• A path to 
freedom
• A source of 
discord
• An imperfect 
technology
ILLNESS
• Taking 
control
• Autonomy 
as 
contingent 
in chronic 
illness
HCP
• Empowered 
by 
education
• No room at 
the inn
• Support for 
Autonomy
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Appendix B: Published autonomy paper 
 
Patient autonomy and choice in healthcare: Self-testing devices as a case in point 
Greaney A.M., O’Mathúna D.P. and Scott P.A. (2012) Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy, 15:383–395 
 
Introduction 
The growing number of self-testing diagnostic devices available for home use raises a 
number of ethical, psychological and social questions. Such devices allow individuals 
to test for a range of medical conditions in the absence of medical supervision. These 
devices are on sale in pharmacies, super-markets and a growing online industry where 
over a thousand tests are listed (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 
2003). It is now possible to test for HIV (albeit only one system approved) (Federal 
Drug Administration, (FDA) US, 2009), genetic markers (Levitt, 2001), response to 
coagulation therapy (Heneghan et al., 2006), glaucoma (Ianchulev et al., 2005) and 
even dementia (Kier and Molinari 2003) without leaving one’s home. The premise 
underpinning the nature and availability of these devices, which is noted in their 
marketing strategies, is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the 
assessment and management of their health by assuming a more independent role. 
Increased patient autonomy is assumed to be a good thing. In this paper we critique 
this assumption. We do not oppose patient involvement in care, but rather seek to 
critique a particular understanding of patient autonomy and its practical implications.  
 
We propose that diagnostic self-testing is a specific instance of the application of a 
developing model of patient autonomy in healthcare policy and practice. Recent 
legislative change and health policy in Ireland and the UK support this direction 
(Department of Health and Children, Ireland (DoHC), 2008a) Patients are now granted 
increased independence in the management of their own health and associated 
decision-making. Various forms of paternalism are, for the most part, viewed as 
antiquated and sometimes unethical. Patient autonomy, choice and freedom in 
decision-making have been embraced as part of a progressive philosophy for 
healthcare delivery. Wilson (2007, p.354) refers to “the antipaternalistic assumptions” 
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of modern bioethics which are claimed to support these views. We suggest that policy-
makers have adopted these ‘assumptions’ to underpin current healthcare policy with 
little substantive debate.  
 
The aim of this paper is to reflect on these ‘assumptions’ and the extent to which 
autonomy, in so far as it is often construed as patient choice and freedom in decision-
making, represents a progressive principle for healthcare delivery. The central thesis 
here is that current perceptions of autonomy do not represent a progressive philosophy 
for healthcare, as they fail to capture the multi-dimensional nature of the concept and 
undermine other significant issues such as relationality, care and responsibility. The 
paper draws on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process 
to support this claim. The self-testing process represents a specific microcosm of 
greater patient involvement and autonomy in healthcare and therefore provides an 
ideal practical context for discussion. We conclude by offering an alternative account 
of autonomy which may better serve patients. We accept that autonomy is constituted, 
perceived and valued differently in various cultures. This paper draws primarily on the 
Irish, UK and US perspectives; therefore, we acknowledge that the discussion has 
relevance primarily in a Western context.1  
 
The argument 
The argument we propose may be outlined as follows. Current healthcare ethics and 
recent social policy documents uphold patient autonomy as a paramount ethical 
principle. This model of autonomy goes beyond merely encouraging participation as 
autonomy is increasingly portrayed as individual freedom to choose. Such a model is 
not a suitable benchmark for healthcare policy, or professionals, because (a) it 
represents a one-dimensional, sometimes misguided, perception of autonomy 
associated with the absence of constraints and (b) it denies important considerations 
of relationality, care and responsibility which may better serve patients. Therefore, 
healthcare practice and policy, which uphold the primacy of autonomy and equate it 
with increased patient choice and freedom in decision-making should be reviewed, or 
at least accepted with suitable qualification. 
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Autonomy, freedom to choose and contemporary healthcare  
Prior to further discussion of autonomy, and its application in healthcare, some initial 
understanding of the term is required. A definition will not be outlined at this point as 
one of the central issues under discussion here is what the essential nature of autonomy 
is.2 However; some sense of the term must be delineated to allow the argument to 
proceed. In general usage ‘autonomy’ refers to a multi-faceted concept encompassing 
such elements as “self-governance” and “self-rule” (Oxford University Press, 1997) 
The word is derived from the Greek ‘autos’ which refers to the self and ‘nomos’ which 
refers to laws. In this original sense autonomy referred to a political system shared by 
a group of citizens. A city in ancient Greece had ‘autonomia’ when its people were in 
a position to make their own laws (Dworkin, 1988). 
 
An understanding of autonomy as a feature of individuals is widely attributed to 
Kantian philosophy where individual agents, as opposed to societies, are viewed as the 
locus of autonomy (O’Neill, 1992). Within contemporary healthcare the term is often 
used ambiguously and inconsistently whereby different interpretations suggest 
different ways of respecting autonomy (Keenan, 1999; Aveyard; 2000; Slowther, 
2007). Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the concept 
but define autonomy as; “self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by 
others and from personal limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent 
meaningful choice” (2001, p.58). 
 
The association of autonomy with lack of interference inherent within this definition 
is significant. It associates autonomy with freedom or liberty.3 Foster (2009) denies 
any ambiguity in healthcare regarding the term autonomy and notes in a rather glib 
fashion, that everyone is quite clear what autonomy means. It refers to “straightforward 
libertarianism” (p.3). The libertarian view of autonomy is associated with freedom 
from constraints and reflects the notion of ‘negative’ liberty as articulated by Berlin 
(1969). In accordance with negative liberty one’s freedom is in proportion to the 
degree of non-interference. The libertarian context of autonomy, associated with 
individual freedom to choose, is growing in popularity in Western healthcare practice 
273 
 
 
(Scully et al., 2006; Varelius, 2005) and creating a consumer like culture of free choice 
(Moreno, 2007). There is increasing criticism of this consumer culture within the 
literature. The basis of the criticism is that patient autonomy now takes precedence 
over professional judgement within the consultation process with potential negative 
consequences for patients (Downie, 1998; O’Neill, 2002; Mol, 2008).  This position 
will be developed as the paper proceeds. 
 
Contemporary professional codes of conduct, healthcare ethics texts and policy 
documents provide some empirical evidence of this shift towards greater patient 
autonomy. Gillon’s (2003) proposal that autonomy should be upheld as the first 
principle has gained momentum in medical ethics. The Irish Medical Council’s (2009) 
most recent direction to its members, while acknowledging some exceptions, asserts 
the patient’s right to control what happens to her in accordance with her autonomy. 
One particular medical ethics textbook outlines autonomy as the “primary 
consideration in patient centered treatment” (Schwartz et al. 2002, p.8). The Irish 
Department of Health and Children has increasingly noted the need for greater patient 
involvement at all levels of health service delivery. This includes mental health service 
provision (DoHC, 2006), safety management (DoHC, 2008b) and chronic illness 
strategy (DoHC, 2008c). The latter policy states, as one of its core principles, that 
patients “should actively participate in the management of their condition” within a 
healthcare system that maximises opportunities for self-care (DoHC, 2008c p.22).  
 
However, current policy goes beyond merely encouraging participation in one’s own 
immediate health. A recent DoHC and Health Service Executive (HSE) document 
(DoHC and HSE, 2008c) outlines a global strategy for increased user involvement in 
the health services. The opening chapter suggests that service users should be central 
figures not only in matters affecting their own care, but also with regard to service 
design and provision. The language of the document is very consumer orientated. This 
language, and proposed initiatives such as a patient charter, supports the advent of the 
patient as an autonomous discerning customer in the healthcare arena and significantly 
alters the patient/healthcare professional relationship (Mol, 2008). Ryan et al. (2010) 
associate the current increase in the use of self-testing devices with these policy shifts 
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in a UK context. The authors suggest that patients may self-test as they perceive this 
to be a desirable aspect of self-care which is promoted by the government.  
 
This rhetoric of patient autonomy now permeates healthcare practice and policy 
replacing previous paternalistic models of care and a culture of medical dominance 
(Rothman, 2001). This shift is attributed to a number of complex social developments. 
The literature provides a thorough account of these developments which include the 
advent of neo-liberalism, economic rationalism, consumerism and associated 
litigation, the commercialisation of medicine and an increasing lack of trust in doctors 
and healthcare institutions (Rothman, 2001; Willis, 2006; Eldh et al., 2006; Kapp, 
2007).4 Modern American bioethics5 has also contributed significantly to this change 
where the principle of autonomy has gained increased prominence as the leading 
ethical principle underpinning healthcare delivery (Moreno, 2007). Moreno refers to 
“an autonomy-driven bioethics” (p.417) in the US fuelled by several social events 
including the blatant disregard for participants in the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment 
(1932-1972), the emergence of the Belmont Report in 1973 detailing ethical principles 
for research and the influential Roe v Wade decision in 1972 which focused on 
personal rights and liberty. 
 
Autonomy and Self-testing 
Moreno (2007) notes that patients’ recognition of their right to autonomy in healthcare 
has greatly influenced the rise of consumerism and supported corporate interests with 
regard to direct-to-consumer advertising. The author mentions self-testing as a 
particular example of the interplay between increased patient autonomy and 
consumerism. Much of the debate regarding the value of self-testing diagnostic devices 
centers on their role in advancing an individualistic paradigm in healthcare delivery, 
which replaces a previously more stringently controlled and professional-led 
healthcare system. This is particularly true in the context of ethical analysis where the 
ability to self-test and possibly diagnose without, or with reduced, professional support 
is seen as an example of extended patient autonomy and questioned on this basis 
(Modra, 2006; O’Lynn, 2007; Kearns et al., 2010). Self-testing diagnostic devices are 
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marketed as a means to encourage patient participation in healthcare and improve 
overall health outcomes through the early diagnosis of disease (Simplicity-health, 
2009). It is proposed that this early participation is a ‘good’ thing. Essentially these 
devices facilitate greater patient autonomy in the context of diagnosis and management 
of disease.  
 
Studies which investigated the efficacy of diagnostic self-testing kits such as glaucoma 
computer based tests (Ianchulev, 2005); International Ratio testing (Henegan et al., 
2006) and blood glucose monitoring (Towfigh et al., 2008; Alleman et al., 2009) 
display clinical results which support their value as diagnostic tools. However, despite 
the positive outcomes noted here, this is not the case for all home testing systems. 
There is considerable debate as to the value of home blood glucose monitoring, 
particularly in patients who are not treated with insulin, and research studies reveal 
different estimates with regard to clinical outcomes (Farmer et al., 2009a). One study 
in the UK found that clinical outcomes in the context of blood glucose levels were 
improved when patient self-testing was replaced by a more proactive patient education 
programme (Harris and Cracknell, 2005). This study also revealed that patients were 
relieved not to have to self-test on a regular basis, as testing reinforced the illness role 
and resulted in feelings of failure and negative health related behaviours when results 
were poor. A considerable portion of self-testing diagnostic tools refer to home 
screening systems, e.g. prostatic antigen (PSA) tests as a method of screening for 
prostatic cancer. Despite one web-site declaring that ‘early diagnosis significantly 
improves the outcome of any prostate disorder treatment’ (Simplicity-health, 2009) 
the empirical evidence in the context of prostate screening suggests otherwise. There 
is no conclusive evidence that routine prostate screening improves health outcomes 
(Illic et al., 2006), and routine screening is not recommended in the general population 
but rather reserved for those who exhibit certain risk factors (Burger and Kass, 2009).  
 
The literature with regard to the extended autonomy afforded to patients in the context 
of self-testing devices, though mainly discursive and non-empirical, raises similar 
concerns. There is a potential for self-testing devices, including screening initiatives, 
to promote a culture of the worried well (McMahon, 2009) and contribute to 
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psychological distress due to the possibility of false positives (Modra, 2006) and the 
lack of pre-test counselling (Raffle, 2000; Kachroo, 2006; O’Lynn, 2007). Whellams 
(2008) makes a rather more sinister claim. The author contends that industry’s 
eagerness to gain FDA approval for home HIV testing kits in the US was not 
proportionate to consumer demand for the product. Whellams’s thesis is that corporate 
motivation for marketing these products is linked to the ease with which future 
diagnostic self-testing systems may then be commercially marketed. The UK Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (2010) recently published an ethical assessment of the increased 
availability of medical profiling and online medicine. The report concludes that while 
certain developments may provide some benefits the claims are sometimes overstated 
and it urges caution, greater regulation and the banning of certain facilities including 
direct-to-consumer imaging.  
 
Examining current perceptions of autonomy in healthcare 
The argument under examination in this paper asserts that the current model of 
autonomy in healthcare does not provide a suitable benchmark for healthcare policy, 
or professionals, because (a) it represents a one-dimensional, sometimes misguided, 
perception of autonomy associated with the absence of constraints and (b) it denies 
important considerations of relationality, care and responsibility which may better 
serve the patient.  We shall address the former point initially and present two principal 
arguments in support of our claim. Firstly, a broader philosophical account of 
autonomy goes beyond notions of ‘negative’ liberty to encompass an understanding of 
‘positive’ liberty which is not necessarily related to the absence of constraints. 
Secondly, being autonomous is not solely concerned with acting on one’s individual 
desires or wants in an isolated vacuum but demands an understanding of our societal 
connections. Our argument addresses a misrepresentation of Kantian ethics which 
exists in some healthcare literature to the detriment of a richer understanding of 
autonomy. 
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Autonomy, constraints and positive freedom 
We argue at this point that contemporary notions of autonomy in healthcare, as 
outlined above, can be questioned because autonomy is not necessarily synonymous 
with freedom to choose and is not dependant on the absence of constraints for its 
existence. The libertarian understanding of autonomy in healthcare subscribes to a 
negative perception of autonomy. This negative perception does not reflect “the 
positive element of self-determination essential to an adequate account of autonomy” 
(Young 1986 p.49). Delineating the differences between positive and negative notions 
of freedom and autonomy are central to this claim. If autonomy can exist in the 
presence of some constraining factors, then an anti-paternalistic healthcare philosophy 
which seeks to advance autonomy by promoting individual freedom to choose is 
fundamentally flawed. 
 
In Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin (1969) delineates between positive liberty which is 
concerned with self-mastery and negative liberty associated with non-interference by 
others. Berlin’s account of positive freedom echoes very much a Kantian perspective 
when he refers to the ‘inner citadel’ where people retreat as rational beings to free 
themselves from desires they know cannot be realised. Berlin tells us that we can free 
ourselves from obstacles in our path by abandoning the path in a self-determining 
manner through the use of critical reasoning. We will explain how this is possible in a 
clinical context later in this paper. 
 
Carter et al. (2007, p.3) explain the distinction between positive and negative notions 
of liberty as follows: 
 
“In other words, when such a theorist [proponent of positive liberty] seeks 
to determine whether people are free, the focus is on what they have done 
or how they have done it.  For a negative-liberty theorist the focus of any 
such enquiry is very different. In order to ascertain if people are free in 
some respect, a proponent of negative liberty asks not what they have done 
but whether they are unprevented from doing something”. 
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This positive, self-determining sense of liberty is also supported by Dworkin’s (1988) 
appraisal of autonomy. Dworkin refers to freedom as liberty and suggests that the terms 
liberty and autonomy should always be distinguished.  He proposes that “autonomy is 
a richer notion than liberty” and relates to “the idea of being a subject, of being more 
than a passive spectator of one’s desires and feelings” (p.107). Dworkin suggests that 
autonomy and freedom are not synonymous even though they may at times be linked. 
He suggests that in forcing a Jehovah’s Witness patient to have a blood transfusion 
against her will one denies her liberty yet also her autonomy. However, in another 
example Dworkin explains that in deceiving a patient about his treatment, his freedom 
has not been denied but his autonomy is thwarted by the process of deception.   
 
This reflects a re-occurring theme within philosophical literature that autonomy and 
freedom are distinctive and that freedom is not a necessary pre-requisite for autonomy. 
Scott (1998) articulates the difference by explaining that the animals in the field are 
free, but cannot be said to be autonomous, as they do not possess the attributes 
necessary for autonomous action, presumably, the ability to act as rational agents. It 
would seem therefore, as Scott explains that freedom is not a sufficient or even 
necessary condition for autonomy to exist. Seedhouse (1998, p.184) supports this 
proposal in stating that autonomy is not “necessarily related to the amount of options 
available” but is more context related.  Seedhouse delineates between respecting and 
creating autonomy and suggests that one can create autonomy for another by not 
necessarily granting all their choices.  
 
Dworkin cautions us against a concept of autonomy associated with significant 
independence. He contends that this understanding “makes autonomy inconsistent 
with loyalty, objectivity, commitment, benevolence and love” (p.21). This statement 
is particularly relevant in the healthcare context where healthcare personnel are 
obliged to consider their professional commitments to care for patients. These 
commitments, and their inconsistency with the current autonomy rhetoric, will be 
explored as the paper proceeds.  
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At this point in the argument we suggest that a notion of autonomy that is equated with 
freedom to choose, in so far as this refers to negative freedom and the absence of 
constraints, is questionable. The discussion regarding positive freedom above raises 
the issue of one’s desires which is also significant in debating the merits of 
contemporary understandings of autonomy.  
 
Autonomy, Kant, desires and relational responsibilities 
A philosophical analysis of autonomy to this point reveals that choosing to act on one’s 
immediate desires may not be in accordance with one’s autonomy. An autonomous 
approach to healthcare delivery which seeks to facilitate patient freedom of choice, 
with little interference, does not sufficiently appreciate that one’s initially expressed 
desires may alter following a reflective process where other factors are considered. 
Being autonomous is not solely concerned with acting on one’s individual desires or 
wants in an isolated vacuum but demands an understanding of our societal 
connections. 
 
This view conflicts with the ‘negative’ understanding of autonomy in healthcare which 
is often attributed to Kantian ethics. We propose here that Kant’s philosophy is often 
misinterpreted in healthcare literature to the detriment of a richer understanding of 
autonomy which may better serve patients’ best interests. As a case in point, the 
medical ethics textbook, noted earlier which portrayed autonomy as the paramount 
ethical principle, contended that respect for autonomy is linked with respect for 
persons and an associated Kantian philosophy which suggests non-interference with 
one’s “plans, ambitions and choices” (Schwartz et al. 2002, p.8). This is not necessarily 
how Kantian philosophers perceive his work.  
 
In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant (1998) sets out an a priori 
metaphysic of morality. Essentially the categorical imperative, its supreme principle, 
outlines what one ought to do unconditionally; “act only in accordance with the maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 421). 
In accordance with this imperative people’s duty is to act only in a manner that they 
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will their actions to become a universal law of nature. Kantian ethics is often portrayed 
as a judicious approach to morality where a rational being acts solely on the basis of 
principles which are self-embodied and not causally determined or influenced by 
outside forces. This understanding of Kantian ethics is often misconstrued as referring 
to the autonomous agent and his autonomous choices. However, contrary to 
misinterpretation, Kant’s autonomy of the will does not refer to autonomous action; 
rather it refers to the practical reasoning employed in “determining choice to action” 
(Heubel and Biller-Andorno, 2005, p.7).  
 
Onora O’Neill echoes similar concerns with respect to misrepresentation of Kantian 
morality.  In Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics O’Neill (2002, p.74), takes issue with a 
number of distinguished philosophers who isolate Kant as a major proponent of 
individual autonomy. “They accuse Kant of identifying autonomy with self-control 
and independence, with extremes of individualism and with blindness to the ethical 
importance of the emotions and institutions” (O’Neill 2002, p.74). O’Neill argues that 
Kant’s unique understanding of autonomy is “quite different from the ethically 
inadequate conceptions of individual autonomy so commonly ascribed to him.”  
 
O’Neill proposes that a careful reading of Kant’s work provides no evidence for a 
Kantian autonomy rooted in individualism. The term ‘autonomous individuals’ does 
not appear within Kant’s writings. Rather, as O’Neill explains, he refers to the 
‘autonomy of principles’ associated with a duty towards others and respect for their 
rights. O’Neill’s thesis is that Kant’s reference to ‘self-legislation’ refers primarily to 
a ‘legislation’ that is formulated by oneself in accordance with a number of universal 
principles (which includes one’s duty towards others) as opposed to referring to the 
‘self’ legislating for oneself in isolation from others. The ‘self’ is reflexive. O’Neill’s 
argument is that those who associate individual autonomy with Kantian ethics focus 
on the notion of ‘self’ as opposed to the ‘legislation’ element of the term. Based on her 
analysis O’Neill presents the notion of ‘principled autonomy’ which is most strongly 
associated with the principle of obligation. The issue of obligation is highly significant 
in the context of the current argument as it represents one of the alternative perceptions 
of autonomy which may better benefit patients. We will return to the alternatives later 
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in the paper but for now we shall continue to outline the misinterpretation of Kantian 
philosophy as highlighted by others.  
 
Paley (2002) also rejects an isolated interpretation of Kantian autonomy. He refers to 
the ‘myth’ that Kant supports a view where individuals make ethical decisions in a 
detached manner and in isolation from the associated context. He takes issue with an 
ethics of care which is framed in opposition to Kant and outlines a convincing 
argument for an ethics of care underpinned by Kantian philosophy. Paley refers to 
Kant’s Formula of Humanity whereby one is obliged to treat individuals as ends in 
themselves and suggests that adherence to the categorical imperative requires one to 
seek out the ‘ends’ of another individual so that one can seek to make them one’s own. 
Similarly, Heubel and Biller-Andorno (2005) note that in applying the Law of 
Universality, the first formula of Kant’s categorical imperative, one is obliged to 
consider the accordance of one’s maxims with those of others. Therefore an accurate 
understanding of Kantian morality appreciates that Kant “cannot reasonably be 
accused of ignoring the fact that autonomy is about our commitments to other people” 
(Paley 2002, p.135).    
 
Consider an asymptomatic woman who wishes to test herself for the breast cancer gene 
BRCA1 using a home-testing kit.6 Prior to sending off the required saliva sample she 
discusses this with her partner who points out the lack of family history and the fact 
that a pre-disposition to the disease does not necessarily mean one will develop it. He 
is concerned that knowledge of the gene will affect his partner’s outlook on life, and 
their life together, and tells her so. The woman, previously so certain of her wish to 
undertake the test, now alters her choice and decides not to proceed as she deems her 
inquisitiveness of lesser importance than the value she places on her relationship and 
current well-being. She makes this decision following a process of critical reflection. 
She does not feel coerced by her partner but values his input and sees merit in his 
contribution.  
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The extent to which she has chosen ‘without interference’ is arguable yet it is a step 
further to suggest that her autonomy has been violated ‘because’ of the interference, 
as notions of negative liberty would suggest. We propose that in this example her 
autonomy has been facilitated, as opposed to violated, through a dialogue which 
encouraged her to critically reflect on her initial desires. This reflects the positive sense 
of liberty as noted by Berlin (1969, p.46) earlier in this paper. We suggest that in this 
case the woman has retreated to the “inner citadel” which Berlin refers to using her 
rational capabilities to reconsider her initial desire to undergo the test. This rational 
self-dialogue, as Berlin outlines, reflects a Kantian understanding of autonomy 
whereby one’s freedom is not constrained if she willingly imposes restraints on herself.  
In this case the woman has willingly refrained from taking the test following a 
reflexive process which considered her partner’s position. We suggest therefore at this 
point, that one’s decision making processes need not necessarily occur in isolation as 
some interpretations of Kant’s work suggest.  
 
Marcia Baron (1995), in a somewhat similar fashion, addresses some of the criticisms 
of Kantian morality, particularly feminists’ accounts (Noddings and Gilligan) which 
condemn the emphasis on duty in his philosophy as being devoid of emotion and 
connection with others.  Baron contends that this misinterpretation is partly due to a 
mistranslation of the Groundwork, particularly a translation by Paton (Kant 1991) 
which alters the meaning of Kant’s philosophy. Paton’s translation attributes moral 
worth to those actions which are done ‘for the sake of duty’ as opposed to using the 
correct translation ‘from duty’. This is significant because as Baron explains one may 
act ‘from duty’ in accordance with Kant’s universal law but at the same time seek to 
recognise and fulfil one’s commitments to others.  However, if one acts for the ‘sake 
of duty’ it suggests that duty embodies both one’s motive and the desired result. Baron 
contends that “one’s goal in acting from duty need not be to do one’s duty. Duty should 
be our motivating conception and need not be our end” (1995, p.12).  
 
In accordance with this perspective one may act not solely because one sees it as one’s 
duty to do so, but may seek to assist others at the same time. This reflects Korsgaard’s 
commentary on the Groundwork (Kant, 2008) suggesting that the needs of others are 
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significant for moral agents who fulfil these needs because they see helping as their 
duty. In this context a sense of duty and natural inclination towards others, and their 
concerns, can coexist.  
 
At this point in the argument we propose that it is reasonable to reject a model of 
patient autonomy which is based on an individual’s freedom to choose in the absence 
of constraints. This model is not desirable as it is based primarily on ‘negative’ 
perceptions of liberty which fail to appreciate the more ‘positive’, reflexive and self-
determining notions of the concept. Furthermore, this version of autonomy is often 
rooted in a misinterpreted account of Kantian philosophy. Kant does not advocate an 
individualistic autonomy. His categorical imperative represents an abstract 
formulation of moral philosophy which does not demand that one exist in isolation 
from others. In fact, the categorical imperative requires that one consider one’s maxims 
in the wider social context (Heubel and Biller-Andorno, 2005). The analysis to this 
point suggests that in accepting a model of patient autonomy based on freedom from 
constraints we are excluding possible alternatives which may be worthwhile. The 
model of autonomy, based on negative liberty, is rejected here because it denies 
considerations of relationality, responsibility and care which may better serve the 
patient population. In what follows we shall address these concepts individually but 
they are interconnected in ways that cannot, and we suggest ‘should not’, be 
obliterated.  
 
Relational autonomy and individual autonomy 
The notion of relational autonomy is significant here. One may reject initial desires 
and wants, not solely for one’s own ends, but to meet the responsibilities one has to 
others by virtue of one’s relationships. Relational autonomy represents a broader 
notion than individual autonomy. One’s decisions may be one’s own while 
simultaneously influenced by one’s relationships to others. Responsibility to others is 
an integral component of the decision-making process. Relational autonomy suggests 
that individual autonomy fails to capture the interdependent nature of our lives where 
decisions affect not only us but those around us. Relational autonomy is particularly 
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attributed to feminist philosophy but is also ascribed to by communitarians and 
proponents of identity politics (Christman, 2004).  
 
Christman (2004, p.143) refers to relational autonomy as: 
 
“the label that has been given to an alternative conception of what it means 
to be a free, self-governing agent who is also socially constituted and who 
possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of inter-personal 
relations and mutual dependencies”. 
 
This holds great resonance for the healthcare environment. Patients do not make 
decisions in isolation from their families, dependents and social commitments. 
However, despite some objections to the concept of relational autonomy, which are 
concerned with both its inherent logic and normative implications7, we suggest that it 
provides a framework in which autonomy can be understood as a concept which is 
compatible with the interdependent nature of our lives.  
 
Meyers (1989) account of autonomy as both relational and practical is particularly 
relevant here. Meyers, similarly to Paley and Baron above, takes issue with an isolated 
autonomy framed in opposition to socialisation whereby one acts independently of 
relationships with others. Meyers (p.178) contends that the process of socialisation is 
critical to an understanding of our true or authentic selves, and that in turn knowledge 
of one’s true self is essential for an autonomous agent as “without reasonably accurate 
self-portraits, people cannot be self-governing”. This ‘alternative’ model of autonomy, 
as Meyers describes it, involves the enactment of a number of autonomy competencies: 
self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction which are, at least in part, socially 
constructed and render an isolated free-will account of autonomy “dispiritingly 
fatalistic as well as incomplete” (p.43).  
 
The self-testing phenomenon again provides a platform for this discussion. Kearns et 
al. (2010) debate the autonomous and relational dimensions of the individual and 
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propose that while diagnostic self-testing tools can advance individual autonomy 
through independent testing and decision-making, the results obtained have 
implications for one’s “relational responsibilities” (p.201). Somewhat similar to the 
example of breast cancer gene testing above, the paper explains this position in the 
context of a man who finds that he is infertile through use of a home testing kit. Does 
he have a moral obligation to share these results with his partner and thus fulfil his 
relational responsibilities? The authors raise further contextual issues with regard to 
home testing and utilise the work of Charles Taylor to highlight that diagnostic self-
testing is not something that occurs in a vacuum but rather holds great significance for 
those who experience the diagnosis. The paper offers an important dimension to the 
debate here as it suggests that decisions about diagnostic self-testing cannot be viewed 
in isolation from the associated contextual issues. We contend at this point that 
autonomy is a relational concept and not dependant on freedom from constraints in so 
far as constraints are perceived as input from those who exist in association with us. A 
model of autonomy which ignores the relational dimensions of a patient’s existence 
does not encompass the reality of the patient’s experience.  
 
Professional responsibility and autonomy 
The above focus on autonomy as relational is primarily in the context of patients’ 
relational responsibilities towards their significant others. However, there is another 
dimension to this relationality; the relationship that exists between healthcare 
professionals and patients, and the responsibilities that exist by virtue of those 
relationships. In both contexts autonomy is not merely relational but based on 
obligation or responsibility. The responsibilities and obligations of the healthcare 
professional are for the most part acknowledged.  
 
As noted above O’Neill (2002) outlines a ‘true Kantian’ notion of principled autonomy 
which involves acting on universal principles of obligation as opposed to an isolated, 
individualistic autonomy. O’Neill’s thesis is that the triumph of autonomy has 
‘contributed’ to a mistrust of healthcare professionals as opposed to the other way 
around. Principled autonomy, in accordance with O’Neill’s analysis, rejects coercion 
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and deception and provides a basis for a trusting relationship. We propose here that in 
practicing principled autonomy, and considering their obligations towards their 
patients, healthcare professionals can contribute towards an environment of trust. 
Principled autonomy offers an alternative to the libertarian account of autonomy, 
associated with freedom to choose, delineated earlier in this paper.  
 
Consider a patient who contacts his doctor requesting an MRI (an expensive 
radiological diagnostic test) in response to reoccurring knee pain. His doctor is 
reluctant to order the test as his clinical judgement suggests it is not required. The 
patient is currently receiving medication for a recent diagnosis of gout. The doctor is 
eager that the medication would be trialled for a period of time before entering into 
further diagnostic and treatment regimes. Furthermore, the physician is aware of the 
cost of the test and the carcinogenic risks of frequent and unnecessary radiology. The 
doctor provides this information to the patient. If the doctor refuses to prescribe the 
investigation it could be argued that the patient’s autonomy has been denied. However, 
it could also be argued that the doctor has acted in accordance with principled 
autonomy which recognises his autonomy and associated obligations and relational 
responsibilities towards the patient. The doctor may also be acting in accordance with 
his responsibilities towards other patients who may require the test in a climate of 
limited resources.8 
 
Through a process of dialogue the patient agrees, albeit with some reservations, to 
continue the current treatment regime. Perhaps this more interdependent, principled 
understanding of autonomy, which takes account of the professional’s responsibilities, 
by virtue of their role, and skilfully encourages the patient to engage in critical 
reflection, might better serve the patient. In this case  the doctor has put the principle 
of non-maleficence before the principle of autonomy. Hofmann and Lysdhal’s (2008) 
paper addressing the use of extensive radiological services supports this course of 
action. The authors contend that an overreliance on autonomy in radiology can result 
in exposure to unnecessary radiation. Furthermore, patient autonomy can be misused 
to reduce the physicians’ responsibilities (they may avoid law suits as error is less 
probable), increase the popularity of the profession (as patients get what they want) 
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and generate further income for the medical facility (if this is a legitimate 
consideration). This example supports the central thesis here that a libertarian model 
of autonomy which fails to take account of professional responsibilities is not one 
which best serves the patient’s interests.  
  
An understanding of relational autonomy places an additional responsibility on 
healthcare professionals; an obligation to be diligent and skilful in ascertaining the 
extent to which choices are autonomous. Atkins (2006) applies Meyers’ relational 
autonomy to the healthcare context. In acknowledging the need for critical reflection 
by the autonomous agent Atkins suggests that such reflective processes involve 
consideration of one’s relationships with others and societal forces. Atkins proposes 
that healthcare professionals can play a skilled role in assisting these reflective 
processes to allow the realisation of a richer notion of autonomy which is not limited 
to free isolated choices. In this context the healthcare professional is obliged to go 
beyond a patient’s initial expression of preferences to illuminate the reasons for these 
preferences and the societal influences which have underpinned them. This is 
particularly relevant in circumstances where patients choose to reject therapeutic 
interventions 
 
Professional care and patient autonomy 
Consideration of the concepts of relationality and responsibility suggests that they are 
important elements of a richer notion of autonomy that seeks to achieve good patient 
outcomes. These concepts are closely linked with the concept of professional care. 
Holm (1997) uses the term “protective responsibility” to articulate the sense of 
obligation experienced by healthcare professionals towards patients in their care. Holm 
coined the term following an extensive grounded theory investigation of the moral 
problems experienced by doctors and nurses in practice. It relates to the healthcare 
professional’s awareness of the vulnerability patients by virtue of their ill-health, and 
their need for assistance with decision-making regarding care interventions.  
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‘Protective responsibility’ does not accept autonomy as absolute but recognises that 
something else may be required to maximise patient well-being in times of ill health. 
Holm (1997, p. 127) explains the term as follows: 
 
“When you meet the patient you meet another human being who is vulnerable, 
who often trusts you, and whose life you can influence in a significant way. 
This creates a special responsibility towards the other human being, which can 
be difficult to understand for outsiders, but which nevertheless plays a 
significant role in the deliberation of health care professionals.” 
 
Protective responsibility may provide a suitable model to bridge the abyss that exists 
between the more stringent positions of autonomy and paternalism.  It recognises the 
interdependent nature of the patient/doctor relationship. This links with Mol’s account 
of the ‘logic of care’ which she frames in opposition to the ‘logic of choice’. Mol 
(2008, p.43) articulates clearly the tensions that exist when a libertarian model of 
patient choice permeates healthcare. In The Logic of Care, Mol outlines a compelling 
account of the realities of a consumer-based culture in healthcare. Mol’s central thesis 
is that a ‘logic of choice’ is not consistent with a ‘logic of care’ and may lead to ‘poor’ 
care. Mol is not concerned with the abilities of individual patients to exercise choice 
but rather how circumstances of choice emerge and evolve. From her observations and 
interactions with diabetic patients Mol concludes that more choice does not necessary 
lead to better care. While the logic of choice is concerned with patients as customers 
and autonomous, independent individuals, the ‘logic of care’ suggests a far more 
messy landscape. In accordance with Mol’s analysis (p.62) “the logic of care is attuned 
to people who are first and foremost related”. Mol encourages doctors to cease 
‘managing’ patients and return to ‘doctoring’.  
 
Downie (1998) shares a similar perspective in language very closely related to Mol’s 
account. He compares a ‘market relationship’ to a ‘professional relationship’ and 
contends that while serving the bests interests of patients is a feature of the latter, it is 
not a priority in the former. Downie associates this market relationship and consumer 
understanding of autonomy with Mill’s account of autonomy whereby one is free to 
act as she wishes, regardless of how irrational those wishes may be, provided her 
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choices do not cause harm to others. In accordance with Downie’s analysis, a 
healthcare system which refers to patients as customers fuels a culture of ‘consumer 
autonomy’. This may condone a patient persisting with treatment which medical 
evidence suggests unnecessary or futile. Downie outlines an opposing ‘rational 
autonomy’ which he associates with Kantian accounts of autonomy.  
 
This links with O’Neill’s (2002) perspective above in so far as Kantian autonomy is 
more considered, than often portrayed in the healthcare context. One makes decisions 
not solely on one’s initial desires or wishes but in accordance with universal rational 
laws. Downie is quite direct in his criticism of ‘consumer autonomy’. He contends that 
a degree of paternalism is inherent within a professional relationship whereby the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence may on occasion take precedence over 
respect for individual autonomy. This certainly supports Holm’s account of ‘protective 
responsibility’ while also echoing O’Neill’s ‘principled autonomy’ as outlined above. 
 
In specific reference to patient autonomy and the clinical relationship Olsen (2003, 
p.705) refers to “the ethical use of influence” within a patient/clinician context. Similar 
to Downie above Olsen proposes that influence is not only ‘intrinsic’ but ‘desirable’ 
within the clinical relationship. Olsen’s discussion centres on the process of coercion 
in mental health practice whereby the use of coercion is justified on the basis of a 
rights-based approach. In accordance with this approach the patient is seen as an 
autonomous self-governing agent who has the right to act free from interference. In 
this context coercion is justified only if the patient lacks capacity to make a judgement 
or may cause harm to himself, or others. Olsen offers an alternative relational approach 
whereby influence is seen as a constant feature of the clinical relationship and 
treatment decisions are continuous and subjective. The relational approach demands 
that every action of influence, despite its magnitude, is assessed for its ethical 
suitability. Therefore, respect for patients is paramount throughout and the power 
relationships are continuously acknowledged. This perspective is coherent with the 
principles of relationality, responsibility and care outlined in this paper. It provides 
another example of professional care superseding autonomy in a clinical context.    
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Gillon’s (2003) specific adherence to autonomy as a paramount principle in healthcare 
practice, which promotes the other bioethical principles, has been rejected by Callahan 
(2003) in favour of communitarianism and by Dawson and Garrard (2006) on the basis 
that it rejects the prima facia nature of the principles. The latter argument is significant 
here as it essentially asserts that the professional duty to care demands that one move 
beyond mere respect for autonomy in favour of acknowledging other ethical principles 
when the context requires it. Dawson and Garrard (2006) take issue with Gillon’s 
position that autonomy is ‘first among equals’ in the context of the four ethical 
principles outlined by Beauchamp and Childress (2001).  They refute Gillon’s 
argument on a number of levels, but particularly with regard to the manner in which 
his standpoint rejects the Rossian perspective of prima facie, as opposed to, absolute 
principles. In accordance with an ethic of prima facie duties (Ross 1930) one principle 
might triumph over the others in accordance with specific situations.  
 
Dawson and Garrard (2006) suggest that justice will take precedence over autonomy 
in resource allocation issues and that the principles of autonomy and non-maleficence 
can often be in conflict in a healthcare context. The authors also add that in suggesting 
that autonomy promotes the other principles Gillon actually exalts their relevance as 
opposed to rendering them less important. In accordance with Dawson and Garrard’s 
perspective accepting Gillon’s position would result in a return to “moral absolutism 
and its demand that we regard some principles as exceptionless” (p.201). The 
acceptance of autonomy as the ‘first’ principle could have negative consequences for 
patient care as outlined above. There are numerous other accounts in the literature 
which suggest that an over-zealous adherence to patient autonomy may allow 
individuals to be disadvantaged by their own choices, create unnecessary confusion 
and provide a means whereby healthcare professionals abdicate, either intentionally or 
otherwise, their own professional and caring responsibilities (Holm, 1997; Scott et al. 
2003a; Kapp, 2007; Whitney and McCullough, 2007, Harnett and Greaney, 2008).  
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The empirical literature also provides some evidence for the proposal that patients 
value the role others take in the decision-making process during their time of 
vulnerability (Scott et al., 2003b; Levinson et al., 2005; Doherty and Doherty, 2005; 
Hamann et al.,2007). A large-scale survey design in Toronto investigated patients’ 
preferences for participation in decision-making at three levels: seeking information, 
discussing options and making the final decision (Levinson et al., 2005). The sample 
was stratified to ensure representation from the wider population. Results showed that 
while 96% of patients surveyed preferred to be offered choices and asked their 
opinions, 52% displayed a preference for leaving the final decision to their doctors.  
This echoes Berlin’s assertion that “individual freedom is not everyone’s need” (1969, 
p.40). 
 
Therefore, it appears that a model of autonomy based on freedom to choose does not 
always meet the requirements of care as articulated by patients and healthcare 
professionals. We propose that the interdependent concepts of relationality, 
responsibility and care are essential components of healthcare. An account of patient 
autonomy which focuses on the absence of constraints may deny their existence or 
minimise their importance. 
 
Summary of argument and conclusion 
Patient autonomy is widely acclaimed as the new orthodoxy or ethic for healthcare 
delivery. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, this perception of 
autonomy is often equated with free choice which does not reflect the more positive 
sense of liberty associated with autonomy. In this view self-determination and mastery 
have greater significance than the absence of constraints.  
 
Furthermore, autonomous choices do not involve acting solely on one’s individual 
desires in a vacuum but encompass a critical, relational, reflexive review of one’s 
initial wants and an appreciation of the impact of choices on others. Misinterpretation 
and subsequent inappropriate application of Kantian philosophy has sometimes 
contributed to an account of autonomy in healthcare which is less than complete and 
292 
 
 
possibly misleading. Finally, a model of autonomy based on freedom to choose, which 
fails to consider the notions of relationality, responsibility and care does not provide 
the best means for increasing human potential. We suggest therefore that the combined 
arguments outlined above provide a platform to question current healthcare policy and 
rhetoric regarding increased patient autonomy and propose that it should be reviewed 
or at least accepted with caution.   
 
Conclusion: Towards a new model of patient autonomy 
Having raised significant problems with the manner in which autonomy is currently 
presented in healthcare the discussion would not be complete without providing at 
least some possible solutions. It is important note that nothing in this paper should be 
construed as suggesting that patient autonomy is not worthy of consideration. What is 
suggested rather is that patient involvement in healthcare should be underpinned by a 
sound philosophical understanding of what it means to be autonomous and an 
appreciation that autonomy is not necessarily related to the range of options available, 
of established intrinsic value, or always desired by those it seeks to liberate. The 
proposals outlined below require another paper to delineate how they may work 
together but it is important to refer to them here to close the current argument.  
 
O’Neill’s (1992) proposal for judging the value of autonomy could be usefully applied 
to the healthcare setting. In this model autonomy is neither revered nor dismissed but 
rather viewed in context. She suggests that social independence should not necessarily 
be desired nor dependence automatically condemned. Rather independence or 
dependence should be judged on the basis of overall contribution to autonomy and 
other ‘goods’. As O’Neill (1992) suggests we may do well to return to a true Kantian 
account of autonomy which does not necessarily rebuke interdependence.  
 
Wilson (2007) concurs with much of O’Neill’s perspective and suggests that we should 
value an individual’s capacity for autonomy as a fundamental way of respecting 
autonomy as opposed to necessarily respecting autonomous choices. This echoes 
Seedhouse’s (1998) position that it is essential to differentiate between respecting and 
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creating autonomy and that the latter may not necessarily involve granting individuals 
all their choices. Both positions offer alternative perspectives for understanding patient 
autonomy. O’Neill’s (2002) ‘principled autonomy’ with a focus on obligation, Mol’s 
‘logic of care’ (2008) and Holm’s ‘protective responsibility’ (1997) collectively 
provide an interconnected labyrinth in which to consider autonomy questions in 
healthcare. The interdependent nature of autonomy within the healthcare setting is 
central to all these perspectives.  
 
Finally, we propose that Meyers’ (1989) account of relational autonomy, as presented 
above, which is both practical and reflexive presents an overarching framework which 
could encompass the other proposals outlined, and provide a means whereby patient 
autonomy can be respected as a socially constructed, non-isolated, concept. It is timely 
that we question to what extent patient autonomy should permeate healthcare policy, 
rhetoric and ethics and how we can reconcile respect for autonomy with a professional 
duty of care. We propose that further philosophical and empirical review, in the 
context of diagnostic self-testing and other fields, is required to answer these questions. 
 
 
Notes 
1. The impetus for this paper arose from an exploration of the meanings ascribed 
to autonomy in the philosophical literature. A review of key seminal works 
revealed an incompatibility with the prevailing understanding of autonomy in 
healthcare and prompted the particular focus of this paper. 
2. The use of the word ‘definition’ has particular significance in philosophy. 
Downie encourages the writer to look beyond ‘lexical’ or ‘word-word’ 
dictionary definitions which merely report the common usage of terms. He 
advocates replacing such nominal definitions with more essential definitions. 
The latter, he contends, can be arrived at through classification and analysis. 
(Downie, R.S. 1994. Definition. Journal of Medical Ethics 20: 181-184.) 
3. The terms liberty and freedom are used interchangeably here as reflected in the 
work of Berlin (1969) and Dworkin (1988). 
4. It is important to note that this genealogy of autonomy is primarily rooted in 
western liberal-democratic and liberal-humanistic thought.  Therefore, it is 
important to appreciate the specific cultural context of this discussion. See 
Pennycook, A (1997) Cultural alternatives and autonomy. In Autonomy and 
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Independence in Language Learning, ed. P. Benson and P. Voller, 35-53. 
London: Longmans 
5. The term bioethics is described by O’Neill (2002) as a meeting ground for 
those who debate the legal, social and ethical implications of new advances in 
medicine, science and bio-technology. A detailed account of the ‘birth’ of 
bioethics is beyond the scope of this paper but a comprehensive historical 
account is found in Reich W.T. (1994) The word bioethics; its birth and 
legacies of those who shaped it. Journal of Medical Ethics 4: 319-335. 
6. This example was constructed following a review of Kim Atkins’ paper which 
is discussed later in this section. 
7. Holroyd maintains that while agents may be relational entities autonomy 
cannot be. See Holroyd, J. 2009 Relational autonomy and Paternalistic 
Interventions. Res Publica, 15:321-336. Christman, within his account of 
relational autonomy, raises a concern that a purely relational approach to 
autonomy may lend itself to an “overarching paternalism” (2004 p.158). 
8. A recent "Liberating the NHS" (2010) white paper proposal, announced by 
the Secretary for State for Health in the UK, suggests a greater role for 
doctors in managing  budgets at a local level through primary care 
consortia. See British Doctors to take charge of spending, www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2010/08/16/gvsb0816.htm (Accessed 4th April 2011) 
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Appendix C: Process and scope of literature review 
A systematic approach to the literature review was undertaken as advocated by 
Trafford and Lesham (2008). Essentially, the review explores international scholarship 
in the area of patient autonomy and self-testing. The literature review process began 
with a subject analysis whereby key terms from the broad research problem were 
isolated, defined and any synonyms identified. Key search terms included ‘patient’, 
‘autonomy’, ‘self-testing’ ‘self-determination’, ‘empowerment’, ‘self-care’, self-
management’, ‘ethics’, ‘bioethics’ ‘technology’, and ‘healthcare’. In order to 
contextualise the discussion, the latter stages of the review focused specifically on self-
testing of blood glucose levels in patients with diabetes mellitus, thus introducing new 
search words. As noted within the thesis, the analysis and discussion phases of the 
research required ongoing immersion in the literature to explore the emerging 
phenomenon.  
 
The scope of the review was determined by isolating key disciplines, periods and 
geographical areas, where literature of relevance was more prominent. The literature 
search reflects the various disciplines associated with the subject area, namely, 
nursing, philosophy, medicine, bioethics, science and technology studies, and 
emerging areas of scholarship: Ethics on The Laboratory Floor and Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA). Sociological and psychological works were also reviewed in light 
of emerging concepts. Certain sections of the literature cluster around key social, 
ethical, technological and medical developments. The development of autonomy as a 
concept within American bioethics since the mid-1970s, and an associated 
international debate which began among the medical and philosophical communities 
in the 1990s regarding the primacy of autonomy as an ethical principle are of 
significance. In addition, research regarding the value of self-testing among diabetic 
patients is prominent in the literature since 2008, following a series of large scale 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs). The debate regarding self-testing technology 
among the wider population represents the most recent dimension to the literature. 
Geographically, the autonomy literature is prominent in a UK and US context but 
exists across the international community. However, the literature regarding self-
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testing among the diabetic community, particularly in the area of HTA, is 
predominantly UK based, while the most recent literature concerning self-testing is 
concentrated primarily in a UK and Dutch context.    
 
A variety of literary sources were accessed. In light of the empirical ethics study design 
the scope of the literature review extends beyond empirical studies to include 
philosophical evidence. Several databases were utilised to search key terms; namely 
CINAHL, MEDLINE, Philosophers Index, Academic Search Planner, Sage Journals 
Online, SpringerLink and Biomed Central. Access to more seminal texts and 
philosophical concepts was assisted by Ebrary books online and the Rutledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The literature encompasses textbooks, journal articles, 
policy documents and the grey literature, including conference papers, legislation and 
unpublished theses. Network theory (Ryan et al. 1991 cited in O’Connor 1992)79 was 
also utilised as a search strategy. In a network approach, the researcher sources recent 
articles of relevance from core reputable journals in the field, and works backwards 
accessing the literature within the articles following the progress of the debate or 
research. This was particularly helpful in getting a ‘feel’ for the prominent works. 
 
The body of literature was also developed through attendance at conferences and 
communication with experts in the field. A series of online alert systems linked to core 
search items and the ‘Table of Contents’ of core journals was also helpful. Following 
initial publication an alert system facilitated by Biomed Central, BioMedLib, assisted 
in identifying literature of direct relevance to the paper subject matter.80 Collectively, 
these various processes of literature searching ensured that reading, writing, reflecting, 
data gathering and data analysis were cyclical as opposed to linear processes. This 
cyclical activity is a key feature of hermeneutic phenomenological enquiry (Crist and 
Tanner 2003, Smythe et al. 2008) which is reflected in the literature review process 
(Smythe and Spence 2012).  
                                                          
79 O’Connor, S.E. 1992. Network theory – a systematic theory for literature review. Nurse Education 
Today, 12, pp.44-50. 
80 Biomed Central provides the service BioMedLib to published authors. The service facilitates an 
alert system to the most recent publications in the paper domain and also highlights citation history.  
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Appendix D: Personal Autonomy – Conceptual Axes 
 
 
Internalist
Theorists that claim autonomy is 
dependent only upon an agent's 
reflective and evaluative capacities
Externalist
Theorists that claim autonomy is dependent upon certain 
external enabling conditions, e.g. the available of a certain 
range of options, as well as an agent’s reflective and evaluative 
capacities.
Substantivist
Theorists that are concerned with 
the content of autonomy 
decisions
Proceduralist
Theorists that are concerned with the 
process by which an autonomous 
decision is reached 
PLOTTING THE FOUR MODELS
Conceptual Axes 
3
 
 
 
 
 
Image reproduced with kind permission from Ms. Vivienne Ashley and The Essex Autonomy 
Project.  http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk  
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Appendix E: “Is-ought” paper 
 
Meta-ethical considerations in empirical bioethics research: The significance of 
Hume’s ‘is-ought’ problem 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This paper examines a fundamental meta-ethical problem associated with bioethics 
research. The ‘is-ought’ problem concerns the relationship between factual  
information and normative judgements, i.e. the extent to which the way something ‘is’ 
can inform what one ‘ought’ to do. Hume’s (1739/2013) perspective is that there is no 
logical relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements. This meta-ethical problem is 
of direct relevance to empirical bioethics research which combines philosophical and 
empirical analysis in the pursuit of new knowledge. It is important that the bioethics 
researcher develop her own metaethical position prior to engaging in empirical work 
(Salloch et al. 2012). This allows the researcher to pre-establish the relationship 
between the empirical and the normative throughout the research process. To this end, 
this paper explores the ‘is-ought’ problem and the extent to which it represents a valid 
impediment to empirical bioethics.  
 
The paper’s central thesis is that there is an inter-relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
statements which supports the use of empirical work in normative judgement. The 
paper seeks to substantiate two main claims in this regard. (1) An inter-relationship 
exists between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements which refutes the absoluteness of the ‘is-
ought problem’, and the associated polarised positions often ascribed to the factual and 
the normative. An understanding of the inter-play between the factual and the 
normative in the context of moral choice, and the associated importance of language 
and meaning within a connected society are utilised to support this claim. (2) In 
addition, I propose that if the ‘is-ought’ problem is accepted as absolute an 
understanding of the reflective, rational activity that represents an important dimension 
of ethical-decision making is lost. I conclude that polarised positions such as an 
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absolute ‘is-ought’ problem are unhelpful and propose a form of neo-naturalism as a 
preferred meta-ethical perspective (Stewart 2009). 
 
Essentially, the ‘is-ought problem’ suggests that ‘is’ premises cannot lead to ‘ought’ 
conclusions. The standard Anglo-American interpretation, prior to debate in the 1950s, 
suggested that there was “no logical relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ judgements” 
(Kupperman 2005, p. 343). Searle (1964) expresses the issue in more modern 
terminology noting that no collection of ‘descriptive’ statements can entail an 
‘evaluative’ statement without the introduction of an evaluative premise. These issues 
are of concern for any researcher intending to engage in empirical research to assist in 
normative analysis.  
 
The basis of the ‘is-ought’ problem is found in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739/2006). A passage in the final section of Book III – On Morals outlines Hume’s 
position.  
 
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, 
perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which 
I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds 
for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being 
of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a 
sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected 
with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses 
some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed 
and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from others, which are entirely different from it. 
 
Hume goes on to suggest that “vulgar systems of morality” fail to recognise this ‘is-
ought’ problem. Hume’s ‘is-ought’ problem has been defended and contested over 
time in an effort to determine its relevance for morality, and in later times, bioethics 
research. Guevera (2008, p.46) contends that the ‘is-ought’ issue has a “mature life of 
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its own, independent of the interpretation of Hume’s texts” which secures its place as 
an enduring philosophical problem.   
 
2.0 Not just the ‘is-ought’ problem 
Prior to considering the arguments regarding the validity of the ‘is-ought’ problem it 
is necessary to discuss its relationship with the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and the ‘fact-value 
distinction’. The three concepts are related, but they are not one and the same as is 
sometimes suggested. Harris (2004, p.18) refers to a section of the passage above as 
Hume’s “articulation of the naturalistic fallacy”. Similarly Borry et al. (2005) and 
Sugarman and Sulmasy (2010) make no distinction between the two concepts, while 
other accounts (Guevera 2008, McMillan and Hope 2008, de Vries and Gordijn 2009) 
reveal subtle differences between the terms. Curry (2006) delineates the ‘fact-value 
distinction’ and the ‘is-ought’ problem as expressions of the naturalistic fallacy (Curry 
2006).  However, As de Vries and Gordijn (2009) explain the ‘is-ought’ problem, the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’ and the ‘fact-value distinction’ represent distinct ethical problems 
and are based on different rationales. An appreciation of the nuances in these terms is 
important in order to adequately explore the ‘is-ought’ problem.     
 
The term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ was first coined in Moore’s Principa Ethica (1903). It 
refers to “the failure to distinguish clearly that unique and indefinable quality which 
we mean by good” (1:10). Moore’s claim is that moral philosophers commit the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’ when they assign the term ‘good’ to natural things in the world. 
In particular he refers to hedonistic utilitarians who equate the ‘good’ with pleasure 
(3:36). Hospers (1997, p.253) explains Moore’s philosophy in the context of his classic 
‘open question technique’ which he uses to refute naturalism. If we assign ‘good’ to a 
certain property in the world, for example honesty, the open question remains: is 
honesty good? In accordance with Moore’s philosophy we go beyond ordinary 
empirical facts when we refer to the ‘good’. For Moore there is a meta-ethical concern 
with this approach to normative ethics. McMillan and Hope (2008, p.13) succinctly 
describe the distinction between the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and the ‘is-ought’ problem: 
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Perhaps the most important difference between these two philosophical 
problems is that Hume is making a point about validity while Moore is 
pointing out that there is something normative about moral terms that 
cannot be captured purely in terms of other facts in the world. 
 
The ‘fact-value distinction’ also merits consideration here. de Vries and Gordijn (2009, 
p.198) suggest that the ‘fact-value distinction’ is not related to a fallacy or problem, 
but is rather a reference to “meta-ethical views”. In accordance with their analysis the 
‘fact-value’ distinction can be reducible to three particular views:  
 
(1) No statement or concept is irreducibly both evaluative and factual. 
(2) Evaluative discourse fails to have certain characteristics (such as truth-
aptness, objectivity, rationality etc.) essential to paradigmatic realistic 
discourses like, for example, scientiﬁc discourse. 
(3) (Scientiﬁc) facts do not presuppose values (or, alternatively, science is 
value-free). (de Vries and Gordijn 2009, p.198) 
 
In this sense, while all three concepts are distinct they also share a core similarity with 
regard to the claim that moral judgements are normative and cannot be inferred by 
descriptive, factual representations of the world around us. Herein lies the problem for 
empirical ethics. Collectively the ‘is-ought’ problem, ‘the fact-value distinction’ and 
the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ cast doubt over the ability of facts, arrived at through 
empirical research, to enable one to derive normative conclusions. If ethical 
judgements cannot be derived from observations of the natural world why engage in 
this activity? “Whatever we find about what is the case, we are left with questions 
about what we ought to do” (McMillan and Hope 2008, p.14). 
 
3.0 Examining the merit of the ‘is-ought’ problem 
3.1 Refuting the absoluteness of Hume’s distinction 
The substantial claim presented here suggests that the ‘is-ought’ problem is not as 
absolute as traditionally accepted as there is evidence of a relationship between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ statements. The factual and the normative do not occupy polarised or 
dichotomous positions as the ‘is-ought’ problem suggests. I present three interrelated 
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arguments in support of this position. (a) Facts, which are deemed problematic in 
supporting normative conclusions, are not entirely factual, as they are often imbued 
with normative meaning. Facts and values are interrelated in a way which refutes the 
‘is-ought’ dichotomy. (b) The relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ depends on how 
we define this ‘relationship’. There may be legitimate patterns of inference between 
factual premises and normative conclusions because of particular aspects of meaning 
associated with the statements. (c) Finally, an understanding of the relational 
autonomous agent suggests that one considers the facts of the situation in a societal 
context in order to determine what one ought to do. 
 
3.1.1 The normative within the factual: Murdoch and others 
Harris (2004) affords some merit to Hume’s position acknowledging that his 
perspective challenges us to consider how we can arrive at moral judgements without 
the accumulation of facts. However, Harris also notes a major difficulty with Hume’s 
‘is-ought’ problem. Harris contends that the separation of fact and value, implicit 
within this distinction, is logically inconsistent as values are “inevitably enshrined in 
the language with which we describe and present facts” (2004, p.18). This is consistent 
with the ‘thick descriptions’ of fact which Kupperman (2005) refers to, Putnam’s 
(2004) ‘thick ethical concepts’ and, Borry et al.’s (2004) reference to the ‘normativity 
of the factual’. This represents a significant challenge to Hume’s assertion that an 
‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’, and is the initial argument presented here. Facts 
are often imbued with normative meaning; therefore, it is contradictory to suggest that 
factual premises cannot infer moral conclusions.  
 
Iris Murdoch is one of the prominent opponents of Hume’s ‘is-ought’ problem in this 
context. Murdoch asserts that moral activity is present in all aspects of our cognitive 
awareness therefore facts cannot be entirely separated from one’s sense of value. We 
interpret facts in relation to our moral compass. Murdoch is “calling attention to, and 
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criticising, the analytic philosophers’ conception of moral rationality” (Diamond 1996, 
p.82).81  
 
Murdoch contends that moral outlook can be expressed in factual terms in the form of 
specialised moral concepts linked to our cognitive awareness. Diamond gives an 
example of these moral concepts and the sense of value they portray. For example, 
there may be a situation where it is clear that one individual took the property of 
another. However, one party may refer to it as stealing while the other may not. In this 
sense facts are interpreted in different ways. Diamond (1996, p.103) explains that 
Murdoch does assign something as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ but rather that: 
  
in ordinary consciousness, in our desires, aversions, images, feelings, 
attachments and perceptions, values are at work, are being shaped and 
reshaped in ways which never lose their attachment to the common world 
but which .are our own. 
 
Murdoch did not accept the prevailing view of analytical philosophers in the 1950s 
that any attempt to infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ was logically unsound as it contained 
hidden premises, or normative premises cloaked in factual terms. However, Murdoch’s 
position is a rather tempered one. It appears that Murdoch does not entirely refute the 
‘fact-value distinction’ but rather that she suggests another way of looking at how 
moral judgements are arrived at. In Vision and Choice (1956, p.54) Murdoch notes 
that “fact and value merge in an innocuous way” (1956, p.54). This argument is 
consistent with the main claim presented here that the ‘is-ought’ problem is not 
absolute. Murdoch suggests that philosophers have been misguided in seeking a 
unified picture of morality and supports a more eclectic understanding of moral choice. 
In accordance with Murdoch’s perspective naturalism is seen “not as a fallacy but as a 
different system of concepts” (p.56) 
 
                                                          
81 My initial introduction to Murdoch’s work was through Diamond’s appraisal. Murdoch’s own 
writings were then accessed.  
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Murdoch’s Vision and Choice in Morality (1956) begins in support of Hepburn’s use 
of fables as a ‘guide’ to morality. However, Murdoch extends her arguments to the 
wider issue of the nature of morality itself, and the extent to which moral judgements 
are arrived at by recourse to the arts, the factual, imagination, and the transcendental 
as opposed to merely logical deliberation.  
 
My point is that if we regard the current view, not as a final truth about the 
separability of fact and value but as itself representing a type of moral 
attitude, then we shall not think that there is a philosophical error which 
consists in merging fact and value. (Murdoch 1956, p.54) 
 
Murdoch recognises the hidden evaluative premises that exist in inferring an ‘ought’ 
from an ‘is’ for example, in the context of using statistics to guide moral judgement. 
Using statistics to inform what one ‘ought’ to do will only apply if we subscribe to the 
‘hidden’ normative premise that one ought to do what is customary. However, 
Murdoch does not reject naturalism on this basis, referring rather to the merits of 
exposing such premises. While the analytic philosopher may contend that exposure of 
‘hidden’ premises supports the logical gap between fact and value, Murdoch’s analysis 
is quite different. In accordance with Murdoch’s perspective, the suppressed premise 
denotes a sense of personal responsibility and relates to the process of individual 
reflection that is implicit within moral rationality. The inclusion of the suppressed 
premise, as the associated deliberation, is the reason why one accepts the conclusion 
on the basis of the facts present. Diamond refers to this as a central theme in Murdoch’s 
work, the notion that “thinking is always an activity of ours as moral beings” (1996, 
p.82). In this sense Murdoch’s rejection of an absolute ‘fact-value distinction’ is 
associated with her critique of the analytic philosopher’s conception of moral 
rationality (Diamond 1996).  
 
For Murdoch, cognitive awareness is value-laden. Diamond explains this particular 
uniqueness to Murdoch’s philosophy. While Murdoch’s thinking supports a rejection 
of the traditional ‘fact-value distinction’ in analytic philosophy she leads us to a 
different perception of the ‘fact-value distinction’. According to Murdoch our moral 
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rationality allows the awareness/interpretation of something ‘in’ the factual world. 
“The morally alive awareness of x may enable us to interpret x into the realm of 
practical life” (Diamond 1996, p.109). In this sense our own value system allows 
concepts to be understood In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch (1992, p.26) 
clearly articulates the interrelationship between fact and value and her opposition to 
the ‘is-ought problem: 
 
In the majority of cases, a survey of the facts will in itself involve moral 
discrimination. Innumerable forms of evaluation haunt our simplest 
decisions. The defence of value is not an attack on ‘ordinary facts’. The 
concept of ‘fact’ is complex. The moral point is that ‘facts’ are set up as 
such by human (that is moral) agents.  
 
This essentially means that we acknowledge and present facts in certain ways because 
of our ethical perspective. As an example, consider a resuscitation attempt on a male 
road traffic accident victim. The team in the accident and emergency department are 
of the opinion that attempts are proving futile. As the lead physician is about to cease 
resuscitation, one member of the team notes that all other members of the family have 
died with the exception of a six- month-old baby and this man who is his father. The 
fact is noted as it is deemed morally relevant in deciding to pursue further resuscitative 
attempts. This fact is assigned particular moral value. Admittedly, the fact itself is not 
sufficient to arrive at the normative conclusion that further resuscitation attempts are 
morally justifiable. There is, as Murdoch has noted, a hidden moral premise. The 
hidden premise in this instance is that parents of young children should be protected 
in so far as this is possible. This premise, when exposed, is not a means to support the 
‘is-ought’ problem, but rather an example of the individual reflection that is inherent 
in moral decision-making in accordance with Murdoch’s position outlined above. 
Other facts related to the possible clinical outcomes post resuscitation will also be 
considered by the team in deciding to proceed or not. 
 
Murdoch’s perspective is supported by Putnam (2004, p.2) who refers to arguments 
regarding the ‘fact-value’ issue as “over-inflated dichotomies”. In Fact and Value 
Putnam (2004, p.3) articulates that “evaluation and description are interwoven and 
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interdependent” activities. This reflects the ‘innocuous’ merging of fact and value 
which Murdoch refers to. Putnam relates ‘the fact-value’ dichotomy to the ‘analytic-
synthetic’ dichotomy which has existed since Kantian philosophy as a fundamental 
dimension of classical empiricism and logical positivism. Putnam uses the word 
‘dichotomy’ specifically to denote a term which has gone beyond the word 
‘distinction’ to place an absolute gulf between fact and value and synthetic and analytic 
arguments. In accordance with Putnam’s analysis we are not surprised if distinctions 
fail to apply in all situations but the same cannot be said of dichotomies.  
 
Putnam does not accept the absoluteness of Hume’s ‘is-ought’ problem which he 
claims is directly related to the ‘fact-value’ dichotomy. He presents two principal 
arguments in support of this position. Firstly he claims that the ‘fact-value’ dichotomy 
rests on a very narrow interpretation of fact. Putnam argues that as science, and man’s 
related understanding of the world, developed the perception of what constitutes fact 
also evolved. Electrons, protons, and bacteria are all deemed to exist but are not 
necessarily observable. Secondly, for Putman, facts and values are entangled in what 
he refers to as “thick ethical concepts” (p. 35). Putnam refers specifically to the use of 
the word ‘crime’ by Hume in arguing against the ‘fact-value distinction’. Hume’s 
rhetorical question asks: Where is the matter of fact that we call crime? Contrary, to 
Hume’s perspective that ‘crime’ can never be perceived of as a fact, or a similar 
assertion by Hare  in terms of the word ‘cruel’, Putnam asserts that fact and value are 
entangled within both these concepts. While Hare attempts to separate the term ‘cruel’ 
into a descriptive and evaluative component, Putnam does not accept this. Rather, he 
explains, we cannot explain the descriptive meaning of cruel without using the term 
cruel or a synonym. Putnam explains that to equate cruel with, for example, ‘causing 
deep suffering’ would not be sufficient, as a surgeon, prior to the availability of 
anaesthesia, may have caused deep suffering but this did not necessarily infer he was 
cruel. 
 
I propose at this point that Murdoch and Putnam present a real objection to the ‘is-
ought’ problem. The facts deemed problematic in supporting normative conclusions 
are not entirely factual, as they are morally derived or imbued with normative meaning. 
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This entanglement of fact and value supports the first dimension of the initial claim 
outlined above. In this context an ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’ as normativity is 
present in fact or, as Murdoch, suggests shapes the realisation of fact in consciousness.  
 
In his rejection of the ‘fact-value’ dichotomy Putnam refers to the interrelated concepts 
of language and meaning. Similarly, Murdoch’s position cannot be separated from the 
philosophy of language. This is also an important consideration in this debate. 
 
3.1.2 Language, inference and ‘logical relationships’ 
The philosophy of language acquisition is relevant in this context. This leads us to the 
second dimension of the initial argument outlined above. The ‘is-ought’ problem may 
not be as absolute as claimed because the relationship between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is 
dependent on how we understand patterns of relation. There may be legitimate patterns 
of relation between factual premises and normative conclusions because of particular 
aspects of meaning associated with the descriptive statements. I utilise Kupperman’s 
work (2005) for much of this analysis.  
 
Kupperman (2005) refers to the manner in which morality and language are 
intertwined. Kupperman explains that the terms ‘good’ and ‘right’ are taught to 
children by use of examples, which would delineate the sense of ‘good’ or ‘right’ the 
teacher wishes to portray. In this context, “an established morality can be passed on, 
in the guise of language acquisition” (Kupperman 2005, p.357). Kupperman holds that 
normative terms have more than one meaning in language. There is the general 
commendatory way of goodness and the way in which the meaning of goodness has 
been portrayed to an individual. In this context the contention that an ‘is’ cannot inform 
an ‘ought’ is questionable. One may infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ statement if she 
associates the factual statement with some degree of normativity developed through 
language acquisition. In this sense, a logical relation between factual premises and a 
normative conclusion exists because of “elements of meaning that connect premises 
and conclusions” (Kupperman 2005, p.359).   
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Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is relevant here. In accordance with 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy we engage in language games when we seek to define 
concepts. In Philosophical Investigations (1958) Wittgenstein uses the word ‘game’ 
to exemplify how the concept can only be truly understood by the use of examples 
which illustrate the ways in which it is used. Peta Bowden (1997) applies 
Wittgenstein’s ‘language-games’ as the theoretical approach to her philosophical 
exploration of the ethics of care. Bowden (1997, p. 12) acknowledges that “caring 
relations vary enormously in their range and application” and accepts Wittgenstein’s 
account of this “practical nature of discursive understanding” as a foundation for her 
theoretical investigations. Bowden’s Caring: Gender-sensitive ethics (1997) presents 
an account of an ethics of care through the particular contexts in which ethical 
dimensions of caring exist as opposed to focusing on principles or theories of care. 
Bowden (1997, p.14) contends that Wittgenstein’s outlook provides us with a different 
way of looking at the world and serves to counteract “reductionist forms of conceptual 
understanding”.  
 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is central to an understanding of a world in which fact and 
value do not exist in isolation from each other (Harris 2004). Values are, as noted 
above, imbued with the language we use to present facts. (Murdoch, Putnam and 
Wittgenstein all support this analysis, albeit in slightly different ways.) Therefore, our 
particular and practical understanding of concepts may lead us to infer an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is’, as we see logical inference between factual statements and evaluative 
conclusions in light of the meaning we assign to those concepts. Cultural and 
institutional meaning assigned to certain terms equates them with certain values. As 
an example, consider a conservative guesthouse owner who may utilise the facts of his 
guests’ marital status to make judgements about their moral character when assigning 
double rooms. The guesthouse owner may have strict religious or moral views about 
pre-marital sex, which lead him to believe that only married couples should sleep 
together. In this sense he utilises this moral view point as a hidden premise (as explored 
by Murdoch) in his deliberations which leads him to decide that the unmarried couple 
who sleep together are of poor moral character. In addition, he equates the term 
‘marriage’ with certain moral values because of the cultural and institutional meaning 
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he assigns to the term. In accordance with Kupperman’s analysis, he acquired this 
understanding of ‘marriage’ through the acquisition of language within the culture in 
which he grew up; a culture which ascribed certain meaning, status and morality to 
marriage as a concept and by extension, to relationships that exist outside of this 
institution. 
 
3.1.3 Relational autonomy and institutional facts 
The final dimension to the initial claim rests on an understanding of the autonomous 
agent as a relational being. In this sense, we assign meaning to facts through our 
societal connections. Our place in society as a relational autonomous agent means that 
we decide what ought to be done based on our connections with those around us. I 
propose here that a relational understanding of autonomy coupled with Searle’s (1964) 
account of ‘institutional fact’ provides a convincing counterargument to the ‘is-ought’ 
problem. A relational understanding of autonomy underlines the significance of the 
factual and contextual in deciding what one ‘ought’ to do. This will be further 
explained as the argument proceeds. Essentially, relational autonomy suggests that the 
autonomous agent does not operate in an isolated context in deciding what they ought 
to do in response to the facts that life presents them with.  
 
Christman (2004, p.143) refers to relational autonomy as: 
 
the label that has been given to an alternative conception of what it means 
to be a free, self-governing agent, who is also socially constituted and who 
possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of inter-personal 
relations and mutual dependencies 
 
Meyers’s (1989) account of autonomy as both relational and practical is significant 
here. Meyers (p.178) contends that the process of socialisation is essential for the 
autonomous agent as “without reasonably accurate self-portraits, people cannot be 
self-governing”. This view of autonomy involves the processes, or competencies, of 
self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction which are, at least in part, socially 
constructed. Atkins (2006) draws on Meyers’s account of autonomy and refers to the 
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critical processes of reflection which one must engage in, in order to arrive at their 
authentic selves. These reflective processes involve consideration of one’s 
relationships with others in order to ascertain the extent to which one’s autonomous 
choices are actually one’s own or socially imposed. This critical reflection incorporates 
consideration of what one ‘ought’ to do in light of the impact on others and the 
available facts regarding their societal connections. 
 
Searle’s (1964) account of ‘institutional fact’ and ‘constitutive rules’ supports this 
claim albeit this was not his intention. To get to this point a wider explanation of his 
position is required. Searle’s (1964, p.44) much-quoted argument in opposition to 
Hume, outlines a series of factual statements which he contends leads to a normative 
conclusion thus negating the traditional ‘is-ought’ problem. The argument goes as 
follows: 
       
1. Jones uttered the statements “I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five 
dollars 
2. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars 
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five 
dollars 
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
5. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars 
 
I disagree with the general thrust of Searle’s argument as there is a significant degree 
of normativity embedded within the statements which he deems to be wholly factual. 
There are considerations regarding promises and obligations within the statements 
which can only be properly understood through some degree of normative analysis or 
moral awareness. We may not agree that promises place us under any moral obligation 
at all. Essentially, I suggest that Searle’s argument does not provide a sufficient 
justification for his proposal that normative conclusions can be derived from solely 
factual statements.  
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Searle (1964, p.52) does acknowledge that his argument is open to possible objections 
and offers a distinction between “brute facts” and “institutional facts” by way of 
confirmation. Searle proposes that there are different types of factual statements. 
“Smith has brown hair” and “Jones got married” are both statements of fact but refer 
to different types of fact in Searle’s analysis. Searle proposes that ‘Smith has brown 
hair’ is a brute fact while ‘Jones got married’ is an institutional fact in so far as it 
demands the existence of a certain institution – the institution of marriage (Searle 1964, 
p.54). Searle goes on to explain institutions as “systems of constitutive rules” (p.55). I 
agree with his analysis of these different types of facts but suggest that his definition 
of ‘institutional fact’ is merely a semantic exercise, as a fact which is institutionally 
related is imbued with a normative understanding of what that institution entails and 
the ‘constitutive rules’ which it embodies.  
 
I propose therefore that Searle’s account of ‘institutional fact’ supports the contention 
that facts are imbued with normative meaning and are not wholly factual. However, 
the concept of ‘institutional fact’ does have significance in light of the argument 
presented in this paper. I propose that the Searle’s concept of ‘constitutive rules’ holds 
significance for the third dimension of the initial argument; that a relational view of 
autonomy requires that one act on the basis of certain facts, albeit, normatively 
constructed facts, that she is exposed to. As an example, the fact that a nurse’s 
dependants will be disadvantaged if she loses her job may impact on her decision to 
bring to light abuses within the organisation in which she works. An institutional fact 
within society suggests that whistleblowers are often treated poorly in the work 
situation. Being a relational autonomous agent means that the ‘constitutive rules’ or 
‘institutional facts’ of the society we live in are central facts in deciding what we 
‘ought’ to do. This is consistent with Meyers’ (1989) and Aitkin’s (2006) view of 
relational autonomy.82  
 
 
                                                          
82 At the close of the PhD process, it became apparent that this conclusion is congruent with the 
findings of the research study.  
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3.1.4 Summarising the initial claim 
At this point I suggest that Hume’s absolutist position regarding the inability of factual 
statements to arrive at normative conclusions is questionable for three principal 
reasons. (a)The factual statements which are deemed problematic in supporting 
evaluative conclusions are not entirely factual. There is an interrelationship between 
fact and value with many facts containing some degree of normativity. (b) The degree 
to which a relationship exists between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ depends on our understanding 
of the nature of this relationship. We may see legitimate patterns of inference between 
factual statements and normative conclusions because of the sense of meaning we 
associate with those statements. Finally, (c) an understanding of the relational 
autonomous agent means that one considers the socially relevant facts of the situation 
one is in to determine what one ought to do.  
 
3.2 The importance of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in moral decision-making 
Here I present the second claim of the argument against the absoluteness of the ‘is-
ought’ distinction. I suggest that accepting the distinction in all cases is to lose sight 
of the reflective nature of moral decision-making. In the discussion of Murdoch’s 
position above I refer to the fact that while she acknowledges the ‘hidden premise’ 
often present in inferring an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, Murdoch sees the suppressed premise 
as an important feature of the internal reflective processes of moral rationality, as 
opposed to evidence of a logical gap between fact and value. In accordance with 
Murdoch’s perspective the hidden premise is associated with the sense of personal 
responsibility inherent within ethical decision making. This reflects a wider theme in 
Murdoch’s philosophy that “thinking is always an activity of ours as moral beings” 
(1996, p.82). In Metaphysics as Guide to Morals (1992 p. 25) Murdoch refers to the 
“misleading” separation of fact and value which overtime has led to “a diminished, 
even perfunctory account of morality”. This account, fails to incorporate the evaluative 
nature of human existence.  
 
Murdoch’s position regarding the ‘hidden’ premise as non-problematic, but rather an 
important facet of moral decision making, is also consistent with the perspective 
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espoused by others. Diamond (1996) refers to Cavell’s account of moral rationality in 
The Claims of Reason. For Cavell a central feature of moral rationality is the individual 
arriving at a sense of understanding about what she is doing and the responsibilities 
associated with that action. Putnam’s perspective is quite similar. Putnam (2004, p.44) 
argues that the ‘fact-value’ dichotomy, implicit within the ‘is-ought’ dichotomy, 
represents a “thought-stopper” which removes the process of rationality from ethical-
decision making. Putnam suggests that it may be easier to accept the dichotomy 
between fact and value than accept the responsibility associated with rational thought:  
 
For one thing, it is much easier to say, “that’s a value judgement” 
meaning, “that’s just a matter of subjective preference”, than to do what 
Socrates tried to teach us: to examine who we are and what our deepest 
convictions are and hold those convictions up to the searching test of 
reflective examination. (Putnam 2004 p.44) 
 
It appears therefore that in accepting the ‘is-ought’ problem as absolute we not only 
ignore the interrelated nature of fact and value outlined above, but promote a form of 
ethical-decision making devoid of personal reflection and responsibility. I argue that 
this is problematic in any ethical decision-making process, but particularly within a 
healthcare context where personal responsibility and accountability are key 
characteristics required of the moral agent.  
 
4.0 Conclusion: Towards a non-polarised meta-ethical perspective 
In conclusion, in accordance with the arguments outlined above, I reject the ‘is-ought’ 
problem as absolute. Furthermore, I suggest that it is problematic to subscribe to such 
a dichotomy as do so is to ignore the processes of reflection, rationality and 
accountability associated with individual moral choice. I agree with Putnam’s 
perspective that in polarising fact and value harmless distinctions have been “elevated 
to absolute dichotomies” (p. 2). I propose that moral decision-making is a more 
eclectic process and therefore propose a correspondingly more eclectic meta-ethical 
perspective, which allows us to “remain at the level of the difference” as Murdoch 
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suggests (1956 p. 57). Stewart (2009) provides a useful means forward here which he 
refers to as ‘neo-naturalism’ or ‘contemporary naturalism’.  
 
Stewart’s neo-naturalism (2009) is supported by his rejection of Moore’s ‘open-
question technique’ and other arguments, similar to those outlined above, which refute 
the absoluteness of the ‘is-ought’ problem. Stewart’s proposes that the open question 
technique merely suggests that moral terms such as ‘good’ do not mean pleasure but 
not that goodness cannot be pleasure or another naturally occurring property. Stewart 
maintains that in attacking the ‘open-question’ argument there is an opportunity to 
revisit naturalism in contemporary meta-ethics. I suggest that ‘neo-naturalism’ is 
consistent with Murdoch’s ‘kind of distinction’ between fact and value and Putnam’s 
call for a less dichotomous approach. It supports the perspective of contemporary 
bioethicists who argue that empirical work can contribute to decisions about want we 
‘ought’ to do (Borry et al. 2004, Holm and Irving 2004, Salloch et al 2012) ethical-
decision making.  
 
In summation, Hume’s ‘is-ought’ problem does not preclude empirical bioethics 
research. An understanding of a neo-naturalist meta-ethical perspective provides the 
foundation for an empirical bioethics, which recognises the value of the normative and 
the factual. It is possible through an integrated process of enquiry to utilise facts gained 
through empirical research to inform decisions about what one ought to do. Recent 
methodological developments in bioethics research provide a tangible means to utilise 
the findings of empirical enquiry in this way (Borry et al. 2004, McMillan and Hope 
2008, Salloch et. al.2012, Rehmann-Sutter et al.2012). 
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Appendix F: Patient interview guide 
 
Final version November 2011 
 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL QUESTION 
1. What is it like to self-test your blood glucose levels? 
 
Essentially I am interested in finding out what it is like is for you to self-
test your blood glucose levels.  
Could you just start off telling me about self-testing in your life as a 
diabetic? 
 
Probing questions as the participants begin to relate particular lived experiences? 
a. In what way? 
b. Why? 
c. How? 
d. Can you tell me more about that? 
e. Can you give me an example? 
f. Can you tell me about a specific time that happened? 
g. What did it feel like? 
 
Additional Questions as required: 
 Can you tell me about a specific time you self-tested your blood glucose levels 
and what it felt like 
 Can you remember the first time you self-tested your blood glucose levels? 
How were you introduced to it?83 
 Do you like self-testing? Why? 
o Are there aspects of self-testing that you particularly like? 
o Are there aspects of self-testing that you particularly dislike? 
 Does self-testing impact on your daily life?  
 Does self-testing impact on your interaction with your friends and family? 
 How do you see self-testing fit with your overall diabetes management? 
 Is there anything about the self-testing process you would change? What might 
make it easier for you? 
  
Following initial interviews – questions to deepen understanding of phenomenon: 
 What do you do with the results from self-testing – can you tell me something 
about that? 
 If the hospital decided to stop self-testing and asked patients to attend more 
often for hospital-based blood testing, how would you feel about that? 
  
                                                          
83 Questions in italics represent those developed post interaction with the team at Twente University 
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Appendix G: Healthcare professional interview guide 
 
August 2012 
1. Is there a specific protocol or policy with regard to self-testing among the 
diabetic population? Could you give me some details about this? 
Additional cues as required? 
a. Are particular National/International guidelines followed? 
b. Does the protocol suggest that particular patients are introduced to, or 
excluded from, self-testing (type 1 v type 2, other clinical criteria)? 
c. Does the protocol outline a specific education programme? 
d. Is there specific criteria regarding how often patients test? 
e. Are there any insulin dose-adjusting programmes for type 1 patients 
based on self-testing results?  
f. Once a patient commences self-testing is there a review of the 
process?  
g. Are protocols shared with local GP’s? 
2. What do you believe to be the benefits of self-testing for diabetic patients? 
3. What do you believe to be the disadvantages of self-testing for diabetic 
patients? 
4. Do you think the process could be harmful to some patients in any way in 
terms of their overall wellbeing – any negative consequences? 
5. Do you think self-testing suits some patients more than others and why? 
6. Is there a diabetic nurse relationship with all patients who attend the medical 
out-patient clinics? 
a. Does the self-testing regieme ever differ for those patients who attend 
the diabetic nurse clinic versus those who attend the medical 
outpatients alone? 
7. Are oral hypoglycaemics always the first treatment of choice for type 2 
diabetics once medication is required?  
8. Are patients asked to collate the results of self-testing for clinic visits?  
a. What format is this data in? 
b. What do you do with this data? 
c. Do you value HbA1c Results to a greater extent? 
9. Does self-testing assist in the more economic management of the diabetic 
population? 
10. Do patients use self-testing as a means to take more control over their illness? 
How important do you think this is? 
11. Do you think self-testing impacts on the patient and nurse/doctor 
relationship? 
12. Does patient involvement in their care ever pose a challenge for you as their 
healthcare professional? 
13. In general do you think further technological developments in self-testing, 
and subsequent possible increase in patient autonomy is a useful 
development? 
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Appendix H: Scientific community participants focus group guide 
and post evaluation 
 
November 2012 
1. The opening line in BDI’S online video refers to its role in ‘Transforming 
healthcare through innovation in diagnostics’  
What does this ‘transformation’ in healthcare mean to you?  
Probes  
Does this encompass the vision or ethos of BDI or would you add something else? 
Is this something you have talked about as a group previously? 
 
2. To what extent does BDI involve stakeholders in the development of devices? 
Who do you see as key stakeholders?  
Probes 
Is the patient an important stakeholder at the development stage? Why? 
What do you think is important to a patient about the specifications of a point-of-
care or self-testing device? 
Do you think male/female patients differ in this regard? 
 
3. BDI Online – Institute Overview, Feb 2010 – States ; 
Patients will also be empowered to take control over the management of their own 
health, improving the quality of their lives, reducing hospital stays and saving lives. 
These devices are targeted at Point of Care applications: these include near-patient 
testing, self-testing in the home… 
There now appears to be more a focus on point-of-care devices at clinical sites (GP 
offices/Hospitals) Two things I would like you to consider - Has this vision 
deliberately changed? Why?  
 
4. Do the current point-of-care devices under development (or core capabilities 
within BDI) have the potential to become self-testing devices – either as a 
diagnostic or chronic monitoring device?  
Probes/Background Information  
Current devices under development - Meningitis/Breast cancer/DVT/HIV  
Core capabilities - Nano sensors/ antibody applications/integrated 
platforms/microfluidics 
Do you think the devices currently under development in BDI have the potential to 
empower patients or maximise autonomy? 
Is this something you associate with self-testing devices? 
5. What do you believe to be the advantages/disadvantages of self-testing for 
patients?  
Probes 
What about chronic monitoring among patients with a chronic illness? 
Do you think the process could be harmful to some patients in any way in terms of 
their overall wellbeing – any negative consequences? 
Vignettes – What are your thoughts on having an insight into this patient’s story? 
(May not be permissible to use all) 
Questions are sequenced to gradually build a patient focus but allow participants to 
introduce this initially without prompting. Not all probes may be used. 
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VIGNETTES 
 
Bart 
I find it [the self-testing] of great benefit. I asked one of the nurses one day 
and she really gave me great insight into it and how it worked out and how 
many units of insulin per your body mass and one thing and another. Like if I 
want to knock 2-3 points off my reading, well 1 unit of insulin should do that 
for me. After she explained about it I just feel so much more comfortable. It 
leaves me eat whatever I like. It’s much more convenient. I’d be very 
disappointed if I had to come in here to have my bloods checked. It would 
mean disruption of my day. 
 
Ann 
It’s the one thing that keeps me on the straight and narrow. It’s a great 
incentive. I mean because you know when you test your blood and the 
reading is not right then you start taking action either maybe not eating as 
much or cutting out something, or making sure it comes down to a correct 
reading. It’s the one thing that really keeps me really on the road, the testing. 
I would say that for definite. 
 
Con 
Well, when I get up it’s the first thing in the drawer that’s looking at me, my 
self-testing kit. I don’t really understand. They tell me the lower my blood 
sugar level is the better. I don’t really know I’m only going by what the nurse 
say. I just can’t my head round this thing that I have it. There are certain 
times I look at the tester kit and I say well, you know if only I hadn’t got it, 
which would be one less thing. Since I had this diabetes it’s taken over. Self-
testing, appointments with Doctor x, appointments with the nurse. I thought I 
was finished all that with the cancer and now it’s back again... I’m being 
reminded every day – I have to test 
 
Alex 
My feelings about the readings, particularly in the last twelve months would 
be frustration. I have Type 2. It’s very clear it has deteriorated in the last 2 
years but particularly in the last year. So when I am looking at it and I take a 
reading and I see it’s a 16 as it was this morning, I know damn well that’s not 
where it should be. It should be better than that. And I have this sense all the 
time that it’s not going to improve so there’s a sense of frustration. So the 
self-testing, all it is an opportunity at this stage to frustrate myself even more 
because I know damn well they are never going to be where they should be. 
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EVALUATION FORM - FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for your participation in the focus group yesterday afternoon and 
contributing so openly to discussion.  
 
As a follow up I would appreciate your honest feedback on two questions which 
essentially ask you to evaluate the exercise. I am hoping to capture some of the 
comments made following completion of the focus group. Please note that any 
feedback may be considered as official data within the study and incorporated within 
the study findings. Any comments will be annonymised and protected in accordance 
with other data as explained in the consent form. Please also note that you are free to 
make no comment at all and thank you for your assistance to date. 
 
 
 
Two questions are as follows:  
 
1. How would you summarise your experience of participating in the focus 
group as a member of a scientific community? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Do you think the BDI community would benefit from further discussion on 
the end-user application of biomedical devices and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
326 
 
 
Appendix I:  Analysis worked example -  From data to thematic 
understanding 
This appendix shows how raw data concluded as a sub-theme ‘Knowing the body’ in 
accordance with Crist and Tanner’s (2003) phases of interpretive analysis as adapted 
within this study. Relevant journal references are summarised and interwoven, as it is 
impossible to separate analysis in interpretive research from the thinking processes 
employed (Smythe et al. 2005).  
 
Phase 1: Early Focus and Lines of Enquiry 
Transcripts of initial narratives were reviewed. Initial lines of enquiry were identified 
at this point and explored within the supervision process. 
November 2011 
‘Awareness’ was noted in Deirdre’s transcript when looking at the role of the device 
for participants in initial narratives (‘keeps me aware’). I also noted corporeal 
considerations in Bart’s transcript (‘I can feel it in my body’) but did not link 
knowledge of blood glucose levels with ‘knowing the body’ at this point. 
 
January/February 2011 
Interpretive writing began at this point. I developed these ideas and worked on an early 
line of enquiry: Instrumentality of the device. This early analysis linked with 
Heidegger’s Question concerning Technology and the concept of the device ‘as’. I 
explored how the device assisted Deirdre and how it motivated her and facilitated 
management of her diabetes.  
 
Phase 2: Central Concerns, Exemplars and Paradigm cases: In this phase central 
concerns, themes or meanings emerging from individual participants were identified 
and interpretive writing continued. 
June/July 2012 
I worked on each individual transcript with an interpretive analysis guide developed 
post Indianapolis phenomenological workshop. I re-listened to all interviews at this 
point. Frances’s story revealed a lot about knowing the body (Frances refers to 
understanding her body). ‘Seeing meaning’ came about with help of reading 
existential accounts of health and illness. Willems article on peak flow monitoring, 
and Foucault and Technologies of the Self, was very significant in promoting 
understanding. Firstly referred to ‘Knowing the body’ here when interpreting Frances’s 
story. Earlier written interpretations re the ‘Instrumentality of the device’ and the 
‘Autonomy continuum’ were also considered while engaging in detailed reflection on 
each transcript. The role of the device for participants impacted on how autonomous 
they appeared. However, though in some way related, ‘Knowing the body’ was noted 
as a distinct ‘understanding’. 
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Phase 3/3a: Shared Meanings/Shared Meanings in context   
As individual meanings became clearer, shared meanings were then sought. An 
interpretive summary was drafted at this point to identify links between meanings 
identified within and across participants’ narratives. Initial drafts were re-written and 
phenomenological reflection continued. As this phase continued, I also explored and 
incorporated the perspectives of other stakeholders to illuminate the patient context.  
 
Nov / Dec / Jan / February 2012 
I sat with; all patient data, individual interpretive summaries, using the 4 existentialist 
categories as overarching themes (this later proved unwieldy as analysis continued and 
the thematic headings were altered). I drew out a heuristic device on a large sheet of 
paper to ‘plot’ all shared understandings in a structured way. I discussed this with work 
colleagues, supervisors and others outside the formal supervision process, to elaborate 
the understanding of ‘Knowing the body’, as a sub-theme of ‘Corporeal 
understandings of autonomy and self-testing in chronic illness’, Frances’s story linked 
with Betty, Deirdre and Bart. Bart’s earlier words regarding his experience of his body, 
and Deirdre’s comments re ‘awareness’ were more salient in light of Frances’s story. 
As per the research protocol, patient interviews were analysed in association with 
healthcare professional (HCPs) interviews and the scientific community participants 
(SCPs) focus group. These stakeholder interviews were analysed seeking salience in 
terms of the shared meanings emerging from patient participants. Notes on analysis of 
transcripts from both stakeholder groups note links with ‘Knowing the body’. At this 
point an interpretive summary was produced which included ‘Knowing the body 
through self-testing’ (its original title) as a separate sub-theme. The perspectives of the 
HCPs and SCPs community were interwoven with the patient stories, and relevant 
literature/philosophy, to aid understanding. Related understandings, as noted above, 
concerning the ‘Instrumentality of the device’ and ‘Autonomy continuum’ were 
incorporated within developing sub-themes. [Analysis journal extracts from this 
period detail how I revisited early lines of enquiry and constructed/ altered sub-themes 
through an iterative process of reflecting, reading, writing and listening. The initial 
intention to group themes in accordance with the existential themes (relationality, 
corporeality, spatiality, and temporality) was altered to allow a more seamless account 
of patient experience. Also Heidegger’s concept of ‘technology as revealing’ was 
developed during this time to explain how exploring the patient’s use of the device 
revealed wider understandings related to the experience of chronic illness]. 
 
Phase 4: Final Interpretations: In-depth interpretations of central concerns and 
summaries were produced. Phenomenological reflection and writing continued 
resulting in numerous drafts in association with the supervision process.  
 
Phase 5: Dissemination of the Interpretation: Final reports were refined and the thesis 
was written in its current format. 
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Appendix J: Interpretive guide to support analysis 
 
My interpretive questions for analysis: 
Initially – Telling the story 
1. What is salient here?  
2. What makes it salient? Are there other ways I could think about this data? 
3. What is being revealed about the experience of self-testing? 
4. What exemplars or specific stories from the patient’s account best represent 
the patient’s experience 
5. What is this patient’s experience of ‘being-in-the world’ as a diabetic who 
self-tests? 
6. Are there any understandings that can be developed from listening to the 
participant’s story again? 
7. What does the ‘I’ listening guide reveal to assist in keeping close to the 
patient experience? 
 
Moving to interpretation . . . 
8. How do I interpret this experience? 
9. What understandings are emerging? 
 
Further interpretation - Heideggerian and other philosophical concerns. . . 
10. This story reveals the self-testing device ‘as’ what in this patients engagement 
with the device? 
11. Are there references to existential modes of being – temporality, relationality, 
corporeality, spatiality?  
12. What philosophical literature and other texts can inform my interpretation? 
13. Are there insights from others within an interpretive team? 
14. What fore-structures have informed my interpretation? 
15. What shared meanings are emerging from analysis of other interviews? 
16. What does this participant express regarding the idea of an Autonomy 
Continuum as revealed by the self-testing device? (Idea put forward during 
early lines of enquiry)  
 
Link to interviews with other stakeholders to illuminate context and temporality 
17. What does this story suggest I ask healthcare professionals? 
18. What does this story suggest I ask designers? 
 
 
Developed from work of Crowther and Smythe as discussed at the Indianapolis Institute for 
Heideggerian Methodologies (2012) and the model of interpretive analysis outlined by Crist 
and Tanner (2003) 
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Appendix K: Knowledge building - Knowledge dissemination 
 
Publications 
Greaney A.M., O’Mathuna D. & Scott P.A. (2012) Patient autonomy and choice in 
healthcare: Self-testing devices as a case in point. Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy, 15(4):383-95. 
 
Conference Presentations 
Greaney A.M. (2013) ‘Being-with’ interpretive research: The analysis process in 
Heideggerian Phenomenology. Paper presented at Royal College of Nursing 
Research Conference, Belfast. 
 
Greaney A.M. (2012) What is it with nurses and Heidegger? Paper presented at 
Hastings Bioethics Centre, Garrison, New York. 
 
Greaney A.M. (2012) To the things themselves! Heideggerian Phenomenology as 
a tool to explore patients’ experiences of self-testing technology. Paper presented 
at RCSI Annual Nursing Research Conference, Royal College of Surgeons. 
 
Greaney A.M (2012) Patient Autonomy within the self-testing process: Conceptual 
and Contextual Perspectives. Paper presented at Dublin Graduate Philosophy 
Conference, Trinity College. 
 
Greaney A.M. (2011) From Hume to Harris: Revisiting the ‘is-ought’ debate three 
hundred years post Hume’s birth. Paper presented at 15th International Philosophy 
of Nursing Conference, Leeds. 
Greaney A.M. (2010) Reflections on diagnostic self-testing and patient autonomy. 
Paper presented at 14th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference, 
Vancouver, Canada. 
 
DCU Graduate Training Elements 
Philosophy of Social Science Module 2011/2012 (5 GTE credits) 
School of Nursing Qualitative Research Summer School 2011 (5 GTE credits) 
School of Nursing Qualitative Research Summer School 2010  
Summer Schools / Visiting Studentships84 
Institute for Heideggerian Hermeneutical Methodologies Summer School, 
University of Indiana, June 2012 
Visiting Scholar at Hastings Centre for Bioethics, New York, June/July 2012 
Vising Student at Centre for Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences 
University of Twente, February 2010  
                                                          
84 Shorter seminars/conferences not included here 
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Appendix L: Ethical approval letter from Dublin City University 
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Appendix M: Invitation letter, plain language statement and 
informed consent for patients 
 
September 2011 
 
Re: Invitation to participate in a research study85 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am involved in research towards a PhD at Dublin City University.  As part of this 
study I am undertaking a research project. The title of this component of the research 
is: 
 
An ethical assessment of self-testing technology: The patient’s experience, and 
healthcare professionals’ views of the self-testing process 
 
The particular piece of my research which I am asking you to participate in involves 
interviewing patients about their experiences of self-testing their blood sugar levels. 
Your participation would involve being interviewed by me about what you like and 
dislike about self-testing. The interview would last for no more than 1 hour and will 
be recorded so I can review what you say. After going back over all the interviews, I 
may ask some people to return for a second interview. A detailed account of the study 
is attached which includes any benefits and risks to which you may be exposed if you 
decide to participate. The study has received approval from the Clinical Research 
Ethics Committee of _____________________ 
 
I invite you to read the attached information and participate in the study if you so wish. 
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw from the 
study at any time. Should you decide to participate, or wish to find out more 
information, my contact details are included on the information sheet and above. If 
you decide not to participate this will in no way impact on your treatment in the 
hospital. 
 
Whatever you decide, the research team wishes you well and thank you for taking the 
time to read this material. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
_______________________________ 
Anna-Marie Greaney (co-investigator) 
 
                                                          
85 Any identifying or personal details have been omitted from ethics documentation within 
appendices 
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR PATIENT PARTICIPANTS 
 
Title of research: An ethical assessment of self-testing technology: The patient’s 
experience, and healthcare professionals’ views of the self-testing process 
 
In order to decide whether or not you want to be a part of this research study, you 
should understand enough about its risks and benefits to make an informed judgment. 
This process is known as informed consent. This letter gives detailed information 
about the research study. If you are interested in participating please contact the 
researcher at the details below who will meet with you to answer any questions you 
may have. Once you understand the study, you will be asked to sign a consent form if 
you wish to participate. 
 
NATURE AND DURATION OF PROCEDURE(S): 
 
What is this research study about?  
This study is interested in finding out what it is like for patients to self-test their blood 
glucose levels. This will provide information about the use of self-testing devices and 
the effects of self-testing on patients. Participation in the study is not required as part 
of your diabetes treatment. The research is funded by Science Foundation Ireland.  
 
Why is it important? 
There are a growing number of self-testing kits available for sale in the community. 
These testing kits allow individuals to test for a variety of diseases without the 
involvement of healthcare professionals. Similarly, more patients with long-term 
illnesses are now in a position to monitor their own condition at home due to the 
development of self-testing devices. Previous research has indicated that some patients 
prefer not to take a lead role in the management of their health. This appears to go 
against the emphasis on patients taking greater control of their health, which self-
testing technology encourages. The Department of Health and Children recognises that 
we need to assess the usefulness of new technologies in healthcare. This study can 
provide some of that information.  
 
How will the study be carried out? 
This particular part of the study will involve interviews with diabetes patients to 
explore their personal experiences of self-testing. The wider study will investigate the 
views of different people involved in the self-testing process. This includes nurses, 
doctors and those who develop self-testing tools.  
 
What will be required of me if I agree to participate? 
You will be asked to attend for interview to talk about your experiences of self-testing 
your blood sugar levels. You will be asked about the things you like and don’t like 
about self-testing and how you manage self-testing in the context of your daily living. 
The interview will take no longer than 1 hour and will be arranged for a time and place 
that is convenient for you. Interviews will be recorded so that the researcher will have 
access to your responses after the interview. You may be invited to attend for a second 
interview to discuss further particular issues of interest raised in the initial interview. 
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You may decide to end your participation in the study at any time. This is entirely your 
decision and will not impact on your treatment in the hospital in any way. 
 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND BENEFITS: 
 
Benefits: The research will have no direct therapeutic benefits to you at this time other 
than an opportunity to discuss your experiences of self-testing. Any queries about your 
diabetes should be directed towards the nursing and/or medical staff. The researcher 
can assist you in this regard if required. However, the information which you provide 
will enable the researcher to add to the knowledge currently available regarding what 
it is like for patients to be involved in self-testing. This information has the potential 
to impact on future decisions regarding patients’ participation in their care and the use 
of self-testing in diabetic, and possibly other, patients.  
 
Risks: The study does not require you to receive any experimental treatment and 
therefore involves minimal risks only. You may have concerns regarding the 
information you share with the researcher and what happens to it. You may also 
become distressed during the interview if you are relating past experiences regarding 
your diabetes management which you find unsettling.  
 
 
Precautions to minimise risks: The researcher will ensure that, apart from exceptional 
circumstances, for example if you said something in the interview that suggested a 
potentially life-threatening situation, any information you share, including the tape 
recording, will remain confidential and that the final research report or any material 
published about the research will not identify you in any way. The researcher takes 
her responsibilities for your welfare very seriously. If you do become upset, the 
researcher will cease the interview if required and assist you in accessing any 
necessary support from the nursing and/or medical staff.  
 
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES: 
 
This study does not involve any form of treatment therefore there are no alternative 
treatment options to outline to you. It is totally your decision to decide to be involved. 
You can stop your involvement in the study at any point. 
 
 
 
WHO TO CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: 
Please contact the co-investigator, Anna-Marie Greaney at ____________ 
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Consent form for patient participants  
 
 
 
Title of research:  
An ethical assessment of self-testing technology: The patient’s experience, and 
healthcare professionals’ views of the self-testing process 
 
The research study the procedures associated with it, and any risks and benefits have 
been fully explained to me.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions concerning 
any and all aspects of the project and any procedures involved.  I am aware that 
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time.  I am aware 
that my decision not to participate or to withdraw will not restrict my access to health 
care services normally available to me, or impact on my relationship with the 
healthcare professionals at the hospital in any way.  Confidentiality of records 
concerning my involvement in this project will be maintained in an appropriate 
manner.   
 
I, the undersigned, hereby consent to participate as a subject in the above described 
project conducted at __________________.  I have received a copy of this consent 
form for my records.  I understand that if I have any questions concerning this research, 
I can contact the researcher listed below.  If I have further queries concerning my 
rights in connection with the research, I can contact the Clinical Research Ethics 
Committee of ______________________________ 
 
 
Signature of research participant: ____________________  
  
Signature of co-investigator: ________________________ 
  
  
Date: ___________ Time:   
 
 
 
Co-investigator, Anna-Marie Greaney is contactable at __________ for any 
additional queries regarding the study. 
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Appendix N: Invitation letter, plain language statement and 
informed consent for healthcare professionals 
 
Re: Invitation to participate in a research study 
 
September 2012 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am involved in research towards a PhD at Dublin City University. As part of this 
study I am undertaking a research project. The title of this component of the research 
is: 
 
An ethical assessment of self-testing technology: The patient’s experience, and 
healthcare professionals’ views of the self-testing process 
 
This is part of a wider study involving a theoretical and empirical analysis of patient 
autonomy within the self-testing process. You have been invited to participate because 
you engage with diabetic patients who self-test in a nursing or medical capacity.  The 
particular piece of the research which I am asking you to participate in involves 
interviewing you about your views of the self-testing process in diabetic patients. A 
more detailed account of the study is attached which includes any benefits and risks 
to which you may be exposed if you decide to participate. These are minimal. The 
study has received approval from the Clinical Research Ethics Committee of 
___________. The study is funded by Science Foundation Ireland. 
 
I invite you to read the attached information and participate in the study if you so wish. 
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw from the 
study at any time. Should you decide to participate, or wish find out more information, 
my contact details are included on the information sheet and above.  
 
Whatever you decide, the research team wishes you well and thank you for taking the 
time to read this material. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
_______________________________ 
Anna-Marie Greaney (co-investigator) 
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Information sheet for healthcare professional participants 
 
Title of research: An ethical assessment of self-testing technology: The patient’s 
experience and healthcare professionals’ views of the self-testing process 
 
In order to decide whether or not you want to be a part of this research study, you 
should understand enough about its risks and benefits to make an informed judgment. 
This detail is included below. If you are interested in participating please contact the 
researcher at the details listed who will meet with you to answer any questions you 
may have. Once you understand the study, you will be asked to sign a consent form if 
you wish to participate. 
 
NATURE AND DURATION OF PROCEDURES 
 
What is this research study about and what is involved?  
This particular study is part of a wider research project. The wider study seeks to 
undertake a theoretical and empirical analysis of patient autonomy within the self-
testing process, and will also involve interviews with the stakeholders who design self-
testing devices. Empirical enquiry in the context of this protocol will involve 
interviews with 10-12 diabetic patients who self-test, and approximately 8 healthcare 
professionals who interact with the patient group. The process and purpose of the 
interviews is quite different. The overall research design is Hermeneutic 
Phenomenological Enquiry (HPE). The patient interviews will be conducted in 
accordance with this methodology and involve mostly open-ended questioning in 
order to elicit their lived experience of self-testing. The interviews with healthcare 
professionals will occur after the patient interviews. The patient data will be used to 
formulate semi-structured interview questions for the healthcare professionals. In this 
sense the patient experience can be interpreted in light of the data obtained from 
healthcare professionals. The context of the patient experience is essential to a 
hermeneutic understanding and the healthcare professional’s views can help 
illuminate this context.  
 
Why is it important? 
There are a growing number of self-testing kits available for sale in the community. 
These testing kits allow individuals to test for a variety of diseases without the 
involvement of healthcare professionals. Similarly, patients with long-term illnesses 
are now in a position to monitor their own condition at home due to the development 
of self-testing devices. Previous research has indicated that some patients prefer not 
to take a lead role in the management of their health, and value the support and advice 
which healthcare professionals can provide. This appears to go against the emphasis 
on patients taking greater control of their health, which underlies developments in self-
testing technology. Self-testing kits are one example of how technology impacts on 
the way healthcare is managed. The Department of Health and Children recognises 
that we need to assess developing technology to determine its appropriateness for use 
in healthcare delivery. This study aims to provide this type of information. In addition, 
the evidence regarding the benefits of self-testing among the diabetic population, 
337 
 
 
particularly those with type 2 diabetes, is inconclusive. This study can provide some 
qualitative data to contribute to this debate.  
 
What will be required of me if I agree to participate? 
You will be asked to attend for one interview to talk about your views of the self-
testing process in diabetic patients. The interview will take no longer than 30 minutes 
and will be arranged for a time and place that is convenient for you. Interviews will 
be recorded so that the researcher will have access to your responses after the 
interview. You may decide to end your participation in the study at any time.  
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND BENEFITS: 
 
Benefits: The research will have no direct benefit to you at this time other than an 
opportunity to discuss your views. However, the information which you provide will 
enable the researcher to engage in a richer analysis of patient data, and therefore, add 
to the knowledge currently available regarding what it is like for patients to be engaged 
in self-testing. This information has the potential to impact on future decisions 
regarding patients’ participation in their care and the use of self-testing in diabetic, 
and possibly other, patients.  
 
Risks and precautions to minimise them: Essentially as sensitive data is not sought the 
researcher does not envisage any particular risks to you as a participant. You may have 
some concerns about confidentiality. However, the researcher assures you that, apart 
from exceptional circumstances, for example if you said something in the interview 
that suggested a potentially life-threatening situation, any information you share, 
including the tape recording, will remain confidential and that the final research report, 
or any material published about the research, will not identify you in any way. In 
addition, the research takes place at two sites which will assist in assuring the 
anonymity of participants in the final thesis and any future publications.  
 
 
 
WHO TO CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: 
Please contact the co-investigator, Anna-Marie Greaney at ________________ 
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Consent form for healthcare professional participants  
 
 
Title of research: An ethical assessment of self-testing technology: The patient’s 
experience and healthcare professionals’ views of the self-testing process 
 
The research study the procedures associated with it, and any risks and benefits have 
been fully explained to me.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions concerning 
any and all aspects of the project and any procedures involved.  I am aware that 
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time.    
Confidentiality of records concerning my involvement in this project will be 
maintained in an appropriate manner.   
 
I, the undersigned, hereby consent to participate as a subject in the above described 
project conducted at ______________.  I have received a copy of this consent form 
for my records.  I understand that if I have any questions concerning this research, I 
can contact the researcher listed below.  If I have further queries concerning my rights 
in connection with the research, I can contact the Clinical Research Ethics Committee 
of ___________________. 
 
 
Signature of research participant: _____________________ 
  
 
Signature of co-investigator: _________________________ 
  
  
Date: ___________ Time:   
 
 
 
Co-investigator, Anna-Marie Greaney is contactable at __________for any additional 
queries regarding the study. 
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Appendix O: Plain language statement and informed consent for 
scientific community (BDI) participants 
 
Plain Language Statement - Information for BDI Participants86 
 
In what context is this research being undertaken? 
This study is being undertaken as part of my PhD studies within the School of Nursing 
and Human Sciences at DCU. Dr. Dónal O’Mathúna is supervising the research. The 
research is partly funded by Science Foundation Ireland (in accordance with the 
Biomedical Diagnostics Institute at DCU) and the School of Nursing, DCU. The 
research has received ethical approval as a low risk project from the DCU ethics 
committee and gatekeeper approval from BDI director Professor Berndt.  
 
What is this research study about and what is involved?  
The study is titled: The ethical assessment of self-testing technology: A philosophical 
and contextual analysis of autonomy within the self-testing process 
The study involves a theoretical and empirical analysis of patient autonomy within the 
self-testing process. The theoretical component consists of a philosophical analysis of 
what it means to be autonomous, through a critical review of the philosophical 
literature regarding patient autonomy. Empirical enquiry involves in-depth interviews 
with diabetic patients who self-test. Additional interviews involve healthcare 
professionals who interact with the patient group. This final component of the project 
seeks to ascertain the perspective of those who are involved in the scientific 
development of potential self-testing technology within BDI. All phases of the 
research process will collectively contribute to creating an understanding of the 
meaning of autonomy within the self-testing process.  
 
What will be required of me if I agree to participate? 
You will be asked to attend for a focus group interview to talk about your views of 
self-testing in healthcare, and the impact that you envisage this technology can have 
on patient care and patient autonomy. No prior preparation is required on your 
part. The interview will take no longer than 50 minutes and will be arranged at a 
suitable location within the BDI environment. Interviews will be recorded so that the 
researcher will have access to your responses after the interview. Participation in the 
study is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. 
 
What potential benefits or risks exist? 
Benefits: The research will have no direct benefit to you at this time other than an 
opportunity to discuss your views. However, participating in this type of discussion 
may facilitate some reflection on the social and ethical dimensions of technological 
developments which you may not have the time to engage with in normal working 
practices. It is envisaged that the wider study will have potential benefits for patients 
through a more elaborate understanding of the realities of the self-testing process. 
 
                                                          
86 Invitation was via e-mail October 2012 to BDI community with assistance of gatekeeper 
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Risks and precautions to minimise them: Essentially as sensitive data is not sought the 
researcher does not envisage any particular risks to you as a participant. You may have 
some concerns about confidentiality. However, the researcher assures you that any 
information you share will be reported anonymously in any future publication. The 
final research report, or any material published about the research, will not identify 
you in any way. In addition, the specific job titles of any BDI members will not be 
listed in any outputs to prevent identification within a small community. The tape 
recording will be protected by the researcher in accordance with good research 
practice. As the data is collected via a focus group the researcher will stress the 
importance of confidentiality within the group participants prior to discussion. The 
researcher is aware of specific IP considerations with in the BDI community and 
has signed up to the necessary agreements.  
 
Who can I contact if I require additional information? 
Please feel free to contact the researcher Anna-Marie Greaney at:_________ 
 
 
If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent 
person, please contact the following: The Secretary, Dublin City University 
Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, 
Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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Informed Consent form for BDI participants 
 
 
Title of research: The ethical assessment of self-testing technology: A philosophical 
and contextual analysis of autonomy within the self-testing process 
 
Researcher: Anna-Marie Greaney, PhD Student School of Nursing, DCU 
Supervisor: Dr. Dónal O’ Mathúna, School of Nursing, DCU  
Ph: 01-7007308 E-Mail: donal.omathuna@dcu.ie  
 
I have read details of the research study, the procedures associated with it, and any 
risks and benefits in the form of a plain language statement. I have had the opportunity 
to ask questions concerning any and all aspects of the project and any procedures 
involved. Any queries have been appropriately addressed. I appreciate that the study 
seeks to examine patient autonomy in healthcare in the specific context of self-testing 
technology. I understand that participation involves attending for a focus group 
interview and that the interview will be taped. I am aware that participation is 
voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time. Confidentiality of records 
concerning my involvement in this project will be maintained in an appropriate 
manner in accordance with legal limitations.   
 
I, the undersigned, hereby consent to participate as a subject in the above described 
project. I have received a copy of this consent form for my records.  I understand that 
if I have any questions concerning this research, I can contact the researcher listed 
below.  If I have further queries concerning my rights in connection with the research 
and wish to contact an independent person I can contact The Secretary, Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, 
Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
 
 
Participants Signature:      
Name in Block Capitals:    _____ 
Witness:          
 
Date:              
 
 
Anna-Marie Greaney is contactable at  ________________for any additional 
queries regarding the study. 
 
 
 
 
